Turkey’s post-American hesitation

The post-American world came to the Middle East in the form of a U.S. and Israeli war in Iran. For Turkey’s decisionmakers in Ankara, who had hoped that a friendly Trump administration would gradually disengage from the Middle East, laying the foundations of Turkey’s ultimate strategic autonomy and regional dominance, this was a shock. It was also a reminder that U.S. President Donald Trump does not operate with any specific policy direction or ideology, and that the U.S.-led order could easily be replaced by a U.S.-led disorder.

The war in Iran has left Ankara with the worst of both worlds: an angry and entrenched Iranian regime, whose military capacity remains largely intact, and an assertive Israel more emboldened in its ability to reorder the region through force.

The Iran war was no doubt a strategic miscalculation for the United States and might in the long run cost Washington its role as the region’s superpower. But the real lesson for Turkey’s policymakers should be that, as Washington reimagines its role in the world, its flip-flops could be just as dangerous as the era of American hegemony. The post-American world Ankara once imagined as a space of greater freedom suddenly looks less forgiving.

Turkey had long been preparing itself for a post-American future, with its President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan having convinced the public that it could pursue its own independent destiny. Yet the Iran war has forced Turkish decisionmakers to confront the awkward reality that the United States is still indispensable, and that Turkey is not yet ready to go it alone.

This leaves Turkey with the same dilemma facing many middle powers today: How does a country shield itself from turmoil in U.S. foreign policy without abandoning the benefits of partnership with Washington?

On a personal level, Erdoğan has hugely benefited from Trump’s tenure due to the U.S. president’s indifference to Turkey’s democratic backsliding, thereby creating more space for Turkey’s strongman to clobber the opposition and eliminate domestic rivals. But externally, a world in which Washington lurches from retrenchment to random intervention, only to abandon its goals when it feels stuck, will not be easy to navigate. The fragmentation of the U.S.-led order may give Turkey more room to maneuver regionally, but it will also expose its weaknesses and usher in a harsher regional environment with fewer rules and guarantees. That means greater risk of miscalculation.

Background: From a loyal NATO ally to a regional power

For decades, Turkey had a well-defined role in the U.S.-led order: a key member of NATO’s eastern flank and, despite its democratic shortcomings, part of the transatlantic West. The bargain was imperfect but stable. Ankara remained anchored in the Western security architecture, while it sought to expand its regional influence.

That bargain no longer holds.

Even before Trump’s return, an uncontrolled decoupling between Turkey and the West was already underway. As Turkey grew more confident and regionally stronger, relations with Washington took a downward turn, defined by one crisis after another—Syria, the Kurdish question, democratic backsliding, and Turkey’s purchase of Russian S-400 air defense systems—pushing the two longtime allies to the breaking point. Europe, meanwhile, settled for a strategically unimaginative cold peace with Ankara, built largely around controlling migration, rather than a serious debate about Turkey’s place in Europe’s future. Without U.S. leadership, Europe has struggled to think geopolitically about Turkey except as a permanent outsider.

What makes the current moment more dangerous for Ankara is that U.S. volatility is now unfolding alongside a wider fragmentation of the West. NATO remains essential for Turkey’s security, but its future feels uncertain. (Four Iranian missiles heading toward Turkey during the conflict were intercepted by NATO systems—a reminder of the alliance’s value.) The liberal order that once offered Ankara a framework for belonging has frayed, while the transactional order replacing it offers few guarantees. Europe remains unwilling to enter a strategic partnership with Turkey as long as Erdoğan’s domestic backsliding continues—and it is not clear that its doors will open even after Erdoğan.

The Iran war arrived upon this background. Erdoğan had hoped that Trump would offer an opportunity for a reset with Washington and a conduit for a pragmatic Turkish tilt back toward NATO. But beyond personal flattery and a U.S. withdrawal from parts of Syria, there is little to show for it in bilateral ties. The Trump-Erdoğan channel has not resolved thorny issues, such as Turkey’s desire to purchase F-35 jets, or produced a more stable regional environment. Instead, Trump’s decision to go to war after a string of crises over tariffs, Venezuela, and Greenland has reminded Ankara that erratic American decisionmaking can have direct and destabilizing consequences for Turkey.

This leaves Turkey in a geopolitical dilemma. It must get along with Washington, preserve its place in NATO, and also grow self-sufficient enough to protect itself from the turbulence of American politics all at once. It has few alternatives. Under Erdoğan, Turkey is unlikely to revive the democratic reform agenda that might appeal to the European Union. But with or without reforms, Ankara will still find it hard to navigate a fragmented Western order.

Turkey’s response to the current disorder will not be a break with the West. Nor will it be a full embrace of Russia, Iran, or China—which offer no geopolitical rewards. Rather, Ankara is likely to do what everyone else is trying to do: get along with Trump while hedging and diversifying. Whether under Erdoğan or a post-Erdoğan leadership, Turkey will continue its quest for greater strategic autonomy and deepen its role in its neighborhood. It will also try to improve relations with Europeans and build small coalitions in its vicinity to hedge against further disruptions.

But a world without Washington’s steady hand is tricky. Europe is more than likely to rebuff Ankara’s recent efforts to anchor itself in the continent’s future security architecture. Without American mediation, Turkey’s intense rivalry with Israel could spill across Syria, the eastern Mediterranean, and beyond—creating a dangerous dynamic or even confrontation. And in an era of intensified geo-economic competition, Ankara may find that its regional ambitions outstrip its capabilities, leaving Turkey dependent on outside powers for artificial intelligence, technology, investment, and high-end defense production.

While the U.S. tolerance for democratic backsliding looks like a good deal to Turkey’s current leadership, it also means a continuation of Turkey’s governance challenges and polarization—raising questions about a stable transition of power in a post-Erdoğan future.

Building a zone of stability

To survive bad times, Turkey should pursue a set of diplomatic and economic openings to build an “island of stability” around itself—from the South Caucasus and the Black Sea to Iraq, Syria, and the eastern Mediterranean. Its geography, scale, and economic dynamism already give it the heft and capabilities to do this.

This requires Ankara to take bolder steps toward diplomacy and reconciliation in its immediate neighborhood. Specifically, it will need to move faster on three unresolved files inherited from the last century: Cyprus, Armenia, and the Kurdish question. It should fast-track, not slow-walk, its current peace process with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK); open the border with neighboring Armenia; and make a serious effort to restart negotiations on Cyprus. Turkey no longer has a democratic model to export. But it can still offer something its neighborhood badly needs: a stable regional order, with diversity, connectivity, and economic development.

There are other opportunities for Turkey in this disorder. Its search for self-sufficiency has already made it a more capable defense and security partner for the United States and Europe. A Turkey that normalizes relations with Armenia, advances a political settlement with its Kurds, and reduces tensions with Greece and Cyprus would be an economic powerhouse and a major asset in a more fragmented regional order. But that outcome requires a healthier engagement with the West and bolder steps from Turkish leaders on regional reconciliation.

Policy recommendations

Given Erdoğan’s declining popularity, economic pressures, and the uncertainty surrounding the country’s political transition, Turkey’s ruling elites may well change over the coming decade. But the country’s deep sense of strategic autonomy and core strategic imperatives are unlikely to disappear. Whoever governs Turkey will still have to manage U.S. volatility, preserve NATO ties, lean on stability with Russia and Iran, manage the competition with Israel, and seek a more robust relationship with Europe.

An institutional reset coupled with governance reforms in Turkey would be in Washington’s interest, but under Trump, it is unlikely to be a serious U.S. priority. The United States should at least focus on encouraging structural choices that make Turkey a more pluralist, prosperous, and constructive partner.

First, Washington should encourage Turkey’s normalization efforts on Armenia, the Kurdish question, and Greece/Cyprus. Progress on these issues would reduce Ankara’s threat perceptions, ease its isolation, and make it easier for Europe and the United States to work with Turkey on defense, energy, and regional connectivity. It would also unlock significant investment opportunities for Turkey and its neighborhood.

A new regional order with Turkey at the center is not an unrealistic idea. That order would include Iraq, Syria, the South Caucasus, and ultimately Black Sea states like Georgia and Ukraine. This can turn into an economic bloc of diverse societies. Trade corridors, reconstruction, energy infrastructure, and connectivity projects can help turn Turkey’s regional ambitions into a stabilizing force. This requires treating Turkey not merely as a problematic NATO ally, but as a middle power whose regional ambitions can sometimes align with Western interests. It also requires Turkey to build an institutional capacity beyond what it has now.

The United States should lean on Europe to develop a more pragmatic relationship with Ankara. Washington is unlikely to lead the redesign of Europe’s security architecture, but it can encourage Europeans to move beyond their current paralysis and include Turkey in the region’s new security framework. Europe does not have to embrace Erdoğan to recognize Turkey’s role in Black Sea security, migration, defense industrial partnerships, energy routes, and a post-Ukraine European framework. A more transactional Europe-Turkey relationship is not ideal, but it is better than drift.

Israel is the toughest file. As Washington continues to imagine a reduced role in the Middle East, it should stop assuming that Israel can serve as the region’s default hegemon. The Iran war, as well as Israel’s policy of “mowing the lawn” in ways that destabilize its neighbors, has intensified Turkish fears of encirclement by an emboldened Israel. The Turkey-Israel rivalry is geographically sprawling, and Israel has recently formed defense alliances with Greece and Cyprus that bring tensions to the heart of Europe. The United States should actively step in for mediation—eventually seeking to establish a new framework in the eastern Mediterranean that prevents the emergence of warring camps and creates legal grounds for resource sharing. A regional order built solely around Israeli military dominance or containing Turkey will not produce stability.

All in all, Washington and Europe should accept that Turkey’s drive for strategic autonomy is not necessarily a threat—or something that Erdoğan has personally invented. It is likely to outlast Erdoğan’s tenure, but it could also be good for U.S. interests in the region. There is no guarantee that a post-Trump America will miraculously bring back a U.S.-led liberal world order—or that middle powers will wait passively for its restoration. They will diversify, hedge, and build new coalitions and trade routes to protect themselves from American volatility. The task for the United States is not to prevent that, but to ensure that Turkey’s search for autonomy and regional ownership still bends westward.