

Rising Waters, Falling Taxes(?)

The Impact of Natural Disasters on Property Assessments

– Evidence from Hurricane Sandy in New York City

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
Qing MIAO, Rochester Inst Tech

Yilin HOU, Syracuse University


Brookings

July 22, 2025

U.S. Billion-Dollar Disaster Annual Event Count



FEMA Disaster Relief Fund Appropriations (2023 Billion\$)



Property Tax Prospective – Key Revenue Source

- Disasters necessitate **substantial spending** on **rescue, relief, and recovery**
 - Home value depreciation; tax base shrinkage
(Bakkensen & Barrage 2017; Ortega & Taspınar 2018; Gibson & Mullins 2020; Cohen et al. 2021)



Property Tax Prospective – Key Revenue Source

- Disasters necessitate substantial spending on recovery
 - For property owners, home value sunk; for govts, tax base slashed
(Bakkensen & Barrage 2017; Ortega & Taspınar 2018; Gibson & Mullins 2020; Cohen et al. 2021).
- **Tax relief for affected homeowners**
 - **Property tax administration:** uniformity, cycle/frequency, constraints
(Bowman & Mikesell 1978; Mikesell 1980; Giertz & Chicoine 1990; Eom 2008; Kim et al. 2023)



Research Question

- **Impact of natural disasters on property value and tax administration**
- **Case:** Hurricane Sandy (2012) in NYC



Impact of Hurricane Sandy in NYC

Most costly hurricanes/flood

Hurricane Katrina (2005)	\$193 Billion
Hurricane Harvey (2017)	\$155 Billion
South Asian floods (2020)	\$128 Billion
Hurricane Ian (2022)	\$ 115 Billion
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- Sandy struck east coast in **October 2012**



Impact of Hurricane Sandy on property tax assessments in NYC

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- Major **Disaster Declaration** in 13 states.
 - \$4.2 billion direct damage in NYC



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- **Widespread socio-economic impacts**
 - Property market; Business
 - Infrastructure; Public health; Social well-being



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 - Property market; Business; Infrastructure; Public health; Social well-being.
- **Mandatory evacuation order.**



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- **Residential properties**
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 - **Persistent value decline of unaffected properties in flood zones** due to perceptions of heightened flood risk (Gibson & Mullins, 2020; Cohen et al., 2021).



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- **Even larger impacts in lower-income neighborhoods** (Ellen & Meltzer, 2024).



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- Larger impacts in lower-income neighborhoods (Ellen and Meltzer, 2024).
- **Decline of commercial property values** (Holtermans et al., 2024; Addoum et al., 2024).



Property Assessment in NYC

Estimated Market Value (EMV)

– Modeling of sale price over previous 3 years

[Assessment](#)



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Assessed Value (AV)

- 6% of EMV, constrained by *Assessment Cap*
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[Assessment](#)



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[Assessment](#)



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[Assessment](#)

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- Taxable Value * Uniform Tax Rate (~20%)



Property Tax Assessment in NYC

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[Assessment](#)

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Taxable Ratio

- Taxable Value / Market Value (Sale Price)
- Proportion to effective tax rate (Tax / Value)



Property Tax Relief after Hurricane Sandy



Property Tax Relief after Hurricane Sandy

- NY statewide **“The Superstorm Sandy Assessment Relief Act”**
 - For taxing jurisdictions inside the declared disaster counties



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- **Modification in NYC** (based on our interviews with DOF staff)



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Neighborhood

- Severely impacted neighborhoods
- 15% EMV reduction for qualified properties


[Timeline](#)

Individual



- Owner-reported property damage
- Demolition change (EMV) for structural damage



Tax Relief and EMV Over-adjustment



Tax Relief and EMV Overadjustment



Transactions



Property-level Data 2007-2021

- **Housing transactions** (Unbalanced)
 - Sale date, price, type, property characteristics



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- Property **assessment rolls** (Year-Property Balanced)
 - Estimated market values (EMV), assessed values (AV), exemptions
 - Tax class 1 properties (1-3 family units, 46% of taxable properties)



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- Hurricane **Sandy-Induced Damage**
 - Structure-level inundation and damage assessment.



Property-level Data of 2007-2021

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 - Estimated market values (EMV), assessed values (AV), exemptions.
 - Tax class 1 properties (1-3 family units, 46% of taxable properties).
- Hurricane Sandy-Induced Damage.
 - Structure-level inundation and damage assessment.
- **Hurricane Evacuation Zones**
 - Historical zones active during Sandy (revamped in June 2014)
 - Zone A is a proxy for high-risk flood areas [HEZ](#)



Difference-in-Differences Model

$$\ln(Y_{it}) = \beta_1 \text{Post}_t \cdot \text{Sandy}_i + \beta_2 \text{Sandy}_i + \alpha X_i + \alpha_{ym} + \alpha_{fy} + \alpha_b + \alpha_A + \epsilon_{it}$$



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- Y_{it} : outcome variables (price, assessment) for property i at time t
 - $\text{Post}_t = 1$ if after Sandy (excluding 2012/10–2013/06)
 - $\text{Sandy}_i = 1$ if property experienced inundation
 - X_i : property features (e.g., # units, stories, living area, lot size, age)
 - α_{ym} : sale-year-month FE (macroeconomic trends, seasonality)
 - α_{fy} : fiscal-year FE (fiscal trends, policy changes)
 - α_b : census-block FE (local differences)
 - α_A : evacuation-zone-A FE (preparedness, resilience, recovery)
- **Identification:** precise property location relative to Sandy's impact zone



Results – Higher Tax Burdens for Inundated Properties

$N = 295,178$ **Price**

Post \times Sandy **-0.10*****
(0.010)

Adj. R^2 0.49

Controls: property char., sale-year-month FE, fiscal-year FE, block FE, Zone A FE. SE clustered at the block level.

[Exemption](#)

[Damage](#)

[Repeated](#)

[Asmt Roll](#)

[Levy](#)



Higher Tax Burdens for Inundated Properties

$N = 295,178$	Price	EMV
Post \times Sandy	-0.10*** (0.010)	-0.17*** (0.010)
Adj. R^2	0.49	0.80

Controls: property char., sale-year-month FE, fiscal-year FE, block FE, Zone A FE. SE clustered at the block level.

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Higher Tax Burdens for Inundated Properties

$N = 295,178$	Price	EMV	AV
Post \times Sandy	-0.10*** (0.010)	-0.17*** (0.010)	-0.10*** (0.013)
Adj. R^2	0.49	0.80	0.77

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$N = 295,178$	Price	EMV	AV	Exempt	Txbl Val
Post \times Sandy	-0.10*** (0.010)	-0.17*** (0.010)	-0.10*** (0.013)	-0.18* (0.010)	-0.065*** (0.015)
Adj. R^2	0.49	0.80	0.77	0.14	0.56

Controls: property char., sale-year-month FE, fiscal-year FE, block FE, Zone A FE. SE clustered at the block level.

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Undamaged but Risk-Prone Properties

- At-risk properties experience depreciation due to perceptions of heightened risk after disasters (Ortega & Taspınar 2018; Gibson & Mullins 2020; Cohen et al. 2021)



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Undamaged but Risk-Prone Properties


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<i>N</i> = 295,178	Price	Est MV	AV	Exempt	Txbl Val	Txbl Ratio
Post × Sandy	-0.11*** (0.010)	-0.17*** (0.010)	-0.10*** (0.013)	-0.18* (0.11)	-0.063*** (0.015)	0.043** (0.019)
Post × ZoneA	-0.11*** (0.013)	0.0294 (0.010)	0.081 (0.12)	0.083 (0.34)	0.14 (0.12)	0.24** (0.12)
Adj. <i>R</i> ²	0.49	0.80	0.77	0.14	0.56	0.23

Controls: property char., sale-year-month FE, fiscal-year FE, block FE, zone-A FE. SE clustered at the block level.





Gradual Recovery of Inundated Properties



[Event Study](#)






Gradual Recovery for Inundated Properties



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
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

Persistent Devaluation and Increased Burdens for At-Risk Properties



[Event Study](#)






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Heterogeneous Effects by Property Value

- **Resilience and recovery vary across properties.**
 - Wealthier communities are better prepared for disasters (Cutter et al. 2012; Van Zandt et al. 2012; Bakkensen & Barrage 2017).



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 - Higher-value property owners show stronger capitalization of risk avoidance. (Lindell & Hwang 2008; Kellens et al. 2012; Gibson & Mullins 2020)



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- **Vertical Equity/Progressivity**: higher-value properties bear higher tax rates.




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- *Horizontal Equity*: similar-valued properties taxed equitably.
- *Vertical Equity/Regressivity*: higher-value properties bearing higher tax rates.
- Properties grouped into three tiers based on pre-Sandy market value (FY2012).





Heightened Tax Burdens on High-Value Properties



[Model](#) [At-risk](#)



Heightened Tax Burdens on High-Value Properties



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- **Limited tax relief for high-value properties:**
 - Greater resilience to storm damage [Damage](#) [Evidence](#)



Policy Implications

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- **Opportunity for correcting tax inequity.**



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- Opportunity for tax inequity correction.
 - Poorly designed relief policies burden vulnerable populations.
 - Distributed relief may address tax regressivity.



Post-Disaster Tax Relief Policy

- **Three considerations** in post-disaster tax relief
 - **Promptness** – top priority
 - **Precision** – requires assessment of property-level damage
 - **Equity** – distribution of tax relief



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- “Coarse” tax relief in NYC.
 - Impacted neighborhoods and demolished properties.
- **Direct adjustment in assessed value or exemption.**



Generalization

- **Economic shocks spread beyond natural disasters.**



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 - Beyond immediate disaster zones, e.g., Miami.
 - **Other market boom or bust, e.g., Covid-19 pandemic.**



Generalization

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 - Texas – tax relief on exemption.



Thank you!

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