Should China have a role in ending the war in Ukraine?

Pavel K. Baev
Reaching an armistice in Ukraine remains an arduous task, and Beijing has no desire to play second fiddle to Trump’s push for a quick end to “ridiculous” hostilities. China would be more than content to see the hastily drafted U.S. plan for ending the hostilities hitting the wall of Putin’s intransigence. This probable dreadlock may open an opportunity for China to step into the peacemaking process and demonstrate its ability to make a difference. Wang Yi, China’s experienced foreign minister, dropped a hint and connected well with the worried Europeans at the Munich Security Conference by insisting that all stakeholders in stable peace must be included in its making.

Putin’s enthusiasm for bargaining with Trump irks China, not least because Moscow has swiftly abandoned the discourse on countering the “Anglo-Saxon” hostility and breaking the U.S. “hegemony” in the world order. Responding to Putin’s call, Xi Jinping refrained from criticizing Russia but found it opportune to emphasize the futility of U.S. attempts to weaken the China-Russia partnership. This signaling may prepare the ground for advancing a new initiative when a frustrated Trump leaves the negotiation table. 

Robin Brooks
China became the main exporter—by far—to Russia in the wake of the latter’s invasion of Ukraine. This export relationship comprises both direct exports from China to Russia and transshipments to Russia via third countries, especially through Central Asia. These exports have more than replaced the flow of goods from Western countries to Russia before the war and are pivotal to keeping the Russian economy and war apparatus running. China therefore has a huge amount of leverage over Russia, on top of the obvious energy purchases (gas, oil, coal). China can exert this influence to speed along a ceasefire.

Jonathan A. Czin
When it comes to Ukraine, China is part of the problem—not the solution. The Trump administration’s goal should be to minimize China’s role in both the conflict and its cessation. Inviting China into the diplomacy over a cessation of hostilities would only reward China’s support for Russia by bestowing Beijing with an unprecedented and unmerited role in European security. China’s presence in these conversations would only diminish U.S. and allied leverage over Moscow since Beijing’s focus is on bolstering Russia’s position vis-à-vis the United States and NATO. China has done little to nothing to restrain Russia thus far in the war—primarily because the Sino-Russian entente is deeper and larger than the Ukraine issue. It is a strategic relationship whose raison d’etre is competition with the West.

It was no accident that Xi’s first state visit after becoming president in 2013 was to Moscow—and the war has only accelerated the entente. Indeed, China has played a unique and consequential role in abetting Russia’s war against Ukraine by offsetting the impact of U.S. and allied sanctions and helping Russia reconstitute its defense industrial base. Meanwhile, China’s diplomatic initiatives on Ukraine—such as the principles for peace proposed in 2023—have been disappointing. These initiatives seem primarily designed to diminish European pressure by dangling the illusory prospect that China could somehow play a constructive role in ending this conflict. That notion is a trap—and we should not fall for it.

Patricia M. Kim
Beijing has reportedly offered to host Trump and Putin for talks on ending the war in Ukraine, underscoring China’s growing diplomatic ambitions. China is not a neutral party, and it cannot play the role of an honest broker. Nevertheless, Beijing wields significant influence over Moscow, and its role in any eventual peace process should not be dismissed outright. The Ukrainian leadership has expressed openness to Beijing’s involvement, recognizing Beijing’s unique leverage over Russia.

A key element of any peace deal will focus on where (temporary) borders are drawn to freeze the fighting, in addition to security guarantees for Ukraine. China has consistently asserted its commitment to sovereignty and territorial integrity—principles it claims to uphold, including in the context of the Ukraine war. As Russia’s key strategic partner, Beijing has played a crucial role in easing Moscow’s economic and diplomatic isolation. It should be encouraged to use its leverage to push for a settlement that preserves as much of Ukraine’s territorial integrity as possible.

The key is to frame Beijing’s involvement not as a quid pro quo but as a test of its credibility as a responsible global actor. Expectations for China’s engagement should be shaped by and originate from Ukraine and Europe—partners Beijing has actively courted as it seeks to position itself as a stable and reliable global power.

Michael E. O’Hanlon
China’s role can be very important indeed. Already, Beijing has helped persuade Moscow not to use nuclear weapons in this war, and while it has otherwise supported Putin too much, it has not sent lethal weapons to Russia, in keeping with American admonitions not to do so. Moreover, its ongoing purchases of Russian oil and gas have actually been desired by Washington, since the U.S. goal with the oil price cap was to restrict Russian revenues without depriving world markets of Russian hydrocarbon exports.

Going forward, China could threaten to scale back its economic collaboration with Russia if Moscow refuses international entreaties for a compromise peace deal. For example, it could stop shipping industrial equipment to Russia—equipment that Russia then uses to make its own weapons. To be sure, any such Chinese action would be pathbreaking, given the closeness of the Putin-Xi relationship, but if the United States under Trump can consider positive incentives toward Russia, perhaps China could be asked to consider negative ones should the peace process stalemate due to obvious Russian recalcitrance.

Beijing might also try to play the role of mediator, perhaps even in conjunction with the United States, in any negotiation process, given its leverage. Since the United States is squarely on the side of Ukraine in this unprovoked Russian war of aggression, it might improve the prospects of any negotiation for there to be a co-mediator that is seen as more pro-Russian or at least neutral.

Constanze Stelzenmüller
Russia has given no sign so far that it is genuinely interested in a cessation of hostilities—and the Trump White House may be dangerously underestimating the obstacles on the Kremlin side to a swift ceasefire. As China has been supporting Russia’s invasion, a Chinese role in brokering a ceasefire and/or peace would require Beijing to step away from that role and offer credible assurances that it is willing and able to assume a neutral stance.

Pavel K. Baev
Moscow is worried about Trump’s overreaction to a probable fiasco, and Ukraine is desperate not to be abandoned by Washington, so both parties may welcome a proactive Chinese move. Putin is in no position to argue with Xi, who could reinforce the already established proposition that Ukraine will not join NATO. What could make a hypothetical Chinese proposal agreeable for Ukraine is a reference to the principle of territorial integrity, which was reiterated in the initial 12-point peace plan Beijing issued in 2023 but then omitted in the proposition advanced together with Brazil. The Trump team would hardly be able to influence the content and the timing of China’s new initiative, but it may signal support for the inclusion of the point that threats to use nuclear weapons are unacceptable. Beijing did make this point on several occasions, and its interest in preventing a nuclear escalation is undiminished. 

Robin Brooks
China is one of the few countries that has so far been tariffed. The tariff imposed—10% on top of already existing tariffs—is non-trivial and raises the average tariff rate of the United States on China from just below 20% to just below 30%. The Trump administration’s focus on China is therefore already elevated, both for trade and geopolitical reasons, and it can try to use this focus to incentivize Beijing to push Russia into making concessions on Ukraine. 

Jonathan A. Czin
The Trump administration has little ability to influence China’s policy toward Ukraine and Russia, except at the margins because China’s enduring concern throughout this war has been to ensure Moscow avoids defeat. China has been willing to pay a diplomatic cost for that objective but does not want to pay more than it must in its relationship with Europe and the United States. At best, the United States—working in tandem with U.S. allies and partners—might be able to dissuade China from inflaming the situation by applying targeted and concerted pressure. This is what occurred at the start of the war when the Biden administration dissuaded China from providing lethal aid to Russia by emphasizing Washington’s readiness to punish China for providing such support. Since then, the United States and its allies have been largely relegated to imposing modest costs on China for supporting Russia’s war, which has bounded but not undermined China’s strategy of supporting Russia. The Trump administration’s decision to pivot to Russia only further diminishes its ability to influence China’s policies on Ukraine and Russia.

Seeking China’s help in ending the war would only reinforce Beijing’s perception that the United States and our allies are too weak to persuade Moscow to do so on our own and would buttress Beijing’s calculation that supporting Russia is a winning strategy. Moreover, Beijing has little interest in helping the United States, since the United States could very well reallocate the military materiel it is currently providing to Ukraine to the Indo-Pacific theater—which is exactly what some members of the Trump administration have argued the United States should do.

The U.S. focus should be on keeping China out of any future European security arrangements and curbing its support for Russia as much as possible. 

Patricia M. Kim
China’s biggest fear is being sidelined while the United States and Russia negotiate a deal that it has no insight into or ability to shape.

The fact that the Trump team is engaging with Russian counterparts on a potential peace deal—without Ukraine or European stakeholders at the table—is deeply concerning, to say the least. However, one silver lining is that this has likely spiked Beijing’s anxiety about a potential U.S.-Russia reset that could weaken its strategic position.

The Trump administration should capitalize on this anxiety and encourage Beijing to play a constructive role in supporting the peace process. But it must remain cautious of Beijing’s attempts to link its “help” on Ukraine to other U.S. concessions. Again, it’s critical for Washington, in coordination with Ukraine and European allies, to set the right expectations for Beijing’s involvement.

Beijing is likely to advocate forcefully for lifting sanctions on Russia, given its deep-rooted antipathy for Western sanctions, which it views as an instrument of geopolitical containment. The Trump administration must resist premature sanctions relief and ensure any rollback includes strong snapback provisions to hold Moscow accountable and deter future violations of a peace deal. 

Michael E. O’Hanlon
If Trump avoids totally blowing up the U.S.-China relationship (for example, with tariffs of 60% or more on all imports from China), I believe there is a basis for cooperation in ending the war. The war serves neither Beijing’s nor Washington’s interests. Trump recognizes the importance of ending the conflict soon—rightly, in my view, as long as Ukraine remains sovereign and safe under the terms of any armistice or peace—and his relative lack of sentimentality about the war or empathy for Ukraine, while off-putting to many Americans (including me), may constitute an advantage in working together with China on the issue.

Beijing will not be in a hurry to increase the pressure on Putin but even suggesting that it might could affect Russia’s calculus in negotiations.

Moreover, Trump, Xi, and a broader international coalition might agree to lift sanctions on Russia if Moscow agrees to terms that Kyiv is prepared to accept. In other words, acting together, we might provide Putin with more positive incentives to end the war combined with more negative incentives not to continue it. 

Constanze Stelzenmüller
The past four weeks show that the Trump administration’s proximate goal is to steer Russia away from China by rehabilitating the U.S.-Russia relationship while downgrading relations with Ukraine and largely sidelining the Europeans. Meanwhile, the administration is threatening a trade war with China and at the same time signaling that it would like a great-power bargain with Beijing. If that is the administration’s ultimate objective, it should demand that China step back from its support of Russia. It should also be wary of driving the Europeans toward Beijing.

But Beijing clearly sees an opportunity here. Senior Chinese party official Wang Yi remarked at the Munich Security Conference that “some countries believe might makes right and have opened a Pandora’s box marked law of the jungle,” cast his own country as the true leader of a rules-based world, and ended with an invitation to Europe to deepen its partnership with China. Noah Barkin, a seasoned observer of European China policy, warns that “if the Trump administration isn’t careful, Europe could come to see Washington as a greater threat than Beijing.” The Trump administration’s course should not end up enabling China’s own quest for dominance, including in Europe. 

Pavel K. Baev
The problem of security guarantees for both Ukraine and Russia looms over any peace plan and may have no practical solution at all—but it can perhaps be circumvented, and China could chart a path around it. Much like the Trump administration, Beijing would be glad to leave the burden of responsibility to the European coalition of the willing, which indeed is beginning to take shape. Xi may impress upon Putin that such a deployment, which might amount to just a tithe of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s estimate of 200,000 troops, would not signify an expansion of NATO “military infrastructure” (a fake claim Putin has recycled for many years). One element of any plan that Moscow and Beijing will agree to is the lifting of all Western sanctions, which would amount to a cancellation of the norm that the crime of aggression must be punished.

Jonathan A. Czin
The United States would look foolish and disingenuous to seek China’s assistance in reconstructing Ukraine. Both the first Trump administration and the Biden administration have warned for years about the hazards involved in China’s development and infrastructure initiatives and expended political capital trying to keep Beijing out of other countries’ critical infrastructure, especially their telecommunications systems. For the United States to turn around and invite Beijing into Ukraine would discredit these efforts and undermine any future U.S. effort to raise legitimate concerns about China’s development initiatives.

Meanwhile, it is not clear that China has much to offer Ukraine in the way of assistance, especially given its need to focus its resources on fortifying its own flagging economy in a seemingly inevitable second trade war with the United States. Moreover, since 2021, Beijing has been retrenching and rationalizing its Belt and Road Initiative rather than expanding it. Finally, China generally provides financing and not development assistance to third countries—and the United States, Europe, and Ukraine would all be better off seeking loans from Western institutions than Chinese ones, which are stringent and unforgiving in seeking repayment—even for countries in dire need of relief. Instead, Ukraine could look to traditional international financial institutions or perhaps a coalition of European and even sympathetic Asian countries like Japan to help finance its reconstruction.

Patricia M. Kim
Questions are mounting over which countries will help maintain the peace in Ukraine. There’s a strong case to be made for establishing a multinational peacekeeping force that includes not only European troops and observers but also personnel from other countries, including China, to raise the stakes for Russia in violating the terms of a ceasefire. The greater the potential costs of violating a deal—relational, military, or economic—the greater the deterrent effect on Putin or any future Russian leaders.

Rebuilding Ukraine will require an extraordinary financial effort. As of December 2023, the World Bank estimated that Ukraine’s reconstruction and recovery will cost $486 billion—a figure that has undoubtedly grown. This burden is far too great for Europe or the United States to shoulder alone and requires a broad international effort.

China pledged in its 2023 Ukraine position paper to assist in Ukraine’s postwar reconstruction. This commitment should be tested. Obviously, Ukraine must remain vigilant against potential national security risks posed by China or any other actor involved in rebuilding its critical infrastructure. To mitigate these risks, Kyiv should assemble the widest possible coalition of partners, ensuring access to diverse options, as well as legal, technical, and security expertise, to ensure a resilient and secure recovery. 

Michael E. O’Hanlon
China could help with what Lise Howard of Georgetown University and I have proposed as an Atlantic-Asian Security Community that could help secure any negotiated peace for Ukraine.

As part of the terms of a possible deal (still a very long way off, clearly) China might even consider joining Western nations in deploying troops to Ukraine—as observers and as a tripwire against future Russian attack. This idea may be a more negotiable way of helping Ukraine secure itself in the future than the possibility of NATO membership. Deploying a fairly thick presence of uniformed military observers from numerous countries into Ukraine after a peace accord is struck, with the promise to reinforce and defend them in the event of a crisis (rather than to withdraw trainers under duress, as happened before Russia’s February 2022 assault on Ukraine), could help outside countries reduce the risk of a rekindled conflict down the road. Under this idea, the participating nations would not need to make a decision to defend their own troops by consensus but could act individually and therefore quickly and reliably—improving the deterrent effect.

Constanze Stelzenmüller
Again, given Beijing’s support for Russia’s invasion, it is hard to imagine China as a credible mediator or supplier of peacekeeping troops. It would no doubt be interested in and able to play a key role in reconstruction.

But it bears pointing out that the Russia-U.S. rapprochement currently being pursued by the Trump administration is highly focused on securing further sacrifices from Ukraine, leaving little room for Ukrainian agency or interests—much less reconstruction on anything other than extractive terms. Russia, meanwhile, is clearly not willing to agree to a ceasefire or negotiations except on its own maximalist terms.