Pakistan

[The emergence of state-backed armed groups and the Taliban's influence] are dangerous developments, and portend a return to the way things were a decade ago in that area. Foot soldiers from the ‘surrendered’ Taliban can easily cross back over to the [Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan] TTP – or facilitate them, provide them logistical support and assistance. [On whether the Afghan Taliban would act in any concrete way against the TTP], I don’t see it happening, The Taliban care greatly about maintaining unity in their ranks – action against the TTP would undermine that and threaten to send defectors over to Islamic State-Khorasan (ISIL’s affiliate in the region), something the Taliban really don’t want. That motivation trumps any desire to appease Pakistan.

[Pakistan's blasphemy laws] have become fully internalised by and ingrained in the population; that is the sentiment that the TLP [Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan party] uses to draw support.

Once the Pakistani military decided to take action against [extremist group Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, TTP], it was able to, to a great degree, at least drive it out of the tribal areas.

[Over the next few years the number of attacks fell, but the TTP was not gone. Its foot soldiers and commanders had melted away or slipped across the notoriously porous border.] Many of them, turns out, were in prison in Afghanistan.

Since the TLP’s inception, the Pakistani state has dithered in front of the group and has appeased it, never countering it ideologically. Given that blasphemy is such a hot-button issue and is instituted in Pakistan’s laws, the state seems to be fearful of taking on the TLP. And the TLP understands this and the fact that it has street power, and uses it ruthlessly to its advantage to gain ground each time it protests.

The Pakistani state defeated the group militarily in 2015, and while the TTP [Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan] has been resurgent in recent months, the Pakistani army clearly has the ability to tackle them again. The terms of negotiations would have the terrorists granted amnesty in exchange for laying down arms. This means they will not be held accountable for killing tens of thousands of Pakistanis and for terrorizing a nation for the better part of a decade. It would also set a terrible precedent for other militant and terrorist groups in the country, as well as would-be terrorists.

[Pakistan's alarm over the bill] falls into a long narrative in Pakistan of its relationship with America, where it feels that the U.S. uses it when it needs to, only to abandon it or turn against it in the aftermath.

[The Pakistan civilian government and the military] seem to be working very well together, essentially as one unit, in this government.

Given the Afghan Taliban’s links with the Pakistani Taliban [TTP] — both operational and ideological — Pakistan really has to worry about the risks a resurgent TTP poses to Pakistan. It has already seen some of those risks materialize with the release of TTP prisoners from jails in Afghanistan in recent weeks as well as an uptick in attacks against Pakistani security forces. [Pakistan’s] relationship with the Taliban in particular could strain Pakistan’s already troubled relationship with the U.S.

[If...military technology were to pass from the Afghan Taliban to regional insurgents like the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan] that spells disaster for Pakistan.

Pakistan will face security concerns with a Taliban-ruled Afghanistan, chiefly from an emboldened and resurgent Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), a terrorist group responsible for killing tens of thousands of Pakistanis. [The developments in Afghanistan may also give a boost  to other fundamentalist groups within Pakistan] in a way that renders them more powerful than before and threaten the state's authority. I think Pakistan will have less clout over the Taliban now than it did in the 1996-2001 timeframe.

Everyone is well aware of Pakistan’s troubled relationship with the Afghan government, and its relationship, that has dated decades now, with the Taliban... What [Pakistan] would probably have preferred is a negotiated political settlement with the Taliban in a position of power, but perhaps not the only actor on the stage.