

From Arm's Length to Arm in Arm: Banks and Municipal Bond Financing

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Disclaimer

*The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors, and **do not** necessarily represent the views of the Federal Reserve Board or the Federal Reserve System.*

Motivation

- Banks exert considerable influence in the municipal bond market
 - They hold a substantial share of outstanding municipal bonds in their investment portfolios
 - In the last two decades: ~20% of total muni holdings (Fed Flow of Funds)
- A growing literature has unveiled a compelling connection between banks' demand for municipal bonds and a range of consequential outcomes
- Existing studies lack precise information on the specific bonds banks hold
 - These papers rely on analyzing municipal bonds that banks are allowed to hold *vs.* those they are constrained from holding due to regulatory guidelines
 - This approach falls short in identifying which characteristics of municipal bonds or issuers influence banks' decisions to hold munis

This Paper

- We use unique and comprehensive regulatory data: Fed's Y-14Q Collection
- What factors do banks use in their municipal bonds investment decision?
- Allow us to explore the channels that mediate the effects of bank demand on municipal bond issuers.
- How does bank demand affect both banks and bond issuers?


Summary of Results

- Relationships play an important role in the banks' decisions to hold a bond.
- Banks prefer Larger, Long-Maturity, Insured, with a High Credit rating that complies with liquidity regulations...
- ... but they are *less sensitive* to these characteristics when picking a bond from a connected issuer!
- We employ a [Khwaja and Mian \(2008\)](#) DID design to causally estimate how bank–issuer relationships affect a bank's decisions to hold a bond.
- Banks benefit from the relationship with information advantage, leading to superior investment performance.
- Bank Relationships enhance bond issuance characteristics in **good times** and act as a stabilizer during **adverse times**

Contribution

- The effects of bank holdings' on municipal financing
[Bergstresser & Orr (2014), Garrett (2021), Ivanov & Zimmermann (2021), Yi (2021), Dagostino (2022), Garrett & Ivanov (2022), Cortes *et al.* (2023)]
 - We introduce a novel dataset that provides unprecedented granularity regarding banks' holdings of municipal bonds ("black box")
 - We shed light on the influence of banking relationships in a bank's decision to hold a bond
 - Our findings show that banking relationships serve as an important channel through which bank demand influences municipal bond issuers.
- The effects of banking relationships in alleviating financial constraints
[Berger & Udell (1992, 1995), Petersen & Rajan (1994, 1995), Butler (2008), Bolton *et al.* (2016)]
 - Adelino *et al.* (2021): relationships between the issuer, underwriter, and mutual fund affect mutual funds' demand for municipal bonds.
 - We reveal the surprising importance of relationships in muni issuances, traditionally characterized by large-scale issuers with strong market reputations
 - We break away from the prevailing focus on bank loans, exploring the impact of relationships on bond issuances

Banks Hold a Large Fraction of Total Issuance



Banking Relationships

- We draw lessons from a substantial body of literature examining bank-firm relationships.
- Large body of evidence showing that banks can reduce lending cost leveraging their superior information gathering and processing capabilities (e.g., Diamond (1991); Berger and Udell (1992, 1995, 2006), Petersen and Rajan (1994, 1995))
- It is premature to assume these findings translate seamlessly to bank relationships in the municipal bond market.
 - Municipal bonds are publicly traded
 - Large issuers with stable revenue streams and implicit guarantees from higher levels of government.

Characteristics of Bonds Purchased: Bank Relationships

	Dependent Variable: $1\{Purchase\}$				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Bank Relationships					
<i>Underwriter</i>	0.385*** (0.033)	0.394*** (0.032)	0.385*** (0.033)	0.386*** (0.033)	0.380*** (0.032)
<i>Credit Relationship</i>	-0.001* (0.001)	-0.002*** (0.001)	-0.001** (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)
<i>Repeat-Holder</i>	0.934*** (0.003)	0.927*** (0.003)	0.932*** (0.003)	0.931*** (0.003)	0.931*** (0.003)
Continues in next slide...					
Year-Quarter FE	Y	N	N	N	N
Issuer Type FE	Y	N	Y	Y	N
State FE	N	N	N	Y	N
Rating \times Year-Quarter FE	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
State \times Year-Quarter \times Issuer Type FE	N	N	N	N	Y
R^2	0.408	0.403	0.410	0.411	0.440
N	1,086,608	1,185,852	1,086,593	1,086,593	1,086,391

Characteristics of Bonds Purchased: Regulation-Compliant and Relationship

	Dependent Variable: 1{Purchase}				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
... Continued from last slide					
Bond Characteristics					
<i>Term Amount</i>	0.011*** (0.000)	0.011*** (0.000)	0.011*** (0.000)	0.011*** (0.000)	0.011*** (0.000)
<i>Maturity</i>	0.003*** (0.000)	0.003*** (0.000)	0.003*** (0.000)	0.003*** (0.000)	0.003*** (0.000)
<i>Yield</i>	-0.001 (0.001)	0.000 (0.000)	0.001 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)
<i>Insured</i>	0.002** (0.001)	0.005*** (0.001)	0.003*** (0.001)	0.002*** (0.001)	0.002*** (0.001)
<i>High Credit Rating</i>	0.008*** (0.001)	0.011*** (0.003)	0.007*** (0.003)	0.006** (0.003)	
Regulation					
<i>HQLA</i>	0.005*** (0.001)	0.007*** (0.001)	0.005*** (0.001)	0.004*** (0.001)	0.004*** (0.001)
<i>Bank-Qualified</i>	0.016*** (0.001)	0.017*** (0.001)	0.016*** (0.001)	0.016*** (0.001)	0.016*** (0.001)
Year-Quarter FE	Y	N	N	N	N
Issuer Type FE	Y	N	Y	Y	N
State FE	N	N	N	Y	N
Rating × Year-Quarter FE	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
State × Year-Quarter × Issuer Type FE	N	N	N	N	Y
R ²	0.408	0.403	0.410	0.411	0.440
N	1,086,608	1,185,852	1,086,593	1,086,593	1,086,391

Bank Relationship and The Characteristics of Bonds Held

Relationship Type:	Dependent Variable: $\mathbb{1}\{\text{Purchase}\}$								
	Underwriter			Credit Relationship			Repeat Holder		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
<i>Relationship</i>	0.998*** (0.003)	0.987*** (0.004)	0.994*** (0.020)	-0.007*** (0.002)	-0.009*** (0.002)	-0.005*** (0.002)	0.996*** (0.001)	0.988*** (0.002)	0.983*** (0.004)
Bond Characteristics									
<i>Large Bond</i>	0.008*** (0.001)	0.005*** (0.001)	0.005*** (0.001)	0.004*** (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.004*** (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.002* (0.001)
<i>Relationship × Large Bond</i>	-0.026*** (0.003)	-0.024*** (0.004)	-0.037* (0.020)	0.016*** (0.002)	0.015*** (0.002)	0.016*** (0.002)	-0.013*** (0.001)	-0.007*** (0.002)	-0.002 (0.004)
<i>High Credit Rating</i>	0.007*** (0.001)	0.007*** (0.001)		0.005*** (0.001)	0.004*** (0.001)		0.003*** (0.001)	0.004*** (0.001)	
<i>Relationship × High Credit Rating</i>	-0.015*** (0.002)	-0.014*** (0.003)	-0.017** (0.008)	0.007*** (0.002)	0.009*** (0.002)	0.006*** (0.002)	-0.007*** (0.001)	-0.007*** (0.001)	-0.009*** (0.002)
Regulation									
<i>HQLA</i>	-0.001 (0.003)	-0.003 (0.003)	-0.004 (0.009)	-0.001 (0.003)	-0.004 (0.004)	-0.002 (0.009)	0.001 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.007)
<i>Relationship × HQLA</i>	-0.001 (0.003)	-0.003 (0.003)	-0.017* (0.010)	0.001 (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.003)	-0.003*** (0.001)	-0.002* (0.001)	-0.004* (0.002)
<i>Bank-Qualified</i>	0.012*** (0.001)	0.012*** (0.001)	0.012*** (0.001)	0.013*** (0.001)	0.011*** (0.001)	0.012*** (0.001)	0.010*** (0.001)	0.009*** (0.001)	0.009*** (0.001)
<i>Relationship × Bank-Qualified</i>	-0.013*** (0.003)	-0.016*** (0.005)	-0.005 (0.016)	-0.004 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.009*** (0.001)	-0.010*** (0.002)	-0.015*** (0.006)
Year-Quarter FE	Y	N	N	Y	N	N	Y	N	N
Issuer Type FE	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N
State FE	N	Y	N	N	Y	N	N	Y	N
State × Year-Quarter × Issuer Type FE	N	N	Y	N	N	Y	N	N	Y
Rating × Year-Quarter FE	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
R^2	0.072	0.077	0.128	0.018	0.026	0.081	0.018	0.026	0.430
N	1,185,863	1,086,608	1,086,391	1,185,863	1,086,608	1,086,391	1,086,606	1,086,603	1,086,391

Relationships and Holdings

- While these findings offer valuable insights into the role of relationships in banks' decisions to hold municipal bonds, they rely on cross-sectional variation, raising potential endogeneity concerns.
- We leveraged changes in liquidity regulations and the reclassification of municipal bonds as high-quality liquid assets (HQLA), which increased banks' demand for municipal bonds.
- Endogenous matching process between banks and issuers. For causal evidence, we need a [Khwaja and Mian \(2008\)](#) strategy:
 - Our approach introduces issuer-year-specific fixed effects into our regressions
 - If the sole determinant of the decision to hold a bond is the issuer's quality, we anticipate both banks to exhibit identical decisions
 - Otherwise, a different likelihood to hold would suggest that banking relationships play a substantive role in these choices

Relationship Lending and the effects of HQLA eligibility using Khwaja–Mian (2008)

Relationship Type:	Dependent Variable: $\log(\text{Bank Holdings})$								
	<i>Underwriter</i>			<i>Credit Relationship</i>			<i>Repeat Holder</i>		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
<i>Relationship</i> \times <i>HQLA</i>	0.406** (0.202)	0.411** (0.203)	0.410** (0.196)	0.711** (0.295)	0.696** (0.295)	0.613* (0.336)	-0.331 -0.22	-0.337 (0.222)	-0.335 (0.223)
<i>Relationship</i>	0.105 (0.148)	0.0933 (0.150)	0.0668 (0.143)	0.0281 (0.185)	0.0264 (0.184)	0.0632 (0.190)	0.519*** -0.131	0.527*** (0.129)	0.501*** (0.128)
<i>Maturity</i>	0.080*** (0.007)	0.090*** (0.010)	0.090*** (0.010)	0.073*** (0.010)	0.087*** (0.011)	0.086*** (0.008)	0.076*** -0.008	0.086*** (0.010)	0.087*** (0.010)
<i>Yield</i>		-0.109* (0.065)	-0.143** (0.062)		-0.148** (0.069)	-0.160*** (0.060)		-0.114* (0.064)	-0.147** (0.061)
$\log(\text{Amount})$			0.345*** (0.051)			0.311*** (0.060)			0.342*** (0.050)
Issuer-Year-Quarter FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
R^2	0.767	0.766	0.774	0.802	0.803	0.810	0.768	0.767	0.776
N	2,698	2,686	2,686	2,110	2,101	2,101	2,698	2,686	2,686

The Information Channel of Bank Relationship: Future Returns

Relationship Type:	Dependent Variable: $Bond\ Return_{b,t}$								
	<i>Underwriter</i>			<i>Credit Relationship</i>			<i>Repeat Holder</i>		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
<i>Relationship</i>	-0.110 (0.502)	-0.121 (0.593)	-0.282 (0.585)	0.421*** (0.144)	0.327** (0.166)	0.281* (0.166)	0.337** (0.142)	0.420** (0.178)	0.268 (0.178)
Bond Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Issuer Type \times Year-Quarter FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
State FE	Y	N	N	Y	N	N	Y	N	N
Rating FE	N	Y	N	N	Y	N	N	Y	N
Rating \times Year-Quarter FE	N	N	Y	N	N	Y	N	N	Y
R^2	0.025	0.026	0.048	0.025	0.026	0.049	0.025	0.027	0.049
N	115,537	79,494	79,488	115,537	79,494	79,488	115,537	79,494	79,488

Bank Relationships in Good Times

	<i>Offer Yield</i>		<i>Purchase</i>	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
A. Underwriting Relationship				
<i>Underwriter</i>	0.110** (0.044)	0.130*** (0.042)	0.857*** (0.026)	0.855*** (0.026)
<i>Underwriter</i> × <i>Post HQLA</i>	-0.236*** (0.056)	-0.251*** (0.055)	0.339*** (0.055)	0.339*** (0.056)
R^2	0.758	0.763	0.088	0.090
N	1,086,606	1,086,603	1,100,406	1,100,403
B. Credit Relationship				
<i>Credit Relationship</i>	0.025*** (0.007)	0.030*** (0.007)	0.003** (0.001)	0.003** (0.001)
<i>Credit Relationship</i> × <i>Post HQLA</i>	-0.031*** (0.011)	-0.037*** (0.011)	0.002 (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)
R^2	0.758	0.763	0.036	0.039
N	1,086,606	1,086,603	1,100,406	1,100,403
C. Repeat-Holder Relationship				
<i>Repeat-Holder</i>	-0.032 (0.024)	-0.050* (0.025)	0.966*** (0.001)	0.965*** (0.001)
<i>Repeat-Holder</i> × <i>Post HQLA</i>	-0.127*** (0.035)	-0.146*** (0.037)	0.003** (0.002)	0.003* (0.002)
R^2	0.752	0.763	0.398	0.399
N	1,086,606	1,086,603	1,100,406	1,100,403
Bond Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Issuer Type × Year FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Rating × Year FE	N	Y	N	Y

Bank Relationships and The Financial Crisis

	Offer Yield		Purchase	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
A. Underwriting Relationship				
<i>Underwriter</i>	0.074* (0.044)	0.092** (0.042)	0.938*** (0.003)	0.936*** (0.003)
<i>Underwriter × Crisis</i>	-0.191** (0.083)	-0.204** (0.083)	0.003 (0.004)	0.005 (0.004)
<i>R</i> ²	0.758	0.763	0.086	0.088
<i>N</i>	1,086,606	1,086,603	1,100,406	1,100,403
B. Credit Relationship				
<i>Credit Relationship</i>	0.023*** (0.007)	0.027*** (0.006)	0.003*** (0.001)	0.003*** (0.001)
<i>Credit Relationship × Crisis</i>	-0.037*** (0.012)	-0.039*** (0.012)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)
<i>R</i> ²	0.758	0.763	0.036	0.039
<i>N</i>	1,086,606	1,086,603	1,100,406	1,100,403
C. Repeat-Holder Relationship				
<i>Repeat-Holder</i>	0.054 (0.043)	0.071 (0.045)	0.939*** (0.003)	0.937*** (0.003)
<i>Repeat-Holder × Crisis</i>	-0.122* (0.065)	-0.136** (0.067)	0.012*** (0.004)	0.013*** (0.004)
<i>R</i> ²	0.758	0.763	0.142	0.144
<i>N</i>	1,086,606	1,086,603	1,100,406	1,100,403
Bond Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Issuer Type × Year FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Rating × Year FE	N	Y	N	Y

Conclusion

- We use unique and comprehensive regulatory data to study how banks strategically navigate their choices among municipal bonds
- We provide causal evidence that banking relationship affects bank decisions to hold a bond and benefits issuers
- Banks benefit from the relationship with information advantage, leading to superior investment performance.
- Bank Relationships enhance bond issuance characteristics in good times and act as a stabilizer during adverse times

Policy Implications:

- Our results support the view that incentivizing banks to hold munis is good for the stability of the municipal bond market
- This could be achieved by reevaluating existing tax policies, which currently limit tax exemptions for municipal bonds *exclusively to banks*