Why Putin is again rattling the nuclear saber

Speaking to the Valdai Discussion Club on October 1, Vladimir Putin chose to rattle Russia’s nuclear saber. He raised the prospect of nuclear weapons if NATO were to attack the Kaliningrad exclave—something that will not happen unless the Kremlin launches war on Europe first.

This is reminiscent of Putin’s nuclear threats in autumn 2022 and 2024. In both cases, it quickly became clear that he had no intention of following up the threat. Putin does not want a nuclear war, but he seeks to raise the threat in order to bully and coerce.

The most recent question of Russian nuclear use arose on September 29. Russian embassies in several European capitals, including London, Brussels and Dublin, put out statements denigrating Western concerns about the possibility of Russian military or increased hybrid attacks against Europe. The statements charged that NATO was readying a blockade of Kaliningrad and warned, “There should be no mistake—Russia would be ready to use all its arsenal, including nuclear weapons, to defend its territory if NATO countries try to isolate Kaliningrad region from the rest of the country.”

At Valdai two days later, Putin echoed this: “If it comes to a direct attack on the Russian Federation—in this case, Kaliningrad, although it could potentially involve other territories as well—the question of Russia using all the weapons at its disposal would inevitably and immediately arise. That is inevitable.”

A pattern of threats

We have seen such nuclear posturing by Putin before.

On September 21, 2022, Putin indicated that he was prepared to annex the Ukrainian oblasts (provinces) of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson, even though at that time Russian forces did not occupy all of any of the four oblasts. Charging that the West sought to weaken Russia, Putin warned, “If the territorial integrity of our country is threatened, we will certainly use all the means at our disposal to protect Russia and our people. This is not a bluff.” Nine days later, Putin said Russia had annexed the four oblasts and added, “We will defend our land with all the forces and resources we have.”

With Russian troops retreating on the battlefield, Putin’s comments generated speculation that the Kremlin might use nuclear arms. Indeed, a U.S. intelligence report assessed a 50% chance that Russia would use tactical nuclear weapons against Ukraine.

The threat appeared to have little impact on the conflict. Ukrainians, who regard the war as existential for their country, continued to fight. The United States and other Western countries continued to send weapons to Ukraine while warning Moscow that “catastrophic consequences” would ensue if it used nuclear weapons against Ukraine.

Putin and other Russian officials soon stepped back from the threat. Speaking at Valdai on October 27, 2022, Putin said, “We have never said anything proactively about Russia potentially using nuclear weapons.” Six days later, the Russian Foreign Ministry put out a statement on the inadmissibility of nuclear war, reiterating the view that “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.” Two weeks after that, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov represented Russia at the Bali G-20 summit and signed on to a declaration stating, “The use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is inadmissible.”

A new nuclear doctrine

In September 2024, as the war with Ukraine had become one of attrition, Putin discussed changes to Russia’s nuclear doctrine. Two months later, the Kremlin released the new doctrine. One change addressed when Moscow might use nuclear arms in a conventional war. Russia’s 2010 nuclear doctrine had said Russia might do so if a conventional assault were to put the existence of the Russian state “under threat.” That was clear, understandable, and credible. The new doctrine suggested nuclear use in the event of a conventional attack that “creates a critical threat” to sovereignty or territorial integrity. Not so clear, understandable, or credible.

And what was happening in November 2024? At that time, the Ukrainian army still occupied about 300 square miles of Russia’s Kursk region. Ukraine had also begun employing U.S. and British missiles to strike targets inside Russia, and Kyiv had started using its own drones to begin conducting a campaign against more distant targets in Russia.

None of that led to a Russian nuclear response. Although Putin claimed a right to attack military targets in countries providing weapons to Ukraine, the Russian response appeared limited to using a conventionally armed Oreshnik missile to strike a target in Ukraine.

What Putin’s threats reveal

While Western leaders cannot wholly discount Putin’s nuclear threats, a pattern seems evident. When the Kremlin raises the prospect of nuclear use in implausible circumstances, at the end of the day, it does not follow through. Putin seems far more comfortable with increasing Russia’s hybrid war attacks—for example, drone incursions, GPS disruptions, cyberattacks, and sabotage—against Europe. Europe has had a difficult time figuring out how to respond, and Putin likely calculates that any response would be limited and manageable for Russia.

In the latest instance of nuclear saber-rattling, Putin well knows that the only circumstance in which NATO would attack or blockade Kaliningrad is a Russian military assault on NATO members. In that case, the exclave, physically separate from Russia and sandwiched between Poland and Lithuania, could well prove vulnerable. However, absent such aggression, Kaliningrad remains quite secure.

Putin used this case to again raise the specter of nuclear war. However, he does not want a nuclear war. He wants the West to believe he is ready for one in order to intimidate. The West can choose not to be intimidated.