How do Taiwanese feel about the Cheng-Xi meeting?

Evaluating the Cheng-Xi meeting

The meeting between Cheng and Xi demonstrates how fundamentally differently Taiwanese voters can interpret a single event. If one only looks at the total numbers, just under 47% feel negatively about the meeting, about 35% feel positive, and under 20% do not know how to evaluate it. But when broken down by party identification, the story becomes more complex.

DPP-aligned green camp voters overwhelmingly view the meeting negatively. For the KMT-aligned blue camp and the TPP, the meeting is seen far more positively. However, the KMT and TPP also contained the largest percentages of those who do not know how to evaluate the meeting, with over 25% of KMT voters saying they are unsure how to assess it. It is widely known that not all KMT party leaders endorse Cheng’s bold, pro-PRC strategy. What we see here in the KMT response, however, is not overt negative feelings toward the meeting, but uncertainty—neither positive nor negative sentiment. One major takeaway is that the split in attitude among KMT elites is also reflected in the party’s base of supporters. While the base will not outright oppose engagement with China, it does not necessarily endorse Cheng.

Independent voters are the next and most important group. Independent voters in Taiwan are the largest and fastest-growing group in Taiwanese politics, and they do not have strong loyalty to either party. Independent voters also tend to be the least interested in and knowledgeable about politics. We find that they split 60%-40% in favor of the meeting. Independent voters tend to look at engagement more positively than not.Finally, the TPP largely mirrors the KMT in terms of its endorsement of the meeting. The TPP’s large amount of support for the meeting also demonstrates how it continues to differentiate itself from independent voters, and instead appears more like a “light blue” party than a “nonpartisan” party.

While trying to understand those who expressed ambivalence about the meeting, we discovered a novel finding regarding their interest in politics. Typically, we would expect those who are least interested in politics to express that they “do not know” how to feel about a certain political situation. Here, we find the opposite: Those who were more likely to answer “do not know” are the most politically interested! This reflects that those who most closely follow the news and politics may genuinely still be deciding how to feel about this situation. This suggests that independent voters who don’t follow politics closely may form their impressions simply by glancing at news headlines.

However, given the increasing complexity of cross-Strait issues, only those with a strong interest in and meticulous attention to politics can understand the nuances and develop more mature perspectives. While political interest is not always a commonly reported statistic, given that independent voters constitute between 30% to 40% of voters, we believe it carries a particularly important meaning in today’s Taiwan. Those who are the least politically interested tend to be independent voters, while DPP and KMT supporters tend to be more politically interested. This may have meaningful implications going forward when understanding who is open to engagement with the PRC and why.

Evaluating the impacts of Cheng’s trip

Next, we assess whether people think that Cheng’s meeting with Xi will bring material benefits—i.e., improve economic development and national security—to Taiwan.

For partisans, the story is as expected: KMT and DPP voters largely disagree about whether Taiwan will see material benefits. KMT voters buy the narrative that these kinds of visits benefit Taiwan, while DPP voters see them as having little to no benefit. TPP voters again largely mirror KMT voters. This stark divide between KMT and TPP voters, on the one hand, and DPP voters, on the other, shows just how fundamentally different Taiwanese voters see this trip and the idea of cross-Strait engagement.

When independent voters were asked whether they felt the trip would bring economic or military benefits to Taiwan, they were overwhelmingly neutral. This contrasts with the majority of independents choosing to evaluate the meeting as positive overall. How do we understand their decision to see the meeting as positive while feeling neutral on whether it would yield material benefits? It appears that independent voters value the symbolic gains from this type of engagement. Independent voters may like engagement, but also recognize that it might not bring any material help for Taiwan’s status.

We also wanted to know if those who are more economically vulnerable or more nervous about a war in the Taiwan Strait would look more favorably on engagement. We find that people who are economically anxious and those who are economically secure do not feel differently about whether this trip can help Taiwan’s economy. Likewise, we find that people who are concerned about a war and those who are less concerned about a war respond similarly about whether this meeting enhances Taiwan’s safety. This suggests that people who are particularly anxious over their material condition did not feel differently about the meeting than those who feel confident in their current standings.

Conclusion

What did Taiwanese voters think of the Cheng-Xi meeting? It depends on which group of Taiwanese voters you ask. For KMT and TPP voters, this meeting was a meaningful step that will maybe bring security and economic prosperity to Taiwan. For DPP voters, it carried no such meaning. Independent voters are largely split.

The trip, however, was not a disaster, especially for Cheng and the KMT. Although the KMT is trying to navigate rocky waters over its own domestic power clashes, Cheng is likely to remain influential inside the KMT for the time being. While the 2028 presidential election is still far away, this trip provided a preview of the kinds of debates we should expect to see in the coming years.

Given the strong lack of approval from DPP voters, however, we should expect more resistance to these kinds of trips from the green camp. As one new study shows, the more that Taiwanese voters perceive the PRC as having sway over their democracy, the more they are likely to feel threatened and protest. If Xi endorses the KMT and continues to express strong support for it, it is likely going to become the defining issue going into the 2028 presidential election. China, and how Taiwanese people relate to it, will continue to dominate Taiwanese politics, as it always has, for the indefinite future.

Taken together, the evidence suggests a further takeaway. Although many ordinary Taiwanese are open to engagement with China, they also feel a sense of its limits. For nonpartisans and those with low interest in politics, the Cheng-Xi meeting is largely perceived as symbolic rather than substantive, with little expectation of concrete economic or security outcomes. In this sense, respondents appear to clearly distinguish between the symbolic value of engagement and its practical effectiveness.

In the next piece, we will examine Cheng’s and Xi’s language on the 1992 Consensus and “one country, two systems,” showing the further divide in the worldview Taiwanese voters have of China and Taiwan’s future.