The Congressional Study Group on Foreign Relations and National Security is a program for congressional staff focused on critically engaging the legal and policy factors that define the role that Congress plays in various aspects of U.S. foreign relations and national security policy.
At monthly study group sessions, participating congressional staff have the opportunity to sit down with leading academics and practitioners to discuss a specific topic of interest relating to foreign relations and national security, ranging from war powers to treaty affairs to international trade. After some opening remarks from these outside experts, the majority of each session is used for comments and questions from—as well as open discussion among—the congressional staff in attendance, which takes place under the Chatham House Rule in order to promote frank conversation. The objective is to facilitate the exchange of ideas between outside experts studying these issues and the congressional staff actually working on them, both to improve policy outcomes and to promote scholarship that is more responsive to congressional needs. Information on several of our prior sessions is available below.
All congressional staff are eligible to participate in the study group, including those working for legislative agencies such as the Congressional Research Service. If you are interested in signing up for the study group’s mailing list, please email csgfrns+subscribe@groups.io from your work account, so that we can verify your eligibility. The groups.io platform will then allow you to manage how you receive emails, access the program’s calendar, and take advantage of other resources available to participants.
The study group is organized by Scott R. Anderson of the Brookings Institution, with support from the Carnegie Corporation of New York. Questions or concerns? You can contact Mr. Anderson at sanderson@brookings.edu.
On Feb. 28, 2020, the study group convened in person in the U.S. Capitol building to discuss the president’s war powers under Article II of the Constitution. As underscored by the U.S. airstrike that killed Iranian military commander Qassem Soleimani, the executive branch maintains that the president has broad authority to use military force overseas without congressional authorization. But what is the actual scope of this authority? And what can Congress do if it is used irresponsibly?
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On April 3, 2020, the study group convened online to discuss the executive branch’s use of executive agreements and Congress’s oversight thereof. While the Constitution only identifies one means of entering into international agreement, the United States now uses several—including executive agreements, which presidents often pursue with little to no direct congressional input. But how much does Congress really know about how these executive agreements are used?
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On May 7, 2020, the study group convened online to discuss the question of the command and control of U.S. nuclear weapons. At present, the president has the unilateral authority to choose to use nuclear weapons, and many assume that this is a result of his Article II powers under the Constitution. But is this assumption correct? Are there ways Congress can limit when and how the president uses nuclear weapons?
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On June 26, 2020, the study group convened online to discuss the use of economic sanctions. Few tools have seen such wide and aggressive use, especially as part of the Trump administration’s maximum pressure campaign on Iran. But should Congress be concerned about the risk of the executive branch using sanctions broadly enough to undermine U.S. global economic power? Or in a way that risks undermining Americans’ civil liberties at home and humanitarian policies overseas?
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On July 31, 2020, the study group convened online to discuss the president’s authority to deploy the military domestically, including through the Insurrection Act. In the weeks prior to the session, President Donald Trump had deployed both the military, National Guard units, and federal law enforcement personnel in response to popular protest around the country, often over objections by state and local officials. But what was the legal basis for the president’s actions? And what might Congress be able to do if it believes that the president’s actions are inappropriate?
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On Aug. 28, 2020, the study group convened online to discuss the increasingly complex relationship between U.S. trade policies and national security. In recent years, the Trump administration has used national security-related authorities to impose tariffs and impose other trade restrictions on allies, often as a means of securing leverage for new trade terms or advancing other policy objectives. Several of these efforts have proven controversial among both parties in Congress, with some arguing that they are improper uses of the authorities in question. But are there real limits on how the president can use these authorities? And what can Congress do if it feels they are being used inappropriately?
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On Sept. 11, 2020, the study group convened online to discuss the issue of to what extent Congress is able to exercise control over the military. In recent years, Congress has enacted statutes that seek to set limits on when the president may remove deployments of U.S. soldiers, including from long standing posts in Germany and South Korea. Are such laws valid exercises of Congress’s own constitutional authority over the funding of and establishment of rules for the military? Or do they infringe on the president’s own constitutional authority as commander in chief?
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On Sept. 25, 2020, the study group convened online to discuss the issue of transparency as it relates to war powers. As the executive branch’s legal views play a dominant role in determining when and how the president believes he may use military force, Congress has made a number of efforts over the past several decades to encourage the executive branch to disclose the legal basis for its uses of military force—at least to Congress, if not to the public. But how effective are the existing reporting obligations? And what can Congress do if the executive branch refuses to comply?
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