US-China engagement in Africa: A crossroads

Since the end of the COVID-19 pandemic, China has gradually but steadfastly resumed its economic engagement with Africa.¹ However, this reengagement has taken on new features, the most distinct being the prominence of Chinese investment in acquiring mining and critical mineral assets in Africa. In 2023 alone, the Democratic Republic of the Congo was the site of copper-related projects worth almost $1 billion,² a copper mine in Botswana was purchased for nearly $2 billion,³ and other large projects related to metals and mining across the continent totaled $7.9 billion (including lithium mining in Mali and Zimbabwe).⁴ Despite these substantial investments, China continues to evaluate areas in Africa where it could further develop its involvement in the mineral sector. During the 2024 China International Mining Conference, experts discussed new opportunities in Madagascar, Guinea, and Mozambique, where mineral resources including graphite, titanium, nickel, cobalt, and tin reserves are relatively underdeveloped and untapped.⁵

China is increasing the procurement of critical minerals for its own economic green transition, which includes the production of batteries, electric vehicles, and the development of renewable energy systems.⁶ As a result, clean energy projects in individual African countries are also being pursued by China, in parallel with its growing mining and critical mineral assets. In 2023, $290 million worth of Chinese loans were used for green-energy projects in Africa— including a hydropower plant in Madagascar, a solar power plant in Burkina Faso, and the electrification of an industrial park in Uganda.⁷

Looking ahead to 2025, the most significant change in China’s external geopolitical environment will undoubtedly be the second Trump administration’s China policy. While Africa has traditionally not been a priority for the U.S.’s grand strategy, countering China’s influence in Africa, especially on strategic and critical mineral supply chains, could emerge as one of Washington’s new priorities. If the Trump administration shifts toward the dealmaking approach that China has prioritized in the Global South, it could potentially increase U.S. effectiveness in its competition with China in Africa. President Joe Biden’s December trip to Angola in support of the Lobito railway project and potential future U.S. investment in critical minerals points to this direction,⁸ though it remains to be seen whether the Trump administration will continue this trend. 

If that is indeed the next phase, the U.S.-China great power competition in Africa could ramp up at an unprecedented pace. As China sees Africa as a critical source of raw materials to fuel its new productivity industries, Beijing is likely to enhance its effort to cut deals and protect the resources indispensable for China’s economic transition and future.

For Africa, this could be an opportunity that carries significant geopolitical risks. While Africa could benefit from the geopolitical competition between U.S. and China, it will require African countries to be particularly diligent and vigilant over the calculus, risks, and potential retaliations in the event that one of the great powers adopts a punitive approach toward African countries viewed to be working with the other side. There are many countries outside of Africa that are already engaging in this type of decisionmaking process. Singapore is one example of a smaller state maximizing their agency by calculating the pros and cons, costs and benefits of every policy that concerns the great powers. However, even they have found it difficult to continue to hedge their policies, as domestic politics rarely appreciates continually-shifting foreign policy stances.⁹ African countries and their domestic situations could be vulnerable in these rapidly shifting global geopolitics, particularly if they already hold significant debt or receive substantial development aid from either of these countries, offering them less flexibility in their foreign policy options.¹⁰ There is also the possibility that proxy wars between U.S. and China could make their way to Africa, especially if the U.S. and China articulate their support for different political camps. 

The diversification of other external partners and the strengthening of collective bargaining powers between like-minded African countries could be key for Africa to maximize its own gains. The European Union has proven to be a steadfast partner across Africa, while India, Turkey, and even Japan and South Korea have also all demonstrated growing interest in working more closely with the continent.¹¹

While China has historically chosen not to prioritize influencing domestic politics, human rights, or governance issues in African countries, the U.S. has attempted to leverage its influence on such issues in the past. However, it is expected that the second Trump administration will put little weight on these issues. In the short term, this approach may mitigate the pressures on some African governments by minimizing the conditions placed on U.S. foreign aid or trade with the continent, but in the long run, this could undermine African countries’ political and economic futures. As the impact of the U.S.’s changing approach to Africa during the Trump administration’s second term is as yet unknown, it is important to consider how China may react to U.S. involvement in Africa. It is expected that African countries will leverage engagement with the great powers for economic gains, but they must also be cautious of how their actions can affect their future stability.