The midterm effect: What the 2026 election could mean for public policy

On Nov. 3, voters will cast ballots that decide the balance of power in Congress and set the stage for what legislation, investigations, and rulemaking could be possible for years to come.

If the blue wave that polls predict materializes, efforts to enact and change the policy agenda will play out against a backdrop of government divided along political fault lines—with the 2028 presidential contest looming. 

In this collection of essays, Brookings experts examine the implications of the upcoming election on the most significant issues facing the nation.

The most consequential health care legislation from the next Congress may be bills that have almost no chance of becoming law.

If Democrats capture one or both chambers, health care will likely be high on their agenda. Given the parties’ divergent views on health care, major changes are unlikely while President Trump remains in office. Yet recent history shows that Democratic efforts could still shape future legislation.

House Democrats passed bills authorizing Medicare drug price negotiation in 2019 and expanding Affordable Care Act (ACA) Marketplace subsidies in 2020, despite little prospect of enactment under President Trump. Versions of both policies became law during the Biden administration. Similarly, House Republicans passed a debt ceiling bill that included Medicaid work requirements in 2023, despite President Biden’s opposition. Similar requirements became law under unified Republican control in 2025.

A Democratic agenda would likely start with reversing cuts to Medicaid and the Marketplaces enacted in 2025 and restoring enhanced Marketplace premium subsidies. But it might also include other efforts to expand or improve insurance coverage, and the appropriate scope of these efforts may spur intense intraparty debate.

Democrats may also explore cost-cutting measures, both as a way of directly lowering costs for consumers and of generating federal savings to help finance coverage improvements. This could include steps to lower hospital or drug prices or to reduce payments to Medicare Advantage plans.

Even if nothing becomes law, effort spent developing and socializing proposals might leave Democrats better positioned to enact reforms when political conditions change.

If Democrats take control of one or both chambers of the 120th Congress, they are likely to feel immense pressure to rein in the Iran war, among other controversial aspects of the Trump administration’s foreign policy. But this will be easier said than done. Trump’s continued pursuit of the war is premised on broad claims of inherent constitutional authority. Even a new majority is unlikely to have the two-thirds support necessary to override a presidential veto in order to install new legislative restrictions. Nor is cutting off funding always a politically viable alternative. 

For this reason, if controlled at least in part by Democrats, the 120th Congress is likely to see more of the innovative methods the current minority has used to pressure the Trump administration into winding down the Iran war, including by withholding funding, rehabilitating dormant expedited procedures, enacting nonlegislative measures opposed to administration policies, and even exploring new litigation options. By combining these measures with newly available oversight tools and the sorts of small-bore legislative solutions (including funding limitations) that can be more readily incorporated into annual “must-pass” defense and appropriations legislation—making them difficult for the president to veto—the new majority will be able to put substantial new pressure on the Trump administration. But harder and more forward-looking limits on presidential authority will likely have to wait at least until a change in the presidency in 2029.  

At that point, if Democrats secure control of both Congress and the White House—and particularly if restraint-oriented Republicans in Congress are willing to collaborate—there could be a window for foreign relations law reform not seen since the post-Vietnam era. The question will then be whether Democrats will be willing to use their undoubtedly limited time in power to engage in reforms instead of advancing their substantive policy agenda. In 2021, Democratic leaders chose to focus on the latter. But the experiences of the past few years may have changed the calculus the next time around.

If the Democrats win control of one or both chambers of Congress, expect considerable focus on antitrust. Why? First, there are serious allegations that the Trump White House worked with favored lobbyists to dictate nonmerits-based resolution of investigations and litigation over the vigorous objections of both political and career staff at the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice (DOJ). Roger Alford, a Trump appointee who served as the division’s second-ranking official until he was fired in July 2025, laid out those allegations before the House Judiciary Subcommittee on the Administrative State, Regulatory Reform, and Antitrust. A full Democrat-chaired committee will likely want to uncover the backstories behind actions at both the DOJ and Federal Trade Commission, where the courts have questioned investigations into disfavored news organizations like Media Matters. 

In addition, hearings on antitrust legislation will likely be in the offing. There is growing sentiment that antitrust enforcement against tech platforms takes too long and provides little disincentive for dominant firms to stop exploiting their gatekeeper status. That worry carries over into agentic AI. While some AI firms are seeking antitrust immunity to coordinate efforts to address rogue behavior—something they likely can do now under current antitrust law—Democrats and at least some Republicans will probably want to ensure our antitrust laws are updated to prevent a handful of AI firms from dominating this powerful new technology and foreclosing meaningful rivalry. And, if the Democrats control both the Senate and the House, there could even be AI legislation sent to Trump to face an inevitable veto. 

With divided party government likely, a lame duck president evincing little interest in Congress, and the 2028 presidential election already underway, prospects for major legislative change in the new 120th Congress seem slim.

Plenty of issues will be ripe in the new Congress. First in line? Any of the measures that Congress and the president fail to resolve in the upcoming lame duck session. Few expect much of the lame duck, especially if Democrats’ electoral dividends lead them to withhold support until they take the reins of one or both chambers next year. Still, other lawmakers suggest that Democrats might prefer to clear some decks before the new Congress convenes

What’s at stake for next year if not finished by year-end? Full-year funding for nearly every government agency, bipartisan permitting reform and multiyear farm bills, reauthorizing Pentagon programs (plus Trump’s demand for large increases in defense funding), and increasing the government’s borrowing limit.  

Divided governments do not always stalemate. Crisis can compel politicians to act, as they did in spades in response to the 2020 global pandemic. That Congress also rewrote NAFTA and enacted several measures targeting China.  

But the 120th Congress will face several barriers. 

First, lawmakers will need supermajorities to overcome potential Senate filibusters. True, it’s technically possible to attempt a filibuster-proof “reconciliation” bill (like the One Big Beautiful Bill Act), but it’s been nearly two decades since Congress pursued one during divided government. Intense partisan team play and onerous federal debt will complicate negotiations. Second, whether in control of one or both chambers, Democrats will likely devote the lion’s share of their attention to investigating the conduct of the Trump administration. With little prospect of cooperation by the administration, “messaging” oversight will be the name of the game.   

Finally, the 2028 race for the White House will loom large. Will legislators prefer policy accomplishments to herald on the campaign trail in 2028? Or will each party prefer to run on stalemate, blaming the other party for failure to address voters’ concerns. Either way, the road ahead will be challenging for Congress, let alone for voters demanding change.

During his second term, President Trump has expanded the scope of executive power, often with the support of the Supreme Court and even when some members of the majority have expressed doubts about his approach. Other than the One Big Beautiful Bill, Congress has enacted little significant legislation, and the president has operated mostly through executive fiat. 

Would Democratic victories in the forthcoming midterm elections alter this pattern? Democrats are already debating whether they should use expanded executive power for their own purposes if they regain the presidency in 2029 or instead push for a rebalancing that restores the constitutional role of Congress as a coequal branch of government. 

In the short term, it is very likely that when Democrats take control of the House, they will use their powers of oversight and investigation to hold the president accountable for his policies. Administration officials will be required to testify, and some will be cited for contempt if they refuse. In addition, Rep. Hakeem Jeffries (D-N.Y.), the Democratic leader who will almost certainly become speaker if Democrats regain the majority, plans to bring to the floor a series of bills that will spell out his party’s policy priorities and underscore the differences between the parties. If Democrats win a majority in the Senate, President Trump may have a hard time getting Cabinet nominees confirmed, confirmation of lower-court judges would slow, and it would be nearly impossible to replace a retiring Supreme Court justice from the conservative bloc with a like-minded appointee. 

But even more important, a Democratic-controlled Congress could challenge the president’s actions at every turn, slowing and perhaps halting the steady expansion of executive power since the beginning of President Trump’s second term and making it more difficult for a subsequent president of either party to follow in Trump’s footsteps. 

On the foreign policy front, President Donald Trump’s response to a turnover in congressional power will differ between trade and national security. On trade, I expect he will show unrelenting activism, testing the outer limits of his authority as he looks for leverage to bend other countries to his will. He will probably not shy away from congressional criticism or legal battles over his trade activism, viewing them as the price of expanding his presidential power. He also will likely view these battles as a way to shift the narrative away from congressional investigations into his actions, those of his family, and his administration. He may see value in casting himself as fighting for American workers and against entrenched interests. 

On national security, Trump will likely draw down U.S. troop numbers in the Middle East and Europe, citing a reduced tempo of military operations against Iran and the results of a posture review in Europe as rationales for his decisions. Bringing troops home stands to be broadly popular with the American public, even as such decisions will likely invite scrutiny from the national security establishment. Trump is poised to shield himself against accusations of retreat and isolationism by exercising toothy power projection in Latin America under the guise of stopping narcotics trafficking and stemming immigrant flows. He will likely throw punches in directions where he does not fear counterpunches while avoiding direct confrontation with other major powers, notably China and Russia, in his final two years in office. 

As the norm-breaking first half of the second Trump administration unfolded, several Democratic members of Congress introduced legislation calling for the president’s impeachment. Trump himself raised the specter of impeachment, saying at a Republican retreat, “If we don’t win the midterms … they’ll find a reason to impeach me. I’ll get impeached.” 

Yet, as the midterm elections approach and Democratic prospects for significant electoral gains improve, impeachment remains largely absent from the party leadership’s public agenda. The biggest reason is that while impeachment requires only a majority vote, conviction requires a two-thirds vote in the Senate. Even with control of the Senate in sight, Democrats are extremely unlikely to win the two-thirds needed to convict. In addition, Trump’s declining public approval may give Democrats another reason to avoid impeachment. With the 2028 presidential election in mind, Democrats may calculate that keeping an unpopular Trump in office would be more advantageous than elevating a younger JD Vance to the presidency, which would give him an opportunity to establish his own political identity and distance himself from the administration’s record. 

But that need not be the end of impeachment. Cabinet secretaries can be impeached in the same way that presidents can. Six articles of impeachment have already been filed against Defense Secretary Hegseth and one against Secretary of Health and Human Services Robert F. Kennedy Jr. In addition, Hegseth could face legal scrutiny for U.S. military strikes against alleged drug traffickers in Latin American waters, which critics argue may constitute unlawful extrajudicial killings. He is also politically vulnerable for the ongoing Iran war. Kennedy has undertaken sweeping changes that have weakened America’s public health infrastructure, and the results are apparent with the worst outbreak of measles in decades.  

Odds are that if impeachment of a Cabinet officer proceeds to a trial in the Senate and picks up even a small amount of Republican support, the Cabinet officer will be forced to resign. For those who want to unseat Trump, this scenario would weaken his ability to implement what many think are impeachable policies without actually impeaching him. But perhaps most importantly, the impeachment of Cabinet officers would be a warning to Democratic and Republican presidential candidates that there is another tool that can be used to hold presidents accountable. 

In financial regulation, personnel is policy. The midterms leave Democrats facing two problems. The first is the Supreme Court, which stripped most financial regulators of their political independence, so these agencies now report to the White House. The second is that Donald Trump, unlike Joe Biden, quickly put his people in place, meaning a Democratic Senate has limited leverage on personnel unless someone leaves. Expect President Trump’s team to continue promoting crypto and rolling back bank regulation with little Congress can do to stop it. Going forward, Democrats face a choice: They can defend institutions like the Federal Reserve and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) even as their leaders take policy positions at odds with Democratic priorities, or they can acknowledge the court’s restructuring of government has made financial regulation an express policy lever of the White House. 

Progressive Democratic chairs could force Republicans to vote on populist ideas President Trump has endorsed, such as capping credit card interest at 10%. This would put Republicans on record either against the president or against their own deregulatory philosophies. Bipartisan legislation remains possible, as it was on housing this year, even though President Trump withheld his signature. Democrats can investigate conflicts of interest around Trump’s personal crypto profits. Investigations tend to increase partisanship. Future deals will depend on whether President Trump views his legacy as being burnished by bipartisan laws or enhanced by unilateral executive action coupled with growing vitriol toward Congress. 

If the Democrats control one or both houses of Congress starting in January 2027, I expect some significant changes in national security policymaking, perhaps most notably on the defense budget and related matters.

But first, some areas where I doubt change would be significant: war powers, military reorganization, and decisions on the use of force. In each of these areas, presidents, including Trump, have generally decided that they can avert, outflank, or run over Congress. Even in the case of a modest Democratic advantage, President Trump could likely count on enough Republican support to sustain his vetoes on key issues. For example, if Congress tried to reform or rewrite the 1973 War Powers Resolution, Trump could veto such a bill—and I doubt the next Congress would do what the Senate and House did back in 1973 when they overrode President Nixon’s veto with a two-thirds majority in each chamber.

By contrast, on the core matter of defense budgeting, I expect change if the Democrats gain control (of either one or both houses). President Trump’s efforts to gain $350 billion in “mandatory” funding for the fiscal year 2027 budget, already delayed by the current Congress, would stand virtually no chance, as Congress would insist on the normal budget process and oversight (with annual “discretionary” funding that it helped manage). The Golden Dome missile defense system and Golden Battleship would get no big chunks of financial support absent detailed plans and substantial debate. Trump would probably not be able to tell the Navy how to reposition its aircraft carrier control towers and how to change the technology for its catapults. That is because, knowing of Trump’s personal and even idiosyncratic interests in these matters, Congress could insist as a condition for funding future ships that best technological and scientific practices govern how the ships are designed and built. These demands could be written into defense authorization and appropriations bills, making them binding. 

This may not seem like a big deal, but normalcy, and checks and balances, need to start somewhere! 

As indicators of a potential blue wave begin to take shape across the political landscape, there is growing optimism that Democratic control of the House will lead to notable shifts in policy outcomes across several domestic policy domains, including immigration. Unfortunately, there might not be much change in one of the more controversial and high-profile aspects of the Trump administration’s priorities: the enforcement of deportation policy through ICE. The executive branch has a lot of power independent of Congress to enforce immigration. In fact, it was through executive orders that President Trump expanded the reach of ICE on the first day of his second term. Even if Democrats win the House, they will not be able to do much to overcome the executive power to continue ICE operations. 

The main power for Congress in this area is their oversight of the federal budget, which would ordinarily allow the House to curtail operations by cutting off funds. However, Congress has used the reconciliation process in both 2025 and 2026 to appropriate nearly $240 billion for immigration purposes. This is more than enough funds to allow the Trump administration to continue their operations without much resistance from the legislative branch. One of the few prospects for Democrats eager to show voters that they are doing all they can to reform deportation policy would be clawing back unspent funds or restricting how those funds could be leveraged. Whether the new Congress will have the votes to make this happen will depend largely on how big the forecasted blue wave is in November. This is not good news for the immigrant community and the many mixed-status families living through a constant state of fear that they or their loved ones may be deported. They may have to wait until after the 2028 election to see any major changes in immigration policy.

The GOP’s efforts to redistrict ahead of the 2026 midterm elections will further disenfranchise Black voters, particularly in the wake of the Supreme Court’s April Louisiana v. Callais decision that delivered another blow to the already weakened Voting Rights Act (VRA). In addition to the ongoing efforts by the Trump administration to impose more stringent voter identification requirements, redistricting, which mirrors the historical process and goals of racial gerrymandering, is disproportionately impacting majority-Black and plurality-Black districts that leaned heavily Democrat in prior elections. Newly redrawn maps are taking away incumbent seats held by Black legislators, while establishing new Republican seats and thus diminishing Black political power. If Democrats can shift control in the midterms, one of their first priorities should be to enact legislation that limits, bans, or institutes objective oversight of the process. 

Six states—Texas, Florida, Louisiana, Alabama, Tennessee, and North Carolina—have already split up majority- and plurality-Black districts. Nine additional states have initiated mid-decade restricting efforts. This has forced some incumbent Black legislators to run in majority-white, heavily Republican districts. Leading up to the midterms, it will be critical to thwart these increasing acts of voter suppression through more robust voter education, stronger oversight of AI’s role in enabling mis- and disinformation, and an increased number of poll watchers on Election Day, among other protections.  

However, efforts to dilute the Black vote could also backfire for the GOP as Democrat and Republican voters share similar concerns regarding the economy and cost of living. Additionally, a transfer of control to Democrats could revive debates over electoral reform. Congress could pass anti-gerrymandering legislation to avoid future partisan takeovers or require independent, bipartisan commissions as proposed in the Redistricting Reform Act of 2025. Efforts could even be bipartisan as some Republicans have called for outright bans on mid-decade changes to electoral maps. Several states have also instituted their own provisions to stop gerrymandering, and installed state-level, independent commissions that are separate from legislatures to make the process less vulnerable to partisanship. Although not currently active, Michigan has an independent citizens’ redistricting commission to review congressional and state maps.  

Congressional and state oversight alone will not fully address the damage done to the Voting Rights Act, which has been pillaged and weakened by a series of Supreme Court decisions that have enabled loopholes for misinterpretation and misuse. The new Congress should make time to address these vulnerabilities in the VRA to eliminate the growing partisan influence that keeps trying to alter who gets to vote, where, and for whom, going forward. 

Even if Democrats take the House and Senate, I expect the immediate effects on K-12 education to be modest. There are a few reasons for that. First, the federal government isn’t the main stage for education policymaking; state and local governments matter more. Second, Democrats almost certainly won’t win large enough majorities to override a presidential veto, which limits what they can change from Washington. Third, it’s not all that clear what Democrats want. The party has seemed directionless on K-12 education for some time, and even the DSA platform says little about it. 

Still, there would be some impacts. Congressional Democrats would throw sand in the gears of GOP policymaking. That wouldn’t necessarily stop the president’s executive actions, but it’d likely prevent another budget reconciliation package with K-12 policies that Democrats dislike. Democrats also could more forcefully resist the administration’s efforts to dismantle the Department of Education (ED)—with oversight hearings and some concrete actions. For example, they could include language in a funding bill to prohibit the interagency agreements being used to offload ED’s responsibilities to other agencies. 

Perhaps the most interesting move would be Democrats passing a bill to signal their future K-12 plans should they retake the White House. One notable development is Rep. Suzanne Bonamici declaring for the race to be the top Democrat on the House Education and Workforce Committee—weeks after introducing a bill with a sprawling set of K-12 proposals. Perhaps that bill is foreshadowing Democrats’ education policy agenda for 2028.

Looking at physical reality, you’d think that 2026 would be a banner year for political attention to climate change and energy. Extreme weather, wildfires, and other perils that voters often associate with climate change are constantly in the news. Two wars entangling supplies from major oil and gas producers have sent energy prices soaring. Electricity bills are rising nearly everywhere.  

Yet almost none of the midterm races will turn on energy or climate. Climate change is strikingly absent. Even Democrats inclined to support climate policy are wary of becoming too visible on a topic that voters generally don’t prioritize—despite the fact that many voters want them to say more. Despite energy being a key driver of inflation that worries voters, energy itself mostly isn’t a top campaign issue. Of the eight top issues that the Pew Center tracks for political attention, voters put energy nearly last.  

Although climate and energy aren’t directly driving the upcoming elections, electoral sweeps by Democrats could have huge implications for policy. In a few states, a swing to unified Democratic control could lead to much stronger climate policies along with regulations against fossil fuels. Democrats leading one or both chambers on Capitol Hill will likely lead to investigations, retaliations, and chaos in Washington, D.C.—hardly the stuff of the stable policy signals needed on energy and climate. That looming gridlock may put a spotlight on the brief lame duck period when more bipartisan legislation might get through Congress and even be signed by the president—for energy mavens, top of that list is a new bill that would help streamline permitting and make it easier to build. With the cost of oil and refined products, such as diesel fuel, you might think that Democrats would pivot toward policies that emphasize all forms of energy, including more oil. But there is little reliable support for oil and gas expansion in the Democratic base; more likely will be investigations about the Trump administration’s diesel fuel deal with Russia and a lot more emphasis on electric vehicles, biofuels, and efficiency—all policies that are unlikely to get consent from the White House, as needed for new legislation.  

One of the hottest issues this election cycle is data centers, thanks to a litany of fears that include voter worries that data center power needs will jack up prices for everyone else. Unlike practically everything else in American politics, however, data centers don’t yet have ideological fault lines. Democrats and Republicans alike are scrambling to look decisive on the matter—mainly by supporting bans. No matter who wins federal and local elections, politicians know who they should abhor. Look for more symbolic political pressure on data centers. Beyond symbolism, with D.C. locked in political gridlock, the bulk of legislative efforts may, mostly, offer a sandbox for elaborating concepts that eventually could be adopted by future governments when officeholders shuffle again after the 2028 elections. 

One of the big challenges facing policymakers after the midterms will be addressing public concerns about AI. Polls show large majorities expressing worries about AI safety and security. With a number of news stories detailing AI agents going rogue and engaging in unauthorized or prohibited activities, there is a need for members of Congress to address these problems.  

There are steps legislators can take. First is mandatory reporting of rogue actions by AI agents from large tech firms. Their tools reach millions of people and therefore are capable of harming a substantial number of individuals. Mandatory reporting would improve transparency about the scope of the problem and the types of intrusions that are most problematic. 

In addition, legislators can improve legal liability for AI agents that inflict harm on consumers, businesses, or government agencies. Right now, accountability for unauthorized behavior is murky, and it’s unclear to what extent existing laws on consumer protection or business practices apply to digital tools. Clarifying liability rules would improve accountability and give tech companies clear incentives to make sure large language models are not engaging in harmful behavior. 

If Congress does not move, state legislatures will act. Several states have already passed AI safety bills, and that trend will likely accelerate in the coming months. A patchwork of state rules poses an enormous challenge for tech companies, which would have a difficult time developing different models for California or New York versus Texas or Florida. It makes sense for representatives and senators to enact meaningful safeguards before conflicting policy rules proliferate at the state level. 

Among presidents’ major accomplishments are significant changes in the federal judiciary’s composition. President Trump’s 231 first-term lower court judicial appointments were fewer than President Carter’s and, by a slim margin, President Biden’s. 

If Republicans retain the Senate, Trump, with 308 projected appointments so far (assuming post-election confirmation of pending and announced nominees) may get the roughly 70 appointments he needs to match Presidents Reagan and President Clinton’s eight-year totals. The 22 current and announced vacancies without nominations are—at the moment—mainly in Democratic-senator states, but home-state senators’ “blue-slip” veto over district court nominees may not survive a change in Judiciary Committee leadership. And it’s anyone’s guess how many of the 55 Republican-appointed district judges and 23 circuit judges who will be eligible to retire on salary by late 2028 will do so; judges during Trump’s second term have been more reluctant than under recent predecessors to create vacancies. 

A Democratic Senate, however, may be in payback mode. In their final two years, the four two-term presidents before Trump all faced opposition-controlled Senates. Until Obama, final two-year confirmations represented about 20% of total confirmations. Of Reagan’s 379 total confirmations, 84 (22%) came during his final two years. Clinton and Bush had similar percentages.  

But Republicans took control of the Senate in 2015 and basically shut down judicial confirmations, resulting in only 22 confirmations—7% of all Obama confirmations.  

What about the Supreme Court? If the Senate stays Republican even with a slimmer majority, look for Justice Alito to retire. If Democrats take the Senate, any vacancies will be health related, with ferocious battles over Trump’s proposed replacements either way.

The backlash over data centers necessary for artificial intelligence (AI) became a major campaign topic involving everyone from local candidates to the president of the United States. What began as neighborhood concerns about local environmental and utility issues grew into a fight over AI power.   

Data centers were the first place voters could clearly see the costs and risks of AI being shifted to them. The backlash exposed the corporate power dilemma of AI: that a handful of executives are making unsupervised decisions that affect everyone.    

Zoning boards and state utility commissions can decide where a data center is located and who pays for its power. Some states are trying to address how AI companies behave. But only Congress can establish uniform national rules.  

The challenge for the new Congress is to turn public concern into enforceable oversight of AI. The test will be whether legislators take symbolic but limited action or step up with meaningful requirements supervised by an agency with technical expertise to oversee safety evaluations, mandatory incident reporting, and protections against the abuse of market power. 

The data center backlash brought the power of AI into public debate. Elected leaders must now decide whether public interest oversight or private interests will shape that power.