# Session 2: Trends in Labor Force Participation 

Nicolas Petrosky-Nadeau ${ }^{1}$<br>The Recent Evolution of Labor Markets Conference<br>Hucthins Center at The Brookings Insitution<br>Washington D.C.<br>January 18, 2024

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# Session 2: Trends in Labor Force Participation 

## Three Firestarter Topics:

1- Transitory and persistent impacts of the pandemic
2- Closing participation gaps
3- Immigration and labor force growth

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## 1 - A Transitory and A (Potentially) Lasting Impact of the Pandemic

Initial concerns over pandemic's impact on women's participation erased by 2023


Lofton, Olivia, Nicolas Petrosky-Nadeau, Lily Seitelman. "Parents in a Pandemic Labor Market," Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Working Paper 2021-04.

## 1 - A Transitory and A (Potentially) Lasting Impact of the Pandemic

Shortfall in participants aged 55+ persistent and concentrated among the non-college educated



Miskanic, Brandon, Nicolas Petrosky-Nadeau, Cindy Zhoa. "To Retire or Keep Working After a Pandemic?" FRBSF Economic Letter, forthcoming.

## 2 - Closing gaps: Significant Lags in Closing Gender Gaps

Despite gains during current expansion a large gap remains relative to peer countries


Daly, Mary C., Joseph H. Pedtke, Nicolas Petrosky-Nadeau, Annemarie Schweinert."Why Aren't U.S. Workers Working?" FRBSF Economic Letter 2018-24. of San Francisco

## 3 - Increasing Role for Immigration in Growing the Labor Force

## Foreign born workers account for nearly 2/3 of LF growth since 2021

 of San Francisco

## Additional Slides

- Federal Reserve Bank
of San Francisco


## 2 - Closing gaps: Caution when comparing populations

Differential aging across demographic groups can distort trends


Note: Authors' calculations using data from the U.S. Department of Labor
Employment to population ratios for blacks constructed using the age population distribution of whites.

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## 3 - Domestic and Foreign Born Contributions to Labor Force Growth



## 3 - Missing Domestic Born Workers?



# Trends in Labor Force Participation 

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Based on joint works with Bart Hobijn

## Questions

- What happened pre-, during, and post-pandemic? Have long-term trends changed, or were they just disrupted a bit by COVID?
- How much of the decline in labor force participation was among older (70+) workers and part-time workers?
- Do we expect LFP of older workers to begin rising again as it had been pre-pandemic? Whither prime-age male LFP?
- What role does availability of childcare play in LFP?
- What about hours-what do we make of differences among surveys?


## Labor Force Participation Trend Predates the COVID-19 Pandemic

Labor Force Participation Rate, Actual and Trend Estimates
Monthly observations; seasonally adjusted


Note: Vintage of forecast is indicated by dot. Actual is seasonally adjusted monthly observations. Trend estimates in bottom panel by source: - CBO trend estimates (2011,2015,2020,2021), ■: Tealbook estimates (backward-looking, Jan 2011 and Jan 2015), *: Aaronson et al. (2014), and $\mathbf{4}$ : from Aaronson et al. (2006), Aaronson et al. (2012), Zandweghe (2012), and Hornstein et al. (2018).

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## Emphasis on Labor Force Entry/Exit Dynamics During the Pandemic

## Labor Force Entry and Exit Rates

monthly; seasonally adjusted; percent of labor force


Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics and authors' calculations

## Participation Dynamics More Subtle

## Flow Origins of Participation: Dec 2023 <br> Monthly observations; seasonally adjusted



- Flows >> Net changes in stocks
- Large flows in and out of labor force
- Unemployed are less attached than the employed
- Attachment wedge

Key Intuition: When someone moves from $U$ to $E$, they are more likely to remain in the labor force going forward. This simple mechanism (the participation cycle) is the source of procyclicality of participation, not labor force entry and exit.

## Participation Cycle Lagged the Unemployment Cycle As Always

## Trough to trough LFPR changes decomposed

Monthly observations; seasonally adjusted; cumulative change since unemployment trough; Total


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## Cyclical Pressures on Participation Similar to 2019

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Monthly observations; seasonally adjusted; cumulative change since unemployment trough; Total


## Key Takeaway

Recovery of participation rates for all groups is not because marginalized workers are drawn back into the labor force, but instead because those in labor force become more attached due to better labor market opportunities and more employment stability.

Contrasts with common narrative as in Perry (1971), Okun (1973)

## Demographic Trends

## Baby Boom Generation: Born Between 1946 and 1964



## Tracking the Baby Boom Cohort: 2002

U.S. Population by Age, 2002


## Tracking the Baby Boom Cohort: 2012

U.S. Population by Age, 2012


## Tracking the Baby Boom Cohort: 2021

## U.S. Population by Age, 2021



## Participation Trends by Age: 2002-2022



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## Pushing Against the Trend

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Referred to as Participation Instability by Marston (1976)

- participation instability also contributed to gender unemployment gap

Albanesi \& Şahin (2018)

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$\longrightarrow$ how much room do we really have?


## References

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## Additional Plots

## Participation Trends by Age for Men: 2002-2022



## Participation Trends by Age for Women: 2002-2022



## Part-time Share

FRED $\approx$ - Employed, Usually Work Part Time/Employment Level


## Labor Force Participation Rate vs. Desired Hours




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