Mr. Chairman, Thank you for the opportunity to speak today on an important topic. I am also pleased to see this committee take the lead in educating the American public on such a critical issue. I have been asked to address the energy component of a theoretical
resolution of the current nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula.
While I do not claim to be an energy expert, per se, I had the privilege of serving as the United States Representative to the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) from May 2001 until the end of August 2003. In that capacity and from my previous experience of working the North Korean issue from the National Security Council staff, I have had the opportunity to talk to a number of more qualified people about what an energy component to an overall settlement might look like.
I propose to provide you today with some thoughts on what might be possible and to point out problems that will have to be addressed along the way. First, let me briefly review how energy has come to play such a prominent role in past and future dealings with North Korea.
Kim Jong-un appears to believe that he can sustain and enhance his weapons programs without major impediments or severe consequences. The United States must impart to Kim that his beliefs are objectionable and wholly contrary to U.S. interests, and that they will be opposed in word and in deed.