Africa’s latent assets

Will Africa finally begin a sustained convergence to the living standards of the developed world in the way China has done in the last 40 years? If so, on what basis will that happen?

While many scholars and commentators see few similarities between the Chinese and African economic experiences, we argue that, in fact, there are profound similarities, which Africa can draw from. Prior to Deng Xiaoping’s 1978 reforms, China suffered for 200 years. The country was convulsed by civil wars, corruption, colonialism, state failure, and disastrous, misguided economic policies like the Great Leap Forward. But it turned out that China had many latent assets and hidden social strengths on which economic prosperity could be built. A central one was a social norm that, as Confucius put it, one should “promote those who are worthy and talented,” (2003, p. 138). Meritocracy turned out to be a powerful asset on which to build an inclusive market economy once Deng Xiaoping initiated his reform plan.

In the modern period, Africa has similarly suffered from many of the same adverse shocks and syndromes. Then again, we believe, also like China, Africa has deep latent assets, of which we focus on three. If properly recognized and harnessed, such assets can not only evoke a new way of thinking about the future of economic development in the continent, but turn Africa’s economic potential into economic success.

Meritocracy. Like China, the majority of African societies are built on achieved, not ascribed status: Indeed, data shows that Africans’ perceptions and anticipations of social mobility are the highest in the world. These expectations are important for behavior and policy preferences. Why are Africans so optimistic? One reason is that they see that their lives and futures are under their control. More than anywhere else, Africans are more likely to say that the way to get ahead economically is through hard work, not luck and connections. These are also exactly the values they wish to transmit to their children.

Data shows that Africans’ perceptions and anticipations of social mobility are the highest in the world.

Cosmopolitanism. This second asset is distinct from the Chinese experience. Because of the heterogeneous and small-scale nature of African society, Africans endlessly deal with differences: Different languages, different cultures, and different histories. Africans are the least mono-lingual people in the world and, interestingly, the word for “stranger” and “guest” are the same in most African languages. This experience makes Africans the most able culturally to cope with our modern globalized world—and people who can deal with differences and adapt will succeed.

Skepticism towards authority. The final asset, also different from China, is Africa’s political culture, which features a deep skepticism towards authority. Historically, this tendency kept the size of African polities small. Today, it can form the basis for effective inclusive states that work in the national interest because people are skeptical and thus attuned to the abuse of power. The difficult political terrain that the colonial powers bequeathed the region has prevented the formation of such states. But the latent skepticism holds significant promise: Africa will not fall foul of the types of charismatic populists that one sees in Latin America.

Such is the task for African policymakers: To stop focusing on shopping lists of Western best practices and, instead, become attuned to where the constraints that stop the latent assets of their societies from flourishing are.

Africa’s latent talents are sociological, as China’s were, and they point to the real reason to be optimistic about the future: Not the extent of natural resources, but the talents and character of Africa’s peoples. For them to bear fruit, some basic institutional problems have to be solved, but China’s history is again revealing. Deng did not solve all the institutional problems for China’s latent assets to lead to an economic take-off. Critically, he knew, even in a challenging context, which areas could best take advantage of the latent assets the society possessed.

Such is the task for African policymakers: To stop focusing on shopping lists of Western best practices and, instead, become attuned to where the constraints that stop the latent assets of their societies from flourishing are.

Here is an example: On July 20, 2014, a Nigerian-American infected with Ebola landed in Lagos, Nigeria from Liberia. He collapsed and died four days later, having lied about having been in contact with Ebola patients. He was initially treated for malaria, and, before people understood the true problem, he had infected medical staff who infected others. An insuperable problem for a state with weak capacity, no? Not at all. Within a matter of days, the Nigerian state contact traced and quarantined over 500 people. Ebola was stopped in its tracks. The Nigerian state may be weak in many dimensions, but in personal connections to society, critical for something like contact processing, it is far stronger than the U.S., which was never able to implement such a system during the COVID-19 pandemic. A latent asset of most African states is that they are deeply embedded in society. Maybe this cannot be leveraged to do many of things they are “supposed” to do, but perhaps it can be used to do many other things, which are critical to sustaining economic growth.