2018
Dozens of consequential decisions were made by U.S. authorities during and after the financial crisis of 2007-2009. It is important to understand how and why the elements of the rescue were designed the way they were. In an initiative led by Ben Bernanke, Tim Geithner and Hank Paulson, the Hutchins Center on Fiscal and Monetary Policy at Brookings and the Program on Financial Stability at the Yale School of Management are filling that gap by commissioning papers by individuals who were actively involved in designing the elements of the rescue. The primary objective is to answer the inevitable question that those who fight future financial crises will ask: Why and how did they do it the way they did in 2007-2009?
On September 11, 10 years after some of the worst moments of the crisis, some of the authors of the papers presented highlights of their findings in a full-day conference at Brookings. Preliminary versions of some of the papers will be available below as working papers. You can learn more about the project by visiting the Program on Financial Stability at the Yale School of Management.
Other available materials include:
- An 85-page book that illustrates the crisis in pictures. Download it here (PDF).
- 13 working papers available for download below.
- Video Ben Bernanke, Tim Geithner, and Hank Paulson in conversation with Andrew Ross Sorkin at Brookings.
Related Content
Day 1: AM Session
Day 1: PM Session
Day 1: Final Panel
Agenda
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September 11
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Welcome
Ben S. Bernanke Distinguished Senior Fellow - The Brookings Institution, Economic Studies @BenBernanke -
Overview
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Panel
In the early stages of the crisis, the Federal Reserve acted as a lender of last resort to stabilize the financial system, initially innovating its traditional practices and later invoking emergency authorities to expand lending to more counterparties and more collateral. What problems were they trying to fix? What were the key design decisions? What constraints did they face? How successful were these efforts?
DownloadsPresenter
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Panel
At the worst of the financial crisis, the solvency of major banking institutions came into serious question. The Treasury, the Federal Reserve, FDIC, and other regulators had to determine how to keep the financial system functioning. What approaches did they consider, and what approaches were considered and discarded? What were the key decision points in guaranteeing liabilities of the banking system, injecting capital, etc.? What worked well, and what didn’t?
Moderator
Presenter
DJDan Jester BDT & Company -
Panel
Questions about solvency extended beyond the banks to all sorts of financial firms, including securities firms and AIG. How did authorities decide that the failure of these financial firms would cause material damage to the functioning of the financial system and economy? What tools did they consider and what tools did they use to prevent investor runs and disruptive failures? How did they weigh the consequences of potential bankruptcy of the auto companies in a fragile economy?
Moderator
David Wessel Director - The Hutchins Center on Fiscal and Monetary Policy, Senior Fellow - Economic Studies @davidmwesselPanelist
SSSteve Shafran AMRI Financial -
Panel
Housing was at the root of the financial crisis. The unwinding of the house price bubble, record-high mortgage debt, and low risk premiums on mortgage securities had a massive depressive effect on the financial system and economy. What was done to support homeowners and the mortgage market? What was considered and rejected? Which tools proved most effective? How was the decision to put Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac into conservatorship made?
Panelist
DJDan Jester BDT & CompanyAndreas Lehnert Director - Federal Reserve Board -
Panel
Monetary and fiscal policies, both in the United States and abroad, were used aggressively to offset the contractionary effects on the macro economy of the severe stresses in financial and credit markets. How did policymakers calibrate these efforts? How did U.S. policymakers coordinate with foreign counterparts? How well were these efforts communicated? What were the constraints? How well did all this work?
Moderator
Presenter
Jason Furman Aetna Professor of the Practice of Economic Policy - Harvard University, Nonresident Senior Fellow - Peterson Institute for International Economics, Former Brookings Expert @jasonfurman -
Panel
Policies became more aggressive as the crisis intensified, starting with the provision of liquidity, to resolution, guarantees, and capital when solvency was in question. After ten years, what is the empirical evidence on the effects of the policies? What are the major criticisms and shortcomings? What lessons can we draw from the papers commissioned for this project that may prove useful for future crisis fighters?
Presenter
MMMeg McConnell Federal Reserve Bank of New YorkPanelist
MDMichele Davis Global Head of Corporate Affairs - Morgan StanleyWilliam B. English Eugene F. Williams, Jr. Professor of the Practice - Yale School of Management -
Closing Remarks
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