As Ecuadorians head to the polls on February 9 to elect the country’s president and national assembly members, security and criminal violence have overshadowed other issues, including the ongoing energy and unemployment crises. Once considered an “island of peace” escaping criminal violence, Ecuador has seen homicides surge by 430% over the past five years, femicides double, youth violence skyrocket by 640%, and extortion explode. The insecurity is debilitating to the lives of the Ecuadorian people. Ecuador’s rising crime also affects the United States by empowering dangerous criminal groups and exacerbating migration flows. Indeed, during his confirmation hearing, Secretary of State Marco Rubio highlighted Ecuador as a U.S. priority, particularly in addressing security threats and combating Chinese illegal fishing.
After brazen criminal attacks in Guayaquil in early 2024, President Daniel Noboa, of the National Democratic Action (AND) party, declared an “internal armed conflict” and labeled 22 criminal groups as terrorist organizations. Issuing a state of emergency, he sent the military to take them on and placed prisons under military control while seeking to decapitate the groups’ leadership. An April 2024 referendum solidified “mano dura” (iron-fist) policies and the military’s role in public security. Over the course of the year, homicides fell by 16.5%, an important accomplishment. But the government’s security strategy has been incomplete, and its high-value targeting (HVT) has also created a perfect storm for violence to increase or persist. The criminal groups’ domestic and international ambitions and scope of activities have expanded. A holistic security strategy is needed. It must move beyond HVT to systematically dismantle the criminal groups’ operational structures, strengthen the judicial system, and bolster police and investigative capacities.
Fragmentation and diversification
Amid widespread criticism of the military’s human rights abuses, including extrajudicial killings, arbitrary and mass detentions, and systemic impunity as well as inhumane prison conditions, the government’s “Plan Fénix” succeeded in capturing some crime bosses. Others were isolated in prison, while some fled abroad. Such HVT is politically appealing and relatively easy to execute.
However, as in many HVT plans around the world, it left the middle operational structures unaffected. Just like in Mexico, mid-level commanders in Ecuador have been vying for control, while the country’s criminal groups have splintered, including the four largest—Los Lobos, Los Choneros, Los Tiguerones, and the Latin Kings. The larger number of violent actors and within-group succession power struggles make mounting effective responses far more challenging. And violence has spread into new areas of Ecuador, further straining security responses.
For example, in the town of Durán, a cocaine transshipment hub, turf wars between Los Chone Killers, a splinter faction of Los Choneros, and the Latin Kings included car bombings targeting public officials. In Manabí, government operations against Los Choneros led to the formation of violent splinter groups, Los Pepes—a coalition of eight smaller gangs. The conflict between these groups has caused widespread violence against civilians.
As has been the case with criminal groups from Mexico to Colombia and beyond, Ecuador’s criminal groups have diversified beyond drug trafficking into extortion, kidnapping, illegal mining, human smuggling, fuel trafficking, and wildlife trafficking.
In areas controlled by Los Choneros, Tiguerones, and Los Lobos, violence-underpinned extortion taxes affect businesses, government institutions, as well as ordinary people. Small and medium-sized businesses struggle to pay and are sometimes forced to shut down. These “vacunas,” fees a victim must pay to avoid physical harm or property damage, are a form of governance and control, not just profit. Similarly, illegal mining, dominated by Los Lobos and Los Choneros, brings more than top dollars: it facilitates money laundering and networking with transnational crime groups.
Changing relationship with transnational crime
In fact, the government’s targeting policy also inadvertently diversified arrangements between transnational and Ecuadorian crime groups. Previously, powerful international groups like the Sinaloa Cartel and Cártel Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG) relied on a favored Ecuadorian counterpart for cocaine shipments and other operations in Ecuador: for Sinaloa, Los Choneros; for CJNG, Los Lobos. In their violent bipolar rivalry spanning from Mexico through Chile, the Mexican drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) pushed these local groups into turf wars. However, HVT and the resulting fragmentation of Ecuador’s criminal groups led the transnational groups to stop relying on a single local group in Ecuador; now, they make short-term deals with many local groups instead. On the one hand, this could reduce the power of some Ecuadorian groups because they are no longer individually benefiting from the Mexican groups’ exclusive support. But on the other hand, it could amplify violent competition among the Ecuadorian groups as each seeks to secure a contract with the big transnational DTOs, which are themselves trying to prevent the Ecuadorian groups from signing up with their rival.
However, the local groups are no longer satisfied with being just vassals and lesser partners of the transnational DTOs. Los Lobos, for example, has grown from merely being service providers for the CJNG and Albanian and ex-FARC mafias into themselves bypassing intermediaries and controlling cocaine shipments to Europe. Ecuadorian crime groups’ international ambitions are threatening the turfs of transnational DTOs, raising the risk of violence escalation.
Encroachment into local politics
Most deleteriously, criminal groups in Ecuador increasingly use violence and corruption to embed themselves in politics. Assassinations of political candidates who challenge criminal groups have surged. In Durán, criminal organizations have coerced officials into providing them with protection and directly took over local governance structures. The state’s authority and legitimacy have weakened, while parallel criminal governance structures are expanding.
Cases like the Metastasis scandal have exposed deep ties between government officials and organized crime.
Yet the country’s weak justice system remains plagued by corruption, inefficiency, and intimidation. Since 2022, 15 judges and prosecutors have been murdered.
The February 9 election
Still, President Noboa’s mano-dura policies have served him well politically, bolstering his nearly 55% approval rating. In a January 24 poll, he led among the 14 presidential candidates with 36.9%, ahead of Luisa González of the Citizen Revolution Movement tallying 32.4%. While enjoying 44% personal approval ratings, González must navigate the polarizing legacy of her party leader, former President Rafael Correa, who is accused of corruption and is in exile. (If no candidate secures over 50% of the vote, or 40% with a 10-point lead, a runoff will occur on April 13.)
Noboa’s platform promises to cement the use of a joint police-military force he created and increase the use of cyber tools and big data.
González also favors technological tools to combat crime. But in contrast to Noboa, she offers a victim-centered, rights-based approach that prioritizes social reintegration for incarcerated individuals and reestablishing community safety assemblies to enable collaborative policing. She neither mentions the armed forces nor specific measures to address escalating violence. Rather, she talks of rebuilding trust in the police and its capacity by providing free preparation for entrance tests for police academy aspirants.
Policy recommendations
To further reduce violence and roll back the power of criminal groups, a security strategy that combines law enforcement with measures to build societal resilience against organized crime is required. This includes well-designed and diligently evaluated anti-crime socio-economic programs.
Shifting from HVT toward dismantling criminal networks’ middle operational level is critical. This approach weakens the groups’ operational capacity, disrupts leadership regeneration, and generates actionable evidence against top-tier criminals. To minimize the risk of escalation, careful strategic planning should guide operations, force prepositioning, and sequencing.
Expanding law enforcement’s focus beyond cocaine trafficking to illegal mining, extortion, and human, weapons, and wildlife trafficking is also important to gather intelligence and deprive polycrime groups of crucial funding and political influence.
Quick progress can be made in this broader effort by investing in scanning and inspection technologies and strengthening interagency and international cooperation at ports and borders, where at least 68% of Ecuador’s exports are at risk of containing contraband. Yet it will be much more difficult, though essential, to combat illegal mining, logging, and poaching in situ, where a combination of law enforcement and socio-economic support to communities is needed.
Bolstering Ecuador’s judicial system by purging corruption and strengthening independence is fundamental. The reestablishment of the Ministry of Justice, dismantled in 2018, would help coordinate criminal policy and institutional oversight. Creating special investigative units, perhaps with U.S. assistance, and insulating them from political interference would advance efforts to tackle high-level corruption and powerful criminal networks.
The $7.6 million that the United States is sending to help Ecuador combat illegal mining and modernize port security and Ecuador’s recent authorization for temporary U.S. military operations in the Galápagos Islands provide a useful start for countering drug trafficking and maritime crime. Enhancing U.S. Coast Guard collaboration with Ecuadorian counterparts is equally important. These law enforcement efforts need to be combined with consultations with local communities and civil society to mitigate concerns about environmental impacts on the Galápagos and avoid repeating the controversies surrounding the former U.S. base in Manta.
Efforts to comprehensively dismantle wildlife trafficking operations and networks, especially those with ties to China, should also focus on terrestrial species. Targeting wildlife trafficking operations often yields intelligence on many other illegal operations and connections to rival state powers. But once again, law enforcement actions need to be combined with diligent respect for human rights and socio-economic assistance to wean communities of economic dependence on poaching.
Finally, upgrading Ecuador’s security infrastructure should also be a critical priority. The existing ECU-911 digital security system, developed by Chinese companies CEIEC and Huawei, poses significant privacy and accountability risks and could serve as a backdoor to espionage. The United States can support Ecuador in replacing it with secure, internationally compliant surveillance systems to enhance monitoring and prevent criminal activity while safeguarding data integrity.
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Commentary
Ecuador’s elections, organized crime, and security challenges
February 3, 2025