This viewpoint is part of Chapter 6 of Foresight Africa 2025-2030, a report with cutting-edge insights and actionable strategies for Africa’s inclusive and sustainable development in the run-up to 2030. Read the full chapter on global partnerships.
Without effective tools to support U.S. companies, the U.S. risks losing out commercially in the African market to China and the emerging “middle powers.
When the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) was passed into law under President Bill Clinton in 2000, it did more than elevate trade and investment on the U.S.-Africa policy agenda. It also helped to forge a bipartisan consensus in Congress based on the foreign policy rationale that the U.S. has interests in Africa that were worth investing in. This consensus has endured over the last 24 years and has led to the creation of landmark initiatives such as the George W. Bush administration’s President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) and the passage of the BUILD Act, which President Donald Trump signed into law, creating the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC). This consensus has also supported approximately $8 billion in development assistance administered in Africa by the U.S. State Department and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) between FY2012 and FY2022, in annual inflation-adjusted dollars.1
The question is whether the bipartisan consensus will be sustained when the 119th Congress is sworn in and the Trump administration assumes office in January 2025. More immediately, a few pieces of legislation will be key to watch in 2025.
There appears to be broad support for the reauthorization of the Development Finance Corporation (DFC), set to expire on October 6, 2025, as the DFC Modernization and Reauthorization Act of 2024 passed through House Committee on Foreign Affairs in July with a vote of 43-2.2 In reauthorizing the DFC under the House bill, the agency would be able to operate for another seven years, its contingency liability would be doubled to $120 billion, and the number of countries where the DFC can invest would be increased.3 Already in FY2024, the DFC committed a record $12 billion of investments across 181 deals in 44 countries.4 Unfortunately, the DFC reauthorization was not attached to the 2024 National Defense Authorization Act, as some had hoped it would be, and will have to be taken up when Congress reconvenes in 2025.5
The DFC is likely to play an important role in a Trump administration Africa policy that analysts expect to be transactional and pro-business.6 Indeed, in the first Trump administration then-DFC CEO Adam Boehler sought to invest $5 billion in Morocco (which coincided with Morocco’s recognition of Israel as part of the Abraham Accords) and another $5 billion in Ethiopia.7 While both targets were unmet, it reflects a strong private sector approach that is likely to reemerge in the incoming administration, which views investments by American entrepreneurs and businesses as drivers of development, job creation, and wealth generation in Africa and the U.S.8
Under the second Trump administration, critical minerals are poised to be a key priority, given that President Trump signed the Energy Act of 2020. The act directed the secretary of energy to develop a comprehensive forecast of projected critical mineral requirements for U.S. national security.9 In December of 2024, U.S. Senators Chris Coons (D-Del) and Todd Young (R-Ind) introduced bipartisan legislation that would strengthen critical minerals supply chains in Africa and elsewhere.10 As Africa is estimated to hold about 30% of the world’s critical minerals, and with the Democratic Republic of the Congo producing 70% of the world’s cobalt, initiatives such as the Lobito Corridor project could also receive ongoing support.11
A concerted effort was made in December to renew the African Growth and Opportunity Act, which is set to expire in September 2025. In April, Senators James Risch (R-Idaho) and Coons introduced a bipartisan bill that would renew the trade pact for 16 years until 2041.12 In December, Representative John James (R-Mich) introduced legislation that would extend AGOA for 12 years.13 Apart from differences over the timeframes, the two bills were aligned in their support for an enhanced AGOA. Nevertheless, AGOA was not included in the continuing resolution (CR) which Congressional leaders reached on December 1714 (and which President-elect Donald Trump opposed), and the African trade legislation will have to be taken up anew in the next Congress.
One issue likely to complicate the reauthorization process is South Africa’s continued eligibility. Senator Risch, ranking member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, has criticized South Africa’s “continued actions that subvert U.S. national security and foreign policy interests.”15 Key members of President-elect Trump’s nominated national security team, including Senator Marco Rubio (R-Fla) and Representatives Michael Walz (R-Fla), and Elise Stefanik (R-NY) have expressed similar concerns.16 Members of Congress will have to weigh South Africa’s foreign policy actions against the fact that the country is the continent’s strongest democracy and most industrial economy, the incoming chair of the G20, and provides nearly 100% of the chromium that the U.S. imports and more than 25% of U.S. requirements for manganese, titanium, and platinum.17
In addition to the South Africa issue, organized labor has voiced concerns about the need for stronger labor and environmental protections in a renewed AGOA.18 Labor’s concerns were a factor in AGOA not being included in the December CR.

Another challenge for AGOA is whether the preference program is sufficient to enable the U.S. to compete effectively with China in Africa. In 2023, two-way trade between the U.S. and Africa was $67.5 billion, while China’s two-way trade was more than four times as large at $282.1 billion.19 Non-oil imports under AGOA have averaged $4.3 billion between 2018 and 2022, which is just over one-tenth of total U.S. imports from the region.20
To bolster the U.S. presence in the African market, Congress could provide tax incentives for U.S. companies to invest in value-added projects, especially in critical minerals, as it did in Section 30D of the Inflation Reduction Act.21 This would lower the risk and provide incentives for U.S. companies to make the long-term investments required for the U.S. to become competitive in this vital sector.
When AGOA was passed in 2000 and renewed in 2015, key constituencies, including the private sector, governors, mayors, state legislators, and civil society organizations, voiced their support. It is likely that a similar effort will be necessary for AGOA to be renewed in a timely manner. Given that one-quarter of the world’s population will be domiciled in Africa in 25 years, and without effective tools to support U.S. companies, the U.S. risks losing out commercially in the African market to China and the emerging “middle powers” that include the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey.22
An existing tool to support U.S. companies is Prosper Africa. Created in the first Trump administration, the initiative has helped to close 1,852 deals valued at $86 billion over the last four years in 49 countries.23 However, a prospective problem for Prosper Africa is that it is housed in the U.S. Agency for International Development, and, like all government agencies, is a potential target for budget cuts by the newly announced Department of Government Efficiency led by Elon Musk and Vivek Ramaswamy. Indeed, the Trump administration sought to cut $4 billion in foreign aid in 2019, but President Trump ultimately sided with the many bipartisan voices in Congress who opposed the cuts.24 Additionally, in its budget for FY2021, the Trump administration announced a 22% cut to critical foreign assistance programs, which was rejected by the incoming Biden administration.25
To safeguard this increasingly important instrument that promotes U.S. investment on the continent, Congress could reconsider the Prosper Africa Act that was introduced by Representative Michael McCaul in 2022.26
PEPFAR is another program that has enjoyed strong bipartisan support since it was first authorized in 2003. It is also one of the most impactful programs the U.S. has ever implemented, providing life-saving medicines to more than 25 million Africans. Nevertheless, there has been a sharp erosion of support among Republicans who claim the program funds “abortion on demand.”27 There is also a view that PEPFAR has transcended its original intent and that HIV is no longer an emergency, in part because science is on the brink of producing vaccines that will provide total protection against the virus to young women.28 While the program has been reauthorized for one year through March 25, 2025, uncertainty persists as to whether Congress will vote to refund PEPFAR and, if so, for how long.29 In leaving PEPFAR unfunded, the U.S. would lose an invaluable instrument of soft power that continues to make a transformative difference in the lives of millions of people on the continent.
As President-elect Trump assumes office once again in January 2025, the decisions made around the reauthorization of the DFC, the extension of AGOA, and whether to fund PEPFAR will serve as important indicators of the Trump administration’s approach to U.S.-Africa relations.
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Footnotes
- Tomás F Husted et al., “Sub-Saharan Africa: Overview and U.S. Engagement,” Congressional Research Service, July 21, 2023, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/R45428.pdf.
- “Meeks Celebrates Committee Passage of H.R. 8926 Reauthorizing the DFC,” House Foreign Affairs Committee, July 11, 2024, sec. Press Releases, https://democrats-foreignaffairs.house.gov/2024/7/meeks-celebrates-committee-passageof-h-r-8926-to-modify-and-reauthorize-the-better-utilization-of-investments-leading-to-development-act-of-2018.
- Adva Saldinger, “House Committee Approves Bill Extending, Enhancing US DFC,” Devex (blog), July 12, 2024, https:// www.devex.com/news/sponsored/house-committee-approves-bill-extending-enhancing-us-dfc-107938.
- Adva Saldinger, “DFC Has Record Year Following Reorganization, but Needs Reauthorization,” Devex (blog), October 29, 2024, https://www.devex.com/news/sponsored/dfc-has-record-year-following-reorganization-but-needsreauthorization-108628.
- Mark Kennedy, “Reauthorizing DFC in Lame Duck Period Avoids Disrupting an Important Foreign Policy Tool,” Wilson Center (blog), November 20, 2024, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/reauthorizing-dfc-lame-duck-period-avoidsdisrupting-important-foreign-policy-tool.
- Yinka Adegoke, “Trump’s MAGA Insiders Want ‘Anti-Woke’ Deal-Driven Africa Policies,” SEMAFOR, November 19, 2024, sec. Africa, https://www.semafor.com/article/11/19/2024/trumps-maga-insiders-want-anti-woke-africa-policies-deals.
- “DFC Visits Morocco to Explore Private Sector Investment,” U.S. International Development Finance Corporation, January 7, 2021, https://www.dfc.gov/media/press-releases/dfc-visits-morocco-explore-private-sector-investment; Alexander Richter, “U.S. International Development Finance Corp. Funding for Ethiopia Could Benefit Geothermal Projects,” ThinkGeoEnergy – Geothermal Energy News, April 4, 2020, https://www.thinkgeoenergy.com/u-s-intl-development-finance-corp-funding-for-ethiopia-could-benefit-geothermal-projects/.
- Pham, “Africa in the Second Trump Administration,” The Jerusalem Strategic Tribune (blog), November 2024, https://jstribune.com/pham-africa-in-the-second-trump-administration/.
- “Energy Act of 2020 (Critical Minerals Provisions) – Policies,” IEA, November 3, 2022, https://www.iea.org/policies/16065-energy-act-of-2020-critical-minerals-provisions.
- “Senators Coons, Young Introduce Legislation to Strengthen Critical Minerals Supply Chains, U.S. Senator Christopher Coons of Delaware,” Chris Coons, December 10, 2024, https://www.coons.senate.gov/news/press-releases/senators-coons-young-introduce-legislation-to-strengthen-critical-minerals-supply-chains.
- Wenjie Chen, Athene Laws, and Nico Valckx, “Harnessing sub-Saharan Africa’s Critical Mineral Wealth,” IMF (blog), April 29, 2024, https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2024/04/29/cf-harnessing-sub-saharan-africas-critical-mineralwealth; “Cobalt Facts,” Government of Canada (Natural Resources Canada, March 9, 2023), https://natural-resources-canada.ca/minerals-mining/mining-data-statistics-and-analysis/minerals-metals-facts/cobalt-facts/24981.
- Makini Brice, “US Senators Introduce Bill to Renew Africa Trade Pact through 2041,” Reuters, April 11, 2024, https://agoa.info/news/article/16451-us-senators-will-introduce-bill-to-renew-africa-trade-pact-through-2041.html
- “Rep. James Introduces the AGOA Extension and Enhancement Act of 2024,” Congressman John James, December 11, 2024, sec. Press Releases, https://james.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=223.
- Jacob Bogage, “Leaders in Congress reach deal to avert government shutdown,” The Washington Post, December 17, 2024, https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2024/12/17/government-shutdown-baltimore-bridge-farms/?ref=biztoc.com.
- “Risch: Biden Admin Is Wrong to Host AGOA Summit in South Africa,” United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, November 2, 2023, https://www.foreign.senate.gov/press/rep/release/risch-biden-admin-is-wrong-to-hostagoa-summit-in-south-africa.
- Pham, “Africa in the Second Trump Administration.”
- Gracelin Baskaran, “Quantifying the Impact of a Loss of South Africa’s AGOA Benefits,” Brookings Institution (blog), January 17, 2024, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/quantifying-the-impact-of-a-loss-of-south-africas-agoa-benefits/.
- Marc L. Busch, “Shifting Focus on Labor and Environmental Standards to Companies Instead of Countries Would Supercharge AGOA,” The Wilson Center, July 30, 2024, Shifting Focus on Labor and Environmental Standards to Companies Instead of Countries Would Supercharge AGOA | Wilson Center
- “Trade in Goods with Africa,” accessed December 17, 2024, https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c0013.html; Nyabiage, “China-Africa Trade Hit US$282 Billion in 2023 but Africa’s Trade Deficit Widens,” South China Morning Post, February 1, 2024, sec. News, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3250552/china-africa-trade-hit-282-billion-2023-africas-trade-deficit-widens-commodity-prices-key-factor.
- “Goods Trade between the United States and sub-Saharan Africa” (Washington, D.C.: U.S. International Trade Commission and U.S. Department of Commerce, December 7, 2022), https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2022-12/ US%20Trade%20with%20sub_Saharan%20Africa%2012072022_0.pdf.
- “Credits for New Clean Vehicles Purchased in 2023 or after,” IRS, accessed December 17, 2024, https://www.irs.gov/ credits-deductions/credits-for-new-clean-vehicles-purchased-in-2023-or-after.
- “Middle Power Politics in the Middle East,” Center for International and Regional Studies, Georgetown University Qatar, accessed December 17, 2024, https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/research/research-initiatives/middle-power-politics-middle-east/.
- “Prosper Africa,” Prosper Africa, accessed December 17, 2024, https://www.prosperafrica.gov/.
- Edward Wong, Annie Karni, and Emily Cochrane, “Trump Administration Drops Proposal to Cut Foreign Aid After Intense Debate,” The New York Times, August 23, 2019, sec. U.S., https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/22/us/politics/trump-foreign-aid.html.
- “Trump Administration Announces Devastating Cuts to Foreign Aid,” CARE, accessed December 17, 2024, https://www.care.org/media-and-press/trump-administration-announces-devastating-cuts-to-u-s-foreign-assistance/.
- Michael T. McCaul, “Prosper Africa Act,” Pub. L. No. H.R.6455, § house – Foreign Affairs; Ways and Means (2022), https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/6455.
- Dan Diamond, “Lifesaving HIV Program Faces a New Threat: U.S. Abortion Politics,” Washington Post, July 29, 2023, https://www.washingtonpost.com/health/2023/07/29/pepfar-aids-hiv-abortion-congress/.
- Stephanie Nolen, “New Drug Provides Total Protection From H.I.V. in Trial of Young African Women,” The New York Times, June 21, 2024, sec. Health, https://www.nytimes.com/2024/06/21/health/lenacapavir-hiv-prevention-africa.html.
- Kellie Moss and Jennifer Kates, “PEPFAR’s Short-Term Reauthorization Sets an Uncertain Course for Its Long-Term Future,” KFF (blog), March 27, 2024, https://www.kff.org/policy-watch/pepfars-short-term-reauthorization-sets-an-uncertain-course-for-its-long-term-future.
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