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The stuck gear: How mid-level de-professionalization hinders school reform in the Kyrgyz Republic

Aleksandr Ivanov and
AI
Aleksandr Ivanov Executive Director - Foundation for Education Initiatives Support
Brad Olsen

November 21, 2025


  • The mid-level educational structure in the Kyrgyz Republic has recently become unbalanced, with a shift away from support and toward more centralized control.
  • This shift deprives education specialists of opportunity to use their expertise and reduces their motivation and contributions.
  • Restoring trust and balance with mid-level education officials can unlock a key driver for improving education in the country.
A child writes on a blackboard while her teacher watches.
A child writes on a blackboard while her teacher watches. Photo: Nick van Praag © The World Bank, CC BY-NC-ND 2.0
Editor's note:

This blog series discusses key insights from case studies being studied as part of the Research on Scaling the Impact of Innovations in Education project at the Brookings Center for Universal Education. The full report of findings will be published in December 2025.

In theory, all the instructions coming from above are supposed to flow to the [middle level], who implements them. But today, [the middle level] is simply a transmission link—and not a very effective one. Our country has lost that system level of decisionmaking.

Kyrgyz Republic education official

For almost three decades since its independence in 1991, the Kyrgyz Republic had been decentralizing education: delegating authority downward, increasing school autonomy, and broadening the range of education stakeholders to include NGOs, parents, and others. However, recently that’s being reversed: In line with the country’s overall political situation, the education system is shifting back toward vertical control with tight rules and centralized decisionmaking.

As part of our Research on Scaling the Impact of Innovations in Education (ROSIE), we’ve been studying the role of mid-level governance in education. This research includes having conducted 23 interviews over six months with people in education in the Kyrgyz Republic, including mid-level officials in district and city education departments as well as school principals and representatives from the Ministry of Education and Science, two municipalities, NGOs, and international education organizations.

The picture of education reform in the Kyrgyz Republic that emerged is complex. Notably, there’s a range of obstacles hindering current large-scale education improvement efforts—from constant shifts in reform agendas and the short-term project-based nature of initiatives that end when initial budgets or enthusiasm runs out, to reforms that don’t fit their location and the system’s neglect of the value of bottom-up initiatives.

Based on our research, the mid-level of education governance represents a key untapped driver for improving education in the Kyrgyz Republic. This level—below the central level but above schools—is directly accountable to communities, more resistant to personnel reshuffling than the central level, and in theory capable of translating broad reforms into daily practices that last. Our full research report, coming out in December, discusses findings and offers recommendations in relation to the four case countries of our study. This blog examines just one issue that appears to contribute to education reform deficiencies in the Kyrgyz Republic. We call this issue “the vicious cycle of mid-level de-professionalization.”

Prioritizing control over support

Until recently, the mid-level educational structure in the Kyrgyz Republic had two main and generally equal responsibilities: control (transmitting orders from the ministry down to schools and reporting compliance back up to the ministry) and support (providing pedagogical training to teachers and facilitating a horizontal exchange of experience and learning across schools). What we learned from our interviews is that the balance has shifted away from the support function and almost wholly onto the control function. The mid-level actors we interviewed report that this shift results from: (1) them being overworked, including the need to respond to ceaseless central-level requests to provide information; (2) them facing immediate sanctions when their control responsibilities are not met, but not when their support is insufficient; and (3) the fact that mid-level support personnel are paid less than their control-oriented counterparts. As a result, interview respondents lamented that schools in their jurisdictions are currently in acute need of instructional and administrative support but there is decreased prioritization and time left to provide this kind of expertise.

Officially, the ministry declares an interest in strengthening the capacity of the mid-level, particularly for educational support, and has launched corresponding projects to do so. But our interviews suggest that the real aim of such initiatives appears to be to ensure faithful executors of central-level ideas, initiatives, and policies—not to support autonomous actors whose local knowledge and educational training contribute to system improvement or reform success. One interviewee put it this way: “The [mid-level officials and offices] are like the ministry’s hands. They just perform some narrow tasks, which may be useful for the reporting system or some bureaucratic processes but, for the real [support of] the education system, I think [there’s no real benefit].” Confirming this, our research found that the mid-level is rarely involved in discussions of reforms at the planning stage, and its operational authority is limited to coordinating externally led implementation.

The vicious cycle of de-professionalization

When education specialists are deprived of autonomy and opportunity to use their expertise, their motivation and contributions decline. Additionally, outside educators and governance specialists who might enter mid-level roles become uninterested in positions where they’re expected to follow instructions and nothing more. If such a person does enter the mid-level, they tend to leave quickly, either being promoted upward or exiting the system altogether.

Given this, a cycle of de-professionalization emerges: The less professional work the system asks of middle-tier officials, the less able or inclined they are to offer their best; when they appear nonprofessional or unmotivated, this strengthens the rationale for stripping additional autonomy or substantive responsibility from them—which deepens the downward spiral. The ultimate result, we fear, will be a mid-level devoid of expertise, motivation, and the ability to leverage its assets toward meaningful contributions to education improvement. This, we believe, is a defining feature of rigid, top-down administrative hierarchies.

Additionally, our data show that the growing imbalance of responsibilities—increasing control and decreasing support—is causing interpersonal tensions throughout the education system and eroding trust at all levels. At the same time, however, our interviews reveal that mid-level actors continue to be committed to education, motivated to work with teachers and colleagues up and down the system, and remain confident in their own capacity for excellence.

Trust, balance, and returning to a strengthened mid-level

We believe the Kyrgyz Republic can simultaneously improve its ability for education reforms to succeed, strengthen, and make increased use of its middle-level—and achieve a workable balance between centralization and decentralization.

Our recommendation is to increase trust between the central- and mid-level officials and between mid-level officials and nongovernmental education reformers. While it may sound unusual, trust-building should be precisely the ambitious task guiding the Ministry of Education right now. But this trust must be reciprocal. Middle-tier officials can earn trust by way of collective capacity-strengthening and clear demonstration of their abilities and commitments. The ministry can tip the balance of mid-level responsibilities back toward an equilibrium of control and methodological support for schools and correspondingly recalibrate time allocations and performance evaluation indicators. This also requires fair pay and realistic workloads for mid-level officials.

To strengthen the mid-tier’s ability to leverage its local knowledge and expertise, it is important to provide the mid-level with genuine opportunities to consult with the ministry and set their own plans for implementing central-level policies and initiatives. And the mid-level should be actively involved in reform—not only during implementation but earlier, too, at the identification and design stages of promising initiatives. Donors and external education reform organizations can provide significant support here: They can include mid-level participation in their needs assessments, implementation plans, and post-project evaluations of initiatives, as well as work together with the mid-level to ensure their initiative becomes embedded into the everyday practices of the location.

You can read more about the role of the mid-level in the Kyrgyz Republic and three other country cases in our forthcoming full report (to be released in December 2025).

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