Over the past decade, as the United States employed increasingly robust sanctions to gradually ratchet up the pressure on Iran to curb its nuclear ambitions, Washington has struggled with the question of how to elicit more cooperation from China, a major buyer of Iranian crude oil and no fan of sanctions, especially unilateral ones. On June 28, the Obama administration granted China an exemption from U.S. sanctions on the Central Bank of Iran (CBI) for significantly reducing its crude-oil purchases from the Islamic Republic. This suggests that one of the biggest carrots Washington can offer to China in exchange for greater support for the U.S. sanctions regimen is expanded opportunities for China’s national oil companies (NOCs) to invest in oil and natural-gas exploration and production in the United States. The greater the stakes that China’s NOCs have in the United States, the thinking goes, the greater the chance they will think twice about doing business in Iran.
The Chinese government responded to the new U.S. sanctions signed into law by President Obama on December 31, 2011, by saying Washington should not expect any cooperation from Beijing. Over the past six months, officials from China’s foreign ministry have repeatedly stated that China’s energy trade with—and investment in—Iran do not violate the various United Nations Security Council resolutions on Iran and that the new U.S. sanctions would not affect China-Iran energy relations.
Despite Beijing’s implication that China would continue to import oil from Iran at 2011 levels (more than 550,000 barrels a day), the main Chinese buyer of Iranian crude oil, Sinopec, responded to the new U.S. sanctions by dramatically cutting its purchases from Iran by 25 percent in the first five months of 2012. At the end of every year, Chinese oil traders negotiate their supply contracts with National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) for the following year. The commencement of their negotiations in late 2011 coincided with growing support in Washington, especially on Capitol Hill, for ratcheting up the pressure on Iran by subjecting foreign firms that do business with the CBI—the primary clearinghouse for Iranian oil transactions—to U.S. financial sanctions. When China’s oil traders sat down at the negotiating table with their Iranian counterparts, Iran’s increasing international isolation was palpable. Sinopec pushed for lower prices and a longer credit period, while NIOC insisted on higher prices and a shorter credit period. The two companies did not sign a new contract until late March 2012 (with Sinopec reportedly extracting some concessions, which have not been disclosed publicly), causing the plunge in China’s crude oil imports from Iran.
Commentary
Op-edGetting China to Turn on Iran
July 19, 2012