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Iraq’s search for security and sovereignty after Assad’s collapse

Members of Iraq's Popular Mobilization Forces ride military vehicles during a military parade in celebration of "Victory Day" marking the seventh anniversary of the defeat of Islamic State militants and the liberation of Iraqi territories, in Mosul, Iraq.
Members of Iraq's Popular Mobilization Forces ride military vehicles during a military parade in celebration of "Victory Day" marking the seventh anniversary of the defeat of Islamic State militants and the liberation of Iraqi territories, in Mosul, Iraq. (Ismael Adnan/SOPA Images via Reuters Connect)

The collapse of the Assad regime in neighboring Syria has significant political and security implications for Iraq. Of immediate concern is the security vacuum in Syria, which may create spillover effects across the border reminiscent of 2014, when the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) established control over territory in both countries. In the longer term, the events in Syria are both a cause and consequence of diminished Iranian power in the region, especially after the military defeat of Hezbollah in Lebanon. Iraqi policymakers, accustomed to being caught between the countervailing American and Iranian pressures, will have to recalibrate their relationship with a weakened Iran. Moreover, they will have to do this in dialogue with a new American administration, under President Donald Trump, who is likely to renew his maximum-pressure campaign against Iran.  

This will play out most visibly in the security sector, where Iraq and the United States will likely revisit the security agreement they announced in September 2024 which outlined the gradual withdrawal of U.S. troops from bases in Iraq by 2026. Beyond security, Iraq will face pressures to politically and economically distance itself from Iran, including by reducing or eliminating its purchases of Iranian gas.

Policymakers in Baghdad should see this as an opportunity to carefully exercise independence from Tehran, but it is critical that Washington does not pressure Baghdad to the point of alienation. The ties between Iran and Iraq are complex, span multiple actors, and do not constitute a simple proxy-sponsor relationship. There are also indications that Tehran is prepared to double down in Iraq as it grows more isolated in the region. A secure and stable Iraq is much more immune to Iran than a weakened one. Two decades after the 2003 war, Iraq has finally reached a point of sufficient stability to address long-standing economic and environmental challenges. In a region brimming with fragile states, Iraq’s hard-earned stability should not be risked.

Toward a bilateral security arrangement

In late 2023, Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani decided that his country was stable enough to push for the conclusion of the Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR), the U.S.-led military mission that was established under the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, which the United States organized in October 2014. In December 2021, CJTF-OIR transitioned to an advisory mission, withdrawing all combat troops from Iraq. From the Iraqi perspective, the next step is to transition into a direct bilateral security agreement with the United States and to end CJTF-OIR entirely.

In reality, the Global Coalition cannot operate without American leadership, which suggests that the entire endeavor was simply a way for the Iraqi and American governments to maintain their arrangement while saving face with their domestic audiences. Iraqis are sensitive about the American troop presence, given the history of invasion, and Americans are tired of forever wars and sensitive to ungraceful exits, like the one in Afghanistan. Baghdad faces additional pressures from Tehran and its political allies in Iraq to end the mission. Behind this façade is a serious commitment on the part of Iraqi policymakers to maintain a strong military arrangement where the United States helps Iraq maintain its hard-fought security, but under a different framework that respects its sovereignty.

It took Iraqis and Americans nearly a year to reach an agreement on ending CJTF-OIR. The agreed-upon plan was a phased withdrawal, starting with bases in Anbar and Baghdad by the end of 2025. By the end of 2026, the mission would withdraw from Erbil, where it currently supports American operations in northern Syria. According to officials at the Department of Defense, the withdrawal is “subject to conditions on the ground and, obviously, consultations among future political leaders of Iraq and the United States.” Without a doubt, the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024 has altered the conditions on the ground. Iraq needs continued U.S. support to maintain its security. Over the years, Iraq and the United States have had multiple security arrangements, which not only provided security but served as a counterweight to Iran.

Countering Iranian influence

Although Iran does not have an official military presence in Iraq, it maintains control over the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, a subset of armed groups within the broader “axis of resistance” umbrella. The Islamic Resistance includes Kataib Hezbollah, Harakat al-Nujaba, Harakat Ansar Allah al-Awfiya, and Kataib Sayid al-Shuhada, all of which are specially designated global terrorists, according to the U.S. State Department. These groups are not the most powerful armed actors in Iraq but are the most unmanageable for the Iraqi government. They took the opportunity of the war in Gaza to distance themselves from the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), an umbrella of paramilitary groups organized in 2014 to counter the ISIS incursion in Iraq. While the Iraqi government has been working to institutionalize the PMF and incorporate them into the broader Iraqi Security Forces structure, the Iraqi government has been unable to control the proliferation of new armed groups, and it won’t be able to do so until the Iraqi Security Forces are significantly stronger and more effective. Moreover, the security vacuum in Syria has meant that Baghdad has no appetite for disbanding any security structure, including the PMF.

Iran has been unable to replicate the Hezbollah model in Iraq. It attempted to do so with Badr Organization, an armed group established in the 1980s, but it was unable to dominate Iraq both politically and militarily. Badr today operates as part of a larger coalition of parties and one of several paramilitaries that operate within the PMF. Iran has cultivated several armed groups in Iraq but has often lost control of them once they entered the lucrative arena of Iraqi politics, which alters their incentives. Thus, Iran has only been able to prop up smaller and fringe armed groups. This is further evidenced by the fact that the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, made up of the armed groups most closely allied with Iran today, felt the need to distance itself from the PMF in order to operate freely. Only now, after the Assad regime’s fall and Hezbollah’s military defeat, is Iran trying to claim possession of the PMF, as demonstrated by the Iranian supreme leader’s post on X following his meeting with Sudani on January 8.

In response, Iraq should avoid becoming the latest front for a war Iran is not intent on fighting itself. Many Iraqi policymakers share this view, especially after the announced ceasefire in Gaza. For example, Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein told Reuters that the Iraqi government was trying to either demobilize the factions or integrate them into the Iraqi state. Prior to this, the highest-ranking Shia spiritual leader in Iraq, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, also stressed the importance of the state having a monopoly on the means of violence. The Iraqi public, fatigued of war, is also uninterested in antagonizing the United States for the sake of a regional partner that abandoned Lebanon.

Under the first Trump administration, the United States showed its capacity to conduct targeted assassinations. In the last year, Israel has demonstrated a similar capacity. As a result, Iraq needs to continue to institutionalize the PMF so that there is no confusion about what constitutes a nonstate actor. This is a naturally lengthy process, as shown by the experience of the Kurdish paramilitaries in Iraq, which continue to struggle to unify under one Peshmerga chain of command. Iraqi policymakers also need to signal that armed groups will only be used to defend Iraqi sovereignty and to take serious actions against violators.

Although Iraqi leaders rarely take advantage of it, Iraq has the ability to exert influence on Iran. Even before this recent regional power shift, Iran relied on Iraq as one of its only outlets to the global market and an important buyer of Iranian goods, particularly gas for electricity production. Iraq also enjoys good diplomatic relations with every powerful actor in the region and has served as a mediator between Iran and Saudi Arabia in the past. With a weakened Iran, Iraqi policymakers and paramilitary leaders should look toward carving out their independence, rather than becoming another sacrifice for Iran. To do so, Iraqi security and stability need to be prioritized, as they will serve as the basis for the military relationship between Iraq and the United States.

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