This is the 15th essay of Assessing China’s “Lost in translation: Decoding Chinese strategic narratives” series. The full collection of essays can be found here.
President Donald Trump is planning to visit China in May. The last time Trump went to Beijing was in November 2017, when he was received with a “state plus” treatment in the Forbidden City. However, soon after that trip, Trump launched an unprecedented trade war against China, and bilateral relations fell to a nadir. This year’s visit takes place at a time when bilateral ties are in a state of fragile stability, following a period of turmoil in the first year of Trump’s second term. How will Trump’s second trip to China impact bilateral relations over the coming three years?
The Chinese side views 2026 as an important opportunity for improving Sino-U.S. relations. On February 4, President Xi Jinping told Trump that he hopes to make 2026 a year where the two countries “advance toward mutual respect, peaceful coexistence, and win-win cooperation.” Summit diplomacy has always played a key role in the development of Sino-U.S. relations. Trump’s trip to China, along with Xi’s return visit to the United States later this year, will largely determine if the above goal will be met. From Beijing’s perspective, the summit will be measured by whether the United States will adopt a correct perception of China and a more positive definition of bilateral relations, whether the two sides can agree on the right way to deal with each other, and whether it will bring about stability and cooperation in the remaining years of Trump’s term.
What issues are on the summit agenda?
Although Xi and Trump have stayed in frequent contact over the last year through phone calls, exchanges of letters, and in-person meetings in third countries, the May visit provides a rare opportunity for the two leaders to engage in in-depth discussions on broad issues of mutual interest. While many specific issues will be on their agenda, the Taiwan question is China’s priority item. In December 2025, two months after his meeting with Xi in Busan, Trump announced a historic arms sale package worth $11.1 billion to Taiwan, which alarmed and infuriated Beijing. Given China’s sensitivity regarding the Taiwan issue and the current tension across the Taiwan Strait, Beijing will undoubtedly urge Washington to commit to serious self-constraint on future arms sales to Taiwan as well as on the handling of U.S.-Taiwan relations. Beijing would also expect Trump to make some open statements to update U.S. Taiwan policy, expressing opposition to Taiwan independence and sympathy to China’s goal of peaceful reunification. While the details are yet to be finalized between the two sides, a new understanding over the Taiwan issue will serve a common goal: stabilizing Sino-U.S. relations and reducing tensions in the Taiwan Strait.
Trade and economic relations will be central to the summit’s achievements. Based on previous bilateral agreements, Beijing aims to solve more problems and expand areas of cooperation. Despite the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision to strike down Trump’s tariffs, Trump may continue to play the tariff card; yet Beijing now feels confident in confronting the tariff challenge and will not treat it as a major concern. Instead, Beijing would like to address technology, the U.S. Department of Commerce’s “entity list,” and investment, among other issues. It will nudge Washington to loosen technology controls in areas such as semiconductors and artificial intelligence, remove sanctions against over 1,000 Chinese firms, and reduce restrictions on Chinese direct investment in the United States. In return, China would like to purchase more U.S. soybeans, energy products, and Boeing aircraft. Beijing may also want to further open its market to the U.S. service industry and investment.
More broadly, Beijing is increasingly concerned about how to protect its overseas economic interests in the face of mounting U.S. pressure. Although Washington has long employed what Beijing views as long-arm jurisdiction and diplomatic coercion to prevent third parties from cooperating with China, during Trump’s second term, the United States has more vigorously and unscrupulously challenged Chinese overseas interests around the world. During the summit meeting, China will likely raise this issue, expressing its serious concern and sending a credible warning to the United States about the adverse consequences that its actions may entail. For instance, China may retaliate against U.S. interests in countries where China holds an upper hand.
People-to-people ties
Cultural and educational exchanges are also on China’s agenda. Beijing used to view diplomacy and security, trade and economics, and people-to-people ties as the three pillars underpinning its overall relations with the United States. However, growing restrictions on people-to-people exchanges, which began during the first Trump administration, have taken a significant toll on bilateral cultural and educational ties—a decline that has deepened further in Trump’s second term. In particular, the past year has seen a remarkable decline in Chinese citizens travelling to or studying in the United States, alongside a notable hike in Chinese scholars and students being denied visas or harassed by U.S. Customs and Border Protection agents. Although Trump has repeatedly welcomed Chinese students to the United States, such statements mean little if they don’t lead to tangible policy change. It would also be desirable for the two sides to establish a working mechanism to facilitate people-to-people exchanges.
During the era when the United States pursued an engagement policy toward China, the two sides established almost 100 dialogue mechanisms covering a wide range of shared interests. Most were dismantled during the first Trump administration, and while the Biden administration restored around 20 mechanisms to promote cooperation and communication, fewer than half a dozen remain active today. This is wholly inadequate for managing the breadth and complexity of the bilateral relationship. A productive summit should lead to the resumption or creation of more dialogue and working mechanisms at various levels.
What success looks like
Trump may expect his China trip to attract attention at home and abroad while delivering some major trade and economic deals. For Beijing, however, this should not be a usual head-of-state visit, but a major diplomatic effort that yields substantive results for the rest of the second Trump administration. This summit agenda should extend beyond trade and economic relations to address the strategic and security challenges confronting both countries. Beijing will be watching closely for signs of the policy flip-flops that undermined the Sino-U.S. relationship during Trump’s first term.
Trump’s visit to China is the first half of the game—setting the tone for bilateral relations in 2026 without resolving everything at once. Xi’s return visit to the United States later this year will build on that foundation, and the full impact of this year’s summit diplomacy will not be fully felt until then.
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Commentary
Beyond trade: Issues in a Trump-Xi summit
March 27, 2026