Xi Jinping’s Moscow visit highlights China’s strategic vulnerabilities

As Russian tanks roll through Red Square for Victory Day on May 9, Chinese President Xi Jinping will stand alongside Russian President Vladimir Putin—a jarring image for a country that claims to be a force for global stability. The image of Xi in Moscow underscores the growing tension at the heart of China’s foreign policy: its strategic partnership with Russia increasingly collides with its broader ambitions to be seen as a responsible global leader, as a steadying alternative to what it depicts as American volatility and Western decline.

Although the China-Russia relationship remains solid, Xi faces challenges. Over the past year, Moscow has expanded its diplomatic outreach, negotiating directly with Washington and signing a mutual defense pact with Pyongyang. Xi’s visit offers him an opportunity to reaffirm the strength of the Beijing-Moscow partnership—even as Putin’s diplomatic options grow.

Trump’s disruption, China’s missed opportunity

Some observers argue that China could turn U.S. diplomatic disarray under the second Trump administration into a strategic advantage. Beijing has long believed that periods of American distraction or disruption offer an opportunity for China to expand its influence. Chinese leaders have been actively courting Europe, Asia, and the Global South, positioning Beijing as a more reliable economic and diplomatic partner—especially as Trump’s erratic tariffs, open musings about annexing foreign territories, cuts to U.S. foreign aid, and disregard for allies and international norms have alienated much of the world.

China hasn’t been subtle. Last month, as the U.S.-China trade war escalated, Xi toured Vietnam, Malaysia, and Cambodia, signing more than 100 deals on supply chain cooperation, artificial intelligence, health, and green energy. China has also stepped up its courtship of Europe and Asia, rolling out visa exemptions and accelerating working-level talks on economic cooperation. Welcoming Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez in Beijing in April, Xi made the case that China and Europe should jointly defend globalization and oppose “unilateral acts of bullying”—a clear swipe at the United States. Just weeks earlier, the top diplomats of China, Japan, and South Korea met for trilateral talks, where Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi pressed for deeper trade and investment ties and a revival of negotiations on a long-stalled trilateral free trade agreement.

Yet Xi’s appearance in Moscow muddies China’s campaign—and exposes the limits of its strategy. By visibly aligning with Putin while Russia wages a war of aggression against Ukraine, Beijing reinforces suspicions that it is willing to side with revisionist powers over defending international norms. To be sure, the diplomatic costs of this alignment are uneven. Many governments in the Global South view Beijing’s partnership with Moscow as unproblematic or at least secondary to their broader interests with China. But in Europe and parts of Asia, where skepticism of Beijing already runs high, Xi’s overtures are unlikely to offer reassurance.

Strategic necessity and growing friction

So why is Xi taking the risk? The answer lies in strategic necessity. As competition with the United States intensifies, Beijing views Moscow as an essential, if risky, partner.

Chinese officials dismiss the prospect of a “reverse Nixon”—the scenario in which Washington and Moscow reconcile relations, leaving China isolated. The consensus view in Beijing is that Putin is unlikely to give Trump the Ukraine peace deal he wants; the distrust between Moscow and Washington remains too profound for any full reset.

What has Chinese officials nervous is not a potential Trump-Putin rapprochement, but the tightening of ties between Putin and Kim Jong-un. The recently signed Russia-North Korea defense pact has only deepened these anxieties. Chinese analysts are increasingly uneasy about Russia’s expanding and opaque military ties with Pyongyang and their potential to create instability right on its doorstep.

Beijing is particularly wary that Putin could position himself as a broker between Trump and Kim, marginalizing China and redirecting U.S. attention away from faltering negotiations on Ukraine. For Beijing, long accustomed to playing a central role in Korean Peninsula diplomacy, ceding its position to Moscow would be seen as a serious blow.

Still, Xi isn’t inclined to make new concessions to Putin. Russia’s economy is faltering, its military is overstretched, and its diplomatic leverage with the West remains limited. China continues to dominate the economic relationship, and that imbalance isn’t likely to change soon—though it’s increasingly a source of the Kremlin’s resentment.

A diplomatic tightrope for China

For China, Russia is both a strategic asset and a potential liability—an ally in confronting Western dominance, yet also a source of risk. A weakened Russia can’t fully serve Beijing’s strategic goals. Yet a resurgent, independent Russia could one day reemerge as a rival. It wasn’t so long ago that China and the Soviet Union were bitter adversaries, facing off across a heavily militarized 4,000-kilometer frontier.

Beijing’s ideal outcome is a Russia strong enough to push back against the West, but weak enough to remain securely in China’s orbit. Managing this delicate balance, however, is becoming more difficult—and carries global consequences.

Xi’s visit to Moscow exposes the contradictions at the heart of China’s foreign policy. The belief that Beijing could capitalize on American dysfunction while maintaining credibility with Europe and Asia is proving naïve. Xi’s embrace of autocrats abroad is not strengthening China’s global hand—it is narrowing it.