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Gaza ceasefire: What the Israel-Hamas agreement means

Supporters and family members of hostages kidnapped during the deadly October 7, 2023, attack on Israel by Hamas, hold lit up torches during a protest ahead of a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas, in Tel Aviv, Israel, January 16, 2025.
Supporters and family members of hostages kidnapped during the deadly October 7, 2023, attack on Israel by Hamas, hold lit up torches during a protest ahead of a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas, in Tel Aviv, Israel, January 16, 2025. (REUTERS/Shir Torem)
Editor's note:

This piece is part of the Center for Middle East Policy’s Israel-Gaza interviews series, in which leading experts unpack the conflict via in-depth Q&As.

On Wednesday, Israel and Hamas reached a ceasefire and hostage-for-prisoner release agreement. It will be the first stop in fighting in the Gaza Strip since a November 2023 agreement allowed for the return to Israel of over 100 hostages held by Hamas in exchange for the release of Palestinians imprisoned in Israel. This phased agreement will see, in its initial phase, the release of 33 Israelis held hostage in Gaza in exchange for the partial withdrawal of Israeli forces and the release of Palestinians imprisoned in Israel.

The logic behind the deal

Kevin Huggard:
To begin, can you describe the logic behind the sequencing that Israel and Hamas have agreed to as part of this multi-stage ceasefire?

Natan Sachs:
This is a two-stage deal, which allows both sides to claim they have stuck to their (contradictory) core demands. Israeli officials claim that this is not an agreement to end the war while Hamas is still standing in Gaza. Instead, they insist that in the second phase the remaining Hamas leadership will be exiled and excluded from governing the Gaza Strip. If Hamas refuses, as one would expect, the ceasefire could collapse. For Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, this is politically important: He can sell the first phase to his far-right partners, but not the proposed second phase.

Hamas, however, understands this calculation, which is why it has so far rejected deals that did not end the war completely with Hamas still on its feet and able to resume its dominant position in Gaza. Threading that needle has required outside assurances, though not ironclad, that a second phase will be negotiated once the first phase is underway.

In the first 42 days of the ceasefire, Hamas would release 33 Israeli hostages: women, the elderly, those categorized as severe humanitarian cases, and two very young children of the Bibas family (though there’s significant fear that they might not be alive). Israel would release hundreds of Palestinian prisoners in return, including more than 200 sentenced to life in prison for murder in the context of terrorism. The precise ratio will depend on the identities of those released.

Also in the first phase, Israel would begin withdrawing from what it calls the Netzarim corridor, which bifurcates the Gaza Strip. The Israelis had intended that this string of military positions would allow them to control who could return to northern Gaza and to prevent those Hamas operatives from returning to northern Gaza, where they’ve been conducting extensive and devastating operations in recent weeks.

In the first phase, Israel would not fully withdraw from Gaza. It would maintain a security buffer zone within Gaza along its perimeter, buffering between it and the Israeli villages attacked on October 7.

Sixteen days after the beginning of the deal, the second-phase negotiations are supposed to start. In the second phase, the remaining male Israeli hostages and captured soldiers would be released.

Israel would also start to redeploy in Gaza’s border with Egypt, which is known in Israel as the Philadelphi corridor. It would leave the Rafah Crossing, with the evacuation completed, in theory, in the second stage of the agreement. This is notable, as Netanyahu has previously called this presence strategically essential for Israeli security.  

The main sticking points

Kevin Huggard:
What were the main sticking points for the two sides? What do you see as their core concessions?

Natan Sachs:
For Hamas, it is entering into the first phase of the deal with no guarantee that phases 2 and 3 will of the deal be implemented. Hamas’ central demand was to essentially return things on the ground to where they were on October 6—which is, of course, something it already had before they started this war. It has insisted on a full Israeli withdrawal from all the Gaza Strip, with Hamas still there to regroup and rearm when Israel is gone. Hamas is not achieving that at the moment, though a full implementation of the deal would point in that direction.

The Israelis are backing down from at least the public statements Netanyahu made at different stages of the negotiations. In particular, Israel is agreeing, in principle, to a gradual withdrawal from the Philadelphi and Netzarim corridors (Gaza’s border with Egypt and an Israeli corridor bifurcating the Gaza Strip into north and south, respectively). If the full deal is implemented, an argument will be made that Hamas has not been fully dismantled as a governing entity in Gaza, despite the massive blows to its fighting capacity. This will not be the “total victory” Netanyahu has repeatedly claimed was at hand. However, no military campaign could achieve that without many more years of devastating war; Weakening Hamas requires a diplomatic effort that puts an alternative to Hamas in place, as I’ve argued previously.

Palestinian civilians in Gaza

Kevin Huggard:
Where does this agreement leave Palestinian civilians in Gaza, almost all of whom have been displaced by fighting, as they begin to attempt to rebuild their lives in cities and towns that have been decimated, especially in areas of northern Gaza which were almost fully depopulated?

Natan Sachs:
The humanitarian need in Gaza today is enormous and acute. The deal immediately allows for two important things: first, a pause, at least, to hostilities, and second, the surge of aid into Gaza, which could be distributed more safely if hostilities are indeed paused. Over a million people are displaced within Gaza, and the infrastructure is in shambles. A surge in aid, and its more effective distribution, could prevent further harm to civilians and allow them to start rebuilding their lives from a long and very bloody war.

The deal would also allow Palestinians to leave the temporary shelters, especially in the area close to the coast in the southern Gaza Strip, and to return north. In significant parts of the northern Gaza Strip, however, there is very little to return to. Jabalia, the former refugee camp, is devastated and will need to be rebuilt from scratch.

The actual recovery of the Gaza Strip and its population will demand an enormous influx of financing and also responsible governance. Large amounts of funding will not be enough. There were already large amounts of funds entering Gaza over the years before this war, but civilians—long immiserated by the Israeli-Egyptian blockade and Hamas’ rule—benefitted little from it, even while Hamas was building its war effort and underground infrastructure. Real reconstruction will now require a far bigger amount of funds and their responsible allocation, in order to better the lives of ordinary Palestinians in Gaza. This is the vaunted “day after,” which would arrive if all phases of the deal were fully implemented. Such implementation would be extremely complex, and we are still far from it, but it will be essential both for any future diplomatic efforts to begin and also for the lives of ordinary people now.

Why now?

Kevin Huggard:
Why did the two sides agree to this ceasefire now? What changed in their decisionmaking, and how is this timing related to U.S. President-elect Donald Trump’s imminent return to office?

Natan Sachs:
This deal is not very different from the one that was on the table in May 2024 and, actually, earlier than that. Enormous tragedies have occurred in the months that have passed since then, in terms of the devastation on the ground in Gaza, of the hostages who have died, and of what these societies have gone through during the war. Nonetheless, this deal is better late than never, despite the real risks it entails—and it does entail risks.

Several factors went into the timing on Hamas’ side, with two likely being the most important. The first is the death of Yahya Sinwar. Though his brother, Mohammed Sinwar, is now probably the key player in the Gaza Strip, Yahya Sinwar’s death changed the dynamics inside Hamas and may have contributed to the readiness for a deal that it did not display previously.

The second element is the strategic environment for Hamas. On October 7, Hamas was hoping to start a regional war. It accomplished that, but only to a limited degree, and with very different results than it had hoped for. The broader war was one between Iran’s so-called “axis of resistance” and Israel. That axis has been dramatically weakened, with severe damage to Hezbollah, the fall of the Assad regime, and Israel’s subsequent destruction of Syria’s Russian-made air defenses. Along with Israeli strikes against Iran’s own air defenses, Iran is now far more vulnerable to further Israeli airstrikes via Syrian and Iranian airspace. Hamas now finds itself at war with only support from the Yemeni Houthis, most notably following the separate ceasefire in Lebanon.

On the Israeli side, there is no question that the Trump factor is significant. Netanyahu is eager to start on the right foot with Trump, who has made clear he wants a ceasefire deal and the hostages returned before he takes office. Very unusually for American diplomacy, the Biden administration and the incoming Trump team worked together on this deal, to a degree. The Biden team, which of course led the effort, allowed space for Steve Witkoff, the incoming Middle East envoy, to convey Trump’s messages to Netanyahu. This proved crucial. The Trump team’s message was forceful and clear about where the incoming president wants things to go.

It’s been reported in the Israeli press that Witkoff, who is Jewish, demanded to meet Netanyahu on Saturday, the Jewish Sabbath, a day when an Israeli prime minister would usually avoid meetings that are not technically urgent. In demanding that timing and through his words, Witkoff conveyed the urgency and importance of this ceasefire in the eyes of the new administration. For the Israeli right, this is the flip side of their jubilation over Trump’s election. They are experiencing a U.S. president who will certainly be very pro-Israeli—and whose favor they are keen to receive—but will also be forceful in demanding whatever he thinks is in his interest.

The reception in Israel

Kevin Huggard:
How do you expect this deal to be received in Israeli politics, where far-right government ministers have consistently opposed negotiations to end this war, and in Israeli society, where anguish for the fate of the hostages has been intensely felt?

Natan Sachs:
A clear majority of Israelis are in favor of this deal, particularly its first phase. That said, it is not an easy thing for Israelis to swallow. They will see not only Hamas likely still in control in Gaza after all that has happened, but also a very large number of Palestinian prisoners released. In the eyes of many Israelis, many of these prisoners are dangerous, convicted terrorists. The example in everyone’s mind is Yahya Sinwar himself, who was released by Netanyahu as part of the exchange of over 1,000 prisoners for captured Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit in 2011. That deal, which had a far weaker strategic justification than this one, sowed the seeds for the current war, much as the 1985 agreement known as the “Jibril deal,” in which Israel released over 1,000 prisoners for three soldiers, contributed, many Israelis believe, to future violence by those released.

Nonetheless, the plight of the hostages, including civilians, the elderly, and young women, is a deeply emotive consideration for Israeli society, which prides itself on solidarity and mutual assurance. There is a widespread sense that the government has betrayed its own citizens, who were snatched from their homes due to the state’s failure to prevent Hamas’ invasion and massacre and left in captivity for over a year. Their release could help start mending the trauma in Israeli society today.

Israel’s far right has vociferously objected to this deal. That stems from both the far right’s more heavy-handed approach to such diplomacy and also from its explicit desire to reestablish the occupation of Gaza and to rebuild some of the settlements there that were dismantled in 2005. This kind of deal, if it came to full fruition, would be an Israeli choice, once again, against that vision and in favor of a different one.

The deal's longevity

Kevin Huggard:
In your view, how likely is this agreement to last beyond its initial six-week phase? What signs might you watch for to understand its potential longevity?

Natan Sachs:
This is the big unknown at present. A lot depends on Trump himself: will the new administration insist on the full implementation of this agreement, or will it declare diplomatic victory after the first phase—including the release of the hostages who are American citizens, and stand out? I suspect that it will insist on full implementation. I don’t think Trump wants a resumption of the war in Gaza, especially with Israeli hostages remaining there after the first phase. Still, will a second phase command enough attention from an administration in its early weeks, with a full docket of dramatic domestic and international priorities to pursue?

The second big factor is Israeli politics. The far-right partners in Netanyahu’s coalition are very opposed to this deal. Itamar Ben-Gvir, the extremist minister in charge of the police, has announced that he will resign if the deal is approved, though he will not, for now, topple the government. Bezalel Smotrich, the finance minister, now holds a lot of leverage and has declared his opposition to the deal as well. Israel has a separate and ongoing political crisis over a budget that must be passed by the end of March and a conscription bill that would allow Haredi (“Ultra-Orthodox”) Israeli men to avoid military conscription despite the ongoing war and bereavement felt by other segments of society. Put together, the political crisis has the potential to threaten Netanyahu’s coalition.

The third and last consideration is what Hamas does on the ground. It will be very eager to quickly reestablish itself as the only power in the Gaza Strip. Yet it is still unclear how much resistance it will mount against any power sharing or international involvement discussed for the third phase of the deal. If it begins immediately rebuilding its fighting capacity, it could draw an Israeli response and an escalation that scuttles a second phase.

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