Congressional Study Group on Foreign Relations and National Security

On Feb. 28, 2020, the study group convened in person in the U.S. Capitol building to discuss the president’s war powers under Article II of the Constitution. As underscored by the U.S. airstrike that killed Iranian military commander Qassem Soleimani, the executive branch maintains that the president has broad authority to use military force overseas without congressional authorization. But what is the actual scope of this authority? And what can Congress do if it is used irresponsibly?

On April 3, 2020, the study group convened online to discuss the executive branch’s use of executive agreements and Congress’s oversight thereof. While the Constitution only identifies one means of entering into international agreement, the United States now uses several—including executive agreements, which presidents often pursue with little to no direct congressional input. But how much does Congress really know about how these executive agreements are used?

On May 7, 2020, the study group convened online to discuss the question of the command and control of U.S. nuclear weapons. At present, the president has the unilateral authority to choose to use nuclear weapons, and many assume that this is a result of his Article II powers under the Constitution. But is this assumption correct? Are there ways Congress can limit when and how the president uses nuclear weapons?

On June 26, 2020, the study group convened online to discuss the use of economic sanctions. Few tools have seen such wide and aggressive use, especially as part of the Trump administration’s maximum pressure campaign on Iran. But should Congress be concerned about the risk of the executive branch using sanctions broadly enough to undermine U.S. global economic power? Or in a way that risks undermining Americans’ civil liberties at home and humanitarian policies overseas?

On July 31, 2020, the study group convened online to discuss the president’s authority to deploy the military domestically, including through the Insurrection Act. In the weeks prior to the session, President Donald Trump had deployed both the military, National Guard units, and federal law enforcement personnel in response to popular protest around the country, often over objections by state and local officials. But what was the legal basis for the president’s actions? And what might Congress be able to do if it believes that the president’s actions are inappropriate?

On Aug. 28, 2020, the study group convened online to discuss the increasingly complex relationship between U.S. trade policies and national security. In recent years, the Trump administration has used national security-related authorities to impose tariffs and impose other trade restrictions on allies, often as a means of securing leverage for new trade terms or advancing other policy objectives. Several of these efforts have proven controversial among both parties in Congress, with some arguing that they are improper uses of the authorities in question. But are there real limits on how the president can use these authorities? And what can Congress do if it feels they are being used inappropriately?

On Sept. 11, 2020, the study group convened online to discuss the issue of to what extent Congress is able to exercise control over the military. In recent years, Congress has enacted statutes that seek to set limits on when the president may remove deployments of U.S. soldiers, including from long standing posts in Germany and South Korea. Are such laws valid exercises of Congress’s own constitutional authority over the funding of and establishment of rules for the military? Or do they infringe on the president’s own constitutional authority as commander in chief?

On Sept. 25, 2020, the study group convened online to discuss the issue of transparency as it relates to war powers. As the executive branch’s legal views play a dominant role in determining when and how the president believes he may use military force, Congress has made a number of efforts over the past several decades to encourage the executive branch to disclose the legal basis for its uses of military force—at least to Congress, if not to the public. But how effective are the existing reporting obligations? And what can Congress do if the executive branch refuses to comply?

On Nov. 20, 2020, the study group convened online to discuss the past, present, and future of sovereign immunity. Recent debates in Congress over the possibility of holding China civilly liable over the coronavirus, allowing people to sue state sponsors of cybercrime, and potential civil liability for acts of terrorism have all implicated core questions of sovereign immunity, meaning the set of key international legal protections that the United States largely, but not entirely, implements through the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”). But what might adjusting these immunities in these circumstances mean for U.S. foreign policy more broadly?

On Dec. 18, 2020, the study group met to discuss the growing convergence of economic and national security policy. Once thought of as separate domains, legal authorities associated with economic policy have often been used to advance national security objectives in recent years–and sometimes vice versa. Should the two areas of law and policy be treated separately? Or as a cohesive whole?

On Feb. 5, 2021, the study group met to discuss the export and proliferation of civilian nuclear technology. Over the course of the Biden administration’s first term, the United States will have to decide not only whether to re-enter a nuclear agreement with Iran, but also whether to renew or amend U.S. civilian nuclear cooperation agreements with Egypt (2021), Morocco (2021), South Korea (2021) and Turkey (2023), enter into an agreement with Saudi Arabia, and resume or expand nuclear cooperation with Russia and China. But what input does Congress have into these decisions? And how could it choose to structure legal authorities differently if it wanted to expand that role?

On April 2, 2021, the study group convened over Zoom to discuss international and domestic legal regimes governing cyberactivity and cyberwarfare. With the recent SolarWinds and Microsoft Exchange hacks, questions of cybersecurity are on the front pages and foremost in many policymakers’ minds. This session focused on the regulatory regime governing how the United States can engage in cyber activity, both offensive and defensive—with a focus on emerging U.S. strategies, including “Defend Forward”—and the unique questions this activity presents to Congress in its oversight and legislative roles.

On May 21, 2021, the study group convened over Zoom to discuss reforming the Authorizations for the Use of Military Force (AUMFs). Recent discussions of AUMF reform have been critical of the President’s use of both the 2001 AUMF, enacted after the 9/11, attacks and the 2002 AUMF, enacted prior to the invasion of Iraq, as the legal foundation for most overseas U.S. military operations over the past two decades. Critics consider these AUMFs outdated and used in ways that Congress never intended, resulting in legal basis for wars counter to democratic will. The session focused on the possibilities and justifications for reform, as well as the legal and policy concerns that policymakers should consider when crafting such reforms.

On July 1, 2021, the study group convened over Zoom to discuss separation of powers issues surrounding treaty withdrawal and reentry. The Trump administration’s withdrawals from the INF Treaty, the Open Skies Treaty, and the WHO Constitution, among other international agreements, and threats to withdraw from NAFTA and NATO focused attention on unilateral presidential treaty withdrawal. President Trump’s actions raised questions about whether the president can withdraw from a treaty without congressional authorization or when Congress specifically bars withdrawal via statute. The Biden administration’s vocal opposition to such withdrawals has also raised questions about the president’s power to re-enter treaties on a similar unilateral basis.