A UN satellite proposal tests limits of technological sovereignty

Satellite broadband technologies like Starlink have become increasingly central to global conflict mediation. From Ukrainian troops using Starlink to stay connected on the battlefield and Russian troops leveraging contraband terminals to initiate drone strikes, to Starlink offering free service to Iranians and Venezuelans during internet blackouts—satellite broadband technology is no longer exclusively a direct-to-consumer service, but one that nation-states depend on for connectivity during geopolitical crises.

These recent use cases of low-Earth orbital (LEO) technologies during geopolitical crises and the need for governance are reflected in numerous agenda items for the upcoming World Radio Conference (WRC) in 2027. Organized by the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), WRC is a specialized agency under the purview of the United Nations that meets every three to four years to coordinate international spectrum allocation, orbital satellite governance, and technical standards for communication technologies. The 2027 conference, which will be held in Shanghai, offers a forum for delegations from U.N. member states to deliberate on global telecommunications issues.

One of the most controversial items on the docket for WRC-27 is agenda item 1.5 (AI 1.5), a proposal aimed at limiting the unauthorized use of non-geostationary orbit (NGSO) satellite technologies in the orbital space above sovereign territories where the technology is prohibited. The U.S. and other Western countries are seeking to block the proposal for its potential to facilitate authoritarian control of satellite communications, while countries like Iran and Russia approach 1.5 as an opportunity to expand digital sovereignty. The stakes of AI 1.5 run deep, and despite the intricate geopolitical interests on both sides of the proposal, the item raises essential questions about technological sovereignty in an age of unprecedented orbital expansion.

What does AI 1.5 suggest, and why is it significant for the US?

The proposal builds on three existing policies in the ITU’s framework: Article 18 and Resolutions 22 and 25, the latter two of which were adopted at WRC-23 in Dubai. Under Article 18 of the ITU’s radio regulations, no enterprise is permitted to operate in a territory without authorization from the territory’s government. Resolution 22 relegates the responsibility for unauthorized transmissions from orbital satellites to ground terminals to the government of the territory experiencing the transmissions. Specifically referencing services that provide “transportable terminals” like Starlink, Resolution 25 stipulates that the countries licensing these systems must ensure they’re only operable within countries that have provided authorization. Article 18 enables nations to extend sovereignty to telecommunications technology, while Resolutions 22 and 25 require action from states experiencing unauthorized transmissions and accountability from states licensing those satellite operators. The intervention proposed by AI 1.5 directly addresses issues of enforcement by enabling states to fully exclude their territory from NGSO satellite service areas. If adopted, NGSO satellite operators would be required to turn off services over territories where the services are not authorized.

U.S. regulators have outright condemned the agenda item, with members of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and National Telecommunications and Information Agency (NTIA) speaking out against it. At an event in early July 2026, NTIA Administrator Arielle Roth said, “there’s a really problematic agenda item being pushed by Iran…[it] raises challenges with respect not only to the cost of deploying global satellites systems, but also potentially public safety repercussions. And it’s also not necessary for the ITU to be regulating in this area.” Roth’s concerns regarding AI 1.5 reflect the United States’ objective of exporting U.S. NGSO technology, since it’s an “an area where [the U.S.] lead[s] and we want to continue to advance our interests,” Roth stated in the same press conference.

Given the United States’ market dominance in the NGSO industry—led by LEO broadband providers Starlink and its burgeoning competitor, Amazon Leo—U.S. telecommunication regulators are determined to minimize ITU regulation that limits NGSO expansion. Blocking AI 1.5 and convincing other U.N. member states to do the same is an integral component of the United States’ pursuit of global leadership in satellite communication. But the pursuit of global NGSO market dominance isn’t the only factor steering policymakers away from adopting this item.

Others have warned about the effect this proposal could have on the global flow of information. A recent report from New America’s LEO Policy Working Group criticizes AI 1.5 for setting an “authoritarian precedent,” asserting that its proponents, Russia and Iran, might leverage authority over satellite communications to limit free speech in their respective countries. Starlink proved especially useful to demonstrators amid the Iranian government’s attack on free speech in January, with Starlink even waiving subscription fees for protesters despite lacking authorization to operate in the country. The emancipatory utility of LEO broadband technology is undeniably important for citizens living under authoritarian regimes like Iran.

Outside of these censorship considerations, New America and the United States’ official policy statement on the subject point out feasibility issues with the proposal. New America’s report states, “[s]atellites depend on continuous telemetry, tracking, and command (TT&C) communications with ground-control facilities,” and that requiring these functions be turned off intermittently during orbit could cause operational and safety risks.

There are additional concerns that the regulation is aimed at punishing a single commercial provider, Starlink, but would unnecessarily constrain less geopolitically entwined NGSO providers. While the free speech and feasibility concerns alone justify non-adoption of AI 1.5, it’s important to consider whether the United States’ position is rooted in safeguarding the free flow of information or in the pursuit of global authority through unilateral control of emerging NGSO technology.

AI 1.5 addresses a serious issue of technological sovereignty and international telecommunications governance in the emerging NGSO satellite market. While adopting AI 1.5 could cause operational and safety issues for the entire market and further limit free speech in authoritarian-led counties, the proposal also identifies a mechanism by which the U.S. has been able to exert hegemonic control over the direction of global conflicts. But it’s likely that the threat of decreased economic authority in the emerging space communication market also underlies the United States’ true opposition to this proposal.

The need for oversight

Rejecting AI 1.5 shouldn’t halt the development of stronger international oversight regarding the use of NGSO communication technology. The existing ITU framework, specifically Article 14 and Resolutions 22 and 25, provide the scaffolding to regulate uplinks from unauthorized ground terminals but place the onus of regulating NGSO companies on the country in which they are incorporated. Given that the ITU lacks the legal authority to regulate individual companies, it’s up to U.S. regulatory bodies—the FCC and NTIA—to mitigate geopolitical interference by commercial actors in the NGSO market. However, the intimacy of regulators’ relationships with NGSO providers, like Starlink owner Elon Musk’s close ties to the U.S. executive branch, raises questions over whether monopolies like Starlink will be punished for their technological diplomacy.

To counteract the danger of NGSO satellite corporations interfering in or acting as arbiters of global conflict mediation, U.S. legislators need to push for stronger regulation of the emerging NGSO satellite market. The rate of innovation has far exceeded the pace of regulation, and unlike sovereign states, corporations like SpaceX, which owns Starlink, are beholden to shareholders, not constituents. Enabling commercial entities to guide foreign policy strategy by subsidizing connectivity when it satisfies secondary goals, like undermining authoritarian regimes, disguises the pursuit of profit as foreign assistance.

It’s misguided to outright condemn AI 1.5 as a ploy by autocratic countries to invoke censorship and insulate citizens, when in fact, the U.S. is likewise pursuing an alternative agenda through its rejection of the WRC agenda item. NGSO technologies provide essential services to citizens living under restrictive regimes and more should be done to safeguard internet access for vulnerable populations. It’s questionable, however, that SpaceX’s Starlink is the only provider capable of offering essential connectivity to civilians in adversarial nations.

Objectively speaking, the proposal would likely create service obstacles for all NGSO providers, posing a threat to orbital infrastructure and general safety. It likewise falls outside the ITU’s jurisdiction to impose regulations that penalize a single provider. For these reasons alone, adopting AI 1.5 would be unwise and inappropriate. However, it’s important that citizens and legislators alike understand that characterizing the proposition as a threat to U.S. dominance in the NGSO market detracts from the true issue guiding this proposal: U.S. satellite communication providers like Starlink are acting as mediators in geopolitical conflicts without substantive oversight. It’s essential that steps are taken to minimize corporate interference in global conflicts to protect American democracy from outsized private influence and safeguard our national security.