

Recovering from COVID

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- 1. Recession was deepest, shortest on record
- 2. Unprecedented sectoral shift

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- 3. Exceptionally aggressive fiscal policy
- 4. Exceptionally fast recovery, in two stages



Note: Set to zero at series-specific peak following NBER peak. See Hall & Kudlyak (2021, 2022abc)

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- 2. Unprecedented sectoral shift
- 3. Exceptionally aggressive fiscal policy
- 4. Exceptionally fast recovery
- 5. Trend-reverting



Questions

- 1. Was this time different? Yes
- 2. Is there a simple quantitative model that captures the anomalies? Yes
- 3. Are macro dynamics back to normal? Seems so
- 4. What are the underlying economics accounting for these anomalies?
 - Epi-ec models + COVID fatigue + vaccines
 - Temporary layoffs & PPP
 - Fiscal policy
 - Other factors: WFH technology, new business formation
- 5. Any broader lessons?

DFM:
$$Y_t =$$

 $Y_t = \Lambda F_t \cdot \qquad + u_t$

Y = observable series F = conventional factors C = COVID factor

Factor IRFs:

$$F_t = \Theta_{FF}(L) \quad \varepsilon_t^F$$

Y decomposition: $Y_t = \Theta_{YF}(L)\mathcal{E}_t^F + u_t$

• Pre-COVID F DFM (3 F's) doesn't fit the COVID episode: wrong dynamics, signs, covariances)

DFM:

$$Y_t = \Lambda F_t + \Gamma C_t + u_t$$

Y = observable series F = conventional factors C = COVID factor

Factor IRFs:

 $\begin{pmatrix} \boldsymbol{C}_{t} \\ \boldsymbol{F}_{t} \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} \boldsymbol{\Theta}_{CC} (\mathbf{L}) & \boldsymbol{\Theta}_{CF} (\mathbf{L}) \\ \boldsymbol{\Theta}_{FC} (\mathbf{L}) & \boldsymbol{\Theta}_{FF} (\mathbf{L}) \end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix} \boldsymbol{\varepsilon}_{t}^{C} \\ \boldsymbol{\varepsilon}_{t}^{F} \end{pmatrix}$

Y decomposition: $Y_t = \Theta_{YF}(L)\varepsilon_t^F + \Theta_{YC}(L)\varepsilon_t^C + u_t$

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- COVID shock
 - Unexpected economic manifestation of/reaction to risk of severe illness or death from COVID

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- COVID shock
 - Unexpected economic manifestation of/reaction to risk of severe illness or death from COVID
- Identification of COVID shock
 - i. C = 0 pre-COVID
 - *ii.* F shocks have no within-month effect on C_t
 - Biological & administrative delays ~4-6 weeks
 - Large epi-ec literature with feedback on deaths; see Atkeson-Kissler (BPEA 2024)
 - Anxiety, perceptions, and economic activity; Fetzer et al. (2021)
 - iii. Λ , F, Θ_{FF} time-invariant (testable)

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 - Unexpected economic manifestation of/reaction to risk of severe illness or death from COVID
- Identification of COVID shock
- Identify space of *F* shocks but not individual shocks
 - We'll see that fiscal shocks are in this space

Estimation

- Monthly, 128 real activity indicators (77 used for estimation), 1970m1-2024m9
- 2-step estimation, hold *F* coefficients and dynamics fixed over COVID (will test)





Employment: Accommodations and food services

 $Y_{t} = \Theta_{YF}(\mathsf{L})\varepsilon_{t}^{F} + \Theta_{YC}(\mathsf{L})\varepsilon_{t}^{C} + u_{t}$

- —— C-shock component
- —— F-shock component
- —— F+C component

---- Actual





PCE: Nondurables

 $Y_t = \Theta_{YF}(\mathsf{L})\varepsilon_t^F + \Theta_{YC}(\mathsf{L})\varepsilon_t^C + u_t$

— C-shock component
— F-shock component
— F+C component
---- Actual





Many structural changes.

Macro manifestations?

- 1. Macrodynamics Stability pre-COVID v. post-COVID
 - A seems stable
 - FIRFs seem stable

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2. Long-term sectoral shifts?

- Levels (shares)?
- Change in overall growth rate?

Deviation from 2007:IV-2019:IV trend, logs

Series	Actual – trend	<i>t</i> -stat
GDP	0.024	0.55
PCE	0.044	1.36
PCE-Durables	0.068	0.97
PCE-Nondurables	0.060	1.43
PCE-Transportation services	-0.057	-0.60
Employment	0.010	0.23
Employment – Manufacturing	0.039	0.41
Employment – Acc. & food services	-0.085	-1.96

Digging into recovery dynamics: the 5 anomalies

- i. Speed & depth of contraction
- ii. Sectoral shift
- iii. Exceptionally large transfers _
- iv. Speed of recovery
- v. Trend reversion

Any lessons?

- well-explained by epi-ec literature, NPIs, self-protection

1. Prevalence of temporary layoffs

- Workers with v. w/out jobs: Hall-Kudlyak (2021, 2022abc), Forsythe et al (2022)
- PPP? Hubbard-Strain (2020), Autor et al. (2022ab), Granja et al (2022)
- PUA, Extended UI? E.g. Hornstein et al (2024)

Hall and Kudlyak (2022): The Unemployed With and Without Jobs



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- 1. Prevalence of temporary layoffs
- 2. Surge in new business formation
 - Decker-Haltiwanger (*BPEA* 2023, update 2024)
 - Availability of new WFH technology (Zoom)



Source: Decker & Haltiwanger (2024)

Note: BDS and BED annual firm births are age-0 firms as of March. BFS applications are likely employers (HBA). All series expressed as rates except BFS. Quarterly series are seasonally adjusted. Gray bars indicate NBER recession dates (2001:Q1-Q4, 2007:Q4-2009:Q2, 2020:Q1-Q2). Source: Business Dynamics Statistics, Business Employment Dynamics, Business Formation Statistics. ²²

- 1. Prevalence of temporary layoffs
- 2. Surge in new business formation
- 3. Fiscal policy boost, especially March 2021 ARP



C-shock component

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Lessons?

- 1. Resilience and flexibility + back to normal macrodynamics
- 2. Fast recovery I: Temporary layoffs
 - Most of the rehiring was natural response to re-openings, NPIs, adjusted work arrangements
 - PPP rehiring effect: ~3% (0-5%) boost in rehiring at eligible firms (~1-2pp aggregate effect)
- 3. Fast recovery II: March Sept. 2021
 - Fiscal stimulus
- 4. Trend reversion
 - ~1/3 to 1/2 of the trend reversion is attributed to conventional shocks i.e. fiscal stimulus

Bonus Slides

COVID Timeline



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- 3. Exceptionally aggressive fiscal policy (March 2020, January 2021, March 2021)
- 4. Exceptionally fast recovery: months 1-6 (May-Oct. 2020), also months 7-18 (Nov. 2020 Oct. 2021)



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Pre-COVID Cross-Sectional 5%, 25%, 75%, 95% Quantiles of 128 monthly time series











Cross-sectional quantiles during COVID

Standardized data (pre-COVID standard deviations)

Residuals from 3-factor DFM (F's only)

Residuals from DFM with 3 *Fs* & 1 *C*



DFM: Improvement of fit from COVID factor

DFM

- Monthly, 128 real indicators (77 used for estimation), 1970m1-2024m9
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Historical decompositions: Contribution of COVID & Conventional (F) Shocks









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Many structural changes:

- Long COVID & LFPR
- Early retirements
- Remote work
- Gig work

Macro manifestations?

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IRFs for 2 F VAR(2): pre-COVID & COVID







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Sectoral Growth in 2024:III v. 2019:IV One-sided smoothed with 45° line



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Log unemployment rate w/out job during expansions