The countdown to a Trump-Xi summit

After months of a grinding trade war, the long-anticipated summit between President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping is now taking shape. The timing, venue, and agenda remain fluid, but the political momentum is unmistakable. In early August, the Trump administration announced that Washington and Beijing had agreed to extend their tariff truce for another 90 days, citing “significant steps” by Beijing to address U.S. concerns and a mutual commitment to keep talking. The announcement followed senior-level trade talks in London and Stockholm, as well as a first meeting between Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi—an encounter that prompted a surprisingly upbeat State Department readout noting that both sides were exploring “areas of potential cooperation.”

Trade and investment issues—such as China’s overcapacity, investment pledges, and purchases of U.S. goods—as well as fentanyl, are certain to feature prominently in a potential U.S.-China trade deal. These are important concerns, but if they become the sole focus of negotiations, Washington risks missing a larger opportunity. For now, both governments appear intent on stabilizing the atmosphere ahead of a potential leader-level meeting. The summit will not reset the U.S.-China relationship, nor will it yield a sweeping grand bargain. But it does provide a window for Washington to elevate preparations to a more strategic plane—laying down economic guardrails, defending key U.S. interests, and pressing China on areas where cooperation is possible. Failing to capitalize on this moment to lock in more durable gains would be a strategic mistake.

Formalizing the truce: Restraining economic weaponization

What has become increasingly clear in recent months is that both the United States and China have the ability to inflict significant economic harm on each other—and on the global economy. The rapid escalation of tariffs, export restrictions, and retaliatory measures has shown just how quickly competition can spill over into broader economic disruption.

The United States remains heavily dependent on Chinese exports of rare earth minerals and magnets—critical inputs for products ranging from semiconductors and automobiles to jet engines. When Beijing tightened export controls on these materials in response to U.S. tariffs and restrictions on advanced chips, the impact was felt immediately by American automakers and technology firms. And despite China’s drive for technological self-reliance, its reaction to U.S. export controls underscores that Chinese firms still rely on—and actively seek—access to U.S. semiconductors.

Both governments are now racing to close these vulnerabilities. Washington is investing in domestic rare earth extraction and magnet production, while Beijing is accelerating indigenous chip design and fabrication. Yet complete self-sufficiency in these arenas will take years, not months. For the foreseeable future, supply chains will remain deeply intertwined, even as both sides build redundancy in strategic sectors for security purposes. Full autarky is impossible in the modern era, where the complexity of even everyday products makes total self-sufficiency not only economically impractical, but in many cases, unattainable. A world in which critical inputs can be capriciously weaponized serves neither the United States’ nor China’s interests.

At the summit, Trump and Xi should agree to insulate commercial trade in non-sensitive goods from the broader strategic contest. They should affirm that the United States and China will: 

• Commit to avoiding the weaponization of economic interdependence except in limited, narrowly defined national security contexts.
• Ensure transparency and predictability when imposing new restrictions, including prior notice and a clear explanation of strategic intent and desired outcomes.
• Refrain from targeting non-military sectors so that global trade flows continue without unnecessary disruption.
• Establish working-level mechanisms for continued communication and quick resolution of bureaucratic delays impeding legitimate business.

These commitments would not end the strategic rivalry, nor would they prevent the use of targeted restrictions where national security truly requires them. But they would help stabilize the economic relationship—reducing uncertainty for businesses, shielding American firms from whiplash diplomacy, and signaling to global markets that commercial logic still has a place alongside geopolitical competition. 

Pressing China on North Korea and Russia

The weeks ahead also provide an opportunity to push Beijing to play a more constructive role in addressing regional security flashpoints—particularly North Korea and Russia.

On Russia, the Trump administration has floated secondary sanctions targeting Chinese purchases of Russian oil, although it has not followed through on its threat. Beijing likely welcomed Trump’s recent meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin, as continued engagement between the two leaders reduces pressure on China to reduce its support for Moscow. Still, the Russia-Ukraine war will not be resolved overnight, and Chinese pressure on Russia to move in the right direction will be important in the coming months. Washington should use the lead-up to a summit to make clear that it is serious about secondary sanctions and is prepared to penalize continued Chinese facilitation of Russian military resupply—such as sales of drone components, machine tools, and dual-use microelectronics.

Beijing will not publicly jeopardize its partnership with Moscow, which it views as a strategic hedge against its long-term rivalry with the United States. But the Trump administration should urge Chinese leaders to privately identify tangible steps—such as curbing specific exports—that would signal their disapproval of further escalation and convey Chinese interest in seeing Moscow move toward a durable ceasefire that respects Ukraine’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. In parallel, Washington should also press Beijing to publicly reiterate its support for a ceasefire and direct dialogue between Ukraine and Russia. Such cooperation should be framed as essential to paving the way for a trade deal and summit later this year.

On North Korea, U.S. and Chinese interests remain broadly aligned: both seek a denuclearized North Korea and lasting stability on the Korean Peninsula, and both are increasingly concerned by Pyongyang and Moscow’s growing military coordination. Beijing’s competition with Moscow to draw Kim Jong Un closer complicates prospects for China to exert real pressure on Pyongyang, but Washington and Beijing nevertheless share an interest in curbing North Korea’s destabilizing nuclear and missile programs.

Trump has signaled his willingness to reengage diplomatically with Kim, but the path forward has become more difficult. Since the failed 2019 Hanoi summit, North Korea has significantly hardened its position—codifying its nuclear weapons status in its constitution and declaring its nuclear arsenal is non-negotiable. Its recent defense pact and deepening alignment with Russia have only bolstered Pyongyang’s confidence.

To break this impasse, Washington should press both Beijing and Moscow to state clearly that North Korea’s bid for recognition as a nuclear weapons state is a nonstarter. Moscow will likely refuse—but that very refusal could expose daylight between China and Russia. Washington should also urge Beijing to steer Pyongyang back to the 2018 Singapore Joint Statement, which Trump and Kim personally endorsed, and includes a commitment to the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. This remains a strategic area where U.S. and Chinese interests still overlap—and where cooperation could be possible.

Protecting core principles—especially on Taiwan

The Trump administration must resist making strategic concessions in pursuit of a summit—particularly on Taiwan, where Beijing is certain to push for changes to long-standing U.S. language and policy. Recent decisions to deny Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te a transit stop in New York City and to cancel a planned U.S.-Taiwan defense meeting were widely interpreted as conciliatory gestures toward Beijing ahead of the Stockholm talks. Such steps risk cementing the dangerous perception that U.S. Taiwan policy is negotiable.

In the run-up to or during the summit, Beijing may press Washington to replace its traditional formulation that the United States “does not support Taiwan independence” with the stronger “opposes Taiwan independence.” This is far more than a semantic shift—it could be read as aligning U.S. policy with Beijing’s sovereignty claims. At the same time, China is certain to object to U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, many of which remain in the pipeline.

The administration should make clear that neither the policy language nor U.S. support for Taiwan’s self-defense capabilities is up for negotiation. Consistency is essential—not only as a matter of principle, but as a deterrent to future coercion. Any signal that Washington might compromise on its long-standing Taiwan policy would embolden further pressure from Beijing and undermine U.S. credibility across the Indo-Pacific.

What comes after the summit?

The post-summit phase will, in many ways, be more important than the summit itself. In the lead-up, both sides will likely maintain a cordial tone and refrain from major provocations to preserve the diplomatic environment. But absent active management in the weeks and months that follow, the relationship could quickly unravel again. That’s why Washington must treat post-summit management as a strategic priority—not an afterthought. Agreements, no matter how carefully crafted, will not endure without active monitoring, enforcement, and sustained engagement.

To that end, working-level communication channels must remain active and empowered to troubleshoot disputes before they escalate. Enforcement mechanisms should be clearly defined, with timelines and transparent benchmarks. Regular high-level touchpoints should be institutionalized to sustain oversight, manage disputes, and reaffirm shared guardrails.

Ultimately, the Trump-Xi summit will not resolve the deep-rooted structural tensions in the U.S.-China relationship. However, it can be used to impose strategic discipline on that rivalry—making it more predictable, less susceptible to crisis, and more manageable for global markets and U.S. allies.

The next two months represent a moment of real leverage. Washington should use it not only to de-escalate the trade war, but to build a framework for sustained, disciplined competition. That means locking in economic guardrails, securing Chinese cooperation on Ukraine and North Korea, defending key U.S. interests—especially on Taiwan—and, above all, putting in place the mechanisms to manage what follows.