

# Post-Covid Inflation in Emerging Europe

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# Remember

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- The same economics toolkit that helps make sense of post-Covid advanced economy inflation also helps make sense of emerging markets' inflation


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
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- The same economics toolkit that helps make sense of post-Covid advanced economy inflation also helps make sense of emerging markets' inflation
- In almost all cases in emerging Europe, the underlying reasons are also the same
- Turkey is the major exception with senseless policy mistakes creating high and persistent inflation
- In other emerging Europe the commodity price shock by itself explains the great majority of inflation run-up

# A Familiar Inflation Path





# The Baseline



# Emerging Europe, FX regimes


Country	Exchange Rate System	Currency
Croatia	Managed Floating Exchange Rate Regime (until 2023) Became a euro area member in 2023	Croatian kuna (HRK) joined ERM II in 2020 Adopted euro (EUR)
Romania	Managed floating exchange rate regime	Romanian leu (RON)
Serbia	Managed floating exchange rate regime	Serbian dinar (RSD)
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Fixed exchange rate pegged to euro (Currency Board)	Bosnia-Herzegovina convertible marka (BAM)
Bulgaria	Fixed exchange rate pegged to euro since 1997 (Currency Board)	Bulgarian lev (BGN) joined ERM II in 2020
North Macedonia	Fixed exchange rate pegged to euro (Stabilized Arrangement)	North Macedonian denar (MKD)
Kosovo	Euroization	Unilaterally adopted euro (EUR) in 2002
Montenegro	Euroization	Unilaterally adopted euro (EUR) in 2002
Albania	Free floating exchange rate regime	Albanian lek (ALL)
Hungary	Free floating exchange rate regime	Hungarian forint (HUF)
Poland	Free floating exchange rate regime	Polish zloty (PLN)




# Emerging Europe, GDP and inflation

Countries	GDP per capita (€), 2019	Inflation, 2019	Cumulative inflation, 2021-2022	Inflation, 2023	Weight in emerging Europe
Albania	4,820	1.5	11.7	4.5	1.2
Bosnia and Herzegovina	5,444	0.3	22.0	2.2	1.6
Bulgaria	8,820	3.1	21.9	5.0	5.5
Croatia	13,710	1.3	18.5	5.4	5.0
Hungary	15,000	4.1	34.2	5.5	13.1
Kosovo	3,944	1.2	19.6	2.3	0.6
Montenegro	7,960	1.1	20.9	4.9	0.4
North Macedonia	6,000	-0.2	23.5	3.8	1.0
Poland	13,870	3.0	24.6	6.2	47.5
Romania	11,560	4.0	21.8	7.0	20.0
Serbia	6,620	2.1	23.7	7.5	4.1
Türkiye	8,220	11.8	123.5	64.9	-
Switzerland	7,5150	-0.1	4.1	2.1	-
Euro area	34,760	1.3	14.6	2.9	-
Emerging Europe	11,711	3.1	24.5	6.1	100

# Headline Inflation



# Core Inflation



# One Factor Rules Them All


Countries	Headline inflation PC1 loadings	Core inflation PC1 loadings
Albania	0.093	0.112
Bosnia and Herzegovina	0.095	0.081
Bulgaria	0.097	0.111
Croatia	0.098	0.118
Hungary	0.091	0.115
Kosovo	0.091	0.087
Montenegro	0.096	0.108
North Macedonia	0.096	0.095
Poland	0.095	0.099
Romania	0.095	0.106
Serbia	0.095	0.114
Explained variance	92.14%	75.11%

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
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- Hard to coordinate on common policy error
- But, these countries mostly follow ECB policy so common policy error may be imported
- Common external shock is the better explanation

# Commodity Prices and Inflation






# Weight of Energy in Consumption Basket and Headline Inflation



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
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- Energy shock is also supply shock

# Energy Intensity of Production








- Energy intensity is irrelevant


- Energy intensity is irrelevant
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- Define energy sensitivity of production as energy intensity  $\times$  share of imported energy


# Energy Sensitivity of Production and Core Inflation




# Memo: Energy weight in basket and core inflation in EA



# Energy inflation and core



# Core and non-core inflation





Sample period: January 2021-December 2022

Dependent variable	Annual headline inflation	Annual core inflation
Energy contribution to annual headline inflation	1.53*** (0.20)	0.53** (0.20)
Food contribution to annual headline inflation	1.35*** (0.09)	0.35*** (0.09)
Constant	0.74*** (0.26)	0.75*** (0.26)
Observations	264	264
R <sup>2</sup>	0.93	0.53

Pooled OLS regression results with Newey-West standard errors in parentheses. \* p<0.10, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01

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- Iffy econometrics, may be spurious
- Importantly, leaves very little room for supply chain disruptions
- Can we test if this is a mechanical result of regressing headline and core inflation on components of inflation?

Sample period: January 2018-December 2019

Dependent variable	Annual headline inflation	Annual core inflation
Energy contribution to annual headline inflation	1.41*** (0.14)	0.41*** (0.14)
Food contribution to annual headline inflation	1.11*** (0.19)	0.12 (0.19)
Constant	0.68*** (0.19)	0.68*** (0.19)
Observations	264	264
$R^2$	0.60	0.07

# Culprit: External Shock

- Countries were differentiated by their exposure to the same shock
- Conditional on that, we understand much of the inflation response

# Outliers: Albania and Hungary

- Albania is an energy producer and exporter
- Lek was appreciating
- Very similar to Switzerland in energy sufficiency and appreciating currency




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- Where macro policy is very relevant: Turkey

# Exception that proves the rule



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- Accompanying mix of very funky policies (for a time) to limit the fallout
  - Using the variance of the effective rate as a policy tool
  - Off-market rates offered for reserves in foreign currency
  - Banks forced to use discount window, rates above the top end of corridor
  - Banks forced to do cross currency swaps with central bank

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
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  - Long rates shooting up
  - Regulation to push them back down
- Resulting in very strong financial repression

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- Turkey is what policy driven inflation in emerging markets looks like



# Commodity Price Driven Post-Covid Inflation



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# Conclusion

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- Energy price shock explains the inflation in emerging Europe
- Open question: Why is the level of inflation conditional on country characteristics higher in emerging Europe compared to EA?
- Very worth thinking about