India’s competitive turn toward China

Co-chairs Brands and Stivers, members of the commission and staff, thank you for the opportunity to testify on India’s perceptions of and response to China’s growing power in the Indo-Pacific and globally.

Over the last two decades, Indian policymakers have gone from seeing China as a potential enabler to more of an obstruction in achieving Indian objectives. This change has affected India’s approach toward China, its policies in various functional domains, as well as its partnerships.

And this shift toward more intensified competition with China has persisted despite an ongoing reengagement process between India and China.

Driving this shift have been several border crises, including the fatal Sino-Indian military clash in 2020, as well as other bilateral friction points. It has also been amplified by Indian concerns about China’s ambitions, activities, and influence in South Asia and the Indian Ocean region.

In its immediate neighborhood, New Delhi has long believed that China’s close partnership with Pakistan is designed to contain India. In the rest of South Asia and in India’s extended neighborhood, it has worried that Beijing’s expanded security and economic footprint is boosting China’s interests and influence and curbing those of India. This has contributed to a negative Indian view of China’s Belt and Road and other regional initiatives.

India’s wariness also reflects a broader concern: that Beijing seeks a unipolar Asia where it gets to set the terms. New Delhi has stated that it instead wants a multipolar Asia where countries have room to make their own choices. Moreover, India believes a multipolar Asia is essential for a multipolar world—one in which India would be a leading power.

India does share certain views with China on the global order. For instance, they are both sovereignty hawks and resent interference in their internal affairs, and both oppose Western sanctions and have backed efforts to support trade in local currencies.

But, in recent years, Sino-Indian divergences have outweighed convergences on the global stage. There are differences on issues like trade. Furthermore, while India wants more representative multilateralism, it sees China as an obstacle to Indian membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the U.N. Security Council.

New Delhi also has concerns about Beijing trying to undercut India’s influence in the developing world and in groupings like BRICS. And it is wary of China imposing its vision and standards through its global security, development, civilizational, and governance initiatives, none of which India has endorsed. New Delhi also has little desire to sign on to Beijing and Moscow’s efforts to reshape BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization from non-Western platforms to anti-Western ones.

These regional and global apprehensions have contributed to India adapting and enhancing its outreach in its immediate and extended neighborhood, as well as in the Global South.

These concerns—combined with a Sino-Indian capabilities gap that limits how much India can respond alone—have also affected India’s view of the U.S. role in Asia. In contrast to Beijing, New Delhi has, in recent years, wanted to see a persistent or expanded American presence in the region. And India has indeed even sought to partner with the United States and other like-minded countries, including Australia, France, and Japan, to compete for influence with China in the Indo-Pacific.

India has also been participating in minilaterals, such as the Quad, that are designed in part to offset Chinese advantages regionally and globally. Furthermore, it is cooperating with China’s rivals to shape the leadership, agendas, and outcomes at regional and multilateral institutions.

New Delhi has particularly perceived a Washington willing to compete with an assertive China as a useful partner in India’s balancing strategy. This made India more responsive to U.S. efforts to partner with India bilaterally and in the Indo-Pacific, more willing to manage India-U.S. differences, and more ready to join U.S. initiatives on issues such as critical and emerging technologies and supply chain resilience.

There has, however, been a debate in India about how far and fast to deepen ties with the United States. And India’s current concerns about the U.S. approach toward India and China, if they persist, could limit the pace and extent of Indian cooperation with the United States and shape the nature and extent of Sino-Indian reengagement.

Any alleviation of those concerns would be helpful to enable greater U.S.-India cooperation in the Indo-Pacific. In addition, in terms of the road ahead:

The administration should be encouraged to undertake regular and updated assessments of India-China dynamics to include issues such as likely India-China contingencies and possible pathways for Sino-Indian reengagement and their implications for the United States.

The administration should also undertake assessments of what capabilities would make India a more effective U.S. partner in balancing China in the Indo-Pacific. And it should enable or encourage allies to enable those Indian capabilities.

Along with considering reviving or updating various dialogue mechanisms, there should also be more regular U.S.-India consultations on China to exchange perspectives and discuss response options. This should ideally include updating each other on stabilization efforts with China.

The administration should also be encouraged to undertake a dialogue with the Indian government on Chinese activities in South Asia and the Indian Ocean region. This can help enable more effective collaboration and coordination, avoid duplication, and deconflict New Delhi’s and Washington’s approaches in the region.

There should also be bilateral or Quad consultations to coordinate ahead of key regional and global summits; a stepping up of Quad activities in the regional security, economic security, and technology domains; and mapping efforts to identify regional gaps or supply chain vulnerabilities.

Finally, there should be more frequent congressional exchanges with Indian counterparts on China and the Indo-Pacific, and, ideally, more visits by members and staff to India with China/Indo-Pacific-focused agendas.