China and Russia’s strategic relationship amid a shifting geopolitical landscape

ANGELA STENT: Yes, certainly events are occurring at a dizzying pace. So I think the short answer is the trajectory of the war is not going to change for the foreseeable future. What President Trump wants is a very quick ceasefire, and then he thinks he’s more or less done with this. What President Putin wants is no ceasefire. He wants what he’s getting, which is a normalization of relations with the United States, the possible lifting of sanctions, and the end of Western isolation of Russia as it continues to conduct this brutal war. The Russians have said they would only accept a ceasefire if Ukraine were to accept the loss of the four territories that Russia has annexed, none of which Russia fully controls. The Ukrainians are not willing to do this, and of course, this was one of the reasons for the spat that we saw in the White House.

So Russia’s strategic posture will continue to be the same, except I would expect Russia to be more assertive globally if it is able to secure this reset with the United States. I think the Russians never dreamt that this would happen so quickly and so fully in the last three years.

ALI WYNE: Thanks very much, Pattie, for the question. And thank you for bringing us all together for a conversation that I think all of us would agree couldn’t be timelier. My sense is that Chinese officials are, I think, quite surprised, by the speed of developments and the extent to which the Trump administration wants to, it seems, normalize relations between Washington and Moscow. On balance, I don’t think that China is particularly concerned about the possibility of a real rapprochement. I think it’s important—especially amid speculation that we hear about the possibility of a kind of reverse Nixon gambit that the United States might orchestrate—to distinguish between a potentially a tactical de-escalation in U.S.-Russia relations and a fundamental recalibration of Russian policy towards the United States, and the latter, I don’t think, is realistically on the table.

I think on balance, China does discern a window of strategic opportunity, particularly when it comes to the rupture in the transatlantic alliance. And we already see that China is positioning itself vis-à-vis the European Union. China is encouraging the European Union to do more to assert its strategic autonomy. There is talk among many European countries about de-risking not only from China, but also from the United States. I think that on balance, China sees a window of strategic opportunity, and China doesn’t stand to lose in any way from saying that it welcomes talks between Trump and Putin. It doesn’t stand to lose anything by saying that it welcomes a quick resolution to the war for reasons that Angela mentioned in her remarks. I think it’s unrealistic, despite the wishes that the Trump administration has, to imagine that the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, which now just passed a really bloody three-year anniversary, is going to reach a resolution any time soon.

ALI WYNE: It isn’t clear to me what China could realistically offer, or I should say, it isn’t clear to me what China might be prepared to offer that might that might ratchet down tensions between Russia and Ukraine for a couple of reasons. Number one, ever since the beginning of this conflict now over three years ago, China has consistently declined to identify Russia as the aggressor in this war. And number two, China has continued to provide economic support for Russia’s continued aggression.

Having said so, I think that [with] the recent rupture—and I would call it a rupture, not just perhaps a run-of-the-mill divergence in perspectives between Washington and Brussels, but a real rupture in transatlantic relations—I do think that China sees an opportunity to present itself, at relatively low cost to its own national interest, as a potential intermediary between Russia and Ukraine. And I think that it’s notable that on the sidelines of the Munich Security Conference that took place last month, both the Ukrainian Foreign Minister and the head of President Zelenskyy’s office met with China’s top diplomat, Wang Yi, and they spoke quite favorably about their interaction.

So I think that China sees the opportunity to burnish its diplomatic credentials, to burnish its conflict-mediation credentials without really having to expend much in the way they would undermine its own national interests or they would fundamentally alter its relationship with Russia.

TARA VARMA: Thanks, Pattie. Happy to be taking part in this important conversation at such a changing moment as well. I think the Europeans really were under shock in the past few days, basically since the Trump administration took office, [with] the announcements of higher tariffs against Canada, Mexico and the European Union than on China. So that was also interesting. And President Trump said very clearly last week that he thinks the EU was built to, and I apologize for the rude language, “screw over” the United States. So he really, you know, in his first term, he said that the EU was a foe to the U.S., worse than China. So these are ideas that he’s had for a long time.

We know that he really despises multilateralism and international cooperation, and he’s demonstrating it today with the administration of loyalists that surround him. And I think we’ve been, as Europeans, hoping that this was just a posture, that this was just for show, that what matters to President Trump is in the end to have a deal, and so that there might be a way to negotiate our way through crises.

I think what we’re seeing now is this is, of course, this runs much deeper than what we had expected. Kaja Kallas, a former Estonian prime minister and the head of EU diplomacy now, was in Washington, D.C., last week. She was supposed to meet with Marco Rubio, who canceled on her last minute for no apparent reason, I think, except to show that the new administration is really going to see the EU as a foe, as an enemy to work against. And of course, the EU finds itself in a pretty dramatic situation because it doesn’t deal with collective security. The EU is an economic and political regional entity. It has grown with U.S. acquiescence throughout the past decades. And even if we’ve had a number of rifts in the past, particularly when it comes to trade, there was never the idea that the U.S. was set against the EU growing.

What we’re seeing now with this new administration and with Elon Musk in particular is an antagonism vis-à-vis the EU, which is being demonstrated on a daily basis. And a number of key administration leaders, they resent the EU for its digital and climate regulatory power, and this is what they’re going to work against. And so the Europeans find themselves in a situation not only of having to deal with the withdrawal of the U.S. from key collective security agreements or arrangements—or at least putting into question the credibility of the U.S. security guarantee—but they actually even find themselves with a U.S. that’s going to work actively against them.

So we’ve seen in the past few days a flurry of visits from European leaders. French President Emmanuel Macron was in Washington, D.C., last week to meet with President Trump. He had called, prior to his visit, Ursula von der Leyen, the president of the European Commission, and a number of European leaders, Viktor Orbán, Giorgia Meloni, the German chancellor. A few days later, the U.K. prime minister, Keir Starmer, also came. And of course, we witnessed the following day, the pretty horrific and dramatic meeting between the Ukrainian President Zelenskyy and President Trump and Vice President Vance.

So what we’ve seen now is a meeting of European leaders in London Sunday, March the 2nd, where they agreed that they were actually going to provide a special fund to help Ukraine. But they’re doing this in crisis mode, I think, realizing that the Europeans cannot count on the U.S. anymore, which is a pretty big shock, I would say.

And in terms about the relationship to China and the EU’s approach to China, I think what we’re seeing is a number of European leaders who are saying that they’ve turned their backs on Russia and on Russian gas and that they can’t really afford to turn away from all of their major partners, so that in the event of the U.S. formally withdrawing from European security, they might want to turn to Beijing. As Ali said, we’ve heard from the PRC support for European strategic autonomy, and I think a satisfaction coming out of Beijing that actually the Europeans might fall even more into their arms, which I think might be against U.S. interests.

And so we might find ourselves in a situation where Beijing has a lot to gain from this and the Europeans basically have no choice but to dive even more into the EU-China relationship, which they had qualified five years ago as a triptych of partnership, competition, and systemic rivalry. So let’s see how this evolves

ASLI AYDINTAŞBAŞ: Pattie, Turkey is not alone in not fully joining the Western consensus on the war in Ukraine. It [Russia’s invasion of Ukraine] certainly was seen as a huge violation of international law and a dangerous move on the part of Russia. On the other hand, I think Turkey, like India, like many countries in the Middle East and powerful players in the Global South, wanted to pursue some type of a balancing act. In the case of Turkey, this is driven by economic needs, but also centuries of warfare between the Ottoman and Russian empires, and also a sense of cynicism about the world order and where it was heading. Long before the advent of the Trump administration, Turks had started seeing the world as a more transactional space and sort of a multipolar order and the cynicism also included U.S. intentions on the war in Ukraine and the attitudes towards Ukraine, as was said to me again and again, and we could disagree with this assertion, but just to tell how Turks saw it. Turkish officials often said United States would give Ukraine enough support to stay in the war, but not enough to win.

So, from the get-go, they seemed to see this as an unwinnable war, and therefore called for ceasefire negotiations from early on, an end to the war, hosting talks. In fact, the first substantial negotiations between Ukraine and Russia took place in Istanbul in 2022, followed by a grain deal, prisoner exchanges, Black Sea talks, et cetera. So they do welcome prospects of an end to the war, which is a huge risk for countries on Russia’s periphery.

But they are worried, of course. They’re worried about a number of things, including a speedy Russia -U.S. normalization that’s worrisome for two reasons, maybe, for countries like Turkey and countries in the Caucasus, in Central Asia, in Eastern Europe. It does leave potentially a triumphant Russia. Of course, it’s not the end of the war that people worry about. It’s how it ends, how it leaves Russia, how it leaves Vladimir Putin and his understanding of the world order. And if Russia ends this war feeling on top, feeling triumphant, I think that’s really bad news not just for Turkey, but for, you know, countries on the eastern flank of Europe, but also in the Caucasus, Central Asia.

They’re also worried now about a lawless world. So great power competition worked for middle powers because it provided opportunities for many of them to play off great powers against one another. But a great power condominium in which the United States decides to triangulate relations with Russia and China, and perhaps allow for zones of influence, that is very, very bad news. So Turkey will do what many European countries do and try to hedge against what they think is a very sort of unpredictable U.S. behavior, [and] politically try to get closer to Europeans. But economically I think, I say this without knowing anything, but I think economically they’ll also do what a lot of European countries will try to do, that is, develop economic relations with China.

ANGELA STENT: Every U.S. president since the end of the Cold War has tried to reset relations with Russia, both Democrat and Republican, and all these resets have failed. And the major reason why they failed is because so far, U.S. presidents and the U.S. public have had a very different understanding of the drivers of international relations and how the world should be governed. I think the major difference is now that we have a president in President Trump who seems to share Vladimir Putin’s view of the world: there are only a few truly sovereign states—the U.S., Russia, China, maybe India—that smaller states have limited sovereignty, and as Aslı was alluding to, that the way you govern the world is you really go back to a tripartite, as it would be now, Yalta, and each of the major powers has their own sphere of influence. And neither Russia nor the United States really have much time for a number of different international organizations, unless they’re ones that they control.

So on the basis of this, I would say that a reset is possible because the U.S. has changed the rules of the game and we see a U.S. very willing to engage with Russia. We know that President Trump has been, you know, very eager to do business in Russia since he visited the Soviet Union for the first time in 1987. He admires Vladimir Putin. He has an animus against Ukraine. And he still sees huge business opportunities in Russia. He’s alluded to it based on I’m not quite sure what, particularly if the major U.S. energy companies do not go back into Russia. So for that reason, he will try to have a successful reset with Russia.

A month ago, Putin was saying that the United States was the main enemy of Russia. He’s of course changed his tune. He has now said that U.S. interests align with those of Russia. And he wants a reset because I think he believes he’s going to get it on his terms, which would of course include a settlement in Ukraine in which Ukraine is unable really to secure its own sovereignty and territorial integrity. Because if there is a ceasefire in Ukraine and President Trump thinks that’s all we have to do, as we know, the Russians will come back, and they haven’t given up their desire to subjugate Ukraine and see regime change there.

So having said all this, one of the goals behind the Trump administration’s outreach to Moscow and resetting relations is [that] they seem to believe that they can separate Russia from China, that they can induce Putin to rethink his relationship with Xi Jinping and with China and do whatever you want to call it, a reverse Kissinger. And we’ve heard them explicitly say this.

As we have said in the paper that we all wrote, it is highly unlikely that Russia has any desire to separate itself from China. Of course, it likes to have options. If it had a successful reset with the United States, that would probably give it somewhat more leverage in dealing with China. At the moment, it’s highly dependent on China to continue this war. But I think what Russia would do would be to say, fine, we’re going to continue this close relationship with China, with North Korea, Iran, et cetera. But now we have a good relationship with the United States. This just raises our standing in the world.

But there is a fundamental mistrust of the United States among the current and previous and probably future Russian leadership. And they’re not going to squander this relationship with China that they’ve built up over the past couple of decades.

ALI WYNE: Thanks, Pattie. I would pick up where Angela left off with her most recent answer. I do think that Russia sees maybe a tactical opportunity to diversify its diplomatic portfolio as it were. But as Angela said, we have to take into account not only Russia’s fundamental, enduring distrust of the United States, but also its fundamental and growing dependence on China, a dependence that can be measured in economic terms and diplomatic terms. I wouldn’t go so far as to say that China is sanguine about the prospect of some kind of rapprochement between the United States and Russia. Given how insistent the second Trump administration has been on entertaining this possibility of a reverse Nixon or a reverse Kissinger, China has its apprehensions, but I wouldn’t say that those apprehensions have morphed into trepidation.

As an example, recently Russia’s security chief, the main security chief, Sergei Shoigu, went to Beijing, [and] met with President Xi, and China and Russia. In their joint readouts of that meeting, they hailed the continued momentum of Sino-Russian ties. So, I think the momentum in that relationship between China and Russia continues apace. And I don’t see any reason for that trend to change. I would just say that if there is to be any fundamental change in the dynamics of the Sino-Russian relationship, I think that those would be far more likely to emerge from a recalibration on the part of either China or Russia about the net strategic utility of the relationship, as opposed to from external pressure.

I think that what we have seen to date is that external pressure from the West—and I think particularly from the United States—has had the unintended effect, the unfortunate effect of perhaps compelling China and Russia to strengthen their embrace. And despite the possibility of a tactical reset in U.S.-Russia relations, I would still argue that on balance, over the long-term, I think that Russia continues regard the United States as its principal adversary, China continues to regard the United States as its principal adversary. And so long as those fundamental strategic judgments hold, it isn’t clear to me that perhaps a tactical reprieve in U.S.-Russia relations would alter that fundamental dynamic.

So just in brief, to summarize, China is certainly monitoring developments in the U.S.-Russia relationship, which as a number of others on the call have said, have come at a dizzying pace, and I think that that dizzying pace will continue. So China is not sanguine. China will continue to monitor developments between the United States and Russia. But I would say that from Russia’s perspective, I think that Russia regards the next four years as an opportunity to extract perhaps tactical concessions from the United States. I don’t see any evidence thus far that Russia sees an opportunity to reset its relationship with the United States fundamentally in a way that would outlast the second Trump administration, and I think that China takes comfort in that likelihood.

TARA VARMA: So, you know, Pattie, a number of leaders have reached out to Xi Jinping and to the PRC asking them to, first of all, lean into Vladimir Putin, convince him actually to begin the cessation of hostilities. I think we need to remind our listeners as well that this is a blatant violation of territorial sovereignty and of international law by Vladimir Putin, who invaded a sovereign country, Ukraine, three years ago now. A number of leaders have reached out to China hoping that, because Xi Jinping seems to be the only leader able to talk to Vladimir Putin right now, he would listen to them and help put an end to this war. What we’ve seen is not exactly that. It’s been very significant material support by China, which has helped Russia not only continue the war but actually renew its stockpile of weapons. So I’m not saying that we shouldn’t do it, but I feel like a number of leaders have done that and it hasn’t panned out completely yet. I think the developments of the past 24 to 48 hours show us that Europe is taking these new developments quite seriously. In London, Prime Minister Starmer and French President Macron said that they were working with Volodymyr Zelenskyy on a peace proposal that they would then submit to the U.S., and they’re also working on a ceasefire. So I think they’ve kind of understood what the U.S. is putting on the table and how to ensure that some, even minimal, form of U.S. support be maintained.

But you’re right. The question is whether there can be troops on the ground or not. This has been a topic of really high contention amongst Europeans themselves. Macron and Starmer were two leaders who didn’t want to rule out that there might be troops on the ground, not mentioning whether they should be European or NATO-led troops, but that there should be some form of European participation in ensuring Ukraine’s security in the mid-to-long-run. And there have been no agreements, to say the least, on this issue. We’ve seen a lot of internal European divisions.

So before reaching out to other powers, I would say I think we need European unity on this and to decide how far we want to go as Europeans in protecting Ukraine. And my sense is in the past three years, Europeans have been quite clear that Ukraine’s security, Ukraine’s future is not only existential, but it’s really tied to European security and so that we have a special responsibility when it comes to ensuring the security of Ukraine. We need to decide this amongst ourselves and then I think reach out to other powers who might want to participate as well and who would form a clear deterrent to Vladimir Putin. I think that’s important because whatever ceasefire is decided right now, it needs to be very clear in its terms that it will deter Vladimir Putin in the end not to invade Ukraine again, which is I think a very big risk right now.

TARA VARMA: I guess it depends on China, right? If China really wanted to do this, it would mean 180 degrees on the position that it’s taken until now. So I think if it were serious about it and that it wanted to involve troops, and these would be Chinese troops and for instance, maybe not UN troops, I think it might help definitely to deter Vladimir Putin. But that entails China fundamentally changing its position right now.

And what we’ve seen in the past three years is Xi Jinping reaching out to Vladimir Putin quite a lot. Not so much reaching out to Volodymyr Zelenskyy. I think Zelenskyy and Xi only spoke once. I’m not saying that it’s impossible. I mean, I could see how, first of all, China would want to participate in the reconstruction of Ukraine. I think that’s going to be a big issue. And if China is serious about this, it will definitely want some political stability on the ground. So I think if China sees an interest for itself in peace finally happening in Ukraine, then yes, it might shift gears and be serious about it.

But that would mean, again, a change in its relationship with Russia, which is not unforeseeable considering how we’re seeing a U.S.-Russia rapprochement right now that I’m guessing, that I don’t know how comfortable Beijing is [about]. So that would mean Beijing shifting its gears a bit. It’s not impossible, but it’s not what we’ve seen until now.

ASLI AYDINTAŞBAŞ: Pattie, I think China’s involvement in Ukraine’s post-war reconstruction may be inevitable and may actually not be such a bad thing for Ukraine’s sovereignty and survival, given that the United States, namely the Trump administration, has made it very clear that they do not want to spend, in the words of President Trump, one more dime on Ukraine. So, China may be one of the few players out there willing to engage in reconstruction.

But would it be a hedge against further Russian aggression? I don’t know. I think it may be too early to talk about that. We have to see how talks roll out, whether they are able to put together a successful peacekeeping force, and if the Russian aggression towards Ukraine is at least paused for now.

So it is too early to say whether China’s economic involvement in Ukraine brings the type of long-term stability we are seeking. But I think countries will be looking for that, looking to see if China can play a constructive role. We are, of course, in very much of an upside-down situation. We’ve long criticized China for its predatory economic practices in Asia and Africa and here and there. You know, it was the job of U.S. diplomats to go around the world and developing countries especially and warn these countries about the debt trap from China and about deeper economic engagement with China. But it’s really hard to make that case at this moment in history, when we have, you know, a U.S. president talking about, you know, sort of getting Greenland or a riviera in Gaza, or putting on the table a very sort of extractionist deal with Ukraine for critical minerals.

So if the U.S. changes its tone towards a more, perhaps for lack of a better word, extractionist agenda, economic agenda to various parts of the world and abdicates its role as the enforcer of rules and norms and the liberal order and so on, it is really very difficult to make a case against deeper economic engagement with China for many parts of the world, including, I would say, eventually Europe. We’ll see how that goes. I mean, Ukraine may be too weak to play footsie with China at this point, because they’re so dependent on Western support and weapons and so on, but other countries may start seeking economic partnerships with China as a result of a new posture from Washington.

I will quickly flag Turkey for the reconstruction discussion, because this is a country that has huge experience in reconstruction and energy sectors and is known as a country that exports infrastructure and development projects all around Africa, North Africa, the Middle East.

So I think what is for me interesting to see [is] if Europeans and U.S. will tap into Turkey’s resources. Turkey clearly does not have the money to pay for Ukraine’s reconstruction. But it has the ability to quickly help with roads and energy grid infrastructure and so on, if they will become sort of a preferred party so as not to leave it all to China, but if such a new arrangement could in itself serve as a reset in relations between Turkey and Europe or the West in general.

ANGELA STENT: Yes, thank you for that question. And let me just say something about peacekeeping because this has been an interesting discussion. Don’t forget that Sergei Lavrov, the Russian foreign minister, has explicitly said, no European troops will be allowed to be peacekeepers in Ukraine. So I think we’re very far away from even contemplating what kind of peacekeeping force they would have.

Alright, let me turn now to North Korea. North Korea has become a very important ally of Russia in its war with Ukraine, sending troops, providing ammunition, artillery for the Russians, and we don’t quite know what the Russians are providing the North Koreans, but we suspect a lot of it is high-tech, satellites, and maybe even contributing towards their own nuclear program. And Putin sees this alliance, as you say, it’s a mutual defense pact, with North Korea as part of Russia’s growing role as the leader of what Russia calls, or Putin calls, the world majority, or what we might call the Global South.

So this is not just some kind of temporary relationship only directed towards helping Russia win the war with Ukraine. I think if and when the war ends maybe they’re not going to need the North Korean soldiers who’ve been dying at very high rates, by the way, in Russia. But I believe that this relationship will continue. And again, it provides some extra leverage for Russia in its relationship with China, which is such an asymmetrical relationship as we can see.

And I would expect this to continue because the Russians have never been that concerned about North Korea’s nuclear program. What they’re really concerned about would be if something happened to the North Korean regime and you had a united Korea that was in the Western camp. Again, it seems unlikely, but that would be their deepest fears. So they’ve overcome some of the reservations they had about dealing with North Korea. And I think as long as you have Putin or someone who shares his views in power in the Kremlin, and as long as you have Kim Jong Un there, and he’s quite a young man, I think this relationship will remain and it’s really not going to be that greatly affected if the war ends.

ALI WYNE: Thanks, Pattie, and I do want to underscore one of the points that you made in asking your question, which is I think that there is a tendency sometimes to perhaps overstate the import of interactions that we see between competitors and adversaries. One sort of analytical and prescriptive mistake is to discount the import of deepening alignment, but another analytical and prospective mistake, which we highlight in the paper is to aggrandize. So point one, I think.

Point two is that, and I think we also make this point in the paper, I don’t think that anyone would deny that there is deepening alignment between these four countries as a whole and between various subsets of this quad, the dark quad as you said. I think it’s important to note though that China goes to great lengths to—whether or not you agree with its self-perception or its self-depiction—but China does go to great lengths to present itself as separate from the other three, and China is very loathe to be grouped in with the other three. I think that China likes to present itself as being an upholder of the international system, whereas the other three are perhaps more disruptive.

And certainly, if you just look at China and Russia, there is a persuasive argument to be made that Russia doesn’t have the wherewithal to present a coherent challenge to the United States, to present a coherent challenge to the international system. I think that Russia has concluded that it can best remind the rest of the world of its influence by sowing upheaval, and I think that China likes to present itself as being more of a stabilizing force.

Another point is that, as far as how China is appraising developments between the United States and Russia, my sense is that China seems to have concluded that even if it were to pursue a fundamental recalibration of its disposition towards Russia, that shift wouldn’t change the broad thrust of Western policy towards China. And so I think China’s conclusion is, why would we jettison a partnership with Russia if that action wouldn’t produce significant strategic dividends for China?

I guess the last point I would make is that the broad contours of China’s diplomacy seem unlikely to change, and I would argue that China is broadly trying to diversify its diplomatic portfolio and particularly trying to strengthen its relationships with three sets of countries. The first set of countries, which is the one that we’ve been discussing mostly in this conversation, is with countries with which the United States has either competitive or adversarial relations. So in category one, China is trying to strengthen its relationships with Russia, with Iran, with North Korea.

Category two is with so-called middle powers or swing states or pivot states, whatever your preferred nomenclature, but these are regional powers that are, I think, trying in many cases to play the United States and China off of one another and that see an opportunity to exercise greater agency by simultaneously courting the United States and China. These are countries such as Brazil, Indonesia, South Africa, Turkey. So, category two is these middle powers that haven’t decisively thrown their lot in with either the United States or China. I think China is trying to make further inroads with those middle powers.

The third category of countries where China is arguably exerting its greatest amount of effort is countries in the developing world. I hesitate to reduce the enormity of the developing world to a phrase such as the Global South or the global majority. But certainly, if you look at where China is building new diplomatic postings, where China is strengthening its trade, its investment, its infrastructure footprint, I do think that the linchpin of China’s foreign policy thus far, when it comes to pushing back against growing pressure from advanced industrial democracies, it is in the developing world. So despite this dizzying set of developments in U.S.-Russia relations, I would summarize by saying that I would expect the broad contours of China’s diplomacy to be largely unchanged.

So just to summarize, China is looking to strengthen its relationships with three sets of countries: U.S. competitors and adversaries; middle countries; and then countries in the developing world. And I would expect that regardless of what transpires between the United States and Russia, that three-part diplomatic strategy on China’s part will likely endure.

TARA VARMA: You know, Pattie, this is a really important issue. And I think looking at the legacy that the Biden team had left, looking at a world where the U.S. and Europe could work together on China, one of the things that I thought was [that] there was until a few weeks ago, a shared assessment or shared understanding from the European side and the American side of the trajectory that China was taking, which was more and more autocratic, more and more supportive of Russia. And yet China is such a crucial part both of the American and the European economies and the American and European economies being intertwined themselves. This triangle was really important to tackle.

I think we’re in a fairly different situation now where I’m not sure that the U.S. and Europe share the same assessment when it comes to China and what to do with China. It seems quite clear that President Trump wants to do a deal with President Xi Jinping in the same way that he wants to deal with Russia. And that he believes in spheres of influences, that China has the right to a sphere of influence, that Russia has the right to a sphere of influence, and in the same way that the U.S. has a right to a sphere of influence. And that he believes that these three great powers are the great powers that matter today.

He evidently doesn’t really care about what Europeans think, or doesn’t believe in their contribution in any way whatsoever. I was thinking the U.S. and Europe could cooperate on critical raw materials. When we look at the negotiation that he is starting with President Zelensky, it’s really about the U.S. having access to critical raw materials, not the U.S.’s partners in any way. Same for securing key technologies or building export control, building key standards on technology, all these issues that were really key to the previous U.S. administration. They don’t seem key at all to the current administration, or at least the current administration doesn’t see a role for allies in that relationship.

So I think the triangulation in the Europe-U.S.-China relationship is really different now than it was a few weeks ago, and I see unfortunately now very little space for discussion and deal-making, because I think what President Trump is looking for is not so much transactionalism or deal-making as we were told, but he’s in the logic where it’s more of an extortion really, he’s looking to make deals with people where his counterparts don’t benefit from the deal at all. He wants to be the sole benefactor of the deals that he makes. We are seeing this with Ukraine, we’re seeing this with Europeans. And so, unfortunately, I think the space for cooperation is really limited right now between the U.S. and Europe on building a China strategy.

ASLI AYDINTAŞBAŞ: Pattie, it doesn’t look like someone from the Trump administration has read our paper, at least the part on the Global South. I’m kidding, of course. The Global South does not seem to be a priority for the Trump administration and our recommendation that the United States must more vigorously counter Chinese and Russian charge, that it wants a hegemonic control and so on. It just seems so irrelevant at this point in history. It’s hard to see Washington prioritizing an affirmative economic agenda in the Global South or [going] around the world talking about reforms to the longstanding problems in multilateral institutions.

I mean, if the cuts in USAID and U.S. foreign aid were not enough of a sign, I think that the type of policies and language we’re hearing—on tariffs and the Gaza Riviera, Greenland, and Ukraine, rare minerals deal, et cetera—it is making a clear case to countries in the Global South that [the] U.S. is unpredictable, somewhat chaotic, but also that it is going to very much act like—Tara has used the word extractionist, and I think that is a good expression—but it’s going to very much have an America First agenda.

This is a different United States, and it is clearly not one that is going to be seeking a more inclusive international order. So that has a sense of creating an equality in terms of how countries see the U.S. and China.

And it also creates a situation in which Russia and China do not have to try very hard to make a case that the U.S. has a hegemonic attitude in its relations with other countries.

Because the truth is, power as an enforcer of a rules-based international order of liberal democracy and so on was a huge chunk of U.S. power and leverage around the world, [including] the Global South. Sometimes countries resented this democracy versus autocracy argument. But it was the case that the United States was still the primary enforcer of a rules-based order and a defender of democracy.

Now, if that’s not going to be the case, I think there could be a sense that China and the United States are really, you know, sort of coming from a similar place. And China does have the advantage of having more predictability and stability in what it offers the world.

So what I see right now in the Global South is a huge panic. They don’t know how to deal with the Trump administration. They don’t know how to engage with the Trump administration. They don’t know how to position themselves in a world that’s not just transactional, but it’s possibly a triangulated form of a great power condominium and a world in which there are spheres of influence. And that’s really bad news for a lot of countries.

And I think that, you know, the two high profile visits we’ve seen recently at the White House, you know, the King of Jordan coming to the Oval Office, or President Zelenskyy coming into the office, and having to leave in situations that left him far worse off, somewhat humiliated and worse off back at home, is also creating this sense that maybe the Global South will stay behind and watch it for now and see where it goes. And it doesn’t look like it has any other option at the moment.