Blog Post

It’s Groundhog Day with North Korea

February 8, 2016, Katharine H.S. Moon

In the wake of North Korea's latest missile launch, parties around the world are expressing “grave concern” and threatening “severe consequences.” But no matter how many exclamation points we add to words of disapproval and how many sanctions we generate, they are not likely to change North Korea’s nuclear ambitions.

  • In the News

    There's some evidence that in the mid-to-late 2000s, the [North Korean] government decided to close some of the larger, export-oriented, regime-supported manufacturing facilities. When that happened, chemists and others set up private facilities, either repurposing equipment or copying from what they'd learned in the state factories. They then tapped into the existing black market inside North Korea and the cross-border smuggling networks into northeastern China to distribute their products.

    February 7, 2016, Sheena Chestnut Greitens, The Daily Beast
  • In the News

    Manufacturing methamphetamine requires relatively little in the way of sophisticated equipment; it can be manufactured in a bathtub in someone's home. That's one reason why it was relatively easy to privatize (or partially privatize) production inside North Korea. Evidence from my interviews with people involved in the manufacturing and distribution of methamphetamine made inside North Korea consistently indicates that the precursor chemicals are coming from China via cross-border illicit trading and smuggling networks.

    February 7, 2016, Sheena Chestnut Greitens, The Daily Beast
  • Interview | CRI English

    February 4, 2016, Katharine H.S. Moon

  • Blog Post

    Punishing Pyongyang: With new U.S. sanctions, how will China respond?

    February 2, 2016, Jonathan D. Pollack | comments

  • In the News

    Beijing is very likely to voice disapproval of any measures that negatively impact China’s financial or commercial interests, especially if the sanctions [against North Korea] are unilateral.

    January 29, 2016, Sheena Chestnut Greitens, NK News
  • In the News

    The sanctions rely on banks being conscious of their reputation, they are powerful in that the banks themselves have to decide what is in their economic interests. Depending on how the sanctions [against North Korea] are written, the Chinese government might object, but banks and companies might still feel enough pressure that they decide it’s interest is to comply.

    January 29, 2016, Sheena Chestnut Greitens, NK News
  • Paper | 4th Korea Research Institute for National Strategy-Brookings Joint Conference

    The role of the U.S.-ROK alliance in the process of unification: A U.S. view

    January 25, 2016, Katharine H.S. Moon

  • Presentation | 4th Korea Research Institute for National Strategy-Brookings Joint Conference

    U.S. policy and East Asian security: Challenge and response

    January 25, 2016, Evans J.R. Revere

  • Presentation | 4th Korea Research Institute for National Strategy-Brookings Joint Conference

    Changes and prospects for the structure of regional stability in East Asia: A U.S. perspective

    January 25, 2016, Jonathan D. Pollack

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