Op-Ed

Seven Reasons for Hope in Afghanistan

The Afghanistan war is a slog at best. There is little doubt about that.

Even those of us supporting the mission must acknowledge that it has been slower and harder than expected. The reasons are generally well known, including a resilient and highly motivated insurgency with sanctuaries in Pakistan; a corruption-ridden Afghan government that, by its poor governance, gives sustenance to the Taliban; and mistakes on the part of NATO, which for years pumped too much poorly regulated cash into a country unable to handle it, fueling corruption in the process.

As NATO leaders gather in Chicago this week for a major summit where Afghanistan will be issue No. 1, it is understandable why their citizens are tired of this effort. And with Osama bin Laden dead and other al Qaeda leaders out of the picture or out of the region, the motivation behind the effort seems less compelling to others as well.

Nothing I saw on a recent trip to Afghanistan dispelled the above realities. But I also saw plenty of good that should give us encouragement.

Because we already have an exit strategy to have most NATO troops out of Afghanistan by the end of 2014, no one needs to worry too much about a possible quagmire.

Beyond that, there are good reasons to think that even if this mission cannot achieve its loftiest earlier goals — a strong democracy and a clearly defeated insurgency on our watch — it can likely attain the minimal acceptable requirement: preventing a Taliban return to power and a major al Qaeda presence on Afghan soil.

Here are some highlights of the more hopeful indicators in Afghanistan:

Much still needs to be done, of course.

Land reform, and the prevention of land expropriation by corrupt actors, demands attention.

Electoral watchdog organizations need to be strengthened, and means of possible voting fraud need to be reduced, before 2014; otherwise, cheating and scandal could delegitimize the election outcomes and contribute to more ethnic tension.

The international community needs to find leverage — and communicate its willingness to use that leverage — to maximize the chances that good leadership emerges from that election, conditioning future aid and troop levels on the quality of future Afghan governance.

The army and police still need to get a lot better. Some of the worst of the worst need to be arrested and tried for corrupt ways.

Pakistan needs to help more. Even if true alliance and friendship are unlikely, we at least need Pakistan to behave like the “frenemy” it once was instead of the antagonist it has more recently become.

But all these points are pretty well known. Less well known is all the good happening in Afghanistan. Whether it will be enough in the end is unclear, but there is a lot to build on.

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