Research
BPEA | 1988 No. 1Financing Constraints and Corporate Investment
Bruce C. Petersen,
R. Glenn Hubbard, and
R. Glenn Hubbard
Dean and Russell L. Carson Professor of Finance and Economics
- Columbia Business School
Steven M. Fazzari
Steven M. Fazzari
Washington University in St. Louis
R. Glenn Hubbard
Dean and Russell L. Carson Professor of Finance and Economics
- Columbia Business School
Steven M. Fazzari
Washington University in St. Louis
1988, No. 1
EMPIRICAL models of business investment rely generally on the assumption
of a “representative firm” that responds to prices set in centralized
securities markets. Indeed, if all firms have equal access to capital
markets, firms’ responses to changes in the cost of capital or tax-based
investment incentives differ only because of differences in investment
demand. A firm’s financial structure is irrelevant to investment because
external funds provide a perfect substitute for internal capital. In general,
with perfect capital markets, a firm’s investment decisions are independent
of its financial condition.