What Africa can learn from the US-Ukraine critical minerals deal

Introduction

The global transition to cleaner energy is triggering a seismic shift in mineral geopolitics. Critical green minerals, including cobalt, graphite, lithium, manganese, and rare earth elements, have become the cornerstone of low-carbon energy systems. These minerals are essential for the battery value chain, as well as for solar panels, wind turbines, and other clean energy technologies. For this reason, countries with reserves of these minerals are gaining strategic relevance in global supply chains.

With its abundant endowment of green minerals, Africa is not just a participant but a central player in the global decarbonization agenda. While progress was made in the past decade, the continent still faces a vicious cycle as dependence on raw commodities limits inclusive growth and the structural transformation required to escape this dependence.

The U.S.-Ukraine Critical Minerals Agreement, signed in April 2025, can serve as a significant model for Africa. It outlines a roadmap for climbing the global supply chain ladder while also highlighting the risks of falling into the trap of an imbalance in bargaining power and limited value-added. These are crucial considerations for Africa’s mineral agreements, as they highlight the strategic implications of the U.S.-Ukraine deal for Africa’s mineral strategy.

As indicated in the 2009 Africa Mining Vision (AMV), African countries endowed with mineral resources aspire for their minerals to lead to inclusive, sustainable growth and transform the lives of their people. The U.S.-Ukraine agreement on critical minerals provides valuable lessons on negotiating ownership and sovereignty, advocating for a place in global value chains, and achieving a significant repositioning in a rapidly evolving geopolitical landscape.

Below, we discuss some of these lessons in relation to Africa, as well as other ways that a U.S.-Africa critical minerals supply chain can be formulated for mutual benefits while avoiding an extractive relationship.

A lesson on negotiation for ownership, sovereignty, and alignment

The U.S.-Ukraine critical minerals agreement aims to integrate Ukraine into the green supply chains of developed Western countries, thereby reducing Western dependence on other suppliers, including Russia and China. Of great interest to other producing countries is that this agreement features joint exploration, enables processing, and adheres to environmental and governance standards as priorities. The agreement also promises the creation of a partnership between the two governments aimed at promoting financial and technical support from U.S. government agencies and private investors.

According to The Kyiv Independent, the deal includes provisions for public-private partnerships, shared investment in logistics infrastructure, and access to the U.S. Development Finance Corporation for eligible Ukrainian projects. The U.S. and Ukraine agreement underscores “mutual benefit” and long-term collaboration, especially in a post-conflict reconstruction era. However, it leaves high-value manufacturing, such as battery production, largely outside Ukraine’s borders in the U.S. and the EU markets.

This state of affairs may be strategic for Ukraine in the short term as the country seeks post-conflict reconstruction and economic reset, but it limits its capacity for downstream industrial development. This is a clear lesson for African countries, which have historically been at the mercy of extractive relationships: Access to capital and geopolitical alliances should be balanced with domestic policies that prioritize local beneficiation, technology transfer, and local value creation, both in-country and regionally, as appropriate.

Africa’s green mineral wealth and the imperative of transformation

Africa possesses approximately  30% of the world’s known reserves of critical minerals, key to energy transition. The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) produces and supplies over 70% of the world’s cobalt. Namibia and South Africa are emerging as significant producers of rare earth elements. Zimbabwe and Mali hold vast lithium reserves, while Tanzania and Mozambique are rich in graphite, and Guinea is a top global producer of bauxite. However, the persistent lack of value addition has relegated African countries to the bottom of global value chains.

The AMV was adopted by African heads of state and governments in 2009 to address the issue of mineral wealth not trickling down to improve lives and structurally transform the economies of mineral-rich countries. It calls for nationally and continentally anchored value chains, and equitable, optimal, and transparent governance of minerals. The recently adopted African Green Minerals Strategy (AGMS) focuses explicitly on leveraging Africa’s critical minerals for green industrialization, building on the AMV.

The AGMS advocates for local value addition and processing, regional value chains, and integration with global clean energy technologies. It also recognizes the need for African-led financing mechanisms, calling for the establishment of a green minerals venture capital fund. This fund would aim to de-risk early-stage exploration and infrastructure projects, promote African ownership, and attract private and public investment into environmentally responsible green mineral ventures.

The AGMS emphasizes that greater domestic control over capital will allow African countries to move from being price takers to becoming crucial players in the green transition. The proposed fund, with support from Development Finance Institutions (DFIs), offers a path toward resource sovereignty rooted in African agency.

Geological information, mapping, and capital

The bargaining power of African countries in contract negotiations could significantly increase with geological mineral information and data. Having reliable and up-to-date data also has the propensity to attract responsible investments. Yet several African countries currently lack up-to-date and dependable data. In contrast, Ukraine entered negotiations with robust geological data and a clearly mapped inventory of critical mineral deposits, positioning it as a strategic supplier to Western economies.

Thus, Africa would benefit from strengthen its geological foundations. The African Minerals and Energy Classification (AMREC) and the Pan-African Resource Reporting Code (PARC)—developed under the AMV—offer standardized frameworks for mineral resource classification, reporting, and valuation. AMREC-PARC enables a unique classification of geological assets into bankable reserves, which can be leveraged to mobilize funds through capital markets. By adopting AMREC and PARC, African countries will be able to share templates that are harmonized with quality data, therefore reducing investor risk and promoting exploration partnerships. These codes also facilitate the development of mineral exchanges, improve royalty collection, and help countries better assess the long-term economic potential of their mineral wealth towards building an African investment architecture that prioritizes value retention over resource flight.

Regional integration through AfCFTA: A platform for green industrialization

The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) was established to serve as the foundation for regional mineral value chains. With 54 signatories, AfCFTA provides a market of 1.4 billion people and a GDP of approximately USD 3 trillion. The AfCFTA can reduce intra-African trade barriers and accelerate the localization of mineral processing and manufacturing through harmonized tariffs, customs protocols, and infrastructure coordination.

The AGMS supports the development of mineral corridors and regional processing hubs, such as the Lobito Corridor, which links Angola, the DRC, and Zambia. If used judiciously, mineral corridors facilitate access to ports and facilities where value-added activities can occur while sharing the costs of infrastructure and mitigating environmental impacts. By pooling mineral assets and human capital, African states can attract better, larger, and more responsible investments.

Even though the U.S.-Ukraine deal is bilateral, it provides some insights into the advantages of coordinated investment platforms. Africa should adopt a regional model—leveraging AfCFTA, AMREC-PARC, and a green minerals venture fund—to negotiate from a position of collective strength and vision. Fragmentation has historically undermined Africa’s development prospects; integration can reverse that trend.

Policy recommendations for Africa: A new model of mineral development

While the global green transition presents undeniable opportunities for mineral-rich African countries, they should proceed with caution to avoid the mistakes of the past associated with the extractivist model.

To guarantee ownership, sovereignty, long-term gain, sustainability, and value creation on the continent, the following policy recommendations are made for African countries:

First, governments should pass and enforce local content and beneficiation laws, which require a portion of minerals to be processed locally before they are exported. These local content and beneficiation laws should be accompanied by incentives for investors who establish refining, recycling, and component manufacturing facilities within the borders of Africa.

These incentives should be implemented by African governments through coordination of their ministries of mines, industry, trade, and energy, and by the regional economic communities of which they are members. However, investment can also be supported with funding and guidance from DFIs (e.g. the African Development Bank (AfDB), the African Export-Import Bank, the African Finance Corporation, the African Legal Support Facility (ALSF) and the Arab Bank for Development) and the United Nations (U.N) (e.g. the UN Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), UN Trade and Development, UN Industrial Development Organization, and the UN Development Programme).

Once the main partners are identified, African governments should establish a focused and deliberate roadmap. This roadmap should include enacting legislation that mandates local mineral processing before export; setting up thresholds for in-country beneficiation and enforcing compliance through mining licenses; offering focused tax incentives limited in time and scope, land access, and power subsidies to investors setting up local refining and manufacturing facilities; and harmonizing policies through AfCFTA industrial protocols to promote intra-African value chains. This will be crucial for mineral-rich countries to retain more value within the continent, reduce dependence on commodity export, and align with the AMV’s call and the AGMS goal for downstream linkages and green industrialization. Beneficiation promotes the AGMS goal of sustainable, inclusive green industrialization.

Second, public-private partnerships should prioritize technology transfer and skills development. This should be done to build African capabilities in managing and benefiting from their green mineral wealth. It supports the AMV’s and the AGMS’ emphasis on human and institutional skills and knowledge development. Including clauses for technical training, joint research, and co-investment in infrastructure in mineral agreements is highly recommended, as is empowering African universities, technical and vocational colleges, and geological surveys to support Africa’s green minerals ambitions. This priority of technology transfer and skills development in the green minerals sector should be guided by a clear development rationale and institutional leadership at all relevant levels.

Within African governments, ministries of mines, energy, industry, education, science and technology, and infrastructure, among others, should cooperate and collaborate in leading the design and the enforcement of Public-Private-Partnership clauses in mineral agreements and in the negotiation of binding technology transfer and training provisions in all new mining contracts. At the continental level, African regional institutions such as the African Union, the AfCFTA Secretariat, the AfDB, the ALSF, and UNECA should facilitate regional coordination and funding. The private sector, including mining and technology companies, as well as downstream actors—whether domestic or international firms—should be held accountable for co-investing in African skills ecosystems and innovation hubs, not just extraction.

Universities and technical Institutions, such as the University of Zambia, Ghana’s University of Mines and Technology, South Africa’s Mintek, and the DRC’s Center of Excellence for Batteries, should become centers of excellence for mineral processing, metallurgy, and green technology research and development. Civil society organizations (CSOs) can be tasked to monitor implementation, and local communities should benefit from localized training centers and employment schemes. Regarding how it should be done, one approach could involve embedding clauses for technology transfer and joint training in mineral development agreements, establishing joint research centers with private sector co-funding, upgrading curricula in mining and engineering institutions with green mineral knowledge, and forging linkages with diaspora expertise and South-South partnerships pilot projects in countries with strong mining sectors.

Third, the green minerals venture capital fund proposed by the AGMS was suggested to fill the finance gap in Africa’s green industrial value chains. It encourages African ownership, reduces donor dependency, and directly supports AGMS objectives. It should be capitalized with contributions from African sovereign wealth funds, DFIs, and regional banks. While the modalities for setting up the funds are still being developed, the fund could be set up by pooling funds from national, regional, and continental institutions, prioritizing investments that integrate mining with clean energy and manufacturing, and utilize blended finance models to de-risk green industrial ventures. It would be recommended that the Fund be governed by a pan-African board aligned with the AMV and the AfCFTA priorities. The Fund should support mining, clean energy, industrial clusters, and domestic manufacturing.

Fourth, African countries should adopt transparent licensing and contract disclosure practices. CSOs, traditional authorities, and communities should be given a voice in mineral governance. This should be enacted by publishing all mining contracts and licenses on open platforms, institutionalizing community development agreements, setting up independent oversight mechanisms and grievance redress systems, and by training civil society and local leaders to understand mining contracts and environmental impacts.

Fifth, Africa should continue to assert itself in global forums, such as the G20, the World Trade Organization, the U.N. High-Level Panel on Critical Energy Transition Minerals, and bilateral platforms—such as Africa-EU partnerships—to ensure that international rules for mineral trade, traceability, and sustainability reflect African priorities. Presenting a united, continental front enhances bargaining power, ensures a just transition, and upholds the imperatives of AMV and AGMS for fair and inclusive mineral governance. African negotiators should speak with one voice grounded in the AMV, AGMS, and AfCFTA frameworks. This should be done through regional bodies such as the African Union Commission, AU Permanent Missions, the AfCFTA Secretariat, UNECA, and the African Group of Negotiators, among others. African stakeholders across industry, government, civil society, and academia have encouraged the formation of a continental negotiation bloc towards African critical green minerals diplomacy. For that, Africa’s capacity in trade and mineral diplomacy should be built. There should be a call for advocacy towards global traceability schemes that consider African contexts and costs to push for fair pricing, carbon justice, and recognition of Africa’s role in the green transition.

Conclusion: An equitable green transition for Africa

Africa stands at a crossroads. It can either remain a supplier of raw materials for a green transition it does not control, or it can become a co-architect of a new, just global energy economy. The U.S.-Ukraine critical minerals agreement illustrates how strategic alignment and resource diplomacy can enhance a country’s position in global supply chains. However, it also highlights the risks of outsourcing beneficiation and high-value jobs abroad.

Africa does not have to follow the same path. With the Africa Mining Vision, the African Green Minerals Strategy, the AfCFTA, and tools such as AMREC, PARC, and the proposed green minerals venture capital fund, the continent has a roadmap for green industrialization that is just, inclusive, and future-oriented.

What is now required is political will, policy coherence, and a collective strategy to act. Only then can Africa ensure that its green critical minerals serve not just global climate goals but the aspirations of its people for prosperity, dignity, and sovereignty.