The U.S.-Pakistan Strategic Relationship
Pakistan has been an important U.S. partner since the events of September 11, assisting in the hunt for al Qaeda and Taliban leaders its western frontier regions. Despite its contributions, some within the U.S. assert that Pakistan needs to do more, especially in light of continuing American military aid. Given these factors and the upcoming elections in Pakistan, U.S.-Pakistan relations have been the focus of intense scrutiny by the two governments, their peoples, and the media. Further, Pakistan’s nuclear program and its ongoing tensions with its neighbor Afghanistan also pose unique challenges to the bilateral strategic relationship.
On February 6, the Brookings Institution hosted a discussion on the future of the U.S.-Pakistan military relationship with three distinguished speakers: General Jehangir Karamat, a former Pakistani army chief of staff and ambassador to the United States; General Anthony Zinni, a former Marine general who served as commander of United States Central Command and was a U.S. special envoy to the Middle East; and Richard Armitage, who served as U.S. deputy secretary of state from 2001 to 2005. The event was moderated by Brookings Senior Fellow Philip Gordon.
Agenda
Moderator
Philip H. Gordon
Former Brookings Expert
Mary and David Boies Senior Fellow in U.S. Foreign Policy - Council on Foreign Relations
Panelists
Richard Armitage
Former Deputy Secretary of State (2001-2005)
General Jehangir Karamat
Former Brookings Expert
General Anthony Zinni
Former Commander, CENTCOM
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[The emergence of state-backed armed groups and the Taliban's influence] are dangerous developments, and portend a return to the way things were a decade ago in that area. Foot soldiers from the ‘surrendered’ Taliban can easily cross back over to the [Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan] TTP – or facilitate them, provide them logistical support and assistance. [On whether the Afghan Taliban would act in any concrete way against the TTP], I don’t see it happening, The Taliban care greatly about maintaining unity in their ranks – action against the TTP would undermine that and threaten to send defectors over to Islamic State-Khorasan (ISIL’s affiliate in the region), something the Taliban really don’t want. That motivation trumps any desire to appease Pakistan.
