The Transatlantic Bridge: Igor Blaževič on the countries that will fill the democracy gap

Igor Blaževič:
It’s not in good shape, as we know. We don’t know how much more damage will be done. The Trump administration has changed and disrupted profoundly the transatlantic alliance. I don’t know how things will develop in the United States, which remains to be seen and decided there.

But I think that what we will see is the European Union continuing to have open doors for the revival of productive alliance relations with the U.S. across Europe. I don’t think the EU will give up on that. There will be constant effort to keep it. On the other side, Europe will need to shrink into its own effort to increase its own capacity to defend itself and to help Ukraine survive. Both of these things will have a very negative global impact, because the European approach was always second to the United States’ approach in standing by democrats around the world. Europe was never the leader, but it was the second backer. Now, with the Trump administration withdrawing from that, Europe will not be capable to pick up the global support for democracy but will try to focus more on defending itself and defending as much as is possible in a close neighborhood.

Igor Blaževič:
Yeah, we can say that it is increasing its own capacity, but we need to be realistic. Any decisionmaking in Europe is very slow and complicated. This is a complex beast. We and Europe cannot give up on constant consensus and alliance building. So, it will be a slow and less effective process, but I think that the political decision has been done. The awareness of what is needed to be done is here. You can say expanding, but I still call it a shrink because there will be a certain amount of narrowing the scope of what Europe is able to do. I mainly work with Canada’s assistance in a democracy internationally, including in Myanmar and across the post-Soviet region around the world. What I see is that Europe will not fill the gap which is emerging there, but I do feel and see a willingness and capacity of Europe to focus at least on itself and on a close neighborhood.

Igor Blaževič:
Nobody. Canada will do a little bit, but nobody can replace the U.S.

Igor Blaževič:
In this moment, I see Europe and Canada. I don’t see in this moment anybody else. I don’t think Australia will do it. I might be wrong, but I don’t see it right now. Australia has already for some time been much more pragmatic. Japan will not do it at all because Japan again has its own big task to reorganize itself for self-defense.

It’s very hard to predict how things will develop, but you see how the U.S. traditional allies in Asia are reorienting themselves. South Korea and Japan have signed a free trade agreement with China.

This shift has already been obvious for a longer time with Indonesia, Thailand, and a number of the countries who started to position themselves between the U.S. and China. They tried to benefit from China economically and from the U.S. from the geopolitical point of view. Now it’s more traditional allies like Japan and South Korea that are also shifting. So, the impact has been huge. Others, like Australia, Canada, and Europe, cannot influence these kinds of things because none of them are global players [to the extent of the U.S.].

Igor Blaževič:
My work is not about the United States; it’s about other things. I’m not Czech, I am Bosnian, but I’m kind of deeply embedded here.

I have experiences here of me and my Czech friends in civil society standing in solidarity with the people fighting for democracies in other parts of the world.

We had a partner in the Czech Republic for a very long time. President Havel was a strong advocate and partner. This has been a moment when the Czech Foreign Ministry has also been a partner in standing with democracies around the world.

There was also once a time when the Czech state was not that kind of a partner, and the Czech Foreign Ministry was not a partner, but that did not stop us as an active civil society in continuing. It doesn’t depend on the state whether we do [support those fighting for democracy] or not. We do it anyhow. If the state is our partner, it is good for us and good for everybody. If not, it doesn’t matter, and we continue. So, in that sense, I do think in this moment there will be quite a number of people and institutions here who will be in solidarity with the forces defending democracy in the United States.

There will be mutual understanding, solidarity, and empathy. At the same time, I do think that the Czech state will be very careful not to be part of it officially. The Czech state will probably continue to navigate themselves in a way that they don’t alienate themselves from the current holder of the White House for all different reasons. Government actors will be cautious.

Igor Blaževič:
Let’s say that I think that they will. I can’t imagine in this moment anybody doing what Canada is doing. Eastern Europe has a profound historic mistrust toward the “old traditional Europe”: France and Germany. There is always a deep historic sense that you can never fully rely on France and Germany and Italy and Spain. This is not just memory, it is a really deep historic gene of collective memory. So that means that this part of the world will do anything they can to not give up on the transatlantic geopolitical status quo that we waited for for so long. We paid a heavy price because we didn’t have it. We have done a lot of effort to gain it and for that reason, there will be an enormous amount of patience and desire to preserve it. Strategic patience, no matter the provocations. I think it is wise because, at the end of the day, there is still an understanding that nobody can help you defend you but the United States. Europe will now try to increase its own capacity, but there is profound experience. Nobody still can provide you the geopolitical security as the United States vis-a-vis the Russians.

Igor Blaževič:
I think there will be natural solidarity and understanding of the democratic forces in the United States trying to defend democracy. 

We here see that as our own struggle. We follow it very carefully, but in a certain way there is a hidden part of the tradition here that we believe that the democracy in the United States is strong enough to defend itself. That the democracy in some other countries is not strong enough to defend itself. Our mission here has always been not so much in the fragile countries but really in the dictatorships, because again our profound history is being small and powerless dissidents against a strong opponent.