In the recently-released Democracy Index of the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), Latin America’s performance is worrisome. Just one country, Uruguay, is classified as a “full democracy.” Costa Rica falls into the category of “flawed democracy,” which also includes Mexico and Brazil, both of which fell in the ranking. The assessment could be even more discrediting were it not for the good results of several Latin American countries on the indicator for quality of electoral justice. Brazil’s score is auspicious: 9.58. Only five countries in the world score better.
Like other attempts to gauge democracy based on a given set of variables, the EIU’s assessment is susceptible to criticism. Yet it has the merit of reflecting a reading shared by observers of the current moment in Latin American politics. We agree that the region has continued to leave crucial questions regarding the future of its democratic experiences unanswered. How can one update the models of representation, reinforcing their social resonance and the legitimacy of public action? What can be done to ensure that the state is more efficient and responsive to society at large? What are the paths to advancing the democratization of the political parties, recovering their role as mediators between society and government authority, a function they share today with new mechanisms and new collective actors? Is it feasible to bring a halt to the sequestration of politics by economic power, looking out for the preeminence of the public interest?
In some quarters, the discourse of democratic renewal took on a regressive tone in recent years. A supposed antinomy was preached between social change and representative democracy in the name of seeking less oligarchic and more inclusive models. New institutional arrangements were postulated, with a plebiscitary bias, while principles such as the independence of the branches of government and respect for fundamental freedoms and guarantees were neglected.
While the backward-looking discourse appears to be receding with the victory of the opposition in the Venezuelan elections and the fall of like-minded forces such as kirchnerismo, there are problems that are growing more intense that affect the region from the Rio Grande to Tierra del Fuego. They fall into two main groups.
The first has to do with the impact of the economic crisis on patterns of social cohesion. With the end of the expansionist cycle driven by the high commodities prices, the means for sustaining the widely disseminated programs for income transfers and easy credit were becoming scarce. The emerging sectors lost the immediate prospect of their continued social ascent. More than a few analysts considered the dissatisfaction of those groups to be the fuse that led to the multitudinous demonstrations that took place in Brazil and other Latin American countries in 2013.
True, demonstrators in Sao Paulo held up banners that echoed the “networks of indignation and hope” (as put by Manuel Castells) that proliferated after the “occupy” movement with the disenchantment of traditional politics. Yet their main demand, for better living conditions, will continue to go unaddressed in Brazil and elsewhere as long as the state’s fiscal crisis continues.
The agenda of Latin American societies goes beyond vindicating quality infrastructure services. It includes calls for a genuine updating of the institutions. They want public security, repression of organized crime, transparency in the conduct of public affairs, effective oversight mechanisms, careful accountability by public agents, the end of patrimonialism, an end to practices that harm the national treasury, anti-corruption efforts, and an end to impunity – in summary, a series of positions that cannot be addressed without a coordinated action by the state and citizens. It is that institutional deficit that justifies negative assessments such as the EIU’s.
Yet the exception pointed out by the Democracy Index should be highlighted. After more than 20 years heading up the regional office of the Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), I am happy to confirm that Latin America’s electoral justice system, except for topical cases such as Venezuela, is going against the current. The electoral courts have effectively advocated the adoption of good practices and rules, from the use of new technologies at the service of greater transparency in elections to the endeavor to assure equity in electoral contests. Suffice it to turn to the Brazilian case, which became a reference worldwide in turning to electronic voting. How can one not testify in favor of a model which, in the first round of the 2014 elections, made it possible for 93.9% of the votes to be counted one hour after the polls closed without any evidence of fraud? How can one not welcome the gains in biometric identification, which will eliminate the risk of a repeated vote and make it possible to establish a single national registry? Not to mention the judicious regulation of access by parties and candidates to the media by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal.
Brazil’s electoral justice system has also highlighted the magnitude of the challenge of regulating campaign finance. The figures made available to the Supreme Electoral Tribunal on the weight of financing by companies reveal contributions of more than tens and even hundreds of millions of dollars in a single election campaign. It is an unparalleled phenomenon in the regional context, and perhaps internationally. The anomaly is sufficiently eloquent to justify a correction in direction, such as that adopted by the Federal Supreme Court, at the request of the Brazilian Bar Association (Ordem dos Advogados do Brasil), restricting private financing to natural persons. The adjustment in the party slates for the municipal elections next October will not be simple. Yet what is most important is that an important step was taken to affirm the autonomy of politics. And it happened, as it should, through the joint action of the state and society.
This piece was originally published in
President-elect Bolsonaro has embraced tough-on-crime measures that egregiously violate basic human rights and eviscerate the rule of law. Responding to Brazil’s 63,880 homicides in 2017, Bolsonaro calls for increasing protection for police officers who kill alleged criminals and arming citizens. He calls for further militarizing urban policing, reducing the age of criminal liability from 18 to 16, reinstating the death penalty, authorizing torture in interrogations and imprisoning more people... Brazil’s police are already notorious for being one of the world’s deadliest in the use of force. In many favelas, Brazil’s retired and current police officers operate illegal militias that extort and control local communities, murdering those who oppose them and engaging in warfare with Brazil’s highly-violent gangs and in social cleansing. Bolsonaro is simply threatening to turn the rest of the police into state-sanctioned thugs.