

OCTOBER 2022

WORKING PAPER #177

THE VALUE OF COMMUNICATION FOR MENTAL HEALTH

FRANCIS ANNAN BELINDA ARCHIBONG

The value of communication for mental health

Francis Annan University of California, Berkeley

Belinda Archibong Global Economy and Development, Brookings Institution

OCTOBER 2022 Brookings Global Working Paper #177 Global Economy and Development program at Brookings www.brookings.edu/global

About Global Economy & Development

Founded in 2006, the Global Economy and Development program at the Brookings Institution aims to play its part to ensure that the future of globalization is one of inclusive growth and shared prosperity. With an interdisciplinary team of experts, Global provides thought-leadership, cutting edge research, and innovative policy solutions to achieve a more equitable global economic system for sustainable prosperity, drawing on the core strengths of Brookings—authoritativeness, independence, depth of practical expertise, and unparalleled convening power. For more, visit www.brookings.edu/global

THE VALUE OF COMMUNICATION FOR MENTAL HEALTH

Francis Annan*

Belinda Archibong[▲]

University of California, Berkeley Brookings Institution

Abstract

Mental health disorders account for a significant share of the overall global disease burden and translate into staggeringly large economic losses, particularly in low-income countries, where people are faced with several unexpected shocks. We test whether improved communication can mitigate such mental health disorders. Partnering with a major telecommunications company, we implement low-cost communication interventions that provide mobile calling credits to a nationally representative set of low-income adults in Ghana during the COVID-19 pandemic. Individuals' inability to make unexpected calls, need to borrow SOS airtime, and to seek digital loans decreased significantly relative to a control group. As a result, the programs led to a significant decrease in mental distress (-9.8%) and the likelihood of severe mental distress by -2.3 percentage points (a quarter of the mean prevalence), with null impact on consumption expenditure. The effects are stronger for monthly mobile credits than a lump-sum. Simple cost-benefit analysis shows that providing communication credit to low-income adults is a cost-effective policy for improving mental health. Communication–the ability to stay connected-meaningfully improves mental well-being, and interventions about communication are particularly valuable when implemented as many installments.

KEYWORDS: Communication (L63, O12), Well-being (I38), Mental Health (I12, I15)

[✤] Corresponding Author: University of California, Berkeley, 207 Giannini Hall, Berkeley, CA 94720. e-mail: fannan@berkeley.edu. [♠] Barnard College, Columbia University, 3009 Broadway, New York, NY 10027. email: ba2207@columbia.edu. Field support from Samuel Adotevi, Kwamena Arkafra and Felix Debrah (Ghana Statistical Service) and all field officers is acknowledged. Jessica Moreira provided excellent research assistance. We thank Nathaniel Hendren, Erzo F.P. Luttmer, Albert Ortega, David Cutler, Carol Graham, AEA/ASSA 2021, Brookings, and NBER COVID-19 and Health Outcomes meeting participants for comments on a draft of this paper. We are grateful to the Columbia University CPRC and Earth Institute for funding. The CPRC and Earth Institute had no involvement in any substantive aspect of the research project. Institutional Review Board (IRB) approvals for research data collection were obtained from Georgia State University and Barnard College, Columbia University. The project was registered in the AEA RCT Registry, AEARCTR-0006104.

I Introduction

Imagine that you are unable to communicate-to make a phone call, use the web, access social media, and so on-when the need arises unexpectedly. Does this matter for individuals' mental and economic well-being? Should communication interventions during pandemics be applied as a one-time large transfer or as numerous small installments? How valuable or cost- effective is a policy that provides communication credit to low-income adults for improving mental health? We use evidence from the COVID-19 pandemic to address these important questions.

Throughout the world, major communication interventions have been initiated in the public and private sectors in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. In the United States, ATT Inc. provided free 10GB of internet data per month for 60 days as temporary relief for eligible customers to enable them to stay connected during lockdown, starting March 27, 2020 (ATT Inc. 2020).¹ In Ghana, the government reduced the Communication Service Tax (CST) from 9 percent to 5 percent, which reflected a reduction in the cost of mobile talk time and data purchases, effective from September 15, 2020, in response to the economic and social hardships induced by the pandemic (Ghana Revenue Authority 2020; Figure A5). The need for such communication programs is particularly crucial in developing countries where the informal sector is large, and the COVID-19 crisis presents a substantial threat to individuals who face credit, savings, and psychological stressors and constraints (Banerjee, Niehaus, and Suri 2019). Despite the increase in these communication-based programs globally, there is relatively little evidence on their impacts on well-being during a pandemic.

Administrative data on mobile financial transactions from a major provider in Ghana sheds light on the potential value of communication during the pandemic. Figure A6 shows

¹As the leading provider of mobile services in the US, with about 40% share of the market, ATT Inc.'s initiative affected a significant number of people, particularly those in the low- income communities. Others telecommunications companies, such as Comcast Corporation, have deployed similar interventions, providing essential internet and mobile services with- out charge to low-income families, including seniors, veterans, and people with disabilities (Comcast Corp. 2020). We provide a global review of COVID-19-induced communication programs in Tables A8 and A9.

the distribution of transactions and illustrates that while overall market activity decreased following the onset of the pandemic, interestingly and in contrast, the demand for mobile airtime-related activities (as measured by the purchase of data and airtime amounts, and thus their demand) sharply increased over the period. This descriptive evidence documents the importance of communication during the pandemic and is congruent with our baseline surveys: 68 percent of individuals indicated that their need to call or connect with others (family, friends, employers) had increased due to the COVID-19 pandemic and its disruptions. Yet, between 52 percent and 62 percent indicated that, sometimes, when the unexpected need arises, they are not able to call or connect with their family and friends due to economic hardships associated with the pandemic. Thus, programs that directly mitigate such binding communication barriers will likely have a larger impact on individual and societal well-being.

We use a randomized controlled trial (RCT) to estimate the impacts of a short-term "mobile phone calling credit" among a nationally representative set of low-income households in Ghana during the COVID-19 pandemic. We draw on an existing nationally representative baseline frame (Ghana Living Standards Survey 7 [GLSS7]) and focus on 1,131 low-income individuals or households that are readily reachable by phone, work in the informal sector, and are located in the bottom 75th percentile of the income distribution. This sample is low income, where income and psychological constraints (Mullainathan and Shafir 2013) can easily bind due to pandemic-induced economic losses and spans 193 districts across the country's ten administrative regions.

We partner with a major local telecommunications company to run our experiment by randomly assigning the 1,131 individuals to two candidate communication programs: 40GHS (\$7.0) lumpsum mobile credit (376 individuals) versus 20GHS (\$3.5) monthly installments of mobile credit over two months (371 individuals) versus a control program (384 individuals); and then measuring how these affect individuals' ability to mitigate unexpected communication constraints during the pandemic, with impacts on well-being, that is, mental health, domestic violence, and consumption expenditures. The different programs about communication provide a means of examining how communication programs might be delivered: One-time large communication transfer versus numerous small installments.

The pandemic uncovered a great deal of mental health crises, which have potentially large short- and long-term impacts on human capital development. Mental health disorders account for 13 percent of the overall global disease burden (Collins et al. 2011) and translate into significant economic losses, particularly in low-income environments (Adhvaryu et al. 2019). The direct economic impact of COVID-19 in these environments is high and includes earnings and consumption shortfalls (Banerjee et al. 2020), food insecurity (Laborde et al. 2020), among many other meaningful negative impacts.

Conceptually, programs that facilitate communication during unexpected pandemics could be transformative for people, particularly if bound by internal constraints. Not having to worry about the inability to stay connected could free up the mental and emotional bandwidth (Mullainathan and Shafir 2013) needed to thrive through a pandemic and its prevailing uncertainty. The provision of communication credits during these hardships can also directly free up an individual's resources that would otherwise have been allocated to communication for other consumption expenses. Our interventions are designed to both relax such communication constraints and test their impact on mental health, domestic violence, and consumption expenditures.

We first conduct three baseline survey waves prior to the deployment of the communication interventions. After fielding the first round of interventions (lumpsum and first installment), we conducted two endline survey waves to track the various outcomes. Our final dataset is unique due to its size and national representativeness, the expansive set of outcomes, the administrative data on mobile financial transactions, and 1×3 random variations for communication at the individual level. We find five set of results: First, as a first stage, the interventions decreased unexpected communication constraints significantly. That is, our experimental interventions mitigate individuals' inability to meet unexpected communication needs and stay connected (-37pp=-74% for inability to make unexpected

calls, -22pp=-78% for unexpected need to borrow airtime, and -3.5pp=-44% to seek digital loans). These effects are larger and more sustained over time for the installment communication credit program compared to the lumpsum credit.

Second, we find meaningful improvement in psychological well-being, which is measured using the Kessler Psychological Distress Scale (K10). Mental distress decreased (-9.8%). Severe mental distress decreased (-2.3pp=-24%) relative to a control group. The installment communication credit program had larger and more sustainable effects compared to the lumpsum credit. Relatedly, only the installment program led to a significant decrease in the overall likelihood of individuals threatening their partners by -6.3 percent (but with no impacts on the overall likelihood of individuals hitting their partners–our second measure of domestic violence).

Third, we find a null improvement in direct economic well-being. The overall effect is null on total consumption, which is reassuring since the size and specificity of our intervention were not large enough to meaningfully change consumption. Only the installment communication intervention increased consumption expenditures, but the size is very small economically and only in endline wave two.

Fourth, what drives the estimated impacts? We examine heterogeneity in treatment effects along four dimensions: Poverty, informality, gender, and lockdown. For poverty (Schreiner 2015), the estimated modest reduction in domestic violence is more significant for the very poor. For informality, individuals in the informal sector experienced significantly larger and better mental health improvements. For gender, female respondents experienced slightly better mental health effects, but this is not statistically significant, while for lock-down, individuals located in areas which were previously in lockdown are more eager to re-allocate their budgets to more consumption (utilities and durables, as expected). These are individuals who might still be battling the persistent economic impacts of the COVID-19-driven lockdowns. The results show that our communication impacts likely operate through these relevant channels.

5

Fifth, the marginal value of public funds (MVPF) (Hendren and Sprung-Keyser 2020) for a policy that provides communication credit to low-income adults is 2.04, suggesting that \$1.0 of spending on this communication credit policy delivers more than \$1.0 in benefits to its beneficiaries. We show robustness of the various findings to the post-double selection LASSO estimation procedure (Belloni et al. 2014), including adjustments for multiple testing (Romano and Wolf 2005) and attrition (Lee 2009; Behaghel et al. 2015).

We make four main contributions. Mitigation of pandemics can be a daunting task. Policymakers battle on various fronts: Tackling the spread of the pandemic while easing the potential welfare impacts of the negative income shock and constraints on individuals and households. Our programs relax binding communication constraints (individuals' inability to meet unexpected communication needs and to stay connected) and allow us to provide the first experimental evidence on the impact of communication interventions from a nationally representative set of low-income individuals on overall well-being and gender relations during pandemics. The provision of phone credit may also be a way to encourage people to remain indoors during lockdown, helping to reduce infection during the pandemic. Thus, our results add to the space of potentially resilient policy initiatives aimed at tackling pandemics (mitigating their impacts).

We contribute to several distinct literatures. First is the economics literature on interpersonal transfers following semi-covariate unexpected shocks (Blumenstock, Eagle and Fafchamps 2016; Pulver 2009; Jack and Suri 2016). We look at a fully-covariate and prolonged shock and randomized communication transfers. There is almost no work on mental health and economic impacts of information and communications technology (ICT) (Jensen 2007). We offer short-run causal view of what communication does to mental health, connecting ICT and mental health. Lastly, we add to the growing research on mental health and economic impacts of disease epidemics (Adhvaryu et al. 2019; Banerjee et al. 2020; Archibong and Annan 2020). We cleanly isolate ICT and document how to rely on it to mitigate the mental health impacts of pandemics and epidemics.

II Experiment: Setting and Design

II.1 A Brief Global Review: Communication Interventions

Despite their prevalence, we are not aware of any review that highlights COVID-19induced communication interventions. We begin with a careful and ambitious (yet incomplete) global search of communication-related initiatives that were introduced in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Details are shown in Tables A8 and A9. Our review shows that several communication interventions in different forms and scales (spatial and temporal) have taken place during the crisis. Despite their prevalence and potential importance, there is poor evidence on the impacts of such programs during the pandemic on individuals' economic and psychological well-being.

II.2 Research Context

Our study is set in Ghana. Mobile phone connection penetration is very high: Mobile cellular subscriptions were 134 per 100 people in 2019 (rising from 70 per 100 people in 2010), even among the poor (World Bank 2020). We draw on an existing nationally representative baseline frame (GLSS7) of low-income people in Ghana, which is housed by the implementer of our surveys (Ghana Statistical Service [GSS]). We focus on poor and largely married (91%) individuals (household heads), with over 22 percent poverty rates and have mobile phone and connection access that is readily reachable by phone.

Similar to many countries, the pandemic in Ghana has had economic impacts well beyond its health impacts due to the restrictions on mobility and interactions that it triggered. Following the arrival of the first COVID-19 case in Ghana (March 03, 2020), the President Nana Akufo-Addo announced a lockdown in the two most economically active regions (namely, the Greater Accra Metropolitan Area and the Greater Kumasi Metropolitan Area) on March 30, which was later followed by a nationwide closing of all schools and a ban on other activities and which extended to these affected regions.

People were advised to stay at home and were only permitted to leave their homes

for essential items such as food, medicine, and water, or to visit the bank and public toilets. Intercity travel for private and commercial purposes, except for essential goods and services, was suspended. In terms of intracity travel, vehicle drivers were obliged to reduce their number of passengers to observe social distancing. The borders were closed to all but returning Ghanaians and foreign nationals with Ghanaian residence permits, who were subject to a 14-day mandatory quarantine if the returnees showed symptoms of the virus. From April 20, 2020, the lockdown was removed and some of the restrictions were relaxed, yet individuals continue to battle with the persistent impacts of these restrictions and prevailing uncertainties.

Individuals in our surveys are much aware of the pandemic and its associated restrictions on economic activities. Almost 100 percent of individuals indicated being aware of COVID-19 and the restrictions, and 79 percent trust the government and the media to provide accurate statistics (cases, deaths) of the pandemic. Meanwhile, 68 percent of individuals reported their need to call or connect with others (family, friends, employers) has unexpectedly increased, yet over 52-62 percent are sometimes unable to connect as a result of the pandemic and its hardships. This is meaningful as 77 percent of the respondents are self-employed, 18 percent are located in previously locked-down regions, and 80 percent are involved either fully or partially in the informal sector. Table A13 contains more detailed summaries.

II.3 Measurement of Key Outcomes

We define the various outcome measures: Communication constraints-mitigation, mental health, domestic violence, and consumption expenditures: Communication constraints-(un)mitigation measures the incidence of "(un)mitigated" mobile calls and transfers–asking whether individuals were unexpectedly confronted with the need to call or connect with others (family, friends, work) but unable to do so because they *lacked* enough communication resources to remedy the costs. Under such dire and unexpected situations (as it has been during the pandemic), individuals either borrow airtime (i.e., in-kind SOS credit with a service charge of 10 percent and fully repayable once subscribers recharge their phone accounts with an amount that is more than the outstanding SOS credit amount) or seek digital loans (i.e., short-term digital but cashable loans with an interest of 6.9 percent over 30 days) from telecommunications providers. Therefore, we measure communication constraints-(un)mitigation also based on the incidence of borrowing airtime or seeking digital loans due to unexpected circumstances to connect with others.²

Consumption expenditures are measured across food (inside and outside home), utilities, personal care, education, health, and durables (economic well-being). Mental health is measured by the incidence of mental distress (using Kessler Psychological Distress Scale (K10)) (psychological well-being). K10 values can range from zero (minimum) to 50 (maximum), and values above 30 are classified as severe mental distress (Adhvaryu et al. 2019). Gender relations reflect domestic violence (DV) and specifically elicit from an individual whether he/she either threatened or hit his/her partner (Banerjee et al. 2020).³ We take advantage of our short research instrument, which is limited in space, to measure additional variables: Individuals' characteristics (poverty, age, gender, educational-level, occupation, etc.), awareness and beliefs about COVID-19, and foregoing COVID-19 impacts and communication constraints. We adapted a recently developed shortcut-yet rigorous, inexpensive, simple and transparent-measure of poverty called the "Simple Poverty Scorecard" (Schreiner 2015; Annan 2020).

²Unexpected communication needs are plausibly random, with higher potential for more distress compared to needs that are expected. There is room to adjust or plan for expected needs. Thus, communication is likely more valuable to individuals when faced with unex- pected needs because of the less room to adjust.

³We pre-specified our three primary outcomes in the AEA RCT registry (AEARCTR-

^{0006104): (}i) Information and communication-sharing (value, as measured by: unmitigated calls); (ii) Expenditures on and conditional transfers; and (iii) Mental health, happiness and gender relations. Two other outcomes that are not used were pre-specified. The experimen- tal design: 2 treatments (lump-sum vs installments) and 1 control program, stratified by localities (or districts) was also pre-specified. Without loss, we implemented monthly rather than pre-planned weekly installments to ensure better administrative oversight in the field.

These variables are used to test for randomization balance and explore heterogeneity in treatment effects. Summary statistics of the various well-being measures are contained in Table A13. See the Appendix for specific questions and possible responses to relevant select variables.

II.4 Intervention and Timetable

We evaluate the impacts of two communication programs: Lumpsum mobile credit versus installments of mobile credit. Our goal is to mitigate binding communication constraints during the pandemic that render (potentially marginal) individuals unable to connect with others when the unexpected need arises. The timetable of baseline and endline activities is displayed in Figure 1. We use the administrative (transaction-level) data to calculate the 50th (75th) percentile purchase for airtime and data combined over the data period to be 188GHS (308GHS) per month. We set the total value of our communication credit intervention for each individual to 40GHS, that is, 21 percent of the median monthly purchase, or equivalently, 13 percent of the 75th percentile monthly purchase. We estimate this amount as sufficient to cover the most basic unexpected communication needs over a month or two. We first conduct three baseline survey waves prior to the deployment of the communication interventions, which include:

- **Treatment program I (Lump-sum):** Individuals received 40GHS as mobile credit for one time (not discounted).⁴
- **Treatment program II (Installments):** 40GHS was split into two and individuals received this as mobile credit in installments (20GHS two times with a month interval

⁴At a monthly nominal discount rate of 1.16% (i.e., an annual rate of 14% in Ghana, see: https://www.bog.gov.gh/treasury-and-the-markets/interbank-interest-rates/), the net present value terms of the 20GHS installment transfers is 39.31GHS, which is around the 40GHS lumpsum transfer. Due to the short period of time (i.e., one month interval between the two 20GHS installments), we expect discounting to have little or no effect.

between the two).

• Control program: Individuals received no mobile credit.

The communication credit could be used to make a phone call, transfer airtime, visit the web, or access other social media services. After fielding the first round of interventions (lumpsum and first installment), we conducted two survey waves (endlines) (see Figure 1). As shown in Figure 1, we started with n=1,993 individuals reachable by phone in baseline step 0 to arrive at n=1,131 eligible and select individuals in baseline step 1.

II.5 Treatment Assignment

We use a 1x3 factorial design, randomizing a total of 1,131 representative individuals into three experimental communication programs: Lumpsum mobile credit (376 individuals), installments of mobile credit (371 individuals), and control program (384 individuals). We stratified based on districts, and all misfits were resolved and randomly assigned. The values of the two treatment programs are equal, as specified above. We partnered with a major telecommunications company to directly deliver the mobile credits.

II.6 Balance and Validity of Design

II.6.1 Balance

We base our treatment analysis on a comparison of individuals that received the communication treatments with those who did not receive the treatments. Successful randomization of treatments, and thus identification, requires that the assignments to treatments (i.e., lumpsum credit versus installments credit) are independent of any relevant individual-level statistics. To test that these individuals are comparable, we run the regression:

$$y_{id} = \alpha + \beta \mathbf{M}_i + E_{id}$$

on the baseline data (waves 1 and 2), where $M_i = 1$ if individual *i* in district *d* received a communication credit treatment, and zero otherwise. We consider the various treatments separately and together (pooled) for a number of different outcomes and show that individuals show no observable differences across the two groups. Tables A10 and A11 report the pre-treatment balance results and provide strong evidence in favor of randomization balance with no difference across individuals in assigned (treated) and nonassigned (control) programs.

II.6.2 Attrition

Our randomization is based on the selected individuals that draws on the baseline GLSS data files and step zero. Table A12 displays the breakdown of response rates and attrition between baselines and endlines. Here, attrition may be linked to individuals' non-response and inability to reach the participants either because their phone numbers are inactive or out of network coverage area. To maximize response rates, trained field officers conducted multiple phone calls (see Figure A7) at different time horizons of the day, varying either weekdays or weekends, combined with step zero that introduced the project and solicited the consent of the individuals. If we aggregate all the data rounds, we record an overall attrition rate of 6.5 percent, which is low, given uncertainty during the pandemic. In our empirical estimations, we evaluate and formally show robustness to attrition by treatment status.

III Experiment: Results

We present and discuss the treatment effects. Since all our treatments are about communication (or mobile calling) credit provision, we first report the (combined) pooled effect of communication credit assignment, and then the separate effects for the different treatments.

III.1 Empirical Specifications

We estimate treatment effects using the model:

$$y_{idt} = \beta \mathbf{M}_{id} + \mathbf{X}_{id}^{t} \boldsymbol{\xi} + \eta_{d} + \mu_{t} + E_{idt}$$

which links various outcome(s) *yidt* of individual *i* in district *d* at date *t* to the random treatment variable(s) \mathbf{M}_{id} , district-level (stratification unit) dummies η_d , date of survey fixed effect μ_t (absorbs waves), and additional vector of controls \mathbf{X}_{id} which include the baseline outcomes. For the pooled effects, \mathbf{M}_{id} is a 0-1 indicator for whether an individual received any of the communication programs, and thus β captures the (pooled) treatment effect. For the separate effects, \mathbf{M}_{id} is a 0-1 indicator for whether an individual received a specific communication program. We denote by β_1 and β_2 the separate treatment effects for lumpsum and installments programs, respectively (i.e., $\beta = (\beta_1, \beta_2)^t$).

We take a theory-driven approach and use machine learning (specifically LASSO) to select which out of the long list of controls X_{id} we should include. We do this using the post-double-selection LASSO technique of Belloni et al. (2014). The post-double-selection LASSO for estimating the impacts deals with potential covariate imbalance (if any), and thus we can achieve good estimation performance, in addition to minimizing researcher degrees of freedom and the possibility for *p*-hacking. For our main results, standard errors are clustered at the individual level (the level of treatment) to account for arbitrary correlations (Cameron and Miller 2015). Clustering at district-level yields same inference. To address the potential issue of multiple testing, we adjust *p*-values for multiple testing across family of outcomes following the procedure presented in Romano and Wolf (2005). To evaluate and show robustness for potential attrition bias, we report Lee (2009) attrition bounds (trimming based on observed attrition rates; see Table A12), Imbens and Manski (2004) confidence sets, and Behaghel et al. (2015) attrition bounds (trimming based on the number of times individuals were called before answering the phone survey; see Figure A7).

III.2 Treatment Effects

III.2.1 Communication-Ability to Stay Connected

Do communication credit interventions matter for individuals communication? We begin by asking whether the communication programs mitigated individuals' communication constraints. Table A1 shows the pooled treatments effect for alternative communication outcomes. Relative to a control group, individuals' inability to make unexpected calls for the previous seven days decreased (-37pp = -74% of control mean), inability to make unexpected calls due to COVID-19 decreased (-17pp = -38%), unexpected need to borrow SOS airtime decreased dramatically (-22pp = -78%), and seeking digital loans decreased (3.5pp = 44%) as a result of the communication programs. Table 1 reports the separate treatment effects for each communication program. The installment program produces significantly larger mitigation of the communication constraints compared to the lumpsum (*p*-value < 0.01).

These results strongly confirm that the interventions mitigated individuals' binding communication barriers during the pandemic period, showing economically a large and statistically significant decrease in individuals' inability to communicate and stay connected. **III.2.2** Psychological and Economic Well-being

Do communication interventions matter for well-being? We next evaluate how the communication programs impacted various well-being outcomes. Table A2 shows the pooled treatments effect on consumption expenditures. Table A3 displays the pooled result for mental health (measured using the Kessler Psychological Distress Scale (K10); *6*, *15*) and domestic violence. We find null effect on total expenditures, which is reassuring since the size and specificity of our intervention were not large enough for it to be plausible to find meaningful impacts on consumption. There are, however, economically very small positive effects only for utilities and durables. In contrast to the null effect on consumption, we find meaningful impacts on psychological well-being: Mental health and domestic violence. Mental distress (measured by logK10) decreased by *-*9.8 percent. Individuals were *-*6.3 percent less likely to threaten their partners. Similarly, Table 2 reports the separate treatment effects, showing larger treatment effects of the installment intervention on mental distress, severe mental distress (measured by K10 values > 30), and on domestic violence measures. Individuals in the installment credit are less likely (*-*2.3pp \approx

-24%) to suffer the incidence of severe mental distress. There is limited effect of the lumpsum credit on severe mental distress. For consumption, the separate effects are null and indistinguishable across the two communication treatments, which is not surprising because of the overall null pooled treatments effect on consumption expenditures (table A2).

For potential dynamic effects, Figures A1, A2, and A4 show the results over the trajectory survey by survey. What is significant to note is that the installment program has larger and more sustainable effects compared to the lumpsum, with the exception of consumption. This may reflect either time inconsistency or social pressure problems from receiving one-time large transfers.

III.3 Heterogeneous Effects, Discussion, and the Value of Communication

III.3.1 Heterogeneous Effects

What drives the estimated impacts? We examine heterogeneity in treatment effects along four dimensions: Poverty, informality, gender, and lockdown (results shown in Tables A4- A7). The estimates show that our communication impacts operate through the following relevant channels. For poverty, the estimated modest reduction in domestic violence is more significant for the very poor, while for informality, individuals in the informal sector experienced significantly larger and better mental health improvements. Next, for gender, the female individuals experienced slightly better mental health effects but this is not statistically significant, while for lockdown, individuals located in previously lockeddown areas are more eager to re-allocate their budgets to more consumption (specifically, to utilities and durables, as expected). The latter reflects individuals who might still be battling the persistent economic impacts of the COVID-driven lockdowns. These results are in the right direction, and thus reassuring, and provide corroborative support for our main findings.

III.3.2 Discussions

We document the well-being impacts of providing low-cost in-kind communication transfers. A natural question is how does such in-kind transfers compare to cash transfers? Our experiments did not include a separate treatment program for cash, but one can draw some insights from the ongoing large literature on cash transfers during the pandemic (see e.g., Banerjee et al. 2020). In rural Kenya, Banerjee et al. (2020) examined the effects of a Universal Basic Income (UBI) during the COVID-19 pandemic using a large-scale experiment, showing moderate to no improvements on mental health measures. For context, their cash interventions transferred \$0.75 per day (amounting to a non-discounted total of about \$23.3 per month) to the beneficiaries, which is much larger than the cash equivalence of our in-kind communication transfers, yet we find meaningful improvements on our mental health measures. We do not find any impact on food consumption (Table A2) and therefore no impact is likely to be found on hunger, but Banerjee et al. (2020) reported modest UBI improvements on food consumption (meat/fish) and hunger. Thus, it seems communication transfers might yield larger improvements in mental health relative to cash transfers. We think the in-kind mobile communication transfers reduce potential behavioral barriers that would otherwise prevent the individuals from harnessing the mental health benefits of communication.

III.3.3 The Value of Communication

To put our causal estimates into context, we consider the cost-effectiveness of providing communication credit to low-income adults. To compare the cost of a policy that provides communication transfers with the associated benefits, we adapt Hendren and Sprung-Keyser (2020)'s cost-benefit framework that is conducive to welfare analysis. Specifically, we calculate the marginal value of public funds (MVPF), which estimates the ratio of society's willingness to pay for the provision of communication credit to the net cost to the government (here, an "imagined" funder) of implementing this policy. We estimate a conservative MVPF of providing communication credit to be 2.04. This suggest that \$1.0 of

spending on this communication credit policy delivers more than \$1.0 in benefits to its beneficiaries (see Appendix section V.8 for detailed discussions).

IV Conclusion

The COVID-19 pandemic uncovered a great deal of economic and mental health crises, most particularly for those people bound by credit, savings, and psychological constraints. This paper provides new experimental evidence on the impact of providing communication transfers. Communication during pandemics meaningfully matters for well-being. Our mobile credit interventions led to a notable decrease in unexpected communication constraints; individuals were better able to mitigate their inability to meet unexpected communication needs and stay connected. As a result, the programs led to meaningful wellbeing improvements, particularly on mental health, but modestly on domestic violence, and null on overall consumption expenditures.

In terms of policy and design, communication initiatives that relax potential communication constraints improve psychological well-being and, to a modest degree, reduce domestic violence. However, these programs are more valuable if implemented in numerous installments of communication transfers, rather than one-time. Simple cost-benefit analysis shows that providing communication credit to low-income adults is a cost-effective policy for improving mental health. There is almost no work linking mental health and information and communications technology (ICT) (Jensen 2007; Blumenstock, Eagle and Fafchamps 2016). Therefore, we offer a short-run causal view of what communication does to mental health, using evidence from an unexpected pandemic.

References

- [1] Adhvaryu, Achyuta, James Fenske, and Anant Nyshadham. 2019. "Early Life Circumstance and Adult Mental Health." *Journal of Political Economy*, 127(4): 1516-1549.
- [2] Annan, Francis. 2020. "Misconduct and Reputation under Imperfect Information. Working Paper, Georgia State University.
- [3] Archibong, Belinda and Francis Annan. 2020. "Schooling in Sickness and in Health: The Effects of Epidemic Disease on Gender Inequality. Working Paper, Georgia State University.
- [4] Banerjee, Abhijit, Michael Faye, Alan Krueger, Paul Niehaus, and Tavneet Suri. 2020."Effects of a Universal Basic Income during the Pandemic." Working paper, UC San Diego.
- [5] Banerjee, Abhijit, Paul Niehaus, and Tavneet Suri. 2019. "Universal Basic Income in the Developing World." *Annual Review of Economics*, 11(): 959-983.
- [6] Behaghel, Luc, Bruno Crepon, Marc Gurgand, and Thomas Le Barbanchon. 2015.
 "Please Call Again: Correcting Non-Response Bias in Treatment Effect Models." *Review of Economics and Statistics*, 97(5): 1070-1080.
- [7] Belloni Alexandre, Victor Chernozhukov, and Christian Hansen. 2014. "Inference on Treatment Effects after Selection among High-Dimensional Controls." *Review of Economic Studies*, 81(2): 608-650.
- [8] Blumenstock, Joshua, Nathan Eagle, and Marcel Fafchamps. 2016. "Airtime Transfers and Mobile Communications: Evidence in the Aftermath of a Natural Disaster." *Journal* of Development Economics, 120(C): 157-181.
- [9] Cameron, Colin A. and Douglas L. Miller. 2015. "A Practitioner's Guide to Cluster-Robust Inference." *Journal of Human Resources*, 50 (2): 317-373.
- [10] Collins, Y. Pamela, Vikram Patel, Sarah S. Joestl, et al. 2011. "Grand Challenges in Global Mental Health." *Nature*, 475 (7354): 27-30.

- [11] Ghana Revenue Authority. GRA. 2020. https://gra.gov.gh/news/amendments-to-thecommunications-service-tax-act-2008-act-754/
- [12] Hendren, Nathaniel and Ben Sprung-Keyser. 2020. "A Unified Welfare Analysis of Government Policies." *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 135(3): 1209-1318.
- [13] Imbens, Guido and Charles Manski. 2004. "Confidence Intervals for Partially Identified Parameters." *Econometrica*, 72(6): 1845-1857.
- [14] Jack, William and Tavneet Suri. 2016. "The Long-run Poverty and Gender Impacts of Mobile Money." *Science*, 354 (6317), 1288-1292.
- [15] Jensen, Robert. 2007. "The Digital Provide: Information (Technology), Market Performance, and Welfare in the South Indian Fisheries Sector." *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 122(3), 879-924.
- [16] Laborde, David, Will Martin, Johan Swinnen, and Rob Vos. 2011. "COVID-19 Risks to Global Food Security." Science, 369 (6503): 500-502.
- [17] Lee, David. 2009. "Training, Wages, and Sample Selection: Estimating Sharp Bounds on Treatment Effects." *Review of Economics Studies*, 76(3): 1071-1102.
- [18] Mullainathan, Sendhil and Eldar Shafir. 2013. Scarcity: Why Having Too Little Means So Much, Time Books, Henry Holt and Company LLC.
- [19] Pulver, Caroline. 2009. "The Performance and Impact of MPESA: Preliminary Evidence from a Household Survey." *Presentation to FSD-Kenya*.
- [20] Romano, Joseph P., and Michael Wolf. 2005. "Exact and Approximate Stepdown Methods for Multiple Hypothesis Testing." *Journal of the American Statistical Association* 100(469): 94-108.
- [21] Schreiner, Mark. 2015. "Simple Poverty Scorecard--Poverty-Assessment Tool for Ghana." Available here: http://www.simplepovertyscorecard.com/GHA_2012_ENG.pdf.
- [22] World Bank. 2020. "World Development Indicators". Available here: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IT.CEL.SETS.P2?locations=GH

Figure 1: DATA COLLECTION AND TIMETABLE



Note: Figure shows the timetable of baseline and endline data collection activities. The various bars reflect the daily number of phone calls or individuals surveyed. The baseline involves three panel survey waves (step 0, wave I and wave II). These waves provide information to determine eligible individuals and to conduct pre-intervention randomization balance tests. The endline involves two panel waves (wave III and wave IV) that follow the first round of interventions deployment (Intervention I). Intervention I (the lumpsum and the first tranche of credit installment) spans October 27-29, 2020. Intervention II (the second tranche of credit installment) spans November 24-26, 2020.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Unable to Call, 7days 0-1	Unable to Call, COVID19 0-1	Borrow SOS Airtime 0-1	Seek Digital Loan 0-1
Treatment: Lumpsum	-0.282***	-0.119***	-0.184***	-0.024*
Credit (β_1)	(0.0239)	(0.0244)	(0.0200)	(0.0134)
Lee (2009) Attrition Bounds	[-0.108, -0.069]	[-0.038, 0.001]	[-0.088, -0.049]	$[-0.033 \ 0.005]$
Imbens-Manski (2004) CS	[-0.137, -0.042]	[-0.069, 0.030]	[-0.114, -0.029]	[-0.055, 0.0197]
<i>p</i> -value: Romano-Wolf Correction	0.009	0.009	0.009	0.138
Treatment: Installments	-0.439***	-0.225***	-0.265***	-0.046***
Credit (β_2)	(0.0225)	(0.0240)	(0.0191)	(0.0131)
Lee (2009) Attrition Bounds	[-0.310, -0.289]	[-0.197, -0.176]	[-0.190, -0.169]	[-0.056, -0.035]
Imbens-Manski (2004) CS	[-0.337, -0.268]	[-0.229, -0.148]	[-0.214, -0.153]	[-0.078, -0.022]
<i>p</i> -value: Romano-Wolf Correction	0.009	0.009	0.009	0.009
Observations	2,019	2,019	2,019	2,019
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Survey Date FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	Post-Double	Post-Double	Post-Double	Post-Double
	LASSO	LASSO	LASSO	LASSO
Mean of dep. variable (control)	0.458	0.415	0.265	0.073
<i>p</i> -value (test: $\beta_1 = \beta_2$)	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.008

Table 1: MITIGATION OF COMMUNICATION CONSTRAINTS

Note: District is the randomization strata. The double-post LASSO specification considers all individual controls, and individual district and survey date fixed effects in the possible control set. Controls include: individual's age, 0-1 indicator for whether married or not, 0-1 indicator for whether belongs to akan ethnic group or not, 0-1 indicator for whether self employed or not, household size, 0-1 indicator for whether operates in the informal sector, monthly personal income over an ordinal scale of 1 to 5, 0-1 indicator for whether attained junior high school (JHS) education, and individual's gender. Observations are at the subject \times date level. Clustered standard errors (at the individual level; the level of treatment) are reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01 (1% level), ** p<0.05 (5% level), * p<0.1 (10% level). 90% confidence sets (CS) around attrition bounds are reported in brackets. Romano-Wolf multiple hypothesis correction *p*-values (Romano and Wolf [2005]) reported for communication outcomes family (Unable to Call, 7days 0-1; Unable to Call, COVID19 0-1; Borrow SOS Airtime 0-1; Seek Digital Loan 0-1). Behaghel et al. (2015) attrition bounds (not reported) are tighter. See Appendix section V.7 for variable definitions.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Total (GHS) Expenditure	Threatened Partner 1-4	Hit Partner 1-4	$\log K10$	Severe Distress 0-1
Treatment: Lumpsum	10.60	-0.043	-0.019	-0.058***	0.012
$\mathbf{Credit} \ (\beta_1)$	(11.35)	(0.0374)	(0.0372)	(0.0144)	(0.0084)
Lee (2009) Attrition Bounds	[18.915, 16.809]	[-0.084, 0.031]	[-0.079, 0.035]	[-0.022, 0.008]	[-0.010, 0.028]
Imbens-Manski (2004) CS	[33.490, 30.054]	[-0.117, 0.072]	[-0.111, 0.075]	[-0.045, 0.027]	[-0.031, 0.039]
p-value: Romano-Wolf Correction	0.495	0.514	0.970	0.009	0.217
Treatment: Installments	17.76	-0.121***	-0.079**	-0.141***	-0.023***
Credit (β_2)	(11.82)	(0.0399)	(0.0383)	(0.0142)	(0.0060)
Lee (2009) Attrition Bounds	[-15.773, 7.861]	[-0.171, -0.086]	[-0.136, -0.052]	[-0.134, -0.119]	[-0.032, -0.031]
Imbens-Manski (2004) CS	[-32.233, 21.343]	[-0.254, -0.045]	[-0.219, -0.012]	[-0.153, -0.102]	[-0.040, -0.023]
p-value: Romano-Wolf Correction	0.752	0.019	0.148	0.009	0.019
Observations	2,019	2,019	2,019	2,019	2,019
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Survey Date FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	Post-Double	Post-Double	Post-Double	Post-Double	Post-Double
	LASSO	LASSO	LASSO	LASSO	LASSO
Mean of dep. variable (control)	219.573	1.247	1.166	2.704	0.152
<i>p</i> -value (test: $\beta_1 = \beta_2$)	0.703	0.023	0.116	0.000	0.000

Table 2: IMPACTS OF COMMUNICATION PROGRAMS ON WELL-BEING MEASURES

Note: District is the randomization strata. The double-post LASSO specification considers all individual controls, and individual district and survey date fixed effects in the possible control set. Controls include: individual's age, 0-1 indicator for whether married or not, 0-1 indicator for whether belongs to akan ethnic group or not, 0-1 indicator for whether self employed or not, household size, 0-1 indicator for whether operates in the informal sector, monthly personal income over an ordinal scale of 1 to 5, 0-1 indicator for whether attained junior high school (JHS) education, and individual's gender. Observations are at the subject \times date level. Clustered standard errors (at the individual level; the level of treatment) are reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01 (1% level), ** p<0.05 (5% level), * p<0.1 (10% level). 90% confidence sets (CS) around attrition bounds are reported in brackets. Romano-Wolf multiple hypothesis correction *p*-values (Romano and Wolf [2005]) reported separately for consumption expense outcomes family (Total (GHS) Expenditure; Food-In (GHS); Food-Out (GHS); Utilities (GHS); Personal care (GHS); Educ. (GHS); Health (GHS); Durables (GHS)), and for mental health and domestic violence outcomes family (Threatened Partner 1-4; Hit Partner 1-4; log K10; Severe Distress 0-1). Behaghel et al. (2015) attrition bounds (not reported) are tighter. See Appendix section V.7 for variable definitions.

V Appendix

V.1 Further Results – Tables and Figures

POOLED ENDLINE SURVEYS

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Unable to Ca	ll, 7days 0-1	Unable to Call,	COVID19 0-1	Borrow SOS	Airtime 0-1	Seek Digital	l Loan 0-1
Treatment: Communication	-0.371***	-0.357***	-0.194***	-0.172***	-0.226***	-0.221***	-0.0336***	-0.0347***
$\mathbf{Credit}(\beta)$	(0.0238)	(0.0214)	(0.0262)	(0.0215)	(0.0177)	(0.0185)	(0.0117)	(0.0119)
Observations	2,045	2,019	2,045	2,019	2,045	2,019	2,045	2,019
District FE	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Survey Date FE	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Controls	None	Post-Double	None	Post-Double	None	Post-Double	None	Post-Double
		LASSO		LASSO		LASSO		LASSO
Mean of dep. variable (control)	0.498	0.498	0.452	0.452	0.288	0.288	0.079	0.079
Lee (2009) Attrition Bounds	[-0.424, -0.363]		[-0.239, -0.178]		[-0.282, -0.221]		[-0.079, -0.030]	
Imbens-Manski (2004) CS	[-0.458, -0.335]		[-0.273, -0.148]		[-0.314, -0.197]		[-0.092, -0.015]	
<i>p</i> -value: Romano-Wolf Correction	0.009		0.009		0.009		0.029	

Table A1: MITIGATION OF COMMUNICATION CONSTRAINTS

Note: District is the randomization strata. The double-post LASSO specification considers all individual controls, and individual district and survey date fixed effects in the possible control set. Controls include: individual's age, 0-1 indicator for whether married or not, 0-1 indicator for whether belongs to akan ethnic group or not, 0-1 indicator for whether self employed or not, household size, 0-1 indicator for whether operates in the informal sector, monthly personal income over an ordinal scale of 1 to 5, 0-1 indicator for whether attained junior high school (JHS) education, and individual's gender. Observations are at the individual × date level. Clustered standard errors (at the individual level; the level of treatment) are reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01 (1% level), ** p<0.05 (5% level), * p<0.1 (10% level). 90% confidence sets (CS) around attrition bounds are reported in brackets. Romano-Wolf multiple hypothesis correction *p*-values (Romano and Wolf [2005]) reported for communication outcomes family (Unable to Call, 7days 0-1; Unable to Call, COVID19 0-1; Borrow SOS Airtime 0-1; Seek Digital Loan 0-1). Behaghel et al. (2015) attrition bounds (not reported) are tighter.

	(
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Total (GHS)	Food-In	Food-Out	Utilities	Personal care	Educ.	Health	Durables
	Expenditure	(GHS)	(GHS)	(GHS)	(GHS)	(GHS)	(GHS)	(GHS)
Treatment: Communication	12.92	-6.100	2.079	4.819***	1.776	1.125	-4.254	8.575***
Credit (β)	(9.934)	(5.783)	(3.790)	(1.707)	(2.102)	(2.006)	(3.342)	(2.702)
Observations	2,019	2,019	2,019	2,019	2,019	2,019	2,019	2,019
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Survey Date FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	Post-Double	Post-Double	Post-Double	Post-Double	Post-Double	Post-Double	Post-Double	Post-Double
	LASSO	LASSO	LASSO	LASSO	LASSO	LASSO	LASSO	LASSO
Mean of dep. variable (control)	219.1	125.2	45.95	8.297	8.299	6.943	21.98	2.306
Lee (2009) Attrition Bounds	[-26.423, 24.892]	[-22.275, 0.426]	[-9.990, 7.319]	[-3.339, 5.251]	[-2.645, 3.171]	[-6.296, 1.679]	[-13.572, -1.858]	[-1.425, 9.093]
Imbens-Manski (2004) CS	[-40.599, 37.968]	[-29.700, 7.406]	[-15.275, 11.894]	[-5.524, 7.454]	[-4.842, 5.434]	[-8.295, 4.307]	[-17.586, 2.486]	[-3.177, 11.415]
<i>p</i> -value: Romano-Wolf Correction	0.564	0.534	0.564	0.138	0.415	0.564	0.564	0.009

Table A2: IMPACTS OF COMMUNICATION PROGRAMS ON CONSUMPTION EXPENSES

Note: District is the randomization strata. The double-post LASSO specification considers all individual controls, and individual district and survey date fixed effects in the possible control set. Controls include: individual's age, 0-1 indicator for whether married or not, 0-1 indicator for whether belongs to akan ethnic group or not, 0-1 indicator for whether self employed or not, household size, 0-1 indicator for whether operates in the informal sector, monthly personal income over an ordinal scale of 1 to 5, 0-1 indicator for whether attained junior high school (JHS) education, and individual's gender. Observations are at the subject \times date level. Clustered standard errors (at the individual level; the level of treatment) are reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01 (1% level), ** p<0.05 (5% level), * p<0.1 (10% level). 90% confidence sets (CS) around attrition bounds are reported in brackets. Romano-Wolf multiple hypothesis correction *p*-values (Romano and Wolf [2005]) reported for consumption expense outcomes family (Total (GHS) Expenditure; Food-In (GHS); Food-Out (GHS); Utilities (GHS); Personal care (GHS); Educ. (GHS); Health (GHS); Durables (GHS)). Behaghel et al. (2015) attrition bounds (not reported) are tighter.

Table A3: Impacts of communication programs on mental health and domestic violence

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Threatened Partner 1-4	Hit Partner 1-4	$\log K10$	Severe Distress 0-1
Treatment: Communication	-0.077**	-0.044	-0.098***	-0.004
$\mathbf{Credit}(\beta)$	(0.0328)	(0.0320)	(0.0128)	(0.0065)
Observations	2,019	2,019	2,019	2,019
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Survey Date FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	Post-Double	Post-Double	Post-Double	Post-Double
	LASSO	LASSO	LASSO	LASSO
Mean of dep. variable (control)	1.247	1.166	2.704	0.101
Lee (2009) Attrition Bounds	[-0.197, -0.056]	[-0.158, -0.017]	[-0.147, -0.112]	[-0.025, -0.003]
Imbens-Manski (2004) CS	[-0.238, -0.014]	[-0.198, 0.023]	[-0.168, -0.093]	[-0.033, 0.006]
<i>p</i> -value: Romano-Wolf Correction	0.128	0.633	0.009	0.633

Note: District is the randomization strata. The double-post LASSO specification considers all individual controls, and individual district and survey date fixed effects in the possible control set. Controls include: individual's age, 0-1 indicator for whether married or not, 0-1 indicator for whether belongs to akan ethnic group or not, 0-1 indicator for whether self employed or not, household size, 0-1 indicator for whether operates in the informal sector, monthly personal income over an ordinal scale of 1 to 5, 0-1 indicator for whether attained junior high school (JHS) education, and individual's gender. Observations are at the subject × date level. Clustered standard errors (at the individual level; the level of treatment) are reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01 (1% level), ** p<0.05 (5% level), * p<0.1 (10% level). 90% confidence sets (CS) around attrition bounds are reported in brackets. Romano-Wolf multiple hypothesis correction *p*-values (Romano and Wolf [2005]) reported for mental health and domestic violence outcomes family (Threatened Partner 1-4; Hit Partner 1-4; log K10; Severe Distress 0-1). Behaghel et al. (2015) attrition bounds (not reported) are tighter.

EFFECTS OVER TRAJECTORY



Figure A1: MITIGATION OF COMMUNICATION CONSTRAINTS

Note: Estimates are from a model that includes randomization strata (district) fixed effects, survey date fixed effects, and double-post LASSO specification which considers all individual controls, and individual district and survey date fixed effects in the possible control set. Controls include: individual's age, 0-1 indicator for whether married or not, 0-1 indicator for whether belongs to akan ethnic group or not, 0-1 indicator for whether self employed or not, household size, 0-1 indicator for whether operates in the informal sector, monthly personal income over an ordinal scale of 1 to 5, 0-1 indicator for whether attained junior high school (JHS) education, and individual's gender. Observations are at the subject × date level. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level (the level of treatment). 90% confidence intervals are displayed around the estimates. Table of coefficients and standard errors available upon request.



Figure A2: IMPACTS OF COMMUNICATION PROGRAMS ON WELL-BEING MEASURES

Note: Estimates are from a model that includes randomization strata (district) fixed effects, survey date fixed effects, and double-post LASSO specification which considers all individual controls, and individual district and survey date fixed effects in the possible control set. Controls include: individual's age, 0-1 indicator for whether married or not, 0-1 indicator for whether belongs to akan ethnic group or not, 0-1 indicator for whether self employed or not, household size, 0-1 indicator for whether operates in the informal sector, monthly personal income over an ordinal scale of 1 to 5, 0-1 indicator for whether attained junior high school (JHS) education, and individual's gender. Observations are at the subject \times date level. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level (the level of treatment). 90% confidence intervals are displayed around the estimates. Table of coefficients and standard errors available upon request.

EFFECTS OVER TRAJECTORY



Figure A3: MITIGATION OF COMMUNICATION CONSTRAINTS

Note: Estimates are from a model that includes randomization strata (district) fixed effects, survey date fixed effects, and double-post LASSO specification which considers all individual controls, and individual district and survey date fixed effects in the possible control set. Controls include: individual's age, 0-1 indicator for whether married or not, 0-1 indicator for whether belongs to akan ethnic group or not, 0-1 indicator for whether self employed or not, household size, 0-1 indicator for whether operates in the informal sector, monthly personal income over an ordinal scale of 1 to 5, 0-1 indicator for whether attained junior high school (JHS) education, and individual's gender. Observations are at the subject \times date level. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level (the level of treatment). 90% confidence intervals are displayed around the estimates. Table of coefficients and standard errors available upon request.



Figure A4: IMPACTS OF COMMUNICATION PROGRAMS ON WELL-BEING

Note: Estimates are from a model that includes randomization strata (district) fixed effects, survey date fixed effects, and double-post LASSO specification which considers all individual controls, and individual district and survey date fixed effects in the possible control set. Controls include: individual's age, 0-1 indicator for whether married or not, 0-1 indicator for whether belongs to akan ethnic group or not, 0-1 indicator for whether self employed or not, household size, 0-1 indicator for whether operates in the informal sector, monthly personal income over an ordinal scale of 1 to 5, 0-1 indicator for whether attained junior high school (JHS) education, and individual's gender. Observations are at the subject \times date level. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level (the level of treatment). 90% confidence intervals are displayed around the estimates. Table of coefficients and standard errors available upon request.

HETEROGENEITY IN TREATMENT EFFECTS

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Total (GHS) Expenditure	Threatened Partner 1-4	Hit Partner 1-4	log K10	Severe Distress 0-1
Treatment: Communication	19.05	0.023	0.009	-0.082***	0.001
\mathbf{Credit}	(16.31)	(0.0479)	(0.0486)	(0.0202)	(0.0097)
<i>p</i> -value: Romano-Wolf Correction	0.970	0.009	0.207	0.009	0.841
Poverty Likelihood	-0.730*	0.002	0.001	0.001	-0.001
	(0.394)	(0.0018)	(0.0018)	(0.0005)	(0.0003)
<i>p</i> -value: Romano-Wolf Correction	0.009	NE	NE	NE	NE
Credit x Poverty	-0.305	-0.004**	-0.002	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.477)	(0.0020)	(0.0020)	(0.0006)	(0.0003)
<i>p</i> -value: Romano-Wolf Correction	1.000	0.019	0.128	0.009	0.356
Observations	2,019	2,019	2,019	2,019	2,019
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Survey Date FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	Post-Double	Post-Double	Post-Double	Post-Double	Post-Double
	LASSO	LASSO	LASSO	LASSO	LASSO
Mean of dep. variable (control)	219.5	1.247	1.166	2.704	0.101

Table A4: IMPACTS OF COMMUNICATION PROGRAMS ON WELL-BEING BY POVERTY

Note: District is the randomization strata. The double-post LASSO specification considers all individual controls, and individual district and survey date fixed effects in the possible control set. Controls include: individual's age, 0-1 indicator for whether married or not, 0-1 indicator for whether belongs to akan ethnic group or not, 0-1 indicator for whether self employed or not, household size, 0-1 indicator for whether operates in the informal sector, monthly personal income over an ordinal scale of 1 to 5, 0-1 indicator for whether attained junior high school (JHS) education, and individual's gender. Observations are at the subject × date level. Clustered standard errors (at the individual level; the level of treatment) are reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01 (1% level), ** p<0.05 (5% level), * p<0.1 (10% level). Romano-Wolf multiple hypothesis correction *p*-values (Romano and Wolf [2005]) reported separately for consumption expense outcomes family (Total (GHS) Expenditure; Food-In (GHS); Food-Out (GHS); Utilities (GHS); Personal care (GHS); Educ. (GHS); Health (GHS); Durables (GHS)), and for mental health and domestic violence outcomes family (Threatened Partner 1-4; Hit Partner 1-4; log K10; Severe Distress 0-1). NE denotes not estimable.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Total (GHS) Expenditure	Threatened Partner 1-4	Hit Partner 1-4	$\log K10$	Severe Distress 0-1
Treatment: Communication	-25.10	-0.072	-0.099	-0.008	0.001
\mathbf{Credit}	(26.17)	(0.0680)	(0.0669)	(0.0317)	(0.0096)
p-value: Romano-Wolf Correction	0.990	0.297	0.297	0.138	0.237
Informal Sector 0-1	-54.66**	0.126^{*}	0.069	0.093***	NE
	(25.93)	(0.0731)	(0.0682)	(0.0317)	
$p\mbox{-value:}$ Romano-Wolf Correction	0.069	0.277	0.425	0.019	
Credit x Informal 0-1	44.95	-0.001	0.064	-0.107***	NE
	(28.63)	(0.0818)	(0.0799)	(0.0348)	
$p\mbox{-value:}$ Romano-Wolf Correction	1.000	0.831	0.673	0.099	
Observations	2,019	2,019	2,019	2,019	2,019
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Survey Date FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	Post-Double	Post-Double	Post-Double	Post-Double	Post-Double
	LASSO	LASSO	LASSO	LASSO	LASSO
Mean of dep. variable (control)	219.5	1.247	1.166	2.704	0.101

Table A5: IMPACTS OF COMMUNICATION PROGRAMS ON WELL-BEING BY INFORMALITY

Note: District is the randomization strata. The double-post LASSO specification considers all individual controls, and individual district and survey date fixed effects in the possible control set. Controls include: individual's age, 0-1 indicator for whether married or not, 0-1 indicator for whether belongs to akan ethnic group or not, 0-1 indicator for whether self employed or not, household size, 0-1 indicator for whether operates in the informal sector, monthly personal income over an ordinal scale of 1 to 5, 0-1 indicator for whether attained junior high school (JHS) education, and individual's gender. Observations are at the subject × date level. Clustered standard errors (at the individual level; the level of treatment) are reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01 (1% level), ** p<0.05 (5% level), * p<0.1 (10% level). NE denotes not estimable, which occurs due to insufficient sample from individuals in the informal sector with severe mental distress experiences. Romano-Wolf multiple hypothesis correction *p*-values (Romano and Wolf [2005]) reported separately for consumption expense outcomes family (Total (GHS) Expenditure; Food-In (GHS); Food-Out (GHS); Utilities (GHS); Personal care (GHS); Educ. (GHS); Health (GHS); Durables (GHS)), and for mental health and domestic violence outcomes family (Threatened Partner 1-4; Hit Partner 1-4; log K10; Severe Distress 0-1).

	(1)	(2)	(2)		(~)
		(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Total (GHS) Expenditure	Threatened Partner 1-4	Hit Partner 1-4	$\log K10$	Severe Distress 0-1
Treatment: Communication	11.61	-0.088**	-0.063*	-0.089***	-0.002
Credit	(11.04)	(0.0360)	(0.0351)	(0.0139)	(0.0022)
	0.683	0.168	(0.0331) 0.712	0.009	0.712
<i>p</i> -value: Romano-Wolf Correction	0.085	0.108	0.712	0.009	0.712
Female 0-1	1.489	-0.062	-0.142*	0.021	0.002
	(23.09)	(0.0776)	(0.0751)	(0.0344)	(0.0182)
$p\mbox{-value:}$ Romano-Wolf Correction	0.940	0.861	0.861	0.257	0.861
Credit x Female 0-1	9.465	0.062	0.132	-0.063	-0.012
	(27.49)	(0.0939)	(0.0917)	(0.0406)	(0.0225)
$p\mbox{-value:}$ Romano-Wolf Correction	0.930	0.920	0.920	0.118	0.920
Observations	2,019	2,019	2,019	2,019	2,019
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Survey Date FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	Post-Double	Post-Double	Post-Double	Post-Double	Post-Double
	LASSO	LASSO	LASSO	LASSO	LASSO
Mean of dep. variable (control)	219.5	1.247	1.166	2.704	0.101

Table A6: IMPACTS OF COMMUNICATION PROGRAMS ON WELL-BEING BY GENDER

Note: District is the randomization strata. The double-post LASSO specification considers all individual controls, and individual district and survey date fixed effects in the possible control set. Controls include: individual's age, 0-1 indicator for whether married or not, 0-1 indicator for whether belongs to akan ethnic group or not, 0-1 indicator for whether self employed or not, household size, 0-1 indicator for whether operates in the informal sector, monthly personal income over an ordinal scale of 1 to 5, 0-1 indicator for whether attained junior high school (JHS) education, and individual's gender. Observations are at the subject × date level. Clustered standard errors (at the individual level; the level of treatment) are reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01 (1% level), ** p<0.05 (5% level), * p<0.1 (10% level). Romano-Wolf multiple hypothesis correction *p*-values (Romano and Wolf [2005]) reported separately for consumption expense outcomes family (Total (GHS) Expenditure; Food-In (GHS); Food-Out (GHS); Utilities (GHS); Personal care (GHS); Educ. (GHS); Health (GHS); Durables (GHS)), and for mental health and domestic violence outcomes family (Threatened Partner 1-4; Hit Partner 1-4; log K10; Severe Distress 0-1).

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Total (GHS) Expenditure	Threatened Partner 1-4		$\log K10$	Severe Distress 0-1
Treatment: Communication	0.466	-0.085**	-0.050	-0.092***	-0.006
Credit	(11.05)	(0.0386)	(0.0377)	(0.0141)	(0.0072)
<i>p</i> -value: Romano-Wolf Correction	0.802	0.495	0.86	0.009	0.673
Locked-Down 0-1	157.3***	-0.060*	-0.036	0.105***	0.001
	(55.81)	(0.0341)	(0.0321)	(0.0392)	(0.0067)
$p\mbox{-value:}$ Romano-Wolf Correction	0.029	NE	NE	NE	NE
Credit x Locked-down 0-1	64.46**	0.040	0.029	-0.029	0.015
	(25.07)	(0.0658)	(0.0661)	(0.0335)	(0.0185)
$p\mbox{-value:}$ Romano-Wolf Correction	0.267	0.009	0.039	0.029	0.534
Observations	2,019	2,019	2,019	2,019	2,019
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Survey Date FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	Post-Double	Post-Double	Post-Double	Post-Double	Post-Double
	LASSO	LASSO	LASSO	LASSO	LASSO
Mean of dep. variable (control)	219.5	1.247	1.166	2.704	0.101

Table A7: IMPACTS OF COMMUNICATION PROGRAMS ON WELL-BEING BY LOCKED-DOWN

Note: District is the randomization strata. The double-post LASSO specification considers all individual controls, and individual district and survey date fixed effects in the possible control set. Controls include: individual's age, 0-1 indicator for whether married or not, 0-1 indicator for whether belongs to akan ethnic group or not, 0-1 indicator for whether self employed or not, household size, 0-1 indicator for whether operates in the informal sector, monthly personal income over an ordinal scale of 1 to 5, 0-1 indicator for whether attained junior high school (JHS) education, and individual's gender. Observations are at the subject × date level. Clustered standard errors (at the individual level; the level of treatment) are reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01 (1% level), ** p<0.05 (5% level), * p<0.1 (10% level). Romano-Wolf multiple hypothesis correction *p*-values (Romano and Wolf [2005]) reported separately for consumption expense outcomes family (Total (GHS) Expenditure; Food-In (GHS); Food-Out (GHS); Utilities (GHS); Personal care (GHS); Educ. (GHS); Health (GHS); Durables (GHS)), and for mental health and domestic violence outcomes family (Threatened Partner 1-4; Hit Partner 1-4; log K10; Severe Distress 0-1). NE denotes not estimable.
V.2 Global Review of Communication Programs – Motivating Evidence I

Table A8: A GLOBAL REVIEW OF COVID-19 COMMUNICATION INTERVENTIONS

Setting	Entity	Details and source(s)	Date started	Date ended
United States	Government FCC	*FCC launched the program Keep Americans Connected in which communications companies agreed on not terminating the internet services of Americans in case they do not keep up to date with payments of internet and telephone bills in response to the COVID-19 crisis. The companies opened their Wi-fi hotspots for the population.	03/13/2020	06/30/2020
		*FCC also maintained other communication initiatives during the pandemic such as granting ATT to use additional spectrum in Puerto Rico and Virgin Islands in order to improve and expand the internet connectedness in these territories.	03/26/2020	Ongoing
		*FCC waived temporarily its rules to Inteliquent to Zoom and WebEx in order to stimulate and help consumers who now need strictly in these services to study and work. Source: https://www.fcc.gov/keep-americans-connected	03/27/2020	06/01/2020
	Companies	ATT Inc.: *Provided free 10GB of internet data per month for 60 days as a temporary relief to eligible customers to be able to stay connected during the difficult times, starting March 27, 2020. Source: https://about.att.com/newsroom/2020/covid_19_att_prepaid.html	03/27/2020	MM/DD/YYY
		Comcast Corp.: Provided essential internet and mobile services without charge to low-income families, including seniors, veterans and people with disabilities in the United States. Source: https://corporate.com/covid-19	MM/DD/YYY	Ongoing
		Amazon: *Donated 8,200 laptops to students who attend public schools in Seattle and 4,000 laptops for	04/06/2020	-
		high school students across the US through the Amazon Future Engineer program. *Made many videos on Amazon Prime free for anyone during the stay at home orders period. Content included cartoons and family friendly movies. In addition to that, Amazon made many of its books free for the public who could download them as PDFs. Source: https://www.aboutamazon.com/news/company-news/amazons-covid-19-blog-updates-on-how-were-responding-to-the-crisis	DD/03/2020	Ongoing
		Microsoft: *Microsoft has supported the local education of Washington state during the Pandemic by making the Virtual Classroom and Teams available for free. It has also created training sessions for teachers of the state and helped schools in the districts to increase their phone lines to accommodate more parents and studentsâ phone calls. *Microsoft is also working with the Washington stateâs government to build more broadband spots around the state to help more people have access to the internet through the Airban initiative. The company also brought emergency coverage to 29 school districts of the state. Source: https://news.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2020/04/11/microsoft-covid-19-vashington-state/	03/16/2020	Ongoing
Ghana	Government	The Government reduced the Communication Service Tax (CST) from 9pct to 5pct which reflected a reduction in the cost of mobile talk time and data purchases, effective September 15, 2020 in response to COVID-19	09/15/2020	Ongoing
Brazil	Government	Source: https://gra.gov.gh/news/amendments-to-the-communications-service-tax-act-2008-act-754/ *The government signed an agreement with Cisco in late May in order to launch the program âBrasil Digital e Inclusivoâ (Digital and Inclusive Brazil) that has as its goal to accelerate the technological and digital development of the country. As a response to the COVID-19 crisis, the program aims to facilitate and accelerate telemedicine in the country.	05/27/2020	Ongoing
		*13.6 million of Brazilians live in the âfavelasă (slums) and usually have restricted access to technology and communication systems. In this way, in order to bring awareness about the pandemic to the most vulnerable in Brazil, NGOs, journalists and activists have used alternative methods of communication in the population.	DD/03/2020	Ongoing
		*The Brazilian government launched a program to distribute technological equipment and access to the internet for students of the public school system in the country. The initiative will cost approximately R2.5billionsandtheBrazilianAgencyofCommunications(Anatel)willberesponsibletoimplementitand distribute the materials. Source: https://wewsrom.cisco.com/feature-content?type=webcontent&articleId=2076852	09/18/2020	Ongoing
Ecuador	Government	Similar to the most Favelas communities in Brazil, Ecuador also has a significant population that has limited access to technology and communication channels. These are indigenous communities in which the government and other organizations such as UNESCO have approached in regards to the pandemic in a very strategic way. They have been taking advantage of the communication channels that the indigenous communities have even though they are very scarce. Webpages directed to these communities that address COVID were created, audios and videos were produced by UNESCO and the organizations as well as others have been conducting cultural activities with the communities in order to bring awareness and information about the pandemic.	03/DD/2020	Ongoing
Global	Comment	Source: https://en.unesco.org/news/media-and-communications-indigenous-peoples-pandemic	11/26/2020	11/27/2020
Global /United States	Company- Zoom	ZoomTogether Zoom removed the 40 minutes time limit for free accounts during Thanksgiving as an initiative to help families and friends communicate during the holiday season even if they were distant to each other During Thanksgiving Day, anyone was able to make video conferences longer than 40 minutes through Zoom without being interrupted.	11/20/2020	11/27/2020

Table A9: CONT'D: A GLOBAL REVIEW OF COVID-19 COMMUNICATION INTERVENTIONS

Setting	Entity	Details and source(s)	Date started	Date ended
Global	Company- Google	*Google has donated USD10 million for Distance Learning Fund that supports organizations across the globe which help students who have had to adapt to online learning but do not have access to resources to do so	03/DD/2020	-
		*Google has also partnered with many universities around the world and distributed AI tools and mechanisms to help them keep track of the development of COVID-19 in the world and spread information about it for all.	DD/03/2020	Ongoing
		Source 1: https://www.google.org/covid-19/#distance-learning Source 2: https://blog.google/outreach-initiatives/google-org/google-supports-covid-19-ai-and-data-analytics-projects/		
Global	Company- Transperfect	*Transperfect has been translating and delivering materials and information about COVID-19 across the globe. The work has been so helpful that the company won the International Business Award for COVID-19 Communication Initiatives.	DD/03/2020	Ongoing
		*The company produced videos of COVID-19 prevention tips in more than 11 languages and personalized it for companies for free.		
		Source: https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/transperfect-wins-international-business-award-for-covid-19-communications-initiatives-301134747.html		
Europe and Companies- United States Netflix, Youtube, Streaming servic	Netflix,	These companies have been slowing down and decreasing the streaming quality of their videos since March in Europe and also in the US. The initiative is an attempt to help with the internet traffic and higher latency and packet loss caused by the high usage of the internet by households after stay at home orders took place in Europe and in the US.	03/DD/2020	Ongoing
		Source 1: https://www.cnn.com/2020/03/19/tech/metflix-internet-overload-eu/index.html Source 2: https://latest-news-viral.blogspot.com/2020/03/streaming-in-time-of-covid-19-youtube.html		
Global /India	Company- Facebook	*Facebook has been partnering with governments in order to spread accurate information about the pandemic. An interesting and important partnership was with Indiaâs government that has been relying a lot on social media in order to spread awareness and information about COVID-19. Other than social media, Indian local governments have also developed and used apps that monitor COVID-19 in the country, by using Information and Communications Technology (ICT) and Artificial Intelligence (AI).	03/DD/2020	Ongoing
		*These apps are helpful and very informative, but a significant part of the population in India does not have access to the internet which shows how the âDigital Divideâ in India has deepened the social, health and educational inequalities in the country.		
		Source 1: https://about.fb.com/news/2020/11/coronavirus/; Source 2: https://www.boc.com/news/world-aaia-india-53471749 Source 3: https://www.usforum.org/agenda/2020/10/how-covid-19-deepens-the-digital-education-divide-in-india/ Source 4: https://academiccommons.columbia.edu/doi/10.7916/d8-bbw6-yt70 Download the paper to see all the apps created Source 5: ttps://www.weforum.org/agenda/2020/10/how-covid-19-deepens-the-digital-education-divide-in-india/		

Figure A5: COMMUNICATION PROGRAMS

Saturday, September 12, 2020

Dear Valued Customer, In line with Government's reduction of the Communications Service Tax (CST) from 9% to 5%, effective 15th September, your talk time and data purchases will reflect the tax reduction. Keep safe and remember to wear your face mask safely everywhere you go. # Wearitforme.



10:45 AM

V.4 Administrative Data – Motivating Evidence II



Note: Mobile financial transaction data from a major local telecommunications company and based on 694,695 transactions (2,0751 random

unique subscribers). As displayed, average purchase (total and total without airtime + data) shown in the left vertical axis with solid lines, while average purchase for airtime-related activities (airtime + data only) shown in the right vertical axis with a dash line. Overall market activity decreased following the onset of the pandemic, but demand for mobile airtime-related activities sharply increased over the period. Pre-COVID-19, these two purchases (average totals versus average airtime) look similar.

V.5 Balance and Attrition

Communication Measures (Wave 1)Unable to call in past 7days 0-10.0Unable to call due to COVID19 0-10.1Borrow airtime 0-1 (Wave 2)0.1Seek digital loan 0-1 (Wave 2)0.0Well-being Measures (Wave 1)00Total Expenditure (GHS)129Food expenses inside home (GHS)129Utilities expenses (GHS)00Utilities expenses (GHS)00Health expenses (GHS)00Utables expenses (GHS)<	647*** 0.026) 684*** 0.027) 296*** 0.0257) 085*** 0.015) .802*** 4.197) (-0.027 (0.035) -0.018 (0.037) 0.030 (0.036) 0.002 (0.023) 24.668 (33.046) -3.688	-0.008 (0.036) -0.058 (0.037) 0.039 (0.036) 0.004 (0.022) -7.345
Unable to call in past 7days 0-10.6Unable to call due to COVID19 0-10.3Borrow airtime 0-1 (Wave 2)0.3Seek digital loan 0-1 (Wave 2)0.6Well-being Measures (Wave 1)0.6Total Expenditure (GHS)319(2Food expenses inside home (GHS)129(4(6Utilities expenses (GHS)7.6(5(7.6(6(7.6(7(7.6(8(7.6(9(7.6(10(7.6(11(7.6(12(7.6(13(7.6(14(7.6(15(7.6(15(7.6(16(7.6(17(7.6(18(7.6(19(7.6(19(7.6(11(7.6(12(7.6(13(7.6(14(7.6(15(7.6(16(7.6(17(7.6(18(7.6(19(7.6(19(7.6(19(7.6(11(7.6(12(7.6(13(7.6(14(7.6(15(7.6(16(7.6(17(7.6(18(7.6(19(7.6(19(7.6(11(7.6(12(7.6(13(7.6(14(7.6(15(7.6(16(7.6(17(7.6 <tr< th=""><th>0.026) 584*** 0.027) 296*** 0.0257) 085*** 0.015) .802*** 4.197) (</th><th>$\begin{array}{c} (0.035) \\ -0.018 \\ (0.037) \\ 0.030 \\ (0.036) \\ 0.002 \\ (0.023) \end{array}$ $\begin{array}{c} 24.668 \\ (33.046) \end{array}$</th><th>$\begin{array}{c} (0.036) \\ -0.058 \\ (0.037) \\ 0.039 \\ (0.036) \\ 0.004 \\ (0.022) \end{array}$</th></tr<>	0.026) 584*** 0.027) 296*** 0.0257) 085*** 0.015) .802*** 4.197) ($\begin{array}{c} (0.035) \\ -0.018 \\ (0.037) \\ 0.030 \\ (0.036) \\ 0.002 \\ (0.023) \end{array}$ $\begin{array}{c} 24.668 \\ (33.046) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} (0.036) \\ -0.058 \\ (0.037) \\ 0.039 \\ (0.036) \\ 0.004 \\ (0.022) \end{array}$
Unable to call due to COVID19 0-10.3Borrow airtime 0-1 (Wave 2)0.3Seek digital loan 0-1 (Wave 2)0.6Well-being Measures (Wave 1)0.6Total Expenditure (GHS)319(2Food expenses inside home (GHS)129(6(6Food expenses outside home (GHS)(6Utilities expenses (GHS)(7(1(1Personal care expenses (GHS)(2(26(3(2Utilities expenses (GHS)(2(4(2(5(6(6(1(7(1(8(2(9(3(1(4(2(3(3(4(4(4(5(4(6(5(7(6(8(6(9(6(10(2(2(3(3(4(4(4(5(4(6(5(7(6(8(7(9(7(10(6(11(7(12(7(13(7(14(7(15(7(15(7(16(7(17(7(18(7(19(7(19(7(11(7(12(7(13(7(14(7(15(7(15(7 <td< td=""><td>0.026) 584*** 0.027) 296*** 0.0257) 085*** 0.015) .802*** 4.197) (</td><td>$\begin{array}{c} (0.035) \\ -0.018 \\ (0.037) \\ 0.030 \\ (0.036) \\ 0.002 \\ (0.023) \end{array}$ $\begin{array}{c} 24.668 \\ (33.046) \end{array}$</td><td>$\begin{array}{c} (0.036) \\ -0.058 \\ (0.037) \\ 0.039 \\ (0.036) \\ 0.004 \\ (0.022) \end{array}$</td></td<>	0.026) 584*** 0.027) 296*** 0.0257) 085*** 0.015) .802*** 4.197) ($\begin{array}{c} (0.035) \\ -0.018 \\ (0.037) \\ 0.030 \\ (0.036) \\ 0.002 \\ (0.023) \end{array}$ $\begin{array}{c} 24.668 \\ (33.046) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} (0.036) \\ -0.058 \\ (0.037) \\ 0.039 \\ (0.036) \\ 0.004 \\ (0.022) \end{array}$
Unable to call due to COVID19 0-10.1Borrow airtime 0-1 (Wave 2)0.1Seek digital loan 0-1 (Wave 2)0.0Well-being Measures (Wave 1)0.1Total Expenditure (GHS)319Food expenses inside home (GHS)129(d129Food expenses outside home (GHS)(dUtilities expenses (GHS)(dPersonal care expenses (GHS)6.9(d(dHealth expenses (GHS)6.9(d(dDurables expenses (GHS)(d	584*** 5.027) 296*** .0257) 585*** 0.015) .802*** 4.197) (.899***	$\begin{array}{c} -0.018 \\ (0.037) \\ 0.030 \\ (0.036) \\ 0.002 \\ (0.023) \end{array}$ $\begin{array}{c} 24.668 \\ (33.046) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} -0.058\\ (0.037)\\ 0.039\\ (0.036)\\ 0.004\\ (0.022) \end{array}$
Borrow airtime 0-1 (Wave 2) 0.5 (0)Seek digital loan 0-1 (Wave 2) 0.0 (0)Well-being Measures (Wave 1) Total Expenditure (GHS) 319 (2)Food expenses inside home (GHS) 129 (6)Food expenses outside home (GHS) $49.$ (6)Utilities expenses (GHS) 7.0 (1)Personal care expenses (GHS) 6.9 (1)Health expenses (GHS) 6.9 (1)Urables expenses (GHS) 6.9 (1) (2) (2) (2)Durables expenses (GHS) 6.9 (1) (3) (2) (2) (4) (2) (3) (4) (2) (4) <td>0.027) 296*** .0257) 085*** 0.015) .802*** 4.197) (.899***</td> <td>$\begin{array}{c} (0.037) \\ 0.030 \\ (0.036) \\ 0.002 \\ (0.023) \end{array}$ $\begin{array}{c} 24.668 \\ (33.046) \end{array}$</td> <td>$\begin{array}{c} (0.037) \\ 0.039 \\ (0.036) \\ 0.004 \\ (0.022) \end{array}$</td>	0.027) 296*** .0257) 085*** 0.015) .802*** 4.197) (.899***	$\begin{array}{c} (0.037) \\ 0.030 \\ (0.036) \\ 0.002 \\ (0.023) \end{array}$ $\begin{array}{c} 24.668 \\ (33.046) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} (0.037) \\ 0.039 \\ (0.036) \\ 0.004 \\ (0.022) \end{array}$
Borrow airtime 0-1 (Wave 2)0.1Seek digital loan 0-1 (Wave 2)0.0Well-being Measures (Wave 1)(0Total Expenditure (GHS)319(2Food expenses inside home (GHS)129Food expenses outside home (GHS)49.(4Utilities expenses (GHS)(1Personal care expenses (GHS)(1Education expenses (GHS)(1Health expenses (GHS)(2Durables expenses (GHS)(3(4(4(5(4)(6(5)(7(1(8(1)(9(1)(10(1)(11(1)(12(1)(13(1)(14(1)(15(1)(15(1)(16(1)(17(1)(18(11)(19(11)(11(12)(12)(11)(13)(12)(14)(12)(15)(12)(16)(11)(17)(12)(18)(12)(19)(12)(11)(12)(12)(12)(13)(12)(14)(12)(15)(12)(16)(12)(17)(12)(18)(12)(19)(12)(11)(12)(12)(12)(13)(12)(14)(12)(15)(12)(16)(12) <td< td=""><td>$\begin{array}{l} 296^{***} \\ .0257) \\ .085^{***} \\ .0.015) \\ .802^{***} \\ 4.197) \\ .899^{***} \end{array}$</td><td>0.030 (0.036) 0.002 (0.023) 24.668 (33.046)</td><td>$\begin{array}{c} 0.039\\ (0.036)\\ 0.004\\ (0.022) \end{array}$</td></td<>	$\begin{array}{l} 296^{***} \\ .0257) \\ .085^{***} \\ .0.015) \\ .802^{***} \\ 4.197) \\ .899^{***} \end{array}$	0.030 (0.036) 0.002 (0.023) 24.668 (33.046)	$\begin{array}{c} 0.039\\ (0.036)\\ 0.004\\ (0.022) \end{array}$
Seek digital loan 0-1 (Wave 2)0.0Well-being Measures (Wave 1)(1)Total Expenditure (GHS)319(2)Food expenses inside home (GHS)129(4)(2)Food expenses outside home (GHS)49.(4)(4)Utilities expenses (GHS)7.0(5)(1)Personal care expenses (GHS)(2)(6)(1)Health expenses (GHS)(2)(6)(1)Utilities expenses (GHS)(2)(1)(2)(2)(3)(3)(4)(4)(4)(5)(6)(6)(1)(7)(1)(7)(1)(8)(2)(9)(1)(1)(2)(1)(2)(2)(1)(3)(2)(4)(2)(5)(2)(6)(1)(7)(2)(8)(2)(9)(1)(1)(2)(1)(2)(2)(1)(3)(2)(4)(2)(5)(2)(6)(2)(7)(2)(8)(2)(9)(2)(1)(2)(2)(3)(3)(3)(4)(4)(5)(4)(6)(4)(7)(4)(7)(4)(7)(4)(7)(4)(7)(4) </td <td>.0257))85***).015) .802*** 4.197) (.899***</td> <td>$(0.036) \\ 0.002 \\ (0.023) \\ 24.668 \\ (33.046)$</td> <td>(0.036) 0.004 (0.022)</td>	.0257))85***).015) .802*** 4.197) (.899***	$(0.036) \\ 0.002 \\ (0.023) \\ 24.668 \\ (33.046)$	(0.036) 0.004 (0.022)
Seek digital loan 0-1 (Wave 2)0.0Well-being Measures (Wave 1)(1)Total Expenditure (GHS)319(2)Food expenses inside home (GHS)(2)Food expenses outside home (GHS)129(4)(4)Utilities expenses (GHS)(4)(4)(4)(5)(4)Education expenses (GHS)(5)Health expenses (GHS)(6)Utables expenses (GHS)(6)(5)(6)(6)(1)(7)(1)(7)(1)(7)(1)(7)(1)(7)(1)(7)(1)(7)(1)(7)(1)(7)(1)(7)(1)(7)(1)(7)(1)(8)(1)(9)(1)(1)(1)(2)(1)(3)(1)(4)(1)(5)(1)(6)(1)(7)(1)(8)(1)(9)(1)(1)(1)(2)(1)(3)(1)(4)(1)(5)(1)(6)(1)(7)(1)(8)(1)(9)(1)(1)(1)(2)(1)(3)(1)(4)(1)(5)(1)(6)(1)(7)(1)(8)(1)(9)(1) <tr< td=""><td>)85***).015) .802*** 4.197) (.899***</td><td>0.002 (0.023) 24.668 (33.046)</td><td>0.004 (0.022)</td></tr<>)85***).015) .802*** 4.197) (.899***	0.002 (0.023) 24.668 (33.046)	0.004 (0.022)
Well-being Measures (Wave 1) 319 Total Expenditure (GHS) (2 Food expenses inside home (GHS) 129 Food expenses outside home (GHS) (4 Utilities expenses (GHS) (4 Personal care expenses (GHS) (5 Education expenses (GHS) (5 Health expenses (GHS) (5 Durables expenses (GHS) (5 (1 (1 (2 (1 (2 (1 (2 (1 (2 (1 (2 (1 (2 (1 (2 (1 (2 (1 (2 (1 (2 (1 (2 (1 (2 (1 (2 (1 (2 (1 (3 (1 (4 (1 (5 (1 (5 (1 (5 (1 (5 (1 (5 (1 (5 (1 (5 (1	0.015) .802*** 4.197) (.899***	(0.023) 24.668 (33.046)	(0.022)
Well-being Measures (Wave 1)319Total Expenditure (GHS)(2Food expenses inside home (GHS)129(d(dFood expenses outside home (GHS)(4)(d(dUtilities expenses (GHS)(dPersonal care expenses (GHS)(d(d(dHealth expenses (GHS)(d(d(dUtables expenses (GHS)(d	$.802^{***}$ 4.197) ($.899^{***}$	24.668 (33.046)	. ,
Total Expenditure (GHS)319Food expenses inside home (GHS)129Food expenses outside home (GHS)(6Food expenses outside home (GHS)49.Utilities expenses (GHS)7.0Personal care expenses (GHS)(1Education expenses (GHS)6.9Health expenses (GHS)(1Durables expenses (GHS)5(1(1(2(1(3(1(4(1(5(1(6(1(7(1(8(1(9(1(1(1(1(1(2(1(3(1(4(1(5(1(6(1(1(1(2(1(3(1(4(1(5(1(6(1(7(1(8(1(9(1(1(1(1(1(2(1(3(1(4(1(5(1(6(1(7(1(8(1(9(1(1(1(1(1(2(1(3(1(4(1(5(1(6(1(7(1(8(1(9(1(1(1(1(1(1(1(2(1(3<	4.197) (.899***	(33.046)	-7.345
(2) Food expenses inside home (GHS) (4) (4) (4) (4) (4) (4) (4) (5) (7)	4.197) (.899***	(33.046)	-7.345
Food expenses inside home (GHS)129Food expenses outside home (GHS)49.Utilities expenses (GHS)7.0Personal care expenses (GHS)(1Education expenses (GHS)6.9Health expenses (GHS)(1Durables expenses (GHS)(1(1(1(2(1(3(1(4(1(5(1(6(1(7(1(8(1(9(1(2(1(3(1(4(1(5(1(6(1(1(1(1(1(1(1(1(1(1(1(2(1(3(1(4(1(5(1(5(1(5(1(5(1(5(1(5(1(5(1(5(1(5(1(6(1(7(1(7(1(7(1(8(1(9(1(1(1(1(1(1(1(1(1(1(1<	.899***	` '	
Food expenses outside home (GHS) (4) Utilities expenses (GHS) 7.0 Personal care expenses (GHS) (1) Education expenses (GHS) 6.9 Health expenses (GHS) (1) Durables expenses (GHS) (1) (1) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (3) (1) (4) (1) (5) (1) (6) (1) (5) (1) (6) (1) (1) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (3) (1) (4) (1) (4) (1) (4) (1) (5) (1) (5) (1) (1) (1) (2) (1) (3) (1) (4) (1) (4) (1) (4) (1) (5) (1) (6) (1) (1) (1)		2 688	(31.539)
Food expenses outside home (GHS)49.Utilities expenses (GHS)7.0Personal care expenses (GHS)(1Education expenses (GHS)6.9Health expenses (GHS)(1Durables expenses (GHS)(1	P 4C 4)	-3.088	-6.042
(4 Utilities expenses (GHS) Personal care expenses (GHS) Education expenses (GHS) Health expenses (GHS) Durables expenses (GHS) 1	6.464)	(8.067)	(6.464)
Utilities expenses (GHS)7.0Personal care expenses (GHS)(1)Education expenses (GHS)(2)Health expenses (GHS)(2)Durables expenses (GHS)(3)(1)(3)(2)(3)(3)(4)(4)(4)(5)(4)(6)(4)(7) <td< td=""><td>495^{***}</td><td>7.588</td><td>3.010</td></td<>	495^{***}	7.588	3.010
Image: Personal care expenses (GHS) (1) Personal care expenses (GHS) (2) Education expenses (GHS) (1) Health expenses (GHS) (2) Durables expenses (GHS) (3) (1) (1) (2) (3) (3) (4) (4) (4) (5) (4) (5) (4) (6) (4) (5) (4) (5) (4) (5) (4) (5) (4) (5) (4) (5) (4) (5) (4) (5) (4) (5) (4) (5) (4) (5) (4) (5) (4) (6) (4) (7) (4) (7) (4) (7) (4) (7) (4) (7) (4) (7) (4) (7) (4) (7) (4) (7) <td< td=""><td>1.369)</td><td>(4.962)</td><td>(5.226)</td></td<>	1.369)	(4.962)	(5.226)
Personal care expenses (GHS) Education expenses (GHS) Health expenses (GHS) Durables expenses (GHS) (1) (2) (3) (4) (4) (5) (4) (5) (5) (5) (6) (6) (6) (6) (7))71***	4.260	-2.373
Education expenses (GHS) 6.9 Health expenses (GHS) 29 Durables expenses (GHS) 6 (1) (1) (2) (1) (3) (1) (4) (1) (5) (1) (4) (1) (5) (1) (5) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (2) (1) (1) (1) (2) (1) (3) (1) (4) (1) (5) (1)		(4.126)	(2.265)
Education expenses (GHS) 6.9 (1) Health expenses (GHS) 29 (5) Durables expenses (GHS) (5) (1)	852***	0.129	-0.457
(1) Health expenses (GHS) Durables expenses (GHS) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1	2.446)	(2.500)	(2.791)
Health expenses (GHS) 29. Durables expenses (GHS) 3 (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1)	991***	1.619	5.491
Durables expenses (GHS) (5	897)	(3.200)	(3.873)
Durables expenses (GHS) (1	564* [*] *	-10.082	-3.584*
Durables expenses (GHS) (1	(5.528)	(5.922)	7.764
		5.436***	6.529^{**}
Threatened Partner (1(never) to 4 (very often) scale)	.833)	(5.604)	(3.101)
= 1110a00100 + a10100 + (100000 + (001) + 00000 + (0010) + 000000	94***	0.036	-0.026
	0.040)	(0.051)	(0.048)
	94***	0.036	-0.026
	0.040)	(0.050)	(0.048)
	/	-0.012	-0.008
•		(0.024)	(0.026)
	/	-0.024	0.010
		(0.022)	(0.022)
	,	-0.001	0.036
		(0.035)	(0.039)
Corroborative Mental Health Measures (Wave 1))	()	()
		-0.055	-0.005
	630***	(0.066)	(0.075)
		-0.043	0.062
			(0.093)
	0.050) 382***	(0.095)	0.149
	0.050) 882*** 0.086)	(0.095) -0.090	0.147
	0.050) 382*** 0.086) 501***	-0.090	
= 1 in subset of whith infinites, an one of the (f(also gree) to ((agree) scale)) = 2.0	0.050) 882*** 0.086) 501*** 0.080)	(/	(0.091) 0.108

Note: Observations are at the individual level. Each row is a separate regression. Clustered standard errors (at the district level) are reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Mean baseline characteristics are also balanced across treatment arms.

	Constant	Lumpsum	Installments
Baseline Controls (Wave 1)			
Female 0-1	0.140^{***}	0.006	-0.003
	(0.018)	(0.022)	(0.023)
Akan ethnic 0-1	0.383***	-0.023	-0.008
	(0.033)	(0.030)	0.034
Married 0-1	0.916***	0.023	0.001
	(0.014)	(0.017)	(0.020)
Attained Junior High School (JHS) 0-1	0.790***	-0002	-0.023
	(0.022)	(0.031)	(0.029)
Household size (number)	7.300***	-0.306	-0.885***
	0.273^{***}	(0.343)	(0.249)
Self employed 0-1	0.808^{***}	-0.061	-0.020
	(0.021)	(0.029)	(0.031)
Operates in informal sector 0-1	0.833***	-0.045	0.006
-	(0.020)	(0.028)	(0.027)
Personal income (1 to 5 scale) (monthly)	1.610***	-0.001	0.017
	(0.056)	(0.067)	(0.072)
Self does housework during COVID19 0-1	0.171***	-0.011	-0.003
-	(0.019)	(0.025)	(0.027)
In previously lockdown region 0-1	0.186***	0.008	-0.008
	(0.046)	(0.011)	(0.014)
Aware of COVID-19 0-1	0.994***	0.002	0.005
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Trust Government's estimates about COVID-19 0-1	3.343^{***}	0.025	0.036
	(0.052)	(0.058)	(0.061)
Has relocated / moved in past 7days 0-1 (Wave 2)	0.012^{*}	0.002	0.0023
	(0.007)	(0.0078)	(0.0067)
More Baseline Controls (Wave 0)			
Poverty rate $(\%)$ (Schreiner 2005)	24.035^{***}	-2.272	-2.298
	(1.569)	(1.375)	(1.468)
Staying together with mother 0-1	0.065^{***}	0.004	-0.001
	(0.013)	(0.017)	(0.018)
Has no religion 0-1	0.054^{***}	0.004	-0.002
	(0.011)	(0.014)	(0.017)
Staying together with spouse 0-1	0.891***	-0.043*	-0.013
	(0.015)	(0.023)	(0.022)
Age at marriage (Years)	24.692***	0.186	0.472
	(0.273)	(0.383)	(0.370)
Joint F-test (linear), p-value		0.792	
Chi-squared test (probit), p -value		0.829	

Table A11: BALANCE TEST: PRE-INTERVENTION TREATMENT-CONTROL DIFFERENCES

Note: Observations are at the individual level. Each row is a separate regression. The F and Chi-squared tests are conducted using the pooled indicator 1(Communication Credit) as the outcome and excluding all the communication and well-being outcomes. Clustered standard errors (at the district level) are reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Mean baseline characteristics are also balanced across treatment arms.

Table A12: ATTRITION						
	Lumpsum	Installments	Control	Total	Attrition	
STEP 0				1,993		
*Verify phone numbers						
*Measure poverty (Schreiner 2005)						
SELECT SAMPLE (Randomized)	376	371	384	1,131		
BASELINE I (Wave 1)	376	371	384	1,131	0	
	(100%)	(100%)	(100%)	(100%)	(0%)	
	(SD=0%)	(SD=0%)	(SD=0%)	(SD=0%)	(SD=0%)	
BASELINE II (Wave 2)	352	340	351	1,043	88	
	(93%)	(92%)	(92%)	(92%)	(8%)	
	(SD=24%)	(SD=27%)	(SD=28%)	(SD=26%)	(SD=26%)	
ENDLINE I (Follow-up wave 3)	355	344	349	1,048	83	
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	(94%)	(93%)	(91%)	(93%)	(7%)	
	(SD=23%)	(SD=26%)	(SD=28%)	(SD=26%)	(SD=26%)	
ENDLINE II (Follow-up wave 4)	343	335	319	997	134	
	(91%)	(90%)	(83%)	(89%)	(11%)	
	(SD=28%)	(SD=29%)	(SD=37%)	(SD=32%)	(SD=32%)	

Note: Table reports the summary statistics for the subsample that was successfully reached for a follow-up and for the subsample that was not successfully reached in endline phone surveys. Shown for all panel waves.



Figure A7: PHONE CALLS AND REACHABILITY OF INDIVIDUALS

V.6 Descriptive Statistics

Table A13: SUMMARY STATISTICS OF RELEVANT VAR	Mean	, SD	Ν
Demographic Characteristics			
Female 0-1	0.146	0.354	1130
Akan ethnic 0-1	0.362	0.481	1130
Married 0-1	0.910	0.285	1130
Attained Junior High School (JHS) 0-1	0.784	0.411	1130
Household size (number)	6.906	4.087	1107
Self employed 0-1	0.762	0.425	1130
Operates in informal sector 0-1	0.799	0.400	1130
Personal income (1 to 5 scale) (monthly)	1.621	0.897	1130
Staying together with mother 0-1 (Wave 0)	0.067	0.250	1130
Has no religion 0-1 (Wave 0)	0.053	0.226	1130
Staying together with spouse 0-1 (Wave 0)	0.869	0.337	1130
Age at marriage (Years) (Wave 0)	24.93	4.971	1083
Poverty			
Poverty rate (%) (Schreiner 2005) (Wave 0)	22.04	20.53	1130
Pandemic Basics			
Aware of COVID-19 0-1	0.996	0.060	1105
Trust Government's estimates about COVID19 0-1	0.798	0.401	1105
In previously lockdown region 0-1	0.183	0.386	1130
Self does housework during pandemic 0-1	0.168	0.374	1130
Has relocated / moved in past 7 days 0-1 (Wave 2) $$	0.014	0.118	978
Key Communication Constraints			
Need to connect increased due to pandemic 0-1	0.701	0.457	1104
Unable to call in past 7days 0-1	0.627	0.483	1104
Unable to call due to COVID19 0-1	0.548	0.497	1104
Unable to make airtime transfers in past 7days 0-1	0.474	0.499	1104
Borrow airtime 0-1 (Wave 2)	0.320	0.466	978
Seek digital loan 0-1 (Wave 2)	0.087	0.283	978
		0.200	
Well-being Measures			
Total Expenditure (GHS) (weekly)	324.1	423.2	1102
Threatened Partner (1(never) to 4 (very often) scale)	1.194	0.701	1102
Hit Partner (1(never) to 4 (very often) scale)	1.194	0.701	1102
log K10	2.819	0.369	1102
Severe Distress 0-1	0.096	0.294	1102
I'm tired (mentally, emotionally, or socially) of COVID19 0-1	0.538	0.498	1104
I'm depressed (1(disagree) to 5(agree) scale)	1.598	0.941	1102
I'm relaxed (1(disagree) to 5(agree) scale)	2.885	1.382	1102
I'm satisfied with life, all else equal (1(disagree) to 5(agree) scale)	2.534	1.318	1102
I'm satisfied with finances, all else equal (1(disagree) to 5(agree) scale)	2.073	1.156	1102

NOTE: Number of Districts, n=193, Number of Regions, n=10

Note: Observations are at the individual level. Table reports the summary statistics of relevant variables from our baseline survey waves. This include information about demographics, poverty indicators, communication and well-being outcomes, respectively. The exchange rate during the baseline period is US\$ 1.0 = GHS 5.80.



Note: Observations are at the individual level. Low (scores of 10-15, indicating little or no psychological distress). Moderate (scores of 16-21). High (scores of 22-29). Very high or severe distress (scores of 30-50). 11.5% rate of severe distress (indicated by the vertical dashed line).



Note: Observations are at the individual level. Total consumption expenditure sums all expenses: food (inside and outside home), utilities, personal care, education, health, and durables. 81.7% rate of poor consumption (\leq 500GHS per week and indicated by the dashed vertical line).

V.7 Definition of Relevant Select Variables – Questions

Communication constraints (un)mitigation:

Consider the last 7 days:

- Unable to call in past 7days 0-1: Were you confronted with the need to call others (i.e., family, friends or work) but unable to call because you/ household lacked enough communication resources to cover costs? 0=No, 1=Yes
- Borrow airtime 0-1: Have borrowed airtime due to unexpected circumstances to make calls? 0=No, 1=Yes
- 3. Seek digital loan 0-1: Have taken a digital loan due to unexpected circumstances to make calls? 0=No, 1=Yes
- 4. Unable to call due to COVID19 0-1: Are you sometimes unable to see or communicate with your family and friends due to COVID19, its lockdown restrictions and other personal avoidance steps you have taken? 0=No, 1=Yes

Gender and Domestic violence relations:

Consider last 7 days: Please indicate how often you act to the following:

USE CODES:

```
1=Never (less than 1 time in 7 days), 2=Sometime (1-2 times in 7 days), 3=Often (3-4 times in 7 days), 4=Very often (5-7 times in 7 days), 5=No Answer (if you want/feel uncomfortable to say)
```

- Threatened Partner 1-4: How often do you threaten to hurt your partner or someone close to your partner?
- 2. Hit Partner 1-4: How often do you hit or throw something at your partner?

Mental Health (K10):

Consider last 7 days: Please indicate how often you feel about the following:

USE CODES:

1=None of the time (less than 1 time in 7 days), 2=A little of the time (1-2 times in 7 days), 3=Some of the time (3-4 times in 7 days) 4=Most of the time (5-6 times in 7 days), 5=All of the time (7 times in 7 days)

- 1. About how often did you feel tired out for no good reason?
- 2. About how often did you feel nervous?
- 3. About how often did you feel nervous that nothing could calm you down?
- 4. About how often did you feel hopeless?
- 5. About how often did you feel restless or fidgety?
- 6. About how often did you feel so restless you could not sit still?
- 7. About how often did you feel depressed?
- 8. About how often did you feel that everything was an effort?
- 9. About how often did you feel so sad that nothing could cheer you up?
- 10. About how often did you feel worthless?

Consumption Expenditures (weekly):

- What is the total value (in GHS) of all food and beverage items your household (i) purchased and consumed, (ii) consumed from your own stock or production, or (iii) received as a gift and consumed over the last 7 days? NOTE: Please only include food and beverage items consumed in the 7 days ... GHS
- 2. What is the total value (in GHS) of all food and beverage items you or any member of your household purchased and consumed from outside the house over the last 7 days? NOTE: This includes items purchased outside the house in

restaurants, cafeterias, canteens/kiosks, as well as products such as spirits, tobacco, stimulants, etc. ... GHS

- 3. What is the total value (in GHS) of house rents, house repair costs and utilities that were paid for, purchased, or acquired from other sources (ie gifts and in-kind) by your household over the last 7 days? NOTE: Utilities include sewerage, electricity, water, gas, cooking fuels, house servants, etc. ...GHS
- 4. What is the total value (in GHS) of products and services for personal use and care, that were paid for, purchased, or acquired from other sources (ie gifts and in-kind) over the last 7 days by your household? NOTE: Personal care products and services include barber services, electrical appliances for personal care, oils, soaps, etc. Personal use products and services include jewelry, accessories (watches, clocks, clothing, etc.), cultural services, mobile airtime services, financial service fees, transportation costs. ...GHS
- 5. What is the total value (in GHS) of education expenses (i.e., all tuition or fees including all educational scholarships) over the last 7 days by your household? ...GHS
- 6. What is the total value (in GHS) of consultation or treatment services, and pharmaceutical or therapeutic products purchased last 7 days by your household? ...GHS
- 7. What is the total value (in GHS) of durable products such as furniture, electronics and other household appliances, purchased over the last 7 days by your household? NOTE: This includes furniture, household appliances (large and small), repair of household appliances, miscellaneous accessories such as TVs, laptops, cars, mobile phones, bicycles, torches, batteries, solar lamps, etc. ...GHS
- 8. Total expenditure: add 1 to 8 ... GHS

V.8 Marginal Value of Public Funds (MVPF)

We use our causal estimates to compute the MVPF (Hendren and Sprung-Keyser 2020) for a policy that provides communication credit to low-income adults for two months. The MVPF is a ratio of society's willingness to pay (private benefit) for this policy to the net cost of the policy to the government (here, an "imagined" funder).

V.8.1 Society's Willingness to Pay (MVPF numerator)

We estimate this to include two main components.

First, is the averted (otherwise) social cost of mental health burden, ξ . Mental health disorders account for 13% of the overall global disease burden (Collins et al. [2011]), which is likely higher in low-income countries (Adhvaryu et al. [2019]); we assume 13%. Health expenditure per capita in Ghana is US\$78 (World Bank [2018]). With a treatment effect of -10% reduced mental destress rate (or -25% for severe mental distress; we assume -10%), we conservatively estimate the averted social cost of mental health burden to be $0.10 \times 0.13 \times US = +US \times 1.014$. This ξ estimate is very conservative: Addo et al. [2013] estimate that the average monthly household cost of mental healthcare in Ghana is US\$60.24 (i.e., 2xUS\$60.24=US\$120.48 for two months), so with a treatment effect of -10% reduced mental destress rate and a national average household size of 4.5 people per household, this will imply $0.1 \times US$ 120.48/4.5 = +US averted social cost, which is 2.6 times larger. Second, is the individual beneficiary's willingness to pay for not visiting the hospital or not getting mentally unwell, η . This includes three sub-components: (i) out-of-pocket health bill η_1 (0.10x0.13xUS\$63=+US\$0.82; out-of-pocket health expense is US\$63 [World Bank 2018]); (ii) travel cost to health centers η_2 (assumed to be 20% of the estimated out-of-pocket health bill = 0.2xUS 0.82 = +US 0.203; Addo et al. [2013] suggest using 74% for such indirect costs but we assume 20%); and (iii) lost income from missed work η_3 (assumed to be only 5% of the average earnings of non-farm enterprises $= 0.05 \times US \$231 = +US \11.55 for two months; most individuals in our sample around 80% operate informal non-farm enterprises and the total average annual earnings of non-farm enterprises is US\$1,385 in 2021 US\$ [Ghana Statistical Service, GLSS 7 Table 9.6]; the treatment effects were all concentrated on individuals operating informal enterprises, see Table A5).⁵

Combining all the components, the MVPF's numerator = $\xi + \sum_{i=1}^{3} \eta_i = \text{US}$ \$13.590 for the average treated individual.⁶.

V.8.2 Net Cost to the "imagined" Funder / Government (MVPF denominator)

We estimate this to include two main components.

First, is the cost of providing communication transfer for two months, G (+US\$7.0). Second, is the missed communication services tax (CST) revenue if individuals do not communicate or stay connected, μ . In Ghana, the CST is used to finance the National Youth Employment Programme (NYEP) ($\geq 20\%$ of the CST) and support other national development activities. Using the prevailing 5% CST rate (Ghana Revenue Authority [2020]), we estimate that the government loses $0.05 \times US$ \$7.0= -US\$0.35. In computing the net cost to the government of this policy, it is important to note that (i) communication is a network good so the ultimate economic incidence of these communication transfers extends to other individuals: others might benefit from receiving mobile phone calls from the treated individual (positive externalities) but this might also create congestion hassle or traffic on the communication network (negative externalities). We assume (i) and (ii) to be equal. If the positive externalities dominate, as we would expect (see Björkegren [2019] for an example

⁵Informal non-farm business income may either be consumed in the household (where we find no impacts) or invested (where our impacts are concentrated given that our treatment effects were all concentrated on individuals operating informal enterprises).

⁶We drop the direct value of the communication subsidy to beneficiaries (+US\$7.0) to avoid double counting. In standard maximization models, the willingness to pay would have just been the size of the subsidy *if* people are fully optimizing. Here, it is reasonable to assume that people are not fully optimizing (see e.g., our evidence that the installment program has larger and more sustainable effects compared to the lumpsum, with the exception of consumption, which may reflect either time inconsistency or social pressure problems from receiving one-time large transfers). Given this potential mis-optimization (the envelope theorem does not easily apply and so the benefits the subsidy delivers to people are not already captured by the subsidy), the willingness to pay includes the benefits on mental health and its associated cost reductions (ξ and η).

in Rwanda), then the total cost of this policy is over-estimated in this dimension. Further, we conservatively did not factor in the reduced fiscal cost from less hospital visits generally due to the reduced likelihood of mental health disorders.

Lastly, combining all the components, the MVPF's denominator = $G+\mu$ =US\$6.65 for the average treated individual.

V.8.3 MVPF Estimate

Taking the ratio, we estimate a conservative MVPF of providing communication credit to be $\frac{13.590}{6.650} = 2.044$. Notice that in determining the MVPF, we intentionally bias the estimates to understate the benefits and overstate the costs. With a current total population of about 31,732,129 in Ghana, an adult population of 18,073,230 (57% of the total population), and the poverty rate of our study's sample of adults being 22%, the policy's total benefit will be US\$54,035,343 (=0.22x18,073,230xUS\$13.590) against a total cost of US\$26,441,135 (=0.22x18,073,230xUS\$6.650).

BROOKINGS

1775 Massachusetts Ave NW, Washington, DC 20036 (202) 797-6000 www.brookings.edu