The China-Russia relationship and threats to vital US interests

The growing alignment between the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation has significant implications for vital U.S. interests and the interests of U.S. allies and partners. Animated by shared grievances against the configuration of the international order and mutual concerns about perceived external threats, principally from the United States, the Sino-Russian partnership has deepened over the last decade across the military, economic, and diplomatic domains. Beijing and Moscow’s strategic alignment will pose a significant test for the incoming Trump administration.

China and Russia’s strategic alignment and top threats to vital U.S. interests

• China’s continued economic and diplomatic support for Russia enables the latter to sustain its war of aggression in Ukraine. This war undermines the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity that underpin global stability, threatens the United States’ NATO allies, and risks drawing the United States into a military confrontation in Europe. China has supplied Russia with industrial inputs, many dual use, including microelectronics, military optics, drone and turbojet engines, armored vehicles, satellite technology, and materials like nitrocellulose. These exports have flowed directly through Chinese suppliers and via third countries and have facilitated the reconstitution of Russia’s defense industrial base. China has also undercut efforts to isolate Russia diplomatically. It continues to lend credence to Moscow’s narrative that paints Russia as the victim of Western aggression and NATO expansion as the real driver of the war in Ukraine. As such, Sino-Russian cooperation poses a direct threat to the interests of the United States as well as its European allies and partners.
• China and Russia are weakening the underpinnings of American leadership on the world stage and core elements of the existing rules-based international order. Beijing and Moscow are disseminating narratives of terminal U.S. decline across the Global South and developing alternative supply chains and financial institutions to insulate themselves from U.S. sanctions. The two states are determined to end what they see as a U.S.-dominated international order. With the support of the Global South, they are seeking to create an order in which the United States and its Western partners have a diminished role, and authoritarian states are free from international scrutiny and immune to Western sanctions. The Russia-Ukraine war and the escalating crisis in the Middle East, which have sharply divided the United States, its allies, and its partners from much of the rest of the world, have given Beijing and Moscow a boost in advancing such aims.

  While China or Russia alone might not present a credible alternate pole, a joint China-Russia “pole” is appealing to middle powers including Turkey, South Africa, Brazil, regimes in the Middle East, and other Global South states who believe that the current international order does not sufficiently account for their voices. This is evidenced by the growing popularity of the BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Hedging by these middle powers creates geopolitical capital for Beijing and Moscow, economic benefits for Moscow in particular, and limits the influence of the United States, its allies, and its partners.

• China and Russia’s deepening military alignment poses a challenge to U.S. interests in the Indo-Pacific region. China-Russia military interactions, including joint exercises, have increased in frequency over the decades. In recent months, the two countries have held live-fire maritime drills in the South China Sea and joint long-range bomber patrols near Alaska. While cooperation and integration between the People’s Liberation Army and the Russian Armed Forces are still limited, there is considerable potential for deeper integration. These developments complicate strategic planning for the United States, its allies, and its partners given how costly and complex it would be to deter coordinated, if not joint, China and Russian military operations. In addition, China-Russia technological cooperation in the military domain—including Chinese purchases of advanced Russian fighter jets, submarine technologies, and air defense systems; Russian purchases of Chinese semiconductors that power military drones and tanks; and research collaboration in artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and space technology—raises significant security concerns for the United States and its partners.

Identifying the challenges and strategic opportunities

• China and Russia’s strategic partnership will persist as long as each continues to see the United States as its principal adversary. The United States maintains a significant trust deficit with both Beijing and Moscow which creates challenges for bilateral engagement. Neither Beijing nor Moscow believes that they have anything to gain by working with Washington to check the other’s influence.
• The United States is limited in its ability to engineer a Sino-Russian split. Neither Beijing nor Moscow can be wholly co-opted or punished into submission. It would be extremely misguided to try to win over one or both parties through fundamental concessions, such as endorsing China’s claims to Taiwan or recognizing Russia’s occupation of Ukrainian territories. Such appeasement would not only undermine U.S. credibility with its allies and partners but also embolden China, Russia, and other revisionist regimes to engage in further aggression. Neither can Washington inflict punishments that existentially threaten either China or Russia, such as through a military attack or the imposition of a comprehensive economic embargo, without severely threatening U.S. security and economic stability, as well as that of its allies and partners.
• Chinese and Russian interests are not fully aligned. While Beijing and Moscow share the aim of eroding Washington’s global influence and its alliance networks, the two states have fundamentally different strategic outlooks. As the world’s second-largest economy and largest trading state, China has a far greater stake than Russia in regional and global stability. China does not ultimately benefit from prolonged conflicts in Europe or the Middle East, even if Beijing tends to view these conflicts as greater problems for the United States than for itself. While some Chinese strategists believe a United States tied down in Europe and the Middle East diverts attention from China, others point out that U.S. pressure on China has continued to mount despite these conflicts and that strategic ties between the U.S. alliance networks in Asia and Europe have actually been strengthened in spite of, or in some cases because of, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

  Moscow, on the other hand, has no interest in serving as a junior partner to Beijing and seeks to expand its freedom of strategic maneuver, as evidenced by its outreach to Iran, North Korea, and India, among others. Both capitals fear being drawn into an alignment that could threaten their independent decisionmaking or entrap them in a war that they have no interest in fighting. In fact, such fears contributed to the Sino-Soviet split during the Cold War.

  Finally, despite their pronouncement of a “no limits” partnership, mistrust and rivalry run deep in the Sino-Russian relationship. The two states have a long history of conflict, thin cultural and people-to-people ties, and overlapping spheres of influence in Asia, Africa, and the Arctic—all of which limit the depth of their alignment. These tensions could drive them apart over the medium to long term, as they have in earlier iterations of partnership between Beijing and Moscow.

• Beijing benefits from its respective bilateral ties with Russia, North Korea, and Iran, but it has no interest in joining or endorsing a four-way “axis.” Beijing is uncomfortable with strengthening Russian-North Korean military cooperation and especially with the entry of North Korean forces into the Ukrainian battlefield. The rise of a more militarily advanced North Korea that is emboldened by a Russian security guarantee directly threatens the stability of China’s immediate neighborhood. Similarly, while China is Iran’s largest trade partner and Beijing has some security cooperation with Tehran, this relationship remains limited. Beijing does not benefit by linking its relationship with Iran to a broader axis.
• China’s ties with Russia could potentially serve as an asset (with limits). While falling far short of Ukrainian expectations—and the West’s, more broadly—Beijing has at times used its channels with Moscow to signal its redlines and expectations, such as its opposition to nuclear escalation in Europe. China has also publicly stated that it supports the principles of state sovereignty and territorial integrity that are enshrined in the U.N. Charter. At the appropriate time, Beijing could be pressed to support a negotiated end to the conflict that upholds its stated positions. It could also potentially contribute to Ukraine’s reconstruction and economic recovery should Kyiv seek Chinese participation. For now, however, Ukrainian frustrations with Beijing have mounted given the latter’s consistent support for Russia since its February 2022 invasion of Ukraine.

Recommendations 

The United States’ key objectives for the China-Russia partnership should be to prevent the further deepening of this relationship and to actively counter Beijing and Moscow’s efforts to undermine U.S. global leadership and support for the rules-based international order. To advance these objectives, the Trump administration should:

• Recognize the strategic challenges posed by China and Russia’s partnership as well as their respective ties with Iran and North Korea, without overstating the degree of their alignment and joint coordination. While China and Russia’s partnership runs deep—and the four countries are working to support Russia’s war effort—the “axis” narrative suggests greater solidarity among this grouping than is merited. This clouds strategic analysis and policy creativity, and it enhances the propaganda value of the grouping to the detriment of U.S. interests.
• Keep open channels of communication. While the United States may not be able to engineer a Sino-Russian split, it should keep the diplomatic door open so that if and when strains arise in Beijing and Moscow’s relationship, one or both parties will see Washington as a viable option for hedging against the other.
• Signal to Beijing that its interests are better served by sharply limiting its support for Russia. China broadly shares an interest in regional and global stability and aspires to be a respected leader in the international system. A mix of strategic and reputational costs, such as the threat of secondary sanctions, as well as diplomatic incentives, should be employed to push Beijing to limit and constructively leverage its ties with Russia. When possible, threats and red lines should be communicated privately to provide Beijing with a face-saving off-ramp to adjust its policies. In addition, public recognition for cooperative behavior should be given when due, such as when China supports sanctions enforcement or takes a public stand against nuclear escalation. It not only provides China with a reputational boost but also makes any changes in Beijing’s policy more obvious and politically costly. The key is that Beijing must believe that there is an upside to cooperating with Washington to curb Russian aggression.
• Take the competition for hearts and minds in the Global South seriously. The United States must more vigorously counter the Chinese and Russian charge that it seeks to inhibit the emergence of a more inclusive international order that presents significant economic opportunities and channels for developing countries to shape the rules, norms, and trajectory of the global arena. To that end, the Trump administration should prioritize an affirmative economic agenda in the Global South and reforms to long-standing multilateral institutions that would strengthen support among developing countries.