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Moderator:

PHILIP GORDON, Senior Fellow
The Brookings Institution

Panel Presentations:

GENERAL JEHANGIR KARAMAT
Former Pakistan Chief of Army Staff;
Former Ambassador to the U.S.

GENERAL ANTHONY ZINNI
Former Commander, U.S. Central Command

RICHARD ARMITAGE
Former Deputy Secretary, U.S. Department of State

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P R O C E E D I N G S

MR. GORDON: I am Phil Gordon, a Senior Fellow here at Brookings. It is a pleasure to welcome you to this event on the U.S.-Pakistan strategic relationship. I do not think I need to tell this group how important this issue is and how topical it is given reports of al-Qaeda forming on the Afghan-Pakistan border, the nuclear issue, the issue of relations with India, the issue of Pakistan as a test case for democracy. The important strategic issues go on and on.

It is commonplace on a panel like this to say we could not have a better panel to address these issues. That happens to be true in this case. We really could not have a better set of speakers to address this topic. I think they are already known to you all, so I will be very brief in my introductions so that we can jump right in. First, to my right, General Jehangir Karamat I think you all know. He was ambassador of Pakistan to the United States. Before that he was the Army Chief of Staff in Pakistan preceding General Musharraf. After General Karamat, General Anthony Zinni, again known to everybody in this room, a former Marine General who was our commander of CENTCOM from 1997 to 2000, and after that, the U.S. Special Envoy to the Middle East. Then finally, Richard Armitage who was Deputy Secretary of State in the Bush Administration from 2001 to 2005. You will notice that the years in which these gentleman all

served in the posts that I mentioned coincided, so you will also note that they all know each other extremely well.

In terms of a format, each of the speakers will briefly begin with 7 to 10 minutes, just some informal remarks on the subject of the U.S.-Pakistan strategic relationship. I will probably take the liberty to follow up and ask them a few questions and press them on a couple of issues. Then we will open it to a discussion and questions and answers from the room. With that, let me turn it over to General Karamat for the introductory remarks.

GENERAL KARAMAT: It is a great pleasure to be back at Brookings and a privilege to be on a panel with so many distinguished colleagues.

Ladies and gentlemen, the sort of questions that are being asked in terms of the U.S.-Pakistan relationship right now are what is really happening in Pakistan's Western border areas, why is it happening, and what is Pakistan doing about it. In the few minutes that I have, I could not possibly go into the details, but what I would like to do is tell you and sort of explain what is happening, why it is happening, and what we are doing about it.

Of course, the short answer to these questions is that far too much is happening in the Western border areas, none of it is good, and

that Pakistan is doing everything that a country would be doing when it is faced with a potentially existential threat which is that it is doing its utmost to bring the situation under control and I am glad that it has the support of the U.S. and that it is part of the U.S.-Pakistan strategic relationship in what it is trying to do in the Western border areas.

With what has been happening recently, and you have seen it happening on television, there is no possibility of denying or telling you something different from what is actually happening. The reality is there staring us in the face and it has to be understood in terms of the scale, the dimension, and the danger that it poses not only to Pakistan but to the region and to the rest of the world.

There are many reasons for why this is happening and why this militancy has expanded from Southern Afghanistan into Pakistan's tribal areas. You know there is a land border of 2,500 kilometers, northwest very high altitudes, southwest lower altitudes. You know there are routes across this border and it is a porous border. The main routes which are manned with maybe one in each province, but there are hundreds of less-frequented routes which are not manned and there is movement across them. Vehicles average 14,000 a day crossing over, 12,000 of them in Baluchistan. There are 40,000 people crossing every day with over 30,000 in Baluchistan which is southwest where the altitude

is lower. There are seven divided villages straddling the border and these villages are 100 square meters to 3 to 5 square kilometers and they actually are part on the Afghan side and part on the Pakistan side.

You have 31 refugee camps in the northwest with 1.7 million refugees and another 17 in the southwest with 230,000 refugees. So there are 2 million refugees in these camps and these have become over a period of time centers for drugs, weapons, crime, and some of the people there have linkages deep inside Pakistan and deep inside Afghanistan, so they are a problem.

Northwest, bordering the Afghan border we have seven FATA, or the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, with 3.2 million people in an area of 27,200 kilometers involved, and you have seven border districts in Baluchistan, five Pashtun, two Baluch, and this indicates that there is an ethnic mix in Baluchistan which is important to understand. So there are 2.4 million in those camps with 91,438 square kilometers along the border in Baluchistan.

As I said, the main crossings with one in each province are manned, but the others are not. A biometric system put in place by Pakistan is dysfunctional after just 3 months of operation because the Afghans did not agree to it. Afghans have also resisted any attempt to harden the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and there are

several reasons for that. So if you put together this whole picture which exists on the ground, with the U.S. and NATO operating in Southern Afghanistan and the central gravity of the militancy in Southern Afghanistan, you can understand how it has spread into Pakistan's tribal areas. All the conditions favor this expansion into Pakistan.

What is surprising is that we have not been able to contain and neutralize this militancy in the tribal areas and they have been able to not only consolidate in the tribal areas, but they have been able to now sally out of the tribal areas and attack targets within Pakistan. The recent fighting has been in Sawat and -- Kohat and Thal areas, and there are bombings all over the country linked to the violence in the tribal areas.

The situation on the ground, if I may just take a minute to explain that, is that a new generation of Taliban leaders from within Pakistan's tribal areas have gained control of vast areas of territory inside Pakistan's tribal areas. They actually control that territory. We know their names. They are well known. One of them, Masood, is in the largest South Waziristan agency. These Taliban are trying to, and according to them they have already done it, make a tarik Taliban Pakistan which roughly translates into a Pakistan Taliban organization in that area. And not only all the leaders are in that organization with Masood as their leader, but they also have representatives from the settled areas of

Pakistan, Bannu, Kahad, Diafan, and so on, represented in that. They have established linkages with elements in Afghanistan with people in refugee camps, with sympathizers in Pakistan's urban areas, and most of the recent suicide bombings targeting law-enforcement agencies come from this. Also there are madrassas in each of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas dating back to our joint jihad against the Soviet Union. There are I think about 260 madrassas in that area of which 80 are known to be active. When I say active, it means that they are actively engaged in training and doing everything to prepare people for suicide bombings, for IEDs and whatever you want for terrorist activities. These are also magnets for would-be terrorists from Pakistan and from other parts of the world and from Islamist organizations in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan who apparently have free access to Afghanistan because at least I have not heard of any interdiction and prosecutions taking place in Afghanistan.

The pattern of activity, raids, attacks, IEDs, suicide attacks, bombing blasts, kidnappings, hostage-taking, interdiction of logistics, attacks on law-enforcement agencies, captured personnel, and suspected collaborators periodically beheaded publicly, and more important, the traditional tribal leadership more or less systematically eliminated. This is the leadership we traditionally depended upon to solve problems in the tribal areas. And recently they have also attacked infrastructure targets

like the Kohat tunnel and other targets on intercity routes apparently to isolate parts of the country and bring them under their control. This is the sort of explanation for the geographic expansion that has taken place, the proximity of the tribal areas, the special status of the tribal areas, the madrassas, the capacity of law-enforcement agencies to confront this new threat that is coming.

Add to this mix poor governance, lax administration, and enormous economic incentives for the militants. These economic incentives have to be understood. I will not go into the details unless you want to know about it and during the questions I will be happy to answer them.

Two other aspects really beyond the scope of this talk - I do not have the time; one is we need to analyze the 5-year political government in the frontier provinces in terms of what it has achieved and what is has not achieved, not to blame, but to learn lessons for the future because we headed into elections and another political government. The second is the exact situation on the ground in Afghanistan, going beyond the random acts of violence into economic reasons for what is happening there, the war loads, governance, justice, the police, the military, the political structures, and the actual development which has taken place and the progress toward democracy that has to be made. I think this analysis

will turn up a picture that may be the real reason for the resurgence of the militancy and the expansion into Pakistan.

There is of course smuggling from Pakistan into Afghanistan and the recent food shortages that we have had can be explained from that point of view. And let me just mention that with 400,000 acres under poppy cultivation with an implication of something like $40 to $50 billion, at least $4 billion are going into funding the chaos in which these activities then can thrive because they need this chaos. Then of course there is the absence of any central coordinating authority in Afghanistan. So the logistics of the militancy needs analysis and this is an aspect that needs to be tackled.

Finally, when we come down to the last question, what are we going to do about this, there is a whole raft of ideas that are floating around. There are ideas like overt intervention by the U.S. or covert intervention by the U.S. and about taking care of Pakistan's nuclear assets and so on. I am sure they are good ideas for debate, but they are not going to address the threats that are outlined. In fact, al-Qaeda and the Taliban may welcome that kind of an action but nobody else will. And of course, it will also strengthen the Islamist connection which the militants are very keen on, and weaken the secular liberal Pashtun element which we hope to harness to confront this militancy eventually.

Military operations, yes, we need them and we have a pattern of how we have undertaken these military operations from 2001 through 2006, and I will be happy to share the results with. From 2006 through 2007, we had the peace agreement situation and we have to see how those peace agreements helped, whether they shored up this military situation or they undermined this military situation. I am not saying it was bad because we may eventually have to resort to jirgas and the political element again. It just has to be a strategy which has many prongs, the military, the political, and the development strategy, and development I must say has been far too little and far too late. If you want to undertake that, then it has to be in tandem with the military and the political strategy.

So I will stop here and just say that it is perhaps time to look at this whole situation within the U.S.-Pakistan strategic relationship, not to go into areas which will not help us combat this threat and which will undermine the institutions which we are going to rely on to tackle this threat. We need to go into a very comprehensive strategy, a multipronged strategy, which we can discuss later, to tackle this threat over the long-term because it is going to be there for several years. It is not going to go away in a hurry.

Everybody is saying that Pakistan is a crucial ally of the United States. I also think so. And I also think that for Pakistan the U.S.

is a very important ally. So with that kind of a situation, the U.S.-Pakistan strategic relationship has a great future and we must do everything to make sure that it keeps progressing in the direction that we want to move us toward the end state that we want in Afghanistan and in our tribal areas. Thank you.

MR. GORDON: Thank you, General. Thank you very much for those opening remarks. We will in due course have lots of questions for you, but I think what we ought to do now is give our other speakers a chance to give their opening comments.

GENERAL ZINNI: I would like to talk briefly about the military-to-military relationship, obviously the area that I am most familiar with. My first experience with the Pakistani military came in Somalia. As director of operations for the Combined Task Force that the U.S. led in Somalia in the early 1990s, I was impressed with the fact that we had a battalion of Pakistani military there on the ground when we arrived in an unfortunate situation with the U.N. mandate that was insufficient for the problems that were there with the Pakistanis very ably trying to accomplish the mission to get humanitarian aid and support to the needy. When our mission expanded and the U.N. mission that followed us, the Pakistanis were willing to expand their presence. They upped their commitment to one of the largest contingents for that mission even though

it was very difficult, and they took on the most difficult area of responsibility. The Pakistanis were willing to take on the city of Mogadishu itself. Those of you who are familiar with events in Somalia know what happened. Pakistani forces very bravely and very competently tried to manage a city that was in complete chaos and as a result of the events that occurred on October 19 that we are all well-familiar with here as the Blackhawk Down day, the Pakistanis in the fighting that ensued that day and immediately afterward suffered far more casualties than we did, the Americans, or anybody else in the coalition. Of course, we left and they stayed. I came back to Mogadishu and to Somali as the commander of the task force to cover the withdrawal of U.N. forces and I can tell you the last off the beaches were the Pakistani brigade. As a matter of fact, what was impressive is we had given the Pakistani brigade equipment, kind of old equipment we had in stocks in Italy, cold war equipment, that were generations beyond our most modern equipment. I was told that as we recovered that equipment after the years in Somalia would probably be in bad shape, probably really not very useful. The logisticians who recovered the equipment told me it was in pristine condition. It was turned over with full kit, completely operational, and in amazingly good shape. And in my experience there, that was an indication or hallmark of the forces that I know there and the leadership there. I knew General

Karamat's predecessor as chief of the military and worked closely with him for the Somali operations. Today the Pakistanis have the second most number of troops on U.N. peacekeeping missions. Up until the end of last year, they had the most with over 10,000, which says something about their international commitment, the quality of their forces, and the demands places on those kinds of forces.

In my time at CENTCOM, the military-to-military relationship hung on the thread of the personal relationship between myself and General Karamat, myself and General Musharraf, his successor. We had agreed that regardless of the political situation, the sanctions and all the other things that put pressure on that relationship, that we valued it so much and saw the importance that this personal connection has to be maintained, and I will tell you we called on that personal relationship a number of times. At the turn of the millennium we had a serious of potential attacks that were uncovered by the Jordanians at ceremonies celebrating the turning of the millennium in the Middle East, and we found that the sources of the command and control were located in the Western areas of Pakistan. I was asked by the administration to contact my counterpart, then General Musharraf, to ask if he would make the arrests and based on the intelligence we were receiving from the Jordanians and our own interrogators, scoff up those responsible. It would seem to

surprise you that you would go to the general, the commander of CENTCOM, to ask him to ask his counterpart for this, but that was the thin thread of a relationship that we had, and they were arrested. We were allowed to have access to those people for interrogation. We were allowed to have access to discs that were taken and captured by the Pakistan security forces in the arrests, and about three or four other requests that came about, and again, all under the blanket of this set of sanctions that made it difficult for us to operate.

For us as leaders on both sides, we saw the importance of our officers having this connection. It was unfortunate that we went through a period of time where we sanctioned the education of Pakistani officers at our schools. General Karamat is a graduate of Leavenworth, the Leavenworth Hall of Fame as a matter of fact. He takes pride in that, and I know that for a fact. That kind of connection, that kind of communication, made our ability to communicate and operate with each other despite the political climate much more effective.

I was sent back by the last administration to work the preliminaries to try to defuse the situation in Kargil. I will tell you I would have never been able to see the prime minister had it not been for the chief of the military brokering the access for me to allow the meeting between the prime minister and the president and eventually the defusing

of that situation. And even if the military did not agree with our approach, the respect was so great that it allowed that to occur and allowed that dialogue to begin and defuse what could have been a very serious situation that would have benefited none of us had it blossomed into something more deadly.

I find now that the criticism of the military is what probably disappoints me most. The Pakistani military has suffered over a thousand killed in those Western Provinces along with their security forces, and over twice that many wounded, and yet we are demanding more. In the beginning when they went up into the hills to do these things and to accomplish missions that maybe were seen by their people as not necessarily in their interests but our way, they did it anyway. Did they do it with the kind of equipment with the necessary edge to operate in that very difficult terrain to have an advantage? No. We can look at the assistance program, and I am sure there will be questions about the amounts of money and the amounts of funding and the amounts of support and I would just tell you to look at the capacity or the capability that is being provided. If anybody here, and I see may shaved heads in the audience who have probably have had experience in Iraq and Afghanistan, you know to right insurgencies and to fight in that kind of terrain and to fight in that environment you need an edge. Now matter how modernly equipped

your military is, it is reduced to almost a level playing field in those kinds of environments. And have we provided the edge? Have we provided the training for the security forces? Have we provided the night-vision capability and the kinds of ways and the kinds of qualities that are necessary to operate? I think we need to relook at that kind of support to see what the funding is actually giving us, understand it is not cheap, and to get the edge in these kinds of places for a basic conventional military takes a lot to get it done.

In addition that, I think General Karamat accurately explained the situation on the border. Border security is the problem, border control is the problem. It is not that we do not have a problem with border control, but imagine trying to control that border in Waziristan and along the Southern reaches out of Waziristan. I have been up into that terrain courtesy of the Pakistani military to get a sense of it and I can tell you that it is extremely difficult to control. Yet we have on each side a different set of controls and a relationship maybe that is not what it should be. I would offer to you that maybe our role is to bridge those differences, for us to offer the technical support, the communications, the brokering and the command and control and everything else that goes with a common system for controlling that border, Afghan and Pakistani with us involved. It is in our interests to do it, it is going to take our support and

technology, and it is probably going to take our bridge to make that happen.

It is important that the Pakistani military retain its confidence in its leadership and its international flavor for its officer corps. I think we went through a period where we had a divorce after the first Afghan war, an unfortunate one at the wrong time. We are two nations that absolutely have the same strategic aims and absolutely need each other. It is not a friendly neighborhood. Having been responsible for U.S. military operations, missions, and relationships in that region, I can tell you that Southwest Asia is not a place where we have many friends and strategic relationships that are any more important than this one. This in fact is probably the most important in that area. And I think instead of trying to pick and find fault with the relationship, find the fault lines, to let our let our disagreements wash over and affect the total relationship, I think we need to look forward to building greater relationships based on mutual security interests and the interests on creating stability in that region whether it is economic, political, or security. I think we have both been negligent in allowing the differences and allowing those who would try to break that relationship to sort of take the field and get most of the publicity. And it breaks my heart as a military man knowing that military, having fought side by side with that military, to see the lack of appreciation for the

sacrifices that are being made and I would offer going forward that we need to turn that around. Sure, more has to be done. Sure, there needs to be more effort toward stability done by both sides whether it is political, economic, or in the security relationship, but we have to stop finding fault with the relationship and start building it toward a more positive way in my mind, and I think it begins with the strongest relationship we have, the military-to-military relationship, and that ought to be the source of us growing this into what it should be and what it has been in the past. Thank you.

MR. GORDON: Thanks very much, General Zinni. Secretary Armitage, you also had a lot of direct relations with the Pakistanis at the highest levels and the floor is yours.

SECRETARY ARMITAGE: Thank you very much, and good afternoon. I find myself in the rather uncomfortable position of saying that everything that can be said has been said except not by me, so I will add a few sentences to try to define the problem that we are talking about today.

The first thing I am going to ask everyone here is to take a deep breath. Let's not hyperventilate about what is going on. We've got a problem, but let's take a deep breath. I know that Mark Twain said, even though you are on the right track, you can run over if you are not going

fast enough, but I think it would behoove us all to as I said take a deep breath and let's think about the equities involved here.

The vision of Muhammad Ali Jinnah notwithstanding, he set a pretty difficult task for himself and those who came after him, the governance of Pakistan, which as far as this citizen is concerned is not a country, can be well described in a way as four countries. And with the rather complicating factor now that at least I would say maybe I am affected by our friends in Singapore who now would call Waziristan al-Qaedistan to some extent, so the governance of this is an enormous, enormous problem.

By the way, this is not a problem that the present administration now matter they came to power brought about. This has been a problem in the developments since the time General Zinni acknowledge toward the end of the first Soviet or the Afghan-Soviet war and some of us bear some relationship for this. We knew exactly what we were doing in Pakistan at the time and we knew exactly what was going to happen in Afghanistan when we walked away. This was not a secret. So let's take it easy and look at this in its entire breadth and scope.

If you look at opinion polls recently in Pakistan, there are opinion polls on everything, but one of the opinion polls that you would see is that the affection for extremism in this 162 million populated country of a

median age of 19, the affection for extremism is actually down. What is up is the penchant for violence among those who do espouse extremism and that is sort of the big change phenomenon right now.

The difficulty I think is whichever way you look in Pakistan, nobody can pick what I think our two generals would have said at one time is candidate for soldier of the month. Who is a good candidate for soldier of the month? You have a president who I personally have a lot of affection for. He came to power in an extracurricular way. Unfortunately, the late Benazir Bhutto had a chance as a democratically elected leader and I think it not for nothing that she found herself in Dubai for a number of years, and Mr. Nawaz Sharif also has had his difficulties. I am not being particularly nasty, I am just pointing out the fact that one of the things that we have to deal with now is that we do not have a ready candidate for soldier of the month.

What do we have? We've got a great discussion right now in Washington and beyond in Europe about democracy in Pakistan and that is great. I am all for it. I think it is great. But the question I would have for you is is democracy an endpoint? I would argue it is not an endpoint, it is a journey that never ends. By the way, the people of Pakistan under martial law governments and under democratic governments have not received the governance that I think they really deserve. This is a fact that

you have had a couple of democratically elected governments and people have not really thrived.

So what we have is a journey and it seems to me as we talk about these upcoming elections and we want them to be free and fair and above board and transparent, we've got to realize that if we are going to have a democracy that matters and stays, it is going to have to be a democracy which is based on reformed systems whether it is the judiciary, whether it is rule of law, whether it is freedom of the press, whether it is the party system, et cetera. We are going to have to somehow resolve these ethnic and regional differences or smooth them over to some extent. That is reform and it is a necessary precondition for democracy, and if you do not have it you will have a situation I believe like we have in our own Southern Hemisphere with Venezuela. No one would argue that Hugo Chavez is not democratically elected, he was twice. But what has happened? Reform was not forthcoming, institutions were not developed that could deliver to the needs of the people, their expectations were dashed, they respond to a populist and populists then find themselves with a couple of ways to go. They can either use their popular prestige for the betterment for reform or they can use it to become more autocratic, and that is what I think we are seeing in Venezuela.

So when I say that I want to look at the holistic Pakistan, I would like you to it not only in the ease with which we speak of democracy, but the difficulty of having it develop in a country like Pakistan which as I said has all these ethnic and regional differences with an overlay of some foreign presence and other things. I know one thing, we as a nation should continue to encourage respect for human freedoms, human rights, democracy, all of that. We need to do this. But we've got to be careful in how we make these presentations I think in Pakistan. It does not seem to me to be the better part of wisdom to go publicly to Pakistan to urge that the president of the nation allow U.S. forces, foreign forces, to be active on their soil. It seems to me somewhat counterproductive.

What are the stakes? I have already mentioned the 162 million very young people in Pakistan who deserve a much better life. That is part of it. But it is beyond my candidacy how Afghanistan can be successful unless Pakistan is a success. And for that matter, I have been delighted in recent years with the betterment of relationships with India and particularly the lessening of the fever of Kashmir. It is a problem that needs resolution, but we do not have the situation we had in 2001 and 2002. That is up for grabs if Pakistan is not successful, so the equities here go far beyond 162 million very worthy people in Pakistan.

MR. GORDON: Thank you very much. Thank you all for those opening statements. A lot of topics have been put on the table. I will get to questions, but before I do that I would like to begin though by trying to promote a conversation among the panelists on some of the topics that have been raised. I would propose to do that under the two topics that General Karamat outlined in his opening statement in terms of what is going on, and what do we do about it, and I would like to start to press you a bit further on the what is going on part.

Just this week, in fact yesterday even I believe, Director of National Intelligence McConnell was on the Hill testifying and suggested that radical groups are not only on the rise in Pakistan but actually I believe he said pose a threat to Pakistan itself. I would be interested in any of your reactions to that notion, but specifically, General Karamat, is that the case? And what as a related point is the relationship between these radical groups and the state or the military itself? Because on one hand we sometimes hear that there are links between the two, but at the same time we see that the radical groups are actually attacking the military. So any of you, but maybe General Karamat, could begin on that set of issues.

GENERAL KARAMAT: I think it is evident that they pose a threat to Pakistan because when a group erodes the writ of the state in an

area or in a specific geographic locality which is within Pakistan then that means that they are a threat to the country and you are responding to them as a threat. That is exactly what has been going on, that they pose a threat, they have eroded the writ of the state, and the end goal that we are seeking is to reestablish the writ of the state to reestablish civil administration, to bring about confidence between the public and the civil and military administrations, and to have an administration which can respond in the future to that kind of threat. So, yes, they pose a threat to Pakistan.

MR. GORDON: Anybody else?

SECRETARY ARMITAGE: I kind of hesitate to say this, but this is not a bulletin that extremism is on the rise. The president of the nation has twice suffered near misses in bombings and the prime minister, thank God he sat on the wrong side of the car, survived a near miss. Now what we have had I think is the fact that some people in Pakistan are not sure of the eventual outcome of Afghanistan so it did rise I think to extremism. This should not be a great bulletin. To the extent I think that we do better and the coalitions do better in Afghanistan, and by the way, Pakistan helps us as they can with Afghanistan, then extremism at least to some extent will go down.

MR. GORDON: General Zinni?

GENERAL ZINNI: I would just make one point. It strikes me that the extremists are clever in understanding that the first real center of gravity they have to unravel is that special relationship between the Pakistani military and the Pakistani people. That has always been very strong and I think they see an opportunity of trying to exploit that in creating situations or taking advantage of maybe some of the political situations to try to bring the Pakistani military into confrontation with the people or with elements within there that look like it is the army versus the people. I think that the Pakistani military is very conscious of this and trying to avoid these confrontations that play into that role. It all the more reinforces the idea of us ensuring a very skilled, trained, and well-equipped military and especially working together on the lessons we have learned in dealing with insurgencies in these sorts of things and sharing them because I think that is the primary leverage they are attempting to achieve and if that break happens, you take arguably but I believe the most important institution for stability, the military, and you begin to marginalize it if they are successful.

MR. GORDON: Let's follow-up and stay on this point. We all agree that it is not a bulletin but it is a pretty serious matter if radical groups are threatening the Pakistani state and it raises the question of what to do about it. All of you in one way or another have mentioned the

issue of using military force and actual conflict with these groups. Again I would be interested, and maybe starting with General Karamat, there are a range of options. You mentioned the troops in Waziristan and the jirga, and we have also heard about kinetic operations. How does Pakistan and how does the United States and Pakistan decide? You said you could address actually what is working and what are the lessons of the 2006 experience. What are they? The lessons in the United States it seems to me that many are drawing are that that did not work.

GENERAL KARAMAT: Yes, I have heard that. Let me just say that the military's involvement in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas started post-2001 and in the 2001 through 2003 period, we had speculator successes in arresting people and eliminating the terrorist leadership and so on and we were in it together with the U.S. operating on the Afghanistan side and we had about a two brigade strength operating on our side. So, yes, that was a period of successes. But after that we shifted to a period of selective engagement based on actionable intelligence and going in for targets and so on. That was not so successful because of the time delay between intelligence and the actions which had to be taken.

Then there was a period of large-scale operations where we had more involvement of the military and we had again spectacular

successes in that area. We had people on the run, and that is time if you recall when there was a lot of talk that there are no sanctuaries and people are actually on the run in that area and that is the period when we had maximum success in 2005 through 2006. And that is when the overtures came from the extremists for a peace agreement and we responded and we went into those peace agreements and I believe there minor agreements and bigger agreements, six agreements in all, which at various times were violated, and now with hindsight we find that they perhaps sought to undermine the military successes that we had had and that they allowed consolidation and perhaps expansion because now we are into military operations again. Which does not mean that the military is the only option. The military is one option and it is an option of last resort which we have been pushed into taking. We would very much like that there is a more comprehensive strategy in terms of a development strategy in that area with of course economic opportunities, that there is a political strategy which again revives either the jirga or some kind of peace overtures which are two-sided and are sustainable and we move in tandem with all these three toward the end goal that we have, and I believe that the U.S. and Pakistan can work together on this. The U.S. is supporting us with capacity building, it is supporting us in governance, it is supporting us in a whole spectrum of activities in that area and I think we

need to move forward in all those areas if we want to bring that area finally under control.

So, yes, I am basically optimistic of the end result. It may take time. It has come at a time when we are also into a political transition which makes it difficult to focus totally on that area, but given time and the fact that there is an election coming up on the 18th and a government hopefully after that, I think that we have the ability to focus and the U.S. and Pakistan acting together have an opportunity to end this problem once and for all.

MR. GORDON: General Zinni? Not on that. I will raise one more and then I will open it to the room, one more question under the topic of what we do, and it is the democracy question which will no doubt come from the room, and I will give you a crack at it from up here first. I think General Zinni wrote a piece in The Post last fall about standing by our man, our man being Musharraf. You gave some good reasons for that. Whatever one's personal view of General Musharraf and his effectiveness and so on, the rebuttal to that usually comes in terms of if we stand by our man, that he is unpopular and we lose the Pakistani population, then it is counterproductive to stand by our man. Is there any reaction to that set of arguments that I know you are quite familiar with?

GENERAL ZINNI: The point I was trying to make was twofold. One had to do with President Musharraf and the other had to do with the military which I have explained the value of us valuing what the military has done and their sacrifices. In the interests of complete honesty like Mr. Armitage, President Musharraf is a good friend and I believe he is a patriot, I believe he does what he does and did what he did in the best interests of his country, and I believe there things that he had done with the economy and other things that are positive. There are other things that I may disagree with and certainly many in the audience will disagree with, and I think the point that is most important here is what his intentions were and how things came about.

We tend to shorthand things in a way that shape an issue and give it maybe the wrong context. For example, the shorthand in the media is when President Musharraf executed the coup, I do not think he was even in the country when the coup happened. I think it might have been a coup executed on the military that did not work and may have backfired. We can argue that, and I certainly do not condone generals taking over the government, do not worry, the republic is not in danger from any of us except for those who run for office here, but felt strongly that President Musharraf felt strongly about the importance of this relationship and the commitment to it and I think at many times put himself

at personal risk to maintain that. And whether we agree or disagree with him, I think what he committed to, what his intentions were, that was the point I was making, that they were sincere and they came from an honest and sincere I feel interest in the welfare of his own nation and his own people.

MR. GORDON: Thank you. Anybody else?

SECRETARY ARMITAGE: -- ought to be an adherent to the Hippocratic Oath as well. The people of Pakistan and the one national institution, the army of Pakistan, will eventually make their wishes known. The worst thing I think that can happen is if we make our wishes known that we prefer someone else, we cannot do that from this distance. We will make an error. Also I think by being on someone's side will also damage them quite a bit. I was very opposed, for instance, to the way that we were seen so publicly as assisting Mrs. Bhutto's return. I think it would have been a fine thing had it been kept quiet and seemed to just sort of happen because Pakistanis made this decision, but once we get involved I think it can take on a different sort of color.

The question of whether we are going to lose the affection of the Pakistani people, when President Musharraf enjoyed a much higher affection rate than he does today in the minds of the Pakistani people, the affection with which the U.S. was reviewed was not quite so high. It was

not high at all. So as I say, I would not put -- our losing the Pakistani people. This is not ours to lose. It is Pakistan, it is the Pakistan nation, and to some extent as I say, the one national institute will make their wishes known at some point in time.

That gets back to the question of democracy. Is that democracy? No, of course it is not. But it does get back to some things that the general was talking about, institution building, capacity building, reform, and things of that nature to make this nation confident that they can put on the cloak of democracy over a framework which will be maintained.

MR. GORDON: Thank you. We have time for questions. I would like to open it up. We are going to start right here in the middle. There is a microphone coming. Please just tell us who you are and direct your question to somebody.

MR. LAGARI: My name is -- Lagari. I am with the World -- Institute. I have a question for General Karamat.

MR. GORDON: Please speak up a little bit.

MR. LAGARI: How much money the Pakistani military spent on nuclear weapons as up to now? And how much money you are spending to maintaining command and control of the nuclear weapons? The report you gave here today, we feel that we are living in the Stone

Age. So I would think that better to the relationship to U.S. should be (inaudible) can be helpful for you against the terrorism and nuclear, this blackmailing to the West. So that is my request to Mr. Armitage and General Zinni. The (inaudible) strategic position can be helpful compared to the ethnic Punjabis which are dominating in the military.

GENERAL KARAMAT: What was the question? This was a comment?

MR. LAGARI: (inaudible)

GENERAL KARAMAT: I have no idea how much money we spent. I have no idea.

MR. GORDON: The first question was about spending on nuclear.

GENERAL KARAMAT: I wish I could give you a figure in terms of dollars or rupees of how much we spent, but I would say that a colossal amount has been spent as part of our national security in developing, maintaining, and improving our nuclear assets.

SECRETARY ARMITAGE: I would say certainly the United States was very unhappy with the development of a nuclear weapons program in Pakistan, but notwithstanding how much they may spend, it is money well spent as far as I am concerned. I know when Secretary Powell was Secretary of State, the State Department spent a good deal of

our time, particularly Assistant Secretary Woolf, working with the Pakistani military primarily to the extent they would expose us to production of nuclear weapons to help develop our confidence that they were in good hands, they were safe, and there were pretty good failsafe mechanisms. And I would say having said that we did not like the fact that Pakistan developed these weapons, any amount of money they spend to protect them is good as far as I am concerned.

MR. GORDON: Right here in the third row.

SPEAKER: Thank you (inaudible) two questions, one for General Zinni and the ambassador. General Zinni, you said that it is an unfriendly neighborhood and we do not have many friends. Do you consider India as your friends? And ambassador, the question for you is that many Pakistanis and Americans are asking that since 9/11, billions of dollars have gone to Pakistan to control terrorism and now it has been rising rather than going down, but also money was to transfer madrassas from hate to normal education. How much more time do you need? And I understand that Pakistan is going through turmoil and many attacks now on the Pakistanis and also on President Musharraf, but how can we control now and how much time do you need now? And what the U.S. can do now?

GENERAL ZINNI: To answer your first question, we certainly consider India a friend, yes. I was describing the area of responsibility of the U.S. Central Command which does not include India, which is Pacific Command, and the Southwest Asia that includes Central Asia, Iran, Pakistan, that I was responsible for. So I apologize if I offended our Indian friends.

GENERAL KARAMAT: I think that is a good question. Actually, what you are saying is how much we are spending on education, and I think there is 2.4 percent of GDP that we are spending at the moment. Some of the political parties which are campaigning now are talking of jumping this to 4 percent when they come into power, so this is a good sign that everybody thinks that more should be going into it.

Your impatience with the pace at which things have moved, yes, the people of Pakistan are impatient too. We have had U.S. support, we have had World Bank support with a number of education projects in Pakistan and a lot of progress has been made, but I think we get sidetracked into various things in this transition to democracy. I am not against it. Please note that I am all for the transition to democracy, but it does take time and you have a new government coming in in February or after that and it will take a couple of months to get its act together and then have policies and so on. So those kinds of delays are inherent in a

situation where you are opting for the transition to democracy. So it may take time, but we headed in the right direction as far as this is concerned.

GENERAL ZINNI: May I say one more thing? When General Karamat was chief of the military and I was at CENTCOM, the commander of the U.S. Pacific Command and I had this idea that I would visit India for an extended visit and he would visit Pakistan because obviously we had the two countries that had issues with each other and it would be valuable for us since U.S. command lines were split down the middle. I talked to General Karamat about that and he highly recommended it. He said you need to go to India to get the other side because that is going to give you a clearer view of the situation and we would welcome the Pacific commander here to explain that. So I would just put in a pitch for my good friend here that he was looking to encourage things that might make the tensions be reduced and the situation better.

MR. GORDON: There is a woman about 10 rows farther back on the right side.

SPEAKER: My name is (inaudible) and I a Pakistani student studying here. My question is for General Karamat and the Secretary of the State Department. The question is how do you think that what happened with the judiciary and the arrests of the students and the

lawyers for more than 90 days now is helping fighting extremism? And General Karamat said that he is looking for a three-pronged approach toward solving that problem. I would assume for that you need a democratic government, a democratic government with a strong civil society. And you said that there is some prerequisite for democracy in any country and one of them could be the strong civil society. I would assume that is one of the most important prerequisites. Right now what is happening, do you think that you are actually making civil society stronger, the liberal Pakistanis in the country right now?

MR. GORDON: How is cracking down on the judiciary and students contributing to democracy and the necessary civil society in Pakistan?

SECRETARY ARMITAGE: I think the short answer is it is certainly not. I found nothing to be saluted in cracking on the judiciary or students. As a matter of fact, this goes along I think with what General Zinni said about notwithstanding what we personally feel about President Musharraf, we do not have to agree with every actions he takes. Having said that, I wish that President Musharraf would have had around him a brain trust with whom he could talk about these ideas and have someone say, hey chief, do you really think that is a good idea, or shouldn't we rethink that? And my experience when I left government was that there

was not that type of brain trust or whatever you call it around President Musharraf and I think that he suffers for it. Right now I know as you know that the press and judiciary are the two most popular institutions in Pakistan with the army slipping to third. I think one of the reasons is the direct result of that.

MR. GORDON: Secretary Armitage, is it our job to be that brain trust? The U.S.?

SECRETARY ARMITAGE: No, I was suggesting a Pakistani brain trust. I think that if the U.S. did it publicly this would be stillborn, but I was hopeful or would be hopeful that there would be more of almost a national security type adviser or advisers with whom the president of the nation could exchange views quietly in camera and not have them a matter of public speculation and could help him inform his activities. I cannot speak for President Musharraf in this case, but if you approach most general officers with a problem, they are going to give you a solution. Those very good general officers I think generally have a staff around who they can talk to about this and kind of come up with the best solution. I think that Pakistan would do well to have such a brain trust for lack of a better term. There certainly are enough brains in Pakistan.

MR. GORDON: I see there are a lot of people waiting but I am taking them in the order that I see them. There is a gentleman in the

brown jacket there, and then I will go to the gentleman on the wall and the one in the back. But let's start here.

MR. MEDINA: My name is Francisco Medina. I work with the Executive Intelligence Review. My boss Lyndon LaRouche has been identifying more a policy of chaos in the old regions of the British Commonwealth like in Kenya and what you have in Pakistan right now. My question is for General Karamat. What is your view on British influence there? Do you see that the Islamic group the Hizb ut-Tahrir have a growing influence with the ranks of the army and you have the British also overseeing the investigation into the assassination, so I just wanted your view of British influence in the region.

GENERAL KARAMAT: As far as I know, the Hizb ut-Tahrer is strong in Britain and it has a large following in Britain. I do not think that it is very active or has any kind of following in Pakistan. So whatever is happening in Britain and the people who are supported or who are members of the Hizb ut-Tahrir have probably got involved in some acts of terror and have been traveling to Pakistan, but it is a British phenomenon. Which is not to say that we are not working with Britain. We are working very closely with Britain. In fact, one or two networks were broken with the active support and collaboration of Pakistan intelligence agencies. There is total of 15 networks I think which have been broken up by our

intelligence agencies either acting directly or helping others to act against those networks. And there is close cooperation and collaboration between Britain and Pakistan on this and a very free flow of information and collaboration between the intelligence agencies.

The other part of your question had to do with what?

MR. MEDINA: No, that was pretty much it.

MR. GORDON: Can we get a microphone to the gentleman over standing against the wall there?

SPEAKER: My name is (inaudible) I am a graduate student here at George Washington University and I am a citizen of Pakistan. My first question is for General Zinni. Is it rational for the U.S. military establishment to be supporting your man in Islamabad when you seem to be able to maintain pretty good relationships with whoever succeeds to the position of chief of army staff, General Karamat, General Musharraf, and now General Kayani? So is it really rational for you to support your man in Islamabad in that way when you are able to maintain good relationships?

GENERAL ZINNI: I think the important thing is to support the forces that add to our mutual security interests. It is not a question of an individual. I go back to what Ambassador Armitage had said. To reinforce what Ambassador Armitage said, that when we get into this idea

of a personality as opposed to a leader who sees the interests the way we do and we work on our mutual interests with the forces working together, when we get into supporting personalities, it does not work that well. I think we tried to beam in a personality into Iraq and with Mr. Chalabi it did not work out quite right. So I would never be an advocate of strictly a personality being our target of our support or the aim of our support. If that personality happens to be the leader, if that personality's views of the security situation coincides with ours and we have the mutual interests, then I think we have to respect that and I think it is in our interests to support it. What I fear is when we discount the individual and the work and the sacrifice to maintain that and we try to create a split between the leadership and maybe the military and it will not work in our interests. If there is an election come January and there is a new leader, I think it is in our interests obviously to ensure that we have this strategic discussion that General Karamat talked about to ensure we are both operating on the same sheet of paper.

One of the biggest I think flaws in this whole security debate is the lack of a strategic for this region. I think earlier it was said you cannot have a solution in Afghanistan without a solution in Pakistan, and I could probably add Central Asia and maybe even a broader context of that, and I think that strategic discussion with the leadership is important.

We tend to go down and look at the tactical ends of things, how much support do we give to the military, what kind of border control do we put in, whether U.S. troops should go in or not or drones should pass over. Those things are just the means. You have to have an aim or a direction at the top that you both agree upon and I think it has to be with the leadership whoever that leader is.

SPEAKER: To Ambassador General Karamat as well, is a narrative developing in this conflict with the militants in the tribal areas which is an ethnic narrative which is Pashtun militancy insurgency against a predominantly Punjabi military similar to what has developed in Baluchistan?

GENERAL KARAMAT: One, it has not quite developed in Baluchistan the way you have put it. There is a problem in Baluchistan. Let me put it like this, that there is an ethnic imbalance in Baluchistan at the moment because of the Pashtun influx from Southern Afghanistan and the refugees and so on and the previous balance which was there between the Baluch and the Pashtun has been disturbed. That is one aspect of that. Then the Baluch have certain grievances which they have been voicing in various ways and we have tried to tackle it politically, militarily, and I hope that we will continue to tackle it politically. I think it is moving in a positive direction generally given the sort of economic

opportunities and development projects which are going to come into Baluchistan and hopefully it will move in the right direction.

The Pashtun problem in Southern Afghanistan and in the FATA areas because they are also Pashtuns, there is also a liberal secular Pashtun presence, and the NWFP and the ANP sort of represents that politically. That is there. There are also within the tribal areas tribes who are pro-government or with the government and ready to confront the militants especially in the Wazir for example. Mullah Nazir in Baluchistan is collaborating with the government to pose that. So that it is not a question of Pashtun versus Punjabi, but it is Pashtun and within Pashtun there are two streams. That is why I said that the U.S. jumping in overtly or covertly into an area might just disturb this balance and sideline the elements who could be helpful in the future to us so that you do not want to disturb that, and we are of course working on it in various ways.

The army is drawn from all over Pakistan. The Punjab happens to be the biggest province and it has the biggest representation. But traditionally we recruit in large numbers from the Pashtuns. The regiment to which I believe is 50 percent Pashtun and 50 percent Punjabi. I know it is made out like that this a Punjabi dominated army and it is the Punjabis fighting, but it is not like that at all. We do not look at sects or ethnicities when we are sending people to fight in various areas and so far

I think the track record of the army has been pretty good as a regular professional army in delivering what we have asked it to do.

MR. GORDON: While we are on the subject of insurgencies in the tribal areas, I wonder if any of you see any scope at any point for a U.S. military role there. I do not mean against the will of Pakistan, I mean invited in. There were recent reports that senior U.S. officials went over there to talk about this and it was decided that the time was not right. But can you imagine the circumstances, and does the United States potentially have something to contribute on the ground? General Karamat made the point earlier that it was success in fighting in these areas that led to the ceasefires. So presumably the more effective we are, the more chance there is of a ceasefire. Is there a potential role for the United States on the ground? You are all dying to address this I know.

GENERAL ZINNI: I think that that is the least desirable. The first effort and focus we immediately go to that, it sort of reminds me of a couple that maybe had their first argument and somebody runs up and says, are you filing divorce papers now? You are pushing them toward an end state that maybe is the last place you want to go. What we should be talking about and thinking about instead of questions like that is how do we make the Pakistani military more effective to be able to do this.

I can see where our role in security-assistance programs not only in the provision of equipment and training but sharing our experiences and the training and education that goes with that. Think about the since the sanctions began that we have restricted Pakistani officers from our school systems. That was an investment in the future when you look back on it that we should have been making for all sorts of reasons. So I think instead of leaping to a conclusion like that, we should be talking about how best to ensure the Pakistani military is capable of handling the situation dealing with their own people that they are going to be better suited for than us having boots on the ground. To me that would be something that is never taken off the table by a president, obviously, he cannot, that would be politically unacceptable, but certainly you have to work through every possibility before you come to that kind of conclusion, but we are bumping that question to the front of the line, and that is what I cannot understand.

SECRETARY ARMITAGE: It seems to me that what we are witnessing with the Pakistani military is a military who has been up to this point about your entire career, sir, a force-on-force military. These are the battles and the wars you have fought, and that is not what you are fighting now. Matter of fact, we were force on force and now we are fighting a different war than we thought we would fight in Afghanistan and in Iraq

and it takes a while to sort of, as they used to say in the military, reorientate yourself to that. But beyond that, if there is something that we can usefully do it would seem to me that Secretary Gates is on to it by putting 3,200 more soldiers on the ground in Afghanistan because at the end of the day in Afghanistan it is an infantryman with a bayonet who is going to bend the enemy to our will. So if we want to better the situation in the tribal areas of Pakistan, and all of us do, we can do our part in Afghanistan and that will start it.

GENERAL ZINNI: If I could just add other thing, I am the product of the Vietnam War having spent two tours there, and one tour with the Vietnamese Marines as an adviser. What I saw in that time, the Vietnamese Marines happened to be a very capable force, but every time we were around American units, the Americans wanted to push them away and do the fighting. Matter of fact, my Vietnamese commander said, You do my job once, I will thank you. You do it twice, you got the job. After bitter experiences and many years, we suddenly had this light bulb of Vietnamization go on and decided as President Johnson said, these Vietnamese boys need to be fighting their own war. Maybe if you started from that you would reach a better conclusion and, again, I want to reemphasize that ought to be the starting point.

MR. GORDON: Do you have anything to add?

GENERAL KARAMAT: I would agree with what has been said because even in Afghanistan what the U.S. is doing is trying to build up an Afghan national army and police which can take care of their own problems. So in Pakistan you have a regular professional army which is experienced, trained, and on the ground and I do not understand why anybody should ever want to take over their job. The U.S. is in support and we welcome that and all kinds of help we are getting, we are collaborating, and as General Zinni said and Mr. Armitage said, there is very close cooperation military to military and I would add from my experience as ambassador here that also with the State Department it is a very good relationship that is not a problem at the official government-to-government level between the U.S. and Pakistan. There is complete understanding and we are on the same page and I hope we stay there.

MR. GORDON: Thank you. There are a lot of questions. I am going to gather a couple in clusters. We do have to keep an eye on the time. Back by the camera that is a woman on the aisle and a gentleman who is taking the microphone as we speak, and then Dan Benjamin. We will group these three together if you would.

MR. BATOF: Kami Batof from the "Pakistan Chronicle." My question is about the services that Pakistani forces provide to the U.S. in the Afghanistan border area. I heard that the U.S. is paying only like $600

per soldier whereas if the U.N. hired the services of UNO, it pays like $1,400 or $1,500 per soldier, and in Iraq, the U.S. is spending like $14,000 per soldier. My question is, Pakistan is paid very little but we define this as aid, not something like return of services. So my question is to Mr. Armitage, what is the result of your threat that we will make Pakistan a Stone Age country or it was just President Musharraf wants to stay in power and are just providing very cheap to America? So why should the Pakistani people be upset at America and President Musharraf for providing so cheap services? Thanks.

MR. GORDON: I will try to summarize -- think about it. It was about how badly paid Pakistani soldiers are and the reason they accepted this deal was that because you threatened to bomb them back to the Stone Age. That is a short version, but hang onto it because I want to get the others in as well.

SECRETARY ARMITAGE: But I want to answer it now. As I said before, I have gone my whole career desperately wanting to tell somebody that I would bomb them into the Stone Age and I have never been able to do it because I have never been authorized to do it. And as I have said, further, I have never threatened anything that I could not do. So that conversation never happened. To say that General Mahmoud and

I had a very straightforward, candid conversation would be an understatement, but there were no threats in any way.

MR. GORDON: Thank you.

MS. LABOTT: Elise Labott with CNN. I would like to follow-up on some comments that General Zinni made, maybe Mr. Armitage you can take this one. There has been a lot of talk about reform in Pakistan, but there has also been a lot of talk about the focus on the relationship with Musharraf as one man who could solve all the U.S. problems. Do you think that there has been enough contact across the board with all levels of Pakistani society, not just at various levels of the government, but in the civil society, or do you think there has been too much focus on Musharraf as the solution to all the U.S. problems?

MR. ARMITAGE: The obvious answer, Elise, is it is no. I can give you examples. General Zinni has already spoken about the divorce for 10 years because of the nuclear question and our sanctions. But how about the divorce after 9/11 where many students, many visitors from many nations including Pakistan, were not welcome and we put that snarling, sneering face to the world rather than hope, opportunity, and optimism that we generally export to the world? So the short answer has to be no, no. We needed education, we needed the judiciary, we needed students. Thank God right now we are getting back it seems at least as I

understand it in terms of visas and things of that nature and we are broadening our access to Pakistan, but of course we need to broaden it across the full spectrum of Pakistani society and give them the full exposition to U.S. society.

GENERAL ZINNI: If I can sort of reinforce that point, the reason we ended up in that situation was because of the sanctions and, as I said before, the thin thread of a relationship came down to the military-to-military relationship. You cannot believe the things I was asked to do because there were no other lines of communication there. For example, I was asked one time to talk to President Musharraf to see if he would receive our Ambassador to Pakistan. I could not believe our Ambassador to Pakistan did not have a way of seeing the head of state, but there was not a connection. I described to you the need for our intelligence agencies to get involved with the scoffing up of the leaders of the millennium threat or bombing. Was the commander of CENTCOM doing these things? Why was I sent to convince the prime minister that he should withdraw from Kargil?

The reason for all that is because the only thin line of a relationship despite the sanctions came down to that military to military and it ended up because of the situation with President Musharraf that that ended up being the funnel or the point of contact.

I would just make one other point which is critically important and goes beyond Pakistan because it was something I experienced throughout my region. If we have an issue and it is political, if we have a political issue or a human-rights issue or something else, we do a wide array of sanctions and punishment. I had militaries in my region that were clean, that were professional and were not part of whatever the issue was, political or human rights, and we were immediately sanctioned. The easiest thing to do for an administration or a congress is to sanction the military-to-military relationship. I had two commanders of the military in the region, not Pakistani, tell me that they were so frustrated and asked me were we sending a signal that we wanted them to take over the government, and of course we were not, but they were being punished for things that were happening by the political segment.

MS. LABOTT: But if I might just very quickly, and I know we are short for time, that has not really been the case in the last couple of years since the sanctions have been lifted and it seems as if even the contacts with Benazir Bhutto in the last several months to bring her back were an effort to prop up Musharraf. So why do you think that the United States was not making an outreach to all of the political parties and all of the judiciary and the lawyers and at the time to improve the political situation on the ground?

GENERAL ZINNI: I agree with you that I think we should have been making the efforts not only on a broader political front, but even a broader economic front. The whole issue of the component parts of a society be they political, economic, social, or the security parts, and I think even after the sanctions were lifted, those efforts were not made on the scale they should have been made. Obviously 9/11 was the catalyst for all this, but we sort of still narrowly focused on security rather than the political, the economic, and others which we should have done.

SPEAKER: I would like to pick up on General Zinni's remark about needing a comprehensive strategy. Militancy is not confined in Pakistan to the tribal areas, it has become a problem that threats the state as has been mentioned. The idea exists and has gotten a lot of currency in this town that the way to deal with militancy over the long-term is to restore democracy and then an emboldened and more legitimate government will be able to cope with it.

I would like to ask whether or not there isn't also an element here of strategic culture that needs to be confronted, specifically, Pakistan's attitude toward Afghanistan, and that is that as long as there are elements within the Pakistani security establishment that view Afghanistan as an essential part of its strategic depth and therefore are less than zealous about preserving the border, whether that militancy can

ever be fully beaten back because it seems as though a lot of that militancy is blowback from Pakistan's relationship with Afghanistan, not least from our first war in that region but even to today.

MR. GORDON: The strategic depth doctrine exists?

GENERAL KARAMAT: That may have been the case at some point in time, but I do not think it is the case now. And as far as the border is concerned, Pakistan has been hoping that the border will be hardened, that the border will be defined, that all movement across the border will be documented as it is in every other country and that eventually the special status of the tribal areas and the movement rights that have been given in due course could be changed into regular movement between the two countries. So Pakistan has been for that and is for that.

So even if at some point in the past there were concentrations of strategic depth, and I think that question came in when we had a very active threat from our East from India and we were in conflict with India, but with that having moved into a dialogue stage, we have not reached resolution on anything, but the very fact that both countries being nuclear weapons states, both into institutionalized dialogue, both having shown the political resolve to move on the track of

dialogue, I think there is less and less thought of strategic depth in Afghanistan.

MR. GORDON: Thank you. We have time for just two more that we need to cluster, the gentleman here and then the woman in the back by the door. If you could be brief so that the gentlemen have time to answer. Thank you.

MR. JONES: Bill Jones, Executive Intelligence Review, to General Zinni. The situation in Afghanistan is generally considered that we took our eye off the ball on that one and started to deteriorate and much of what we are seeing in Pakistan in the border areas is a result of the failure to continue with where we started in Afghanistan. And now we are putting pressure on the Europeans and NATO has taken over to do more and this is leading to something of a governmental crisis in Germany and serious implications for NATO. I was wondering what do we do? How do we reestablish some kind of momentum in the Afghanistan situation? Do we have to start rethinking the strategy in order to try and deal with the situation there as a stabilizing element for the region as a whole? And to General Karamat I would like to mention with the murder of Mrs. Bhutto, many people thought that this was aimed to destabilize President Musharraf, to destabilize Pakistan, and to destabilize the region as a whole and I was one of these people who thought that indeed was

the case. And President Musharraf of course as the representative of the military, one of the only institutions holding the country together, was extremely important and therefore if you wanted to see the region remain relatively peaceful, one had to come to the defense of Musharraf in that kind of situation. However, today we are seeing in the paper that even military leaders including former generals are now criticizing President Musharraf that maybe there is reconsideration of how to deal with this situation which would not lead to destabilization of Pakistan. So the question is personally what role does Musharraf play today as a representative of the military or are there changes which can be made which would not lead to destabilizing in the country?

MR. GORDON: Thank you. If we can hold off on the answers, we will take the woman's question and then each can have a final word.

SPEAKER: My question is to General Zinni. We heard you talk frequently about your personal relationships with individuals in Pakistan and often you had to call upon those relationships to get strategic goals achieved. I just wonder how does that reassure the people of Pakistan and how does that reflect on the U.S. government and its capacity to deal with a country like Pakistan? Are we doomed to have a military dictatorship just because it suits the U.S.? If as a Pakistani I were

to ask any one of you to reassure us that the U.S. would take care of its most strategic partner 10 years from now, would you be able to do that at all especially considering the fact that the only time the U.S. does play a role in our country is when you slap sanctions in our face or when U.S. wrath falls upon us?

GENERAL ZINNI: I think that going back to the question we had before about the contacts ending up being just military to military and then obviously military to the leadership because of the events that put General Musharraf as head of state, I think that the important lesson from all that is that we have to broaden the contacts and the interaction society to society. It should not come down to just the single connection of military to military. Our strategic interest in Pakistan is that Pakistan be an economically viable, politically stable country, that it gets the democracy that people want and seek, it is economically well and prospering. It is not just a matter of a military-to-military relationship and looking narrowly at security interests. If you do that, I do not think you achieve stability. I do not think any soldier would tell you, and I can tell you as being a commander responsible for the U.S. military interests in the region, the stability you sought that I was directed to try to either maintain or to establish could not be accomplished simply through military-to-military relationships. There had to be something else going on. There had to be

something on the political, economic, and social interaction creating that. And if we should learn anything about the past relationship from the end of the first Afghanistan war, is those relationships should have been maintained and sustained. And so it goes to your point that it cannot be just this military relationship and looking for mutual security interests and that is it. It will not work. Do you want me to answer the first part of that?

SECRETARY ARMITAGE: No one up here can assure you in 10 years of what our relationship will be because of our own system. But I can assure you of one thing, that we failed miserably I think after the first Afghan war to separate and try to develop a relationship with Pakistan. It was always about our other greater objective in the cold war which was the soft underbelly of the then Soviet Union. We did succeed in this first administration to take the hyphen out of IndoPak, and that is a good thing as we are developing or trying to endeavor to develop a relationship in and of Pakistan. Unfortunately, the Afghan situation right now runs the risk of making this another sort of hyphenated Pakistan-Afghan situation and we have to fight against it and do what General Zinni is trying to say and move much beyond security concerns which are valid to the broader concerns about a relationship that is in and of and about Pakistan, not about Afghanistan, not about the Soviets, not about India.

GENERAL KARAMAT: I think Afghanistan is going to be a test for NATO, a critical test, maybe even a crisis. Remember, the problems that emerged out of Afghanistan that caused 9/11 also impacted in London, in Madrid, and almost in places like Berlin and Rome. So this is a NATO fight and not just a U.S. fight. You cannot make the arguments for other places maybe like Iraq that you can here, and there are some serious questions about NATO's responsibilities and their ability to stand up to the commitment. I think that one of the tests of Afghanistan besides being able to develop a viable strategy for dealing with it and a regional strategy that overarches that is the question of whether NATO can stand up to this commitment. I do not want to overstate this, but it could be a defining moment for this alliance if it does not happen.

MR. GORDON: General Karamat?

GENERAL KARAMAT: In destabilization you are talking about Benazir Bhutto's assassination, across the board in Pakistan it is seen as a very great tragedy and a great blow to Pakistan at a critical moment when we were moving toward democracy. I think she beyond any doubt was a leader who had experience, who had learned from her pervious experiences, and who everybody thought has come in at the right time and is going to be a very positive influence in the whole transition to

democracy and her removal from the scene I think has created an imbalance which everybody is now trying to correct one way or the other.

As far as the present government, I will not say President Musharraf, let me just say the present government is concerned, the freedom that the media has has come in under this dispensation. It is not going to go away. There have been ups and downs in that with crackdowns and releases, but I think it is there to stay and it is going to continue. The civil society which has developed as a very powerful lobby in Pakistan, again, regardless of crackdowns, regardless of military tutelage or regulatory procedures, is again a force which is there to stay, it has demonstrated its sustainability and it is going to be a very important force as we move toward democracy, and this is welcomed by everybody.

I think the problem starts when destabilization comes in because of one particular element sort of taking off at a tangent or in a direction which is unpredictable and you have to bring it back on track, and that is what has been happening in Pakistan. But there is a tremendous urge for democracy and there is a tremendous urge for stability and I think the urge is more urgent now when we have this threat on the Western border, that we want the country to come together, we want a democratic dispensation which can bring the country together and cope with this threat with the military being supported with the full force of

public opinion and the population. That also goes for the relationship with the United States. There is no doubt in my mind that it is a strategic relationship, that we have moved into an era where if the U.S. could walk away from regions in the past without even shaking hands, it cannot do so now. If it should do so, it risks seriously undermining and destabilizing areas which are very important for U.S. interests, so I do not see that happening. And because of that, I think the U.S.-Pakistan relationship has a future, has sustainability, it is just that we should not allow transient developments which are inevitable in a strategic relationship to overtake the overall goal toward which we are heading. We need to keep that goal in mind and keep moving in that direction.

MR. GORDON: Thank you, very nice final words. Ladies and gentlemen, thank you all for coming, and please join me in thanking this distinguished panel.

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