Changing Central Bank Pressures and Inflation

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Motivation

- Significant uncertainty regarding the long-term path of inflation
- Prevailing view: Inflation falls back to target. Stays there on average
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- Prevailing view: Inflation falls back to target. Stays there on average
 - Supported by CB forecasts in advanced economies and EMs
- Alternative view: Inflation stays higher on average and more volatile
 - Articulated in Goodhart and Pradhan (2020)
 - Structural changes. Reversal of disinflationary forces in Rogoff (2003)
 - ▶ E.g., globalization, demographics, fiscal restraint in EMs

This Paper

• What does New Keynesian framework say about long-run inflation?

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- We assume neither zero inflation nor CB commitment
 - Economic factors interact with CB discretion
 - Endogenous and exogenous political economy pressures on CB

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Framework delivers fresh perspective on past and future inflation

Model

- Standard New Keynesian Model
 - Monopolistically competitive firms set prices under Calvo-style rigidity
 - Households make consumption, labor, and savings decisions
 - Two potential inefficiencies:
 - Equilibrium monopoly distortions (i.e., labor share \neq 1)
 - Equilibrium price dispersion and misallocation


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- Full non-linear model in Afrouzi et al (2023). Today simple setting
 - Linearization around solution to full model, holding labor share fixed

Graphical Representation of Steady-State Inflation



Long-Run Steady State

Equilibrium at LRAS-LRAD intersection given labor share

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
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
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
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
- CB framework \rightarrow Process for labor share
- \blacksquare No CB commitment \rightarrow constant labor share, indexes CB dovishness
 - CB chooses interest rates taking firms' price-setting process as given









Effect of Increase in Central Bank Hawkishness




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Historical Global Decline in Inflation



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- Washington consensus
 - Privatization and liberalization \rightarrow Lower monopoly power
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Expansion of CB independence (exogenous)

- Reinforcing factor: Emergence of ZLB induces hawkish tilt
- Lower bias \rightarrow LRAS shifts right, LRAD shifts left \rightarrow Lower inflation



CB reforms explain some, but not entire inflation decline


Taking Stock

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- Some examples
 - Lat Am deterioration of CB independence between 2000s 2010s
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 - Inflation decline in economies far away from ZLB
- Cross-sectional evidence
 - Negative correlation between long-run inflation and CB independence
 - Openness, public debt also explains variation (Campillo and Miron, 1997)

Future Path of Inflation?



Increasing Endogenous Central Bank Pressures

Deglobalization trends

- Decline in global trade and FDI to GDP since 2008
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 - In fact, current fiscal forecasts potentially too optimistic
 - Given expansion of green spending and industrial policy
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 - In fact, current fiscal forecasts potentially too optimistic
 - ▶ Given expansion of green spending and industrial policy
 - ▶ Given increase in defense spending if geopolitical tensions continue
- Long-term real rates likely returning to centuries-old trend
 - Movement away from ZLB reduces hawkish tilt of CB



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- Caveat: Economic forces described might be short-lived
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- Caveat: Economic forces described might be short-lived
 - Deglobalization could reverse, geopolitical tensions could dissipate
 - ZLB could continue to constrain CBs
- Moreover, forces could be counteracted by renewed CB reforms
 - · Would need to work in opposition to, not in tandem with economic forces
 - Success more likely if supported by fiscal reforms

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Introduce simple LRAD-LRAS framework for long-run inflation

- Inflation reduces aggregate (monopoly) distortions
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- CB has single instrument \rightarrow tradeoff due to staggered price-setting

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- Fresh perspective on factors that helped CBs drive inflation down
- Reasons why delivering low inflation in the future more challenging
 - More successful with strengthening of CB independence, fiscal reforms