Can the United States and Europe still cooperate in the Middle East?

In recent decades, U.S.-European relations in the Middle East have hardly been harmonious, to say the least. But the divisions that have emerged in the past 15 months make many of the earlier disagreements seem minor in comparison. Splits over how to handle the crisis in Gaza and the war in Iran have been so great as to not only impede prospects for transatlantic cooperation in the Middle East but also to corrode the pillars of transatlantic relations more generally. Indeed, Europe’s refusal to provide more support for the Iran war has led U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio to announce that Washington would “reexamine the value of NATO.” This has further strained a transatlantic relationship that was already deeply damaged by unilateral U.S. tariffs, President Donald Trump’s cutoff of U.S. support to Ukraine and attempt to take over Greenland, and a deliberate U.S. strategy of “cultivating resistance to Europe’s current trajectory,” in the words of the 2026 U.S. National Security Strategy.

These are hardly propitious conditions for future U.S.-European cooperation in the region. Discrete areas of cooperation may remain possible—such as intelligence sharing, counterterrorism training and operations, maritime policing of the Red Sea, or supporting the new government in Syria. But on the big regional questions of the day—the future of Gaza and the West Bank and policy toward Iran—Europe will likely be reduced to playing a marginal role with minimal influence, even as U.S. actions in the region affect its interests. If Europe can demonstrate more unity and resolve, it may be able to enhance its role by leveraging its capacity to provide investment, humanitarian assistance, or sanctions relief in Gaza or Iran. And the United States would be wise to coordinate more closely with Europe to take advantage of that additional leverage to help deal with problems that have no easy solutions. Realistically, however—given Europe’s divisions, its dependency on Washington, and the Trump administration’s hostility—prospects for cooperation will be dim until there is a U.S. government more aligned with Europe on policy and more open to cooperation.

Similar interests, different approaches

U.S. and European interests in the region are actually very similar. They include preventing and deterring war; countering nuclear proliferation; countering terrorism (and the factors that fuel it); keeping open sea lanes for the free flow of oil and other commodities; supporting human rights; limiting refugee flows; supporting a secure, stable, and democratic Israel that lives side by side and in peace with Palestinians, who also deserve security and stability; and fostering economic development and a sound climate for trade and investment in both directions. While these common interests have not always prevented transatlantic clashes—most spectacularly over the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq—they have also yielded important episodes of cooperation, including the joint pressure campaign and negotiation of the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS established in 2014.

Today, however, three factors severely complicate alignment and cooperation despite the common interests:

1. U.S. alignment with Israel. The Trump administration is almost unconditionally committed to supporting Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s government in Israel, even as Europeans turn increasingly against Israel’s policies in Gaza, the West Bank, Lebanon, and Iran. U.S. Democrats—and some Republicans, even in Trump’s base—share European critiques of Israeli policy and might align with Europe on policy issues such as arms conditionality, recognition of a Palestinian state, or sanctions for settler violence. But so long as Trump does not change course, cooperation with Europe will be out of reach.
2. Differences on diplomacy, international law, and the use of force. The Trump administration believes military force and “maximum pressure” can resolve the challenges posed by Iran, whereas most Europeans favor a diplomatic approach more consistent with international law. Such divisions have complicated cooperation with the Trump administration since it withdrew from the JCPOA and pivoted to “maximum pressure” in its first term, but the February 2026 U.S./Israeli attack on Iran, which most of Europe strongly opposed, has brought those divisions to a whole new level. Although Trump was elected in part to avoid costly military interventions, his perceived successes in Iran in the summer of 2025 and Venezuela in January 2026 appear to have reinforced his belief that military force could achieve U.S. aims without the high costs Europeans (rightly) feared.
3. Trump’s hostility to the European project. The Trump administration is opposed as a matter of disposition to a strong and united Europe, but it nonetheless expects unconditional European support for U.S. global leadership in exchange for U.S. support for European security. Some Europeans might fairly note that past U.S. administrations also largely excluded them from aspects of Middle East diplomacy. But none have been remotely as hostile to Europe’s involvement or influence as the current one, which makes cooperation on policy virtually impossible.

These differences became apparent over Gaza during 2025-2026. During the Biden administration, U.S.-European differences existed but were mostly contained, even as some European countries (France, Belgium, Spain, and Ireland) broke with Washington to call for a unilateral and unconditional ceasefire, and others (Spain, Ireland, Norway, and Slovenia) unilaterally recognized a Palestinian state as early as 2024. But the gaps widened considerably after Trump’s inauguration, Israel’s violation of a January 2025 ceasefire, and the imposition of a total blockade of Gaza for more than two months in spring 2025, leading to widespread starvation in Gaza.

By the end of 2025, almost all European countries were calling for an unconditional ceasefire, and a majority now recognize a Palestinian state, which Rubio slammed as “counterproductive,” a propaganda victory for Hamas, and a “slap in the face” to victims of the attacks of October 7, 2023. Most European countries also supported the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) investigation of Israel, while the United States strongly rejected this move and threatened sanctions on anyone who cooperated with the ICC. When Trump unilaterally launched his “Board of Peace” for Gaza in January 2026 (again without consulting Europeans), the only European countries to join were Hungary, Bulgaria, Albania, and Kosovo, while Britain, France, and Germany declined.

The divisions have been even greater over Iran. In sharp contrast to the JCPOA era, when Europeans were involved in the negotiations and were key to forging and implementing the agreement, Europe now has had no role on Iran. Europe was largely sidelined from negotiations and was not consulted when the United States and Israel bombed Iran’s nuclear program in July 2025 and when Trump launched the war on Iran in February 2026. When some European countries put modest limits on U.S. access to bases for bombing operations, and all refused to participate in a military operation to try to open the Strait of Hormuz, Trump called them “cowards” and threatened to withdraw from NATO.

Not having been consulted, and with their publics strongly against the war (and angry at the high energy costs it has produced), European leaders have nonetheless stood their ground. British Prime Minister Keir Starmer has said he will not allow the U.K. to be “dragged into the war,” German Chancellor Friederich Merz has said the United States “clearly has no truly convincing strategy,” and French President Emmanuel Macron has criticized Trump’s erratic leadership and called on Europe to develop a greater capacity to act without the United States. The result has been the biggest transatlantic split in the Middle East since the 2003 war in Iraq, if not the Suez crisis of 1956.

Looking ahead

So long as the Trump administration is in power, the prospects for U.S.-European cooperation in the Middle East will remain poor. Realistically, Europeans are not only divided but have enough on their plate dealing with domestic challenges and supporting Ukraine in the face of diminished American support. They are unlikely to devote significant resources and effort to increase their influence in the Middle East, especially so long as they remain dependent on Washington for security.

That does not mean there is nothing Europe can do to pursue its interests, however. On Israel, Gaza, and the West Bank, if Europe could overcome its internal divisions, it could wield a degree of leverage on its own. Tools available include humanitarian assistance to Palestinians; security training for a potential international force in Gaza; sanctions that could be imposed on violent settlers; and the European Union-Israel Association Agreement that governs some 42 billion euros (about $48 billion) in trade that could be used as leverage with the Israeli government.

On Iran, while Trump may not want Europe at the table, ultimately any deal that might be reached with Tehran will require Europe to play a role. For example, Europe could help by providing sanctions relief to Tehran (or making investments that the United States would be unwilling to make); participating in mine-clearing or in a maritime corridor in the Strait of Hormuz; verifying a potential nuclear agreement; offering scientific or technical help in removing enriched uranium; or providing base access, military forces, or additional sanctions pressure if Iran rejects or violates an agreement. By exercising its leverage forcefully and unilaterally, rather than meekly deferring to Washington in hope of winning Trump’s favor, Europe might find that the United States will have to take its interests into account, much as it did when Europeans united to stand up against Trump over Greenland.

Ideally, the Trump administration would recognize what Europe could bring to the table and seek to take advantage of the additional leverage that would result from Europeans and Americans joining forces. It’s not as if Washington’s go-it-alone approach is succeeding to the point that this leverage can be left on the table—in fact, both Gaza and Iran are costly disasters that require a significant change of approach. Such major changes seem unlikely in the short term, but failure is the mother of invention, and Trump may come to realize that the United States would benefit from greater allied support in both Gaza and Iran. If that day should come, Europe should be ready to seize the moment; grudging and belated cooperation would be better than the outright divisions of the present.

Meanwhile, Europe will have to bide its time and exercise the leverage it has while waiting for conditions that might make cooperation more likely. The United States and Europe have oscillated for decades between periods of cooperation and periods of tension or crisis. Because their interests ultimately remain largely aligned, there is no reason the trust that has recently been lost cannot one day be rebuilt.