Looking ahead, the Taliban will certainly want to use technology for its own PR and propaganda purposes. But now that it has taken over Afghanistan, it will in all probability want to restrict social media access to the Afghan population in its bid to reduce their access to information. Platforms like Twitter and WhatsApp will have to figure out how to deal with the Taliban's propaganda, while still trying to ensure that Afghans retain their access to these platforms if the Taliban attempts to restrict access.
ISIS-K is a sworn enemy of the Taliban. Even before today’s complex attack in Kabul, there had been real questions about how effective an eventual Taliban government would be in warding off ISIS-K threats.
I think the question of [the administration's] competence [with regards to Afghanistan] comes down to two things: Why wasn't a quick Taliban takeover anticipated, and planned for accordingly, and it also comes down to successful completion of the evacuation effort.
As the Taliban have said, their ideology is the same, but they have more ‘experience.’ I take this to mean that their political leadership has learned in the last 20 years how to manipulate rhetoric to try and gain international legitimacy, it has learned to maneuver on the world stage, but on the ground in Afghanistan — they haven’t shown any indication that anything will be different from the last time they were in power. [There is] no indication that it will be any different from their regressive and draconian rule 20-some years ago.
Pakistan will face security concerns with a Taliban-ruled Afghanistan, chiefly from an emboldened and resurgent Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), a terrorist group responsible for killing tens of thousands of Pakistanis. [The developments in Afghanistan may also give a boost to other fundamentalist groups within Pakistan] in a way that renders them more powerful than before and threaten the state's authority. I think Pakistan will have less clout over the Taliban now than it did in the 1996-2001 timeframe.
Everyone is well aware of Pakistan’s troubled relationship with the Afghan government, and its relationship, that has dated decades now, with the Taliban... What [Pakistan] would probably have preferred is a negotiated political settlement with the Taliban in a position of power, but perhaps not the only actor on the stage.
Pakistan is being quite careful about its stance. Pakistan will not be the first to recognize the Taliban given the kind of negative status that gave them in the ’96–2001 time frame. It’s not going to stick its neck out.