Célia Belin
Visiting Fellow - Foreign Policy, Center on the United States and Europe
Célia Belin is a visiting fellow in the Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings. Her areas of expertise include trans-Atlantic relations, U.S. foreign policy toward Europe, French politics and foreign policy, the role of civil society in foreign policy, religion/secularism, and strategic prospective analysis. Prior to joining Brookings, she served for over five years as an advisor on U.S. affairs and trans-Atlantic relations in the French foreign ministry’s Centre d’Analyse, de Prévision et de Stratégie (policy planning staff), where she recommended policy options through notes, reports, speech-writing and transition documents, as well as conducted 1.5 dialogues and led multiple long-term research projects on areas of strategic importance to French foreign policy. Belin was also chief editor of the center’s flagship publication, Les Carnets du CAPS. She taught U.S. foreign policy to master’s students at University Paris 2 and University of Saint-Denis.
Previously, Belin was a guest fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York and a visiting research scholar in the Middle East Institute at Columbia University.
Belin holds a doctorate in political science (University Paris 2), a master's degree in international relations (University Paris 2), and a bachelor’s degree in Modern Languages/Business (University of Burgundy). Her dissertation on Evangelical pro-Israel lobbying in the U.S. was published by Fayard (Jésus est juif en Amérique, 2011), and the book received a “particular mention” from the Emile Perreau-Saussine prize on political philosophy.
Belin writes regularly on U.S. affairs and trans-Atlantic relations, is a frequent commentator on radio and television, and recently co-edited a book on U.S. foreign policy (Les Etats-Unis dans le monde, CNRS editions, 2016).
Afffiliations:
Annuaire français des relations internationales, co-editor of the US foreign policy section
Centre Thucydide, University Paris 2, nonresident fellow
Célia Belin is a visiting fellow in the Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings. Her areas of expertise include trans-Atlantic relations, U.S. foreign policy toward Europe, French politics and foreign policy, the role of civil society in foreign policy, religion/secularism, and strategic prospective analysis. Prior to joining Brookings, she served for over five years as an advisor on U.S. affairs and trans-Atlantic relations in the French foreign ministry’s Centre d’Analyse, de Prévision et de Stratégie (policy planning staff), where she recommended policy options through notes, reports, speech-writing and transition documents, as well as conducted 1.5 dialogues and led multiple long-term research projects on areas of strategic importance to French foreign policy. Belin was also chief editor of the center’s flagship publication, Les Carnets du CAPS. She taught U.S. foreign policy to master’s students at University Paris 2 and University of Saint-Denis.
Previously, Belin was a guest fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York and a visiting research scholar in the Middle East Institute at Columbia University.
Belin holds a doctorate in political science (University Paris 2), a master’s degree in international relations (University Paris 2), and a bachelor’s degree in Modern Languages/Business (University of Burgundy). Her dissertation on Evangelical pro-Israel lobbying in the U.S. was published by Fayard (Jésus est juif en Amérique, 2011), and the book received a “particular mention” from the Emile Perreau-Saussine prize on political philosophy.
Belin writes regularly on U.S. affairs and trans-Atlantic relations, is a frequent commentator on radio and television, and recently co-edited a book on U.S. foreign policy (Les Etats-Unis dans le monde, CNRS editions, 2016).
Afffiliations:
Annuaire français des relations internationales, co-editor of the US foreign policy section
Centre Thucydide, University Paris 2, nonresident fellow
The French might have been presumptuous, or a bit too clever, in seeing Trump only as an opportunity. It comes with a cost. The cost being the division of Europe... [Trump's] clear favoritism [for nationalist-led countries like Poland, Hungary, and Italy can exacerbate divisions within Europe]... Macron wants to be a strong leader that Trump disagrees with but respects for being strong.
[President Trump's counterparts fear that Americans] do not feel they need to lead the world anymore... The United States is still the dominant power out there – the Atlantic alliance is still alive. But [Trump's] foreign policy weakened some of the elements.
No damage is ever irrevocable when it comes to global standing, but it could take years to repair. [Under Trump, the United States is becoming an] unreliable and untrustworthy actor... Allies and partners will now refuse to trust America blindly. Trump’s damage to US standing will be depend on how long he stays in power, and on how other nations rebalance and diversify away from the US.
What [Macron] was looking for was showcasing his proximity to Trump, but at the same time, that he’s still capable of voicing differences, including in a public way… He did step in the direction of Donald Trump by repackaging his ideas under the label of a new [Iran] deal… On Syria, Macron seems to believe he was able to convince Donald Trump that a framework for stability needs to be developed, whether or not Trump decides to pull out troops… We should pay attention to what’s going on with Merkel now, to see whether Trump extends a minimum of respect and welcome to the German chancellor… [The relationship] brings prestige to both [Macron and Trump]. Trump needed to have a strong European ally that would give him respect… Vice versa, it looks good for Macron that he’s the one seen as being close to Trump.
The Democrats see Macron as someone who can talk Trump into maybe changing his mind on some of the most global issues. And the Republicans see France as a valuable military ally who brings respect for their embattled American president.
[French voters are] very pragmatic. The only thing they’re asking is, even if Macron can’t change Trump’s mind, he needs to state their differences and not appear as an enabler... [Macron] wants to talk to everybody—Trump, Putin, Xi, Erdogan.