Prosperity and power: Trump’s selective US-Africa summit and the race with China

Introduction

In his first major diplomatic move with Africa during his return to the White House, President Trump is set to welcome the leaders of Gabon, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mauritania, and Senegal at a three-day summit in Washington, D.C. from July 9-11. The presidents of these five countries will meet with President Trump in bilateral discussions and a working lunch. The United States has made clear that it seeks partnerships grounded in mutual economic benefit, especially in trade, investment, and critical minerals. While the emphasis might appear to be strictly economic, the summit reflects a broader strategic ambition of reasserting U.S. power and influence in a region where rivals have surged ahead.

This effort aligns with the administration’s foreign policy approach, as discussed in my “A new US-Africa blueprint for Trump amid China’s rise” policy brief. The brief recommends a transactional approach within four foreign policy goals (the “four Ps”): “[R]eclaiming leadership in global trade (prosperity), advancing American influence in a competitive world (power), strengthening regional and global stability (peace and security), and promoting core American ideals (principles).” The current administration seems to be emphasizing two of these goals in particular: Power and prosperity. Under this transactional model, prosperity and power are mutually reinforcing, with economic goals fused with geopolitical ones. By securing critical mineral access, expanding U.S. investment, and deepening bilateral trade, Washington is seeking to project influence, build alliances, and counter adversaries, making prosperity a tool of power and power a tool of prosperity.

This approach is vital at a time when China has outpaced the United States in both economic and political influence in many African countries—including those invited to the summit. China is now among the top trading partners for the five invitees and has established a dominant position in infrastructure, extractives, and strategic sectors. Gabon, for example, supplies 22% of China’s manganese imports and signed over $4.3 billion in investment deals with the country last year. In Guinea-Bissau, China has built the country’s only highway, its key fishing port, and much of its core infrastructure. Meanwhile, the U.S. lags behind in trade and investment. According to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, in 2003, 18 African countries (35%) traded more with China than the United States. By 2023, this number jumped to 52 out of 54 African countries (97%). Across the region, China has integrated its economic statecraft with its geopolitical ambitions by securing supply chains and positioning itself as a top partner for African states. Moreover, while China has been attempting to establish itself as a partner to African countries, Senegal and Gabon were both named as part of the Trump administration’s 36 countries that are currently being considered for full and partial travel bans.

Nevertheless, by convening this summit and explicitly linking diplomacy with commercial partnership, the Trump administration seems to be seeking to both accelerate U.S. trade and investment and reassert strategic presence in a region where America’s influence has been eroding. Prosperity and power are therefore intertwined levers in a broader competition for alignment and advantage in a multipolar world.

Strategic timing and deal momentum

The summit follows a series of rapid developments that signal Washington’s recalibrated priorities. Just two weeks ago (June 27), President Trump hosted the DRC and Rwanda’s foreign ministers to sign a U.S.-brokered peace agreement that would end the fighting that has killed thousands, while also launching a regional economic integration framework that could lead to billions in Western investment.

Just days later, more than $2.5 billion in deals and commitments were announced at the U.S.-Africa Business Summit in Angola, underscoring the administration’s shift toward commercial diplomacy. In the same week, Secretary of State Marco Rubio formally closed USAID, declaring that the “charity-based” model had failed U.S. interests. He cited that sub-Saharan Africa, despite being a top aid recipient, only aligned with the U.S. in 29% of U.N. essential votes, and framed the new foreign policy approach as “prioritizing trade over aid, opportunity over dependency, and investment over assistance.”

The invite list: A strategic choice

The selection of invitees reflects the administration’s intent to engage African countries on economic potential, mineral wealth, and geostrategic relevance, as explained below.

Gabon

Gabon is the world’s second largest producer of manganese, a critical mineral used in stainless steel and batteries. Gabon’s President, Brice Oligui Nguema, who will be attending the summit, recently announced a ban on exporting raw manganese as of 2029 with the hopes of strengthening and growing a local value chain that would involve public-private investment. The country is also rich in other critical minerals like iron ore, copper, gold, and diamonds, with international investment already pouring in—Australian company Fortescue Metals Group signed an agreement with Gabon to explore (and invest an anticipated $200 million in) its iron-ore deposits (some of the largest in the world). China has emerged as Gabon’s top trading partner, outperforming the U.S. and France, with 22% of China’s manganese coming from Gabon and more than $4.3 billion worth of investment agreements signed last year. In 2023, U.S.-Gabon exports were at $297 million compared to China, whose exports totaled $562 million in 2023 and imports totaled $2.77 billion.

The U.S. faces growing competition in Gabon not only economically but strategically. Beijing has drawn closer to Gabon with naval diplomacy, providing medical aid by naval hospital ship to nearly 7,000 civilians, and is rumored to be exploring the establishment of a military base in the country. The rumored base would be the second on the continent and the first on Africa’s west coast. While the United States has offered security training and supported Gabon’s regional peacekeeping through ECCAS and the AU Standby Force, the future strategic relationship between the two countries will depend on how and to what extent the United States escalates its engagement to measure up with China.

Guinea-Bissau

China has been a major contributor to the Guinea-Bissau’s infrastructure, building the country’s only highway, its most important fishing port, a university campus, and more. It also has provided material and technology for agriculture and health and scholarships for Bissau-Guinean students to study in China. China has also taken note of the fact that Guinea-Bissau has “one of the Atlantic’s most abundant fishing grounds,” operating more than 70 fishing boats nearby. Guinea-Bissau also has important natural resources including gold, diamonds, bauxite, phosphate rocks, graphite, limestone and clay, and sand, which continues to attract governments and investors.

China is not the only country ramping up its engagement with Guinea-Bissau: In February of this year, the President of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau Umaro Sissoco Embalo visited President Vladimir Putin in Russia where they discussed elevating their partnership, highlighting their cooperation on military training.

In contrast, the United States’ engagement with Guinea-Bissau has been limited. It is one of the only four African countries in which the United States does not have a physical presence after abandoning its embassy in 1998 when the civil war started. Total U.S.-Guinea-Bissau trade volumes in 2024 were at $3.5 million (almost entirely U.S. exports to Guinea-Bissau ($3.4 million vs $0.1 million imports) compared to China who exported $62.6 million in 2023. This summit may be Washington’s opportunity to re-engage before the geopolitical window closes in light of China and Russia’s involvement.

Liberia

Liberia is one of America’s closest historical allies in Africa. Past U.S. presidents and secretaries of state have made official visits, and Washington played a leading role in Liberia’s post-conflict recovery and response to the Ebola crisis. However, the closure of USAID will deeply affect Liberia, where aid comprises 1.6% of gross national income, making it the largest cut relative to GDP of any country globally. In 2024, total trade between Liberia and the United States was $292.9 million (U.S. exports to Liberia totaling $220.4 million and imports totaling $72.5 million). In comparison, total trade between Liberia and China was $13.06 billion in 2024. 42% of Liberia’s total imports came from China in 2023.

Liberia’s groundbreaking discovery of vast mineral deposits including gold, diamonds, iron ore, and potentially lithium, cobalt, manganese, and neodymium is unlocking new investment opportunities that are expected to attract $3 billion. China has stepped in with a new economic and technical cooperation agreement, but the U.S. still retains substantial goodwill if it can translate it into strategic investment.

Mauritania

Mauritania’s positioning as a relatively stable country within the Sahel has increased the interest amongst countries like China, Russia, the United States, and the European Union who are eager to engage with a country in its strategic location and its potential for energy supply. In 2024, the United States’ total goods trade with Mauritania was $142.6 million ($139.8 million in U.S. exports and $2.9 million in U.S. imports), but it was not amongst the top exporters or importers in the country. China was the second largest recipient of Mauritanian exports following Canada, with the country mainly exporting minerals like gold, iron, copper and fishery products. Mauritania’s vast area of land makes it suitable for green energy production such as solar and wind energy installations. Meanwhile, its counterterrorism efforts have been viewed as successful which is of interest to countries trying to help bring regional stability and curb immigration.

In 2023, China granted the country $21 million in debt relief as they signed an agreement to expand their cooperation under the Belt and Road Initiative which has already built roads, bridges, and other infrastructure in the country. In April of this year, the two countries signed a $27.5 billion agreement to finance development projects and China announced that they will exempt Mauritanian exports from custom tariffs. For Washington, Mauritania offers a chance to deepen ties in a region where Russia and China are aggressively expanding their footprints.

Senegal

Senegal is one the most stable democracies in Africa and is a major player in regional security. The country has historically been a close partner with the United States economically, militarily, and politically and has played a key role in peacekeeping operations supported by the United States. U.S.-Senegal trade totaled $586 million in 2024 ($350.9 million in US exports and $235.1 in U.S. imports). In comparison, China trades at almost 6 times this amount, at $2.93 billion exports from China to Senegal and $310 million in imports as of 2023. China overtook France as Senegal’s top trading partner in 2024, with main exports being electronic equipment, machinery, and vehicles.

Last month, the Senegalese Prime Minister Ousmane Sonko met with China’s President Xi Jinping to reaffirm their cooperation, highlighting opportunities for Chinese enterprises to invest in the country. Senegal’s wealth in critical minerals, particularly phosphate, zircon, and titanium, positions it as a key player in the energy transition and green energy value chains. Russia has also ramped up engagement with Senegal, becoming one of its largest suppliers of oil.

Conclusion

All five summit invitees possess rich natural resources and regional strategic significance. The Trump administration appears to be centering its Africa policy on commercial diplomacy, with prosperity and power as primary drivers and peace and principles no longer being ends in themselves, but instead acting as instruments to enable investment and influence.

This summit marks a pivot point and test for how the Trump administration’s foreign policy will fare when it comes to U.S.-Africa engagement. Whether the United States can translate its new doctrine into durable partnerships will depend on its ability to outcompete China and Russia with capital, presence, and long-term commitment. With the transactional bilateral approach in mind, it will be extremely important for African leaders to come to the U.S. well prepared, keeping in mind their interests and what they can gain from and offer the United States. African countries and the African Union should have their own U.S. strategy that outlines a clear value proposition that is ready to be deployed when opportunities for engagement—like this summit—come to fruition.