Today, the Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Initiative at Brookings hosted a discussion on the current state of the negotiations between the P5+1 partners and Iran on its nuclear program. Just this past weekend, on November 24, a deadline established under the Joint Plan of Action passed with the parties agreeing to continue negotiations into 2015. Senior Fellow Robert Einhorn, a former assistant secretary for nonproliferation during the Clinton administration and the secretary of state’s special advisor for nonproliferation and arms control during the Obama administration, explained the current situation and what to expect moving forward. Watch:
Einhorn moderated a panel that included: Gary Samore of Harvard University’s Belfer Center; David Albright, founder and president of the Institute for Science and International Security; and Edward Levine from the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation.
* Update, 12/1/14: Read an event analysis on the Iran@Brookings blog.
Einhorn also commented on the question of whether Iran “is bound and determined to have nuclear weapons,” noting that Iran “has not yet made a decision to proceed” in that direction and that “it is not inevitable” that it will. Watch:
Einhorn concluded the discussion by emphasizing that nobody knows whether we will reach a deal. “I think there is a reasonable prospect that we won’t be able come to terms,” and if we do it won’t be a “perfect deal.” Still, he said it is important to “look at the deal as a whole” and to “be realistic about the alternatives to a deal.” Watch Einhorn elaborate on those alternatives:
Also, read Suzanne Maloney’s latest piece, “For the Iranian Nuclear Talks, a Deadline Reveals a Deadlock” on the Iran@Saban blog.
Get full event video and audio here.
For all of us who care about preventing an Iranian nuclear bomb, what’s the best way to keep preventing that? [The JCPOA is] not perfect, but it’s something. These conventions are never based on the premise that all the parties are telling the truth, it’s about enforcement mechanisms. No arms control agreement is based in trust.