Chinese citizens’ affection for Taiwanese may reduce risk of cross-Strait conflict

China’s leadership is using multiple approaches to influence domestic and international audiences regarding the issue of Taiwan. In the West and the Asia-Pacific, Beijing is aiming to dissuade other countries from questioning its claims over what it views as a core issue of Chinese sovereignty. In Taiwan, Beijing is intensifying efforts to create uncertainty and fear among the Taiwanese public to reduce Taiwan’s will to resist.

But the audience that China’s leadership cares about most is their own. The Chinese government goes to great lengths to monitor and censor public discussions online, limit the information available to its citizens, and use state media to provide “correct guidance of public opinion.” It also discourages the public from gathering en masse (even something as innocent as a midnight bike ride for dumplings draws official eyes). Recent reporting suggests China may be stoking its citizens for a new phase of pressure on Taiwan, broadcasting patriotic historical dramas like “The Silent Honor” about undercover communist agents in Taiwan in 1949, around the time of the Republic of China’s founding.

But how effective are these efforts in shaping Chinese public attitudes toward Taiwan? Recent polling data show that the Chinese public has a naturally sympathetic view of the Taiwanese people. Further, it suggests that Beijing’s efforts to strike a nationalist chord among Chinese citizens regarding Taiwanese unification might not be easily transmitted.                                              

What Chinese people think about Taiwan

While public opinion surveys are a challenge to conduct in China because of tight media and internet control and the potential for self-censorship, the Chicago Council on Global Affairs and the Carter Center were able to commission NORC, an international polling firm, to field the survey this past April 25-June 16. The interviews were conducted using random digit dialing over the phone using native-speaker interviewers; the sample covered all provinces of China (not Hong Kong and Macau) and was designed to provide a statistically sound estimate of the entire Chinese population across education levels, age groups, and place of residence.¹ The data show the Chinese public senses that many of China’s neighbors are hostile to their country. About six in 10 Chinese say India (62%), the Philippines (61%), and South Korea (63%) are not friends of China, reflecting both historical conflict and border disputes, economic and military competition, and rising power rivalry. But they reserve their greatest suspicion for Japan (81%) and the United States (83%).

Regarding Taiwan, however, Chinese impressions are much more nuanced: 91% say that they consider the Taiwanese people (referred to in the survey question as “Taiwanese compatriots,” 我们的台湾同胞) to be a friend to China. This is far and away the most positive evaluation the Chinese public gives to any other country or people that they were asked about. This could at least partially reflect long-standing official statements about “peaceful reunification.” But observers have also noticed an “increased level of stress on the threat posed by supporters of Taiwan independence” in these statements during Xi’s era, coupled with increased military intimidation. If state propaganda were that impactful, this heightened stress would probably result in less friendly appraisals of the Taiwanese people.

As far as the Taiwanese leadership goes, just 44% consider “the current government of Taiwan” (中国台湾地区现任政府) as a friend to China. Even this percentage is somewhat surprising: Taiwan’s current president, Lai Ching-te, hails from the pro-sovereignty Democratic Progressive Party, and is a politician whom Beijing has characterized as a “separatist.”

Due to polling sensitivities, the July Chicago Council-Carter Center poll did not ask specifically about China’s potential use of military force to unite with Taiwan. The Chinese Citizens’ Global Perception Survey, one of the few publicly available surveys utilizing a nationally representative sample, finds that support for a diplomatic resolution with direct talks between Beijing and Taiwan outweighs support for a military resolution. This preference is likely related in part to the affinity that everyday Chinese feel toward the people of Taiwan. It may also be related to an understanding of the stakes involved in a military intervention, particularly on the economic front.

Warm views of Taiwan are one reason the Chinese public may hesitate to pursue a military solution to this long-standing political problem. Another reason for hesitation is that nearly all Chinese respondents said their country is in a strong overall position in the world (97%) and think that China will consolidate its position over the next five years (95%). As Xi himself has said, for China, “time and momentum are on our side.” As the Chicago Council-Carter Center poll found, a military conflict with the United States over Taiwan is the highest-ranked of potential threats to China, with 57% of Chinese naming it a “major threat” to China. Additionally, the Chinese public is narrowly split over whether China is militarily stronger than (31%), equal to (39%), or weaker than (29%) the United States. If indeed “the East is rising, and the West is declining,” as Xi has frequently said, a conflict now would be a gamble.

The Chinese public also seems pragmatic. Six in 10 (61%) said that China should pursue a balanced approach to the United States, seeking either friendly cooperation or limiting U.S. power when appropriate. And a solid majority believe it is most important for Beijing to take an active role in global peace and security, more so than even leadership on global trade and technology.

Conclusion

There is a lot at stake in the issue of Taiwan. The Chinese public believes their country’s influence is based not just on military might, but also on economic power and China’s technology and innovation. A conflict between Beijing and Taipei, which could expand to the United States and its Pacific allies, would be enormously damaging to all sides. It would almost certainly result in more economic difficulties for China as well as a hit to its soft power. In addition to potential trade sanctions imposed by the United States and its allies and partners, a conflict around Taiwan would badly disrupt the critical shipping lanes connecting China with international markets. The resulting financial implications for Chinese households could be severe, impacting not only confidence in the government but also social stability—a key factor for the Chinese leadership.

This matters for understanding pressures on Chinese leaders: as much as Beijing frames Taiwan as “the core of China’s core interests,” its leadership is most intensely concerned about regime security and legitimacy. This explains why propaganda is often employed during territorial crises, as significant research has shown, depending on whether or not the public and the state coincide on a particular position.

Consider if polling found the opposite: a Chinese public that viewed Taiwan as negatively as they view Japan or the United States, strongly favored unification with Taiwan through the use of force, and was not concerned by the potential costs. Such findings would suggest that Chinese leaders could face real public pressure to initiate a military conflict with Taipei, or at the very least, that they had a very free hand in using military force.

Instead, survey data points to the Chinese public being more or less content with the status quo, not showing signs of burning urgency to resolve cross-Strait differences, and more inclined toward nonviolent solutions than the alternative. The Chinese public is concerned about a conflict with the United States but has warm views of the Taiwanese people, moderate views of Taiwan’s government, and high expectations for their own economic futures. These trends should incentivize leaders in Zhongnanhai to avoid a conflict over Taiwan and instead focus on delivering continued economic growth and prosperity for a public that clearly anticipates it.