Marxists have always been fond of strategies designed to  ‘heighten the contradictions.’ By its stubborn
refusal to send 24  of our nation’s servicemen and women home quickly, China’s ruling  class did an
excellent job of heightening, or at least exposing,  the contradictions within America’s China policy.
The Bush administration seems to want to do two things at  once: be seen as tougher toward the
Chinese government than Bill  Clinton was and maintain commitment to free trade.
In theory, it’s possible to be tough on China where security  matters are concerned and still favor open
trade. In practice,  this approach sends a constant stream of contradictory signals.  President Bush is in
a bind because, in the early days of the  crisis, he wanted to seem tough. Now he is desperate to get out
of  what threatens to become a hostage situation that would endanger  free trade.
The president underscored the problems he faces when he told  the American Society of Newspaper
Editors last week: ‘China is a  strategic partner, I mean, a strategic competitor.’ It may have  looked like
a gaffe. In fact, it was a moment full of insight.
Republicans trashed Clinton’s China policies while providing  him with critical votes on trade. Cleverly,
Bush tried to distance  himself from Clinton’s idea that China was our ‘strategic partner’  by rebaptizing
Beijing as our ‘strategic competitor.’ But those  tough new words were married to the very same trade
policies. In  one sentence last week, Bush acknowledged—for just a moment—that his approach may
be more Clinton-like than he and many in his  party want to admit.
The Chinese government seems intent on making life difficult  for its American defenders. Free trade
advocates keep saying that  the more China opens itself to world trade, the more free and  democratic it
will become. Maybe that will turn out to be true in  the very long run. Certainly China is, in important
respects, more  free and open today than it was 25 years ago.
But China’s government keeps doing things—to religious and  political dissidents especially—that make
its defenders look  like fools, or worse, like people whose desire to make money  renders them
indifferent to the very freedoms they claim their  money-making will expand. Now that China’s leaders
have held  members of our own military for the purpose of making political  and diplomatic points, it’s
harder than ever for Americans to  ignore what those same leaders do to their own dissidents.
The administration is desperately trying to persuade the  Chinese government that it’s digging itself a
huge hole. Secretary  of State Colin Powell referred to China’s desire to join the World  Trade
Organization on Fox News Sunday. ‘We are still supporting  access to WTO,’ he said, ‘but I can say
that if we have to go for  a vote on normal trading relations again, this situation has not  improved their
chances of winning that again.’
At the same time, Powell wanted to say words that would  satisfy China. ‘We have expressed our
regrets, we’ve expressed our  sorrow, and we are sorry that a life was lost,’ he said about the  Chinese
airman who died in the collision. The message to the  Chinese government: Please, guys, we’re doing all
we can. If you  don’t act soon, you and your American friends will be in the soup.
I hope by the time you read this, the strategy will have  worked and our people will be on their way
home. Bush surely  cannot be blamed for the decision of the Chinese government—or  parts of it—to
play things tough.
But this incident should  force the president to rethink whether he can have it both ways.  China’s rulers,
at least, don’t seem to think that trade and  security issues are as separable as we do.
If Bush didn’t want  this confrontation, he could have sent the Chinese a message on  Day One that this
was an accident and we needed to work it out  fast. Alternatively, if he wanted to press China’s leaders,
he  didn’t have to be so quick to declare his belief that ‘the economy  is a place where we can
partner.’     Ultimately, it’s China’s  leadership that has to decide. China can become rich, or it can
be  confrontational. It can accept that innovation requires real  freedom, or try to limit freedom to a
narrow economic sphere.  These are the contradictions that China’s bosses must resolve.
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Commentary
Op-edChina Policy Full of Contradictions
April 10, 2001