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THE 2022 KNIGHT FORUM ON GEOPOLITICS

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Opening Remarks:

SUZANNE MALONEY
Vice President and Director, Foreign Policy
The Brookings Institution

Panel 1: The Russia-Ukraine War:

MODERATOR: MICHAEL E. O’HANLON
Philip H. Knight Chair in Defense and Strategy
Senior Fellow and Director, Strobe Talbott Center for Security, Strategy, and Technology, The Brookings Institution

SAMANTHA GROSS
Fellow and Director, Energy Security and Climate Initiative
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DOUGLAS A. REDIKER
Nonresident Senior Fellow, Center on the United States and Europe
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MELANIE SISSON
Fellow, Strobe Talbott Center for Security, Strategy, and Technology
The Brookings Institution

CAITLIN TALMADGE
Nonresident Senior Fellow, Strobe Talbott Center for Security, Strategy, and Technology, The Brookings Institution
Associate Professor, Security Studies, Georgetown University

Panel 2: Implication for Europe’s Security Landscape:

MODERATOR: ASLİ AYDINTAŞBAŞ
Nonresident Senior Fellow, Center on the United States and Europe,
The Brookings Institution

JAMES GOLDFEIER
Visiting Fellow, Center on the United States and Europe
The Brookings Institution
PARTICIPANTS (CONT'D):

FIONA HILL  
Senior Fellow, Center on the United States and Europe  
The Brookings Institution

CONSTANZE STELZENMÜLLER  
Senior Fellow AND Director, Center on the United States and Europe  
Fritz Stern Chair on Germany and Trans-Atlantic Relations  
The Brookings Institution

Panel 3: Implications for Our Global Security Architecture

MODERATOR: WILLIAM GALSTON,  
Senior Fellow and Ezra K. Zilkha Chair, Governance Studies  
The Brookings Institution

ROBERT KAGAN  
Stephen & Barbara Friedman Senior Fellow,  
Strobe Talbott Center for Security, Strategy, and Technology  
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David Rubenstein Fellow, Center for East Asia Policy Studies  
The Brookings Institution

TANVI MADAN  
Senior Fellow and Director, The India Project  
The Brookings Institution

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PROCEEDINGS

MS. MALONEY: For those of you who maybe joining us from other parts of the country or other parts of the world, I’m Suzanne Maloney. I’m vice president and director of Foreign Policy here at the Brookings Institution. And on behalf of Foreign Policy and the Strobe Talbott Center for Security, Strategy, and Technology, I’m truly delighted to welcome you to this very special event today, our first annual Knight Forum on Geopolitics.

This forum is named in honor of Brookings’ Trustee Philip H. Knight, and it’s made possible through his transformative gift to the Foreign Policy program. The overarching goal of the Philip Knight gift is to advance a more effective U.S. foreign policy by supporting essential research into international security, grand strategy, military affairs, American alliances and security partnerships and transnational threats.

We’re deeply grateful to Phil for making this ambitious effort possible and for enabling us to bring together a truly phenomenal group of scholars today to discuss U.S. grand strategy and U.S. foreign policy at a time of heightened frictions among great powers and tremendous risk within the rules based international order.

It’s hardly surprising that we chose to focus this year’s forum on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. With so many evolving developments in the conflict and far-reaching global consequences, it’s absolutely essential for us to take stock of these devastating events and their impact. I’m especially grateful that the Knight Forum has created an opportunity to hear the analysis and insights of several of our top Brookings experts. We have three panel discussions focusing on different aspects of the war today.

The first panel focuses on the trajectory of the war itself and battlefield dynamics. Our second panel considers Europe’s security landscape and the impact of the crisis on the transatlantic relationship. Our third and final panel today examines the global security architecture and focuses on Asia, South Asia, the Middle East, and the global south.

Ahead of this forum, several scholars have participated and contributed to a series of papers which analyze the crisis and provide crucial commentary on ways to help end
the war, repair its damage, adjust transatlantic and European security architecture and policies to handle the fundamentally transformed strategic landscape that has resulted from the war and to assess the broader implications of the conflict.

These papers are named in honor of American statesmen and our former Brookings Institution President Strobe Talbott. The Talbott papers on implications of Russia’s invasions of Ukraine have offered critical policy options during a time of crisis. Strobe played an absolutely pivotal role in shaping American foreign policy in the region as deputy secretary of state and ambassador-at-large and special advisor to the secretary of state for the newly independent states of the foreign Soviet Union during the Clinton administration. And in his subsequent scholarship during his time as president of Brookings.

While Strobe could not be with us here today, we know that he and his wife, Barbara, are watching from afar and we wish them well. And we look forward to welcoming them back to Brookings very soon.

In addition, I’d like to take a moment to shine a brief spotlight on one of my colleagues who helped bring this event together. My colleague, Michael O’Hanlon is the Philip H. Knight inaugural chair in defense and strategy. Also, research director of the Foreign Policy program here. He’s just recently returned from the region including a meeting with President Zelenskyy himself.

This is just one of the many ways in which Brookings’ scholars have drawn on their expertise to meet the demands of this extraordinary moment. And to provide insights and analysis of the far-reaching consequences of the war.

Before we get fully underway, a final reminder that we are on the record today and we’re also streaming live. So those who are viewing virtually please send your questions via email to events@brookings.edu or on Twitter using the hashtag #KnightForum. For those in the room, we’ll reserve a few moments at the end of each panel for questions and answers. Staff with microphones will come around. Now, over to you, Mike, to introduce our first panel.

MR. O’HANLON: Suzanne, thank you. Greetings, everyone. Suzanne, we’re
lucky to have you running the Foreign Policy program and also to have Amy Liu as our interim president of the institution. And I too would like to thank Phil Knight and Strobe Talbott for all they’ve done for this institution. And to all of you for being here today on this important morning.

You may have noticed already that I’m not Rachel Martin. She was originally tallied to be our moderator for panel one. Those of you who listen in to the Morning Edition will know why she’s not here. She’s covering the queen’s funeral in London on location, but we’re very gratified even as we all honor the queen in our own way that you’re here today with us.

And as Suzanne said, we’re going to think in terms of three panels sort of in concentric circles moving out from the immediate conflict to them think more broadly about Europe’s future and then about the implications for global security at large. So our panel will go until about 10:00 and we’re talking about the war.

But let me introduce the panelists because when I say war, I just don’t mean the battlefield fight. I also mean the broader way in which the West is trying to apply pressure against Vladimir Putin including with economic sanctions and the way in which that influences global energy and food markets among other things.

So two of our four panelists actually specialize on economic and energy matters rather than military matters. But we have, I hope, pretty much the whole spectrum of the battlefield as well as broader combat dynamics covered here. We will proceed with Caitlin Talmadge speaking first. She’s a nonresident senior fellow here at Brookings and a professor at Georgetown University. She, like Melanie Sisson sitting next to her, are two of the best defense scholars in the country and I’m very gratified they’re both with us in the Talbott Center and with us here on the panel today.

Douglas Rediker works with Brookings and also as a nonresident senior fellow. One of the world’s best economic sanctions and warfare experts if I could say so myself. And I’ve learned a lot from him over these past seven or eight months as well as before in thinking through the ways in which economic pressure can be applied against Russia. But also, the ways in which we can make ourselves more resilient in the face of Russian countermoves.
And Samantha Gross to my immediately left is particularly adept at addressing these kinds of energy issues. One of the world’s experts on global energy markets here at Brookings as a senior fellow and can help us think through who’s got the upper hand, Putin or Europe, on issues like natural gas as well as the broader question of how the world adapting to this crisis and trying to respond. Keep the oil and gas flowing, keep energy prices reasonable even as we also see how we can try to give Vladimir Putin greater incentives to end this terrible conflict.

I’m going to just say a couple of words as I warm up here and begin based on my recent trip of last week to Poland and the Ukraine. And then start in with some questions for our panelists and then as Suzanne said have time for all of your thoughts in the last 20 minutes or so of the hour.

Let me just make, if I could, maybe four broad observations about the trip. And I’m not going to overstate what I accomplished or what I saw. I was only in Ukraine for a couple of days only in Kyiv for a little over a day. And with hats off to a Polish think tank that’s called PISM by the Polish initials, P-I-S-M. It’s essentially the Polish Institute for International Affairs which organized the whole trip, provided security and so forth, and set up the meeting with President Zelenskyy.

So one observation, and these are not meant to be comprehensive, just a couple of points to help set the context for our conversation. One observation is that Ukraine itself despite the ongoing tragedy – and I didn’t get close to the frontlines – but the preponderance of the country and certainly the capitol looks pretty good. And hats off to the Ukrainian people for their resilience.

You know, when you’re looking at the faces of people walking on the sidewalks of Kyiv in the outdoor cafes and the restaurants where life almost seems half normal. You know that they are all anxious and worried about the future. Well aware that the moment now of semi-calm in the capitol may not last. And undoubtedly, in my cases or at least many cases, grieving and mourning the loss of loved ones who have already perished in this terrible conflict.
But the appearance and the reality of Kyiv and even of Bucha, the city to the north where many of the atrocities happened in March and some mass killings by Russian forces against Ukrainian civilians. Even Bucha is recovering. People are walking in the parks. Buildings are being repaired. There’s a fair amount of life in the sense of normal activity and it’s fairly impressive. The Ukrainian people are proving resilient. That’s observation number one.

Observation two is that President Zelenskyy is even more awesome in person than I would have expected. What incredible poise and courage. Certainly, a resolute and focused, you know, concentration on the conflict. Constantly on his toes. Very aware of the need to maintain security even within Kyiv knowing the attempts by Russia against his life in the past. But still with a very respectful, affable nature towards other people. Very interested in what we had to say. Very friendly, very modest, and even with a little bit of a dry sense of humor that he was able to maintain in this kind of a tragic time.

And the reason why I like seeing that is not just that it makes him more charismatic and appealing but also maybe it makes him appear like he can handle this in definitely. And I think the war can go on definitely and Ukraine certainly is going to need its leadership team and its people to stay with the fight if that’s what it takes. And I don't see signs of exhaustion. I don't see signs of any kind of loss of balance or composure in the way he conducts himself and it was really encouraging.

This was the morning after his little car accident too. So I can also happily report no limp. No measurable impact of any kind. And he had been in Izyum the day before, you know, honoring the liberation of that city by Ukrainian forces.

Third observation would be that NATO and particularly Polish efforts at maintaining the supply lines into Ukraine are impressive. And I’m not going to say much about the details. Obviously, some of the details are out in the press, but a big part of the effort is of course not to give away too many of the details and to maintain concealment and also resilience in the event that Russia decides to interfere more directly with the flow of supplies much of which are going into southeastern Poland and then from there into Ukraine by various means.
And it’s quite well organized. My hat is off to NATO as well as to the Poles specifically for what they’re doing to make this supply of Western material that’s kept Ukraine in the fight. Keep that going strong.

Fourth point and I’ll make this brief. We can come back to it later in discussion if you wish. But I think it’s probably fairly clear to most this fight is nowhere near over. And the fact that recent momentum has shifted a little bit more in favor of Ukrainian armed forces should not make us complacent in any way, shape, or form. I’m happy to report the Ukrainians do not seem complacent. There are some who are still predicting like one or two American pundits that somehow all of the occupied territory will be liberated by the end of this year.

I think that’s an extremely optimistic perhaps not impossible, but extremely optimistic interpretation. Policy should certainly not be based on that presumption. And the Ukrainians are not basing policy on that presumption. They’re asking for a lot of help, continued assistance.

And as you know from the press, they’re asking for more weaponry. And I’m just going to just quickly mention that my own observation -- not so much things I learned this past week, but my own broader analysis is that we should indeed continue to provide more than the $15 billion in U.S. assistance and other allied help that has already come through by way of military aid.

But I’m more inclined to think that we should beef up their missile and air defenses of cities as well as their tank force. And I’m less interested in providing the attack of long-range missile not because Vladimir Putin has said it’s a red line. But because when I look at the various target sets and military missions that lie before the Ukrainians. Tanks look more relevant for that fight to me than ATACMs.

We can come back to that later if you’d like. Thank you for putting up with my long introduction, but I did want to give you that quick battlefield report. And now, if I can turn to Caitlin.

And, Caitlin, I wanted to just ask you, first of all, for any comments you’ve got
about how you see the battlefield dynamics? But I know also you’ve been thinking a lot based on your expertise with nuclear affairs and other such things about potential escalatory dynamics, about the role of nuclear threats and nuclear deterrence in this whole conflict. And the question of whether we could at some tragic point in the future see an escalation.

So if I could just, you know, again that’s a lot to put on your plate at once, but maybe firstly, you could comment on how you see the battlefield dynamics yourself and then we can go to the broader strategic and potentially nuclear dynamics of this conflict.

MS. TALMADGE: Thank you, Mike. And good morning to everyone. And thanks for the opportunity to be part of this discussion.

I guess I would say in response to your prompt that I kind of would begin where you ended which is to note that it’s just not over. We’re very much in battlefield terms at an early point, a midpoint. We don’t really know but we do have to pump the brakes a little bit on some of the euphoria about recent Ukrainian gains because the reality is, you know, Russia does still control significant Ukrainian territory.

You know, not only Crimea but major cities, Mariupol, Mariupol, Kharkiv. And so, you know, we want to not be overambitious in what we can infer from the battlefield dynamics thus far.

With that being said, I do think that there are some preliminary observations that we can make about these battlefield dynamics and what they might pretend both in Ukraine but also potentially more broadly because I think this is an opportunity to think hard about modern warfare and what that could look like not only in Ukraine but potentially in other theaters which I know is something Melanie will discuss as well.

The big takeaway for me just kind of looking at kind of a 30,000-foot level at battlefield dynamics in this war has to do with the importance of nonmaterial factors in battlefield effectiveness. Which I think has surprised a lot of people. And by nonmaterial factors I mean things besides the number of men you have under arms, hardware, tanks, planes, bombs, bullets, all that stuff. That stuff matters clearly.
But I think if that were what determined military outcomes in the modern era, this war would have been over a long time ago because there was a massive asymmetry in those capabilities, the material capabilities between Ukraine and Russia prior to the war. And many of us including me, I’m as guilty of this as anyone. Really, I think underestimated how well the Ukrainians could use the material capabilities that they had in order to generate military power.

And in fact, I think what we’ve really witnessed over the last six months is both an overperformance by the Ukrainians relative to what we would have predicted based on their material capabilities as well as, frankly, and underperformance by the Russians based on what would have predicted. And that has produced a large delta between, you know, what we would have thought based on a bean count prior to the war and what has actually unfolded which has been very effective and powerful Ukrainian resistance.

And of course, some of that is clearly due to the infusion of material support to Ukraine from the West in terms of weaponry and also in terms of training efforts. And I’m in no way trying to downplay those, but I would just note that, you know, building partner militaries and providing military aid to client states and to allies is something the United States has tried lots of place around the world. And spoiler alert, it doesn’t always go the way it’s gone in Ukraine.

I mean if you think about the billions of dollars that the United States spent training the Iraqi army, the Afghan military forces or even in past years think about the effort to build the South Vietnamese military. Just because an outside power pumps a lot of aid into a country doesn’t mean they’re going to do with it what the Ukrainians have actually been able to do.

And I think that that points to some kind of special sauce with respect to Ukrainian military performance. And I think they were very effective after the shocking loss of Crimea in 2014, for instance, in terms of getting their house in order militarily. Developing more harmonious civil military relations, committing to really rigorous military training, and really also preparing to mobilize their population and have that population be not only motivated to fight but
trained well to fight.

And I think, you know, the result is they have an army with very high morale and really good military skills that are able to actually take advantage of the material support that they have received. And we’ve seen, I think lots of really interesting and impressive innovation by the Ukrainians with the military capabilities that they have. I mean it’s interesting to think about HIMARS as an example.

You know, the United States has provided these and they’re an important capability. But I’ve been really impressed by the fact that the Ukrainians have also gotten really good at making HIMARS decoys. So these are like dummy HIMARS. You know, like the Russians claimed to have destroyed more HIMARS than have actually been provided by the United States to Ukraine because they’ve destroyed a lot of decoys.

And I think as of like last week, we actually hadn’t confirmed that they had destroyed a real HIMARS. I won’t know yet. But my point is that’s innovative and that’s something that you do with tactical skills. We’re seeing the Ukrainians able to launch these high speed antiradiation missiles that go after Russian air defenses from MIGS. So it’s using a western missile on a Soviet-era legacy aircraft which again, you know, that takes some innovation, and it suggests not only that there is innovation in the field by these forces, but that their commander control, you know, structures enable that sort of decentralized innovation.

And so, you know, it’s not just what they have. It’s what they’re doing with what they have. And I think their performance, you know, in this regard goes beyond just sort of tactical and operational level. If you think about a kind of operational strategic level. The way that the Ukrainians have, you know, pulled off this recent counteroffensive. How they chose this specific axes of advance. The way that their information operations, frankly, before the launching of this counteroffensive gave the Russians the impression that the major effort or maybe even the only effort would be in the south and got the Russians to redeploy a lot of their best units away from the areas that the Ukrainians actually made gains in the east.

I mean that’s impressive. And if there’s one sort of, you know, if there’s one
preliminary conclusion I would draw, it’s that, you know, there’s one war the Ukrainians are
definitely winning and that’s the information war. And that’s an example of it. And, you know, I
think their ability to spur continued support in the West is another facet of that.

And conversely, if I could just say a couple of things about the other side of the coin I mentioned. You know, I talked about how I think the Ukrainians have overperformed relative to what we would expect based on their material capabilities. I think the Russians as I said have really underperformed based on, you know, what we would have expected. We’ve seen a lot of, you know, tactical and operational mistakes where there’s just basic military skill that seems to be lacking from some of their operations that may reflect poor training, certainly poor morale, poor logistics. Overly centralized command structures where you’re not seeing the sort of innovation in the field that, you know, I think is characterized Ukrainian performance.

And of course, at a higher level, I think it’s uncontroversial to say that the decision to start the war itself reflects some really serious pathologies in Russian civil military relations that frankly stem from the fact that, you know, Russia is a personalistic dictatorship in which, you know, Vladimir Putin probably does not get told a lot of things that he doesn’t want to hear from his high command and from his military intelligence.

And I think that that has set Russia on a course where, you know, reality is really colliding with expectations in a way that’s leading to underperformance. You know, it’s interesting if you think about, you know, what is Russia’s next step after this counteroffensive and these successes? You know, you would think, again based on material capabilities that Russia would have a greater ability to mobilize manpower from its society.

I mean this is kind of the bedrock of military power is getting, you know, people into uniforms who can fight. And yet, we’ve seen a lot of hesitation on the part of Putin to actually pull that lever to call it a war. To call for a general mobilization. And, you know, we have others who I think will be speaking this morning who know a lot more about Russian domestic politics than I do.

But I think it does point to something going on in Putin’s own domestic
calculations that he’s not willing to utilize this really significant potential source of Russian power. But if he wants to reverse Ukrainian’s recent gains and hold onto what he has, I would expect him to either try to do that or failing that, you know, I worry that he might start to turn to other means of escalating the conflict as a way of trying to coerce a favorable outcome for Russia. Or an outcome that he could say was a success.

And of course, the big concern here -- it’s macabre to speak about it -- but I mean the big concern here is I think Russian nonstrategic or, you know, so called tactical nuclear weapons, which I think, you know, Russia has a big arsenal of them for a reason. They are the sorts of weapons that can break up large concentrations of adversary forces which is presumably what Ukraine would have to generate in order to continue to take territory from the Russians.

And of course, any Russian nuclear use even of a so-called tactical weapon for military purposes would have strategic effects and be a coercive tool. You know, it would not only be the use on the battlefield itself, but it would be a message to the West that, you know, if this doesn’t get solved the way that I want it, you know, I have a lot more of these in the garage and also some other things in the backyard, right?

And so, you know, it is a potential outcome there that I think could be really concerning. And I think the administration is very aware of that and has done a lot of things to manage that escalation that you referenced, the reticence to supply ATACMs. And I think it’s, you know, partly for exactly that reason. To, you know, respect those red lines.

But I do think, you know, we need to keep in mind that Russia is a nuclear power. And of course, it’s not to say that Russian nuclear use would be a good option from Putin’s perspective, but, you know, we could get into a situation where he views it as his least bad option if he’s not willing to do things like mobilize his conventional military power for whatever set of domestic reasons.

And, you know, states have historically sometimes gambled on major escalations in situations where the status quo seemed so bad and so unlikely to get better that
gambling on an escalation would be a better option. If you think, for instance, about, you know, why did Japan attack Pearl Harbor in 1941? Was it because they thought that they could militarily defeat the United States? No, it was because in the status quo they knew that they were going to be economically strangled by the U.S. oil embargo. And, you know, there was a chance that by engaging in this sort of attack and wiping out the U.S. fleet at Pearl Harbor that they could get the United States to back down, right? And essentially destroy one of the main U.S. means of enforcing that embargo, right?

So gain a military advantage. Gain a coercive advantage. We all know, you know, how that ended. But the point is they didn’t go into that attack thinking, yes, this is guaranteed success. They went into it thinking the status quo, if this continues, I’m doomed. So maybe I’ll gamble on this other possibility.

So I will just, you know, stop there at the moment, but I do think that’s kind of where we see the biologic dynamics now. And maybe some things to look out for down the road.

MR. O’HANLON: Thank you, Caitlin. That was excellent and very sobering at the end as well.

Doug, if I could turn to you and ask about how you see the economic war? And I’m really quite intrigued because it’s obviously a complicated situation where there’s been an impressive application of many types of sanctions. Probably far above and beyond what Vladimir Putin expected. And a lot of inability on his part to bring in high technology goods. We’ve read a lot about that. A lot of divesting of Western firms with their supply chain, you know, operations inside of Russia. And yet, Russia seems to still be making just as much money on its net oil and gas exports as ever. And I know Samantha can speak to that as well.

How do you see the overall situation with the economic war? Whose got the upper hand? And where is this headed over the next few months?

MR. REDIKER: So thanks, first of all, Mike, and everyone for joining this morning. It is complicated. So let me take a step back and say, first of all, there are two -- well,
there are multiple layers to this.

But first of all, there’s the support that we, the U.S., the G7, the EU are providing to Ukraine which is a huge economic financial component. And second, the more aggressive warfare elements that we’re using against Russia. So I want to start with the latter ones which are the ones that you pointed out, but I don’t want to forget to bring up the Ukraine support as well because it’s not just HIMARS and other military.

Ukraine needs money. And where it’s going to get that money is an important component not only of the short-term aspect of this war, but the longer term and what happens next. And I don’t think we can lose sight of that. So let’s just start with the Russia side. You know, we collectively, but particularly the U.S. made the decision that the earlier stages of this battle that we were not going to engage militarily in direct confrontation with Russia.

NATO was not going to cross a line. We were going to limit our support. That doesn’t mean that we were not going to use aggressive tactics. It just means they were not going to be hand-to-hand combat between NATO and Russia. Well, that meant that there was an enormous effort being placed on the economic. And I think that there was a public misunderstanding or underappreciation of the asymmetry in terms of timing of that.

So you read countless articles about our sanctions against Russia working. Well, they’re not working the same way if you drop a bomb on somebody’s house. It is destroyed instantaneously. No. Sanctions don’t work that way. They’re not designed to work that way. So I think that we should, first of all, park the idea that sanctions are a direct replacement for military engagement and that the timing of the effect of those sanctions was going to be symmetric to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine militarily. And it doesn’t mean they’re not working.

So, Mike, you highlighted the one that people probably understand the least, but that is the most effective in the long term. And of course, we live in a society that nobody cares about long term, right? Everyone wants instant gratification. So the idea that we have imposed what is called the Foreign Direct Product Rule under the Export Control Act. A lot of words
there. What you need to know about that it means the U.S. has said any semiconductor chip that is evenly remotely high tech. That’s not only what goes into military hardware, but it goes into everything that Vladimir Putin was contemplating as the core of his post-fossil fuel economy.

We have put a global stop on the export of those chips into Russia. That’s huge, but it doesn’t mean it’s going to impact Russia’s economy tomorrow. What’s interesting is we’re six months into this war and it is now actually impacting Russia’s military capacity on the battlefield. I would argue that if you go back to 2014 and the invasion of Crimea that some of the restrictions that we’ve put on then are also impacting Russia’s ability to fight on the battlefield now.

But it’s hard for the public to actually say, what we did in 2015 is impacting the war in 2022, because there’s not just a direct line that you can draw but it is meaningful. So the sanctions that we put on the Export Control Act are huge. Medium term and long term. Not necessarily short term. The question is whether in the battlefield we’re in that medium term trajectory already? But let’s take a step back and say the other sanctions.

The other sanctions. The other sanctions -- sanctions have three basic purposes. To deter, to negotiate their leverage and to punish. Well, they didn’t work as deterrence. President Biden actually said, we’re not using these sanctions as deterrence. Whether it was the intention originally to use them as deterrence or not is water under the bridge. They didn’t deter because there’s a big war going on so let’s just take that and park it.

Negotiating leverage. It’s very, very interesting because a lot of people assumed that we would roll back sanctions as part of some negotiated peace deal. While I think that is still remotely plausible, I think I would emphasize the word remotely more than plausible because it is very hard. Even someone like President Macron of France who has tried to lean into a negotiated peace outcome has seen the war crimes that we’re all seeing and has started to exhibit behavior inconsistent with rolling back sanctions against an alleged but fairly obviously a leader that is engaging in war crimes. Repeated, multiple war crimes.

Very hard to say we’re going to roll back sanctions against you and your regime
because we want to sue for peace. So that leave punishment. And we're doing a pretty good job of punishing. If you take what I said before over the medium and longer term. In the short term, Russia's economy has been pretty resilient. But it's resilient in a way that people aren't appreciating, which is I would push back on the argument that we are funding Russia's war machine by providing them with dollars and euros by still buying their natural gas and their oil.

Because what we've done is restrict the use of those dollars and euros to the point where they can build up a huge amount of reserves of dollars and euros. They just can't do anything with them. Now, one of the problems that we have as a strategic superpower is we are creating alternative means by which Russia is transacting trade, finance, and commerce. Not just Russia, we're creating signaling to China and to others that are not so -- I'm not going to say adversaries. Let's just say they're not our friends in today's and tomorrow's world.

We're creating means by which the world is migrating away from a dollar-led, euro-led, G7-enforced global financial and trade system. I worry about that. I worry about that something Samantha is going to talk about, I'm sure. The potential oil price cap. I think that that has an enormous about of downside, unintended consequences. But I'm just raising the fact that while it appears -- if you look at the ruble's strength, the sanctions are not working. Well, throw that metric out of the window. Sanctions are working. They're just working in a longer-term horizon than people are thinking about.

Let me just move over to Ukraine for a moment and then I'll hand off. But I don't work for Biden to Ukraine. I think the way you need to look at Ukraine from a financial and economic perspective is through three basic phases. One, relief. Two, recovery. And three, whatever is next. I would argue that the likely outcome in a positive case is EU exception.

In terms of relief, we are providing Ukraine with money, grants. Congress is appropriating it. We are giving it to them. They are receiving it and they are living hand to mouth. Europe is having a harder time of that because a lot of the way the world is structured, particularly the EU, is to provide debt, not grants. And the problem with providing Ukraine with debt is at some point that debt needs to be repaid.
So every dollar or euro that we or Europe or the IMF or the World Bank or others provide to Ukraine through debt is actually -- and it's a good thing. They need the money, but it adds to the debt stock. And the debt stock ultimately has to be dealt with. And if you believe as I do, and most people do, that the relief phase has to include private sector involvement, well, the private sector has -- you know, they want to be good citizens, I'm sure. They also want to get a return. And if you are burdening Ukraine with enormous amounts of debt then it is harder to see how the private sector comes in in that next phase, in the rebuilding phase, to actually figure out -- so I said relief, I meant reconstruction.

In the reconstruction phase, how they actually are going to invest. So this is very tricky. Nobody wants to be the one in Europe, in the U.S., in Japan, in the IMF. In any of the institutions that is providing Ukraine with conditions free, here's a check. Go run with it. For the next phase. And there's a big jockeying right now that's going on. So I would say we are being enormously generous in our relief efforts. We are being more circumspect in the recovery efforts and those two are very much linked.

And as I mentioned in my opening comment, EU accession is the ultimately goal for Ukraine. And that is a very processed ladened process which will take a decade. But I think that is the goal and that provides the conditions based structural reforms for Ukraine coming out of this most of which is really based on economic and financial principles.

MR. O'HANLON: Doug, that's great. Samantha, if I could go to you, please? And ask how you see the energy situation shaping up? Who has the upper hand? How well is Europe going to do getting through this winter? And if this is potentially a multiyear war, how does Europe create even more leverage perhaps in the future? Maybe more disengagement or the potential for more disengagement from dependence on Russian gas imports both to create leverage for negotiation? To be more resilient in the face of what Putin might do next? Over to you.

MS. GROSS: Thank you. Yes, I'm here to talk about the energy theater of the war. When I was first asked to speak on this panel, I'm like I don't know a darn thing about
military action. But I realized that the way that most of us are experiencing and feeling this war is through energy markets. That’s how it’s affecting most of the people in room in your ordinary lives.

Russia is the world’s largest energy exporter. On the oil side it’s Saudi Arabia. But if you add in natural gas and also a bit of coal, Russia is the largest provider of exports of energy. And so, naturally, we’re going to feel this. And I think it’s important in that vein to point out how this is quite different from the oil shocks of the 1970s or more recent things we’ve seen like sanctions on Iran.

In the 1970s that was an oil producer saying, we do not want to sell you our oil. This is the exact opposite. These are oil consumers saying, we do not want to buy your product because of what you’re doing with the revenues as Doug pointed out. And because we’re trying to make you an international piranha in the realm of punishment. It’s very different than anything the world has tried to do before. And so, I think it’s really important to think of that and think about how different it is from what we’ve experienced before.

I also want to point out that sanctions serve all the purposes that Doug pointed out, but it’s also important to point out that they cause pain on both sides. Anything that puts sand into the gears of international trade is sure to cause pain for everyone. The idea is just to cause more pain for the party that we’re sanctioning rather than for the sanctioners. And in this situation with Russia as the world’s largest energy exporter that’s not an easy calculation and we’re all feeling that right now.

The place that’s feeling that the most by far is in Europe and that is because of Europe’s reliance on Russia’s natural gas. Before the war started, 40 percent of European natural gas imports were from Russia and that had increased over time. And in part because of some policy decisions, but also in part because Europe’s own native natural gas production was going down.

And rather than work on producing a lot of new gas fields in Europe which is not really what they’re trying to do with the energy transition. They were looking to Russia to get
them through the transition and into a more renewable future. Well, it turns out that that hasn’t worked out. And where the rubber meets the road in this conflict in the energy war is in natural gas in Europe.

It’s not just likely that Russia will cutoff gas exports to Europe this winter. I think that is absolutely the most likely outcome. If you look at where Russian exports to Europe come from, they come from mostly from relatively new fields in the Yamal Peninsula that you can turn on and turn off.

I talk a lot about oil exports not being a spigot, but these gas exports largely are. Also, Russia is making a lot more money from oil exports than it is from natural gas. They have the ability to do this. It will not harm their future production and also they have every reason to do it. I fully expect gas to be if not completely, largely cutoff to Europe this winter, period.

This is a very frightening proposition for Europe especially in areas -- we think a lot about natural gas and power production here in the United States. That’s where we use a lot of it. But a lot of parts of Europe use it in areas that are not easily replaced namely home heating. You think of replacing the boilers and heating systems in millions of homes that’s not going to happen by November.

Also, in heavy industry where you need high heat, where you need to burn something to produce that heat. And they’re not set up to use any other fuel. I think you’re likely to see extremely high prices. You’re already seeing talk of rationing. I think you’re likely to see important and very painful tradeoffs between household use of gas and homes just simply staying warm in northern Europe. And in the industrial use of gas in everything from steel to glass. This is going to be a real challenge for industrial Europe. It is not going to be a pretty winter. And I realize that that’s a very much a downer forecast, but I also think it’s what we should not just prepare for but expect.

On the oil side things are a little different. Doug touched on this and touched on the EU and the G7 focusing on putting a cap on the prices of Russian oil exports. This is a policy that looks really elegant on its face. We want to buy your oil. We need your oil. You’re
one of the world's largest oil exporters. What we don't want you to do is make money off of it. This is a completely new idea. Again, elegant on its face but I have grave concerns about our ability to implement it.

Both in terms of Putin’s ability to retaliate and also in terms of the implementation of it itself. The ideas that this will occur through the prevention of Western suppliers of insurance and shipping. Not allowing them to ship Russian oil unless they're following the sanctions. As Doug brought up, what this does is it pushes business away from these Western businesses. And this may be ugly in the short term, but it may actually change the shape of markets in the long term.

There are a million particulars on this. Everything from the availability of tanker capacity to go the distances they would need to go. It will be really interesting to hear all this plays out, but I think the details on this are really devilish and it will be interesting to see how it happens.

The last thing I’d like to talk about is a bit more positive at least in terms of our opinions in the West. I expect Putin to react very badly to the oil price cap. Why wouldn’t he? What is he going to do? Become more of a piranha at this stage of the game? But what he actually does in response to that is another question. But over the long, long term, Russia loses, period.

The energy transition away from fossil fuels was already going to be really hard about Russia. And Doug again brought up what Russia is thinking of doing in its post fossil fuel economy. What this conflict has done is made that change steeper and brought it forward in time because countries aren’t just moving away from fossil fuels now, they're preferentially moving away from Russian fossil fuels.

That changes the game for Russia and makes an already difficult problem even more difficult. If the oil price cap even partially works a lot of Russian oil fields are old Soviet era fields. And you can’t turn them off and on by turning a spigot. You’ll see real reservoir damage in turning off those fields if they can’t produce because that oil has no buyers. And so, no matter
how this goes out, we're looking at some short-term pain for sure.

But over the long term this is the -- the pain really falls on Putin’s Russia. And I think I'll leave it there and leave it on a slightly more optimistic note after a really gloomy five minutes of talking.

MR. O’HANLON: Well, Samantha, that was very sobering, but very helpful.

And now, Melanie, you have the job of not only extending this analysis to the globe and perhaps the China/Taiwan question, but also maybe integrating.

And so, I have two questions for you. One is indeed about China and Taiwan and what China maybe learning from this conflict? But what this does to affect the chances of war? And what type of war could possibly occur over Taiwan, heaven forbid. But also, as you hear the different analyses and integrate them. Who do you think might have the upper hand?

And do you have any expectations of where this war goes next within Ukraine itself?

We hear Caitlin and myself point out that even if there’s momentum on the Ukrainian side, it’s hard to see exactly what that means for the next few months. And Russia may have the upper hand on escalation options. Doug and Samantha have talked about how Russia is hurting and over time its economy really is going to suffer for a variety of reasons. But in the short to medium term, Europe may be really at the fall from here of showing whether it has the resoluteness to get through a tough winter.

And I expect Putin not to be willing to really concede anything even if he’s losing on the battlefield until he sees whether he can break Europe in the next few months. How do you see it on that question? And then again please extend this problem and this analysis to East Asia.

MS. SISSON: Thanks, Mike, very much for inviting those questions and I will try to only disappoint you slightly by saying that I’m not in the business of making predictions, but I hope to access a lot of the content that you’ve identified along with my colleagues. And thanks very much, I’m really pleased to be here for a wonderful occasion like this.

So what I would like to do is make a couple of observations from the perspective
of somebody who thinks very much about U.S. defense strategy including the alliance structure.
And it will touch on a lot of the sort of the elements that have already been raised.

But when I think about the manner in which the United States chose to engage this conflict both prior and during its emergence. I think one of the real positives for me was that the Biden administration’s position really reenforced the meaning of U.S. defense alliances. Defense alliances are the most serious business there is. And they’re very serious because they’re high cost and high risk. You have to pay the cost of making them credible in terms of military commitment. And the risk, of course, is that they can fail.

A defense alliance is essentially the most extreme form of military deterrence. And when they fail, which they have in the past, that means the United States is at war. That is a nontrivial risk as I’m sure everybody in the audience very well understands. And so, defense alliances are not something that are undertaken profitably. They are very measured and few and selected because the issues at stake are vital to the interests of the United States and they’re confined to those set of interests.

The United States does not have a defense alliance with Ukraine. Now, this didn’t mean and doesn’t mean that the United States can’t contribute militarily or that it couldn’t have decided to go to war on behalf of Ukraine. It just meant that the deterrent posture was not one of purely military deterrence as you would see in the defense alliance or at least primarily military deterrence.

Instead as Doug and others have highlighted. The United States and likeminded partners engaged in what’s becoming to be called a strategy of intergraded deterrence, which is not exclusive to military tools but includes also diplomacy, information, and very much economic tools of influence. So of course, we know what has occurred since that time. And there’s a lot of interest in sort of what we can extrapolate? And what that might mean for the close correlate in the Western Pacific in terms of a China and Taiwan? And certainly, there are a lot of tactical and operational lessons to be learned.

Every one of the sort of positives and negatives that Caitlin outlined, I’m sure
are not lost on Taipei or Beijing or on the United States for that matter. But when it comes to the United States, I want to emphasize that I think the very first question about the implications for Taiwan goes back to the first principle of defense alliances.

Is the status of Taiwan of vital national interest for the United States? Does it rise to that level? And that is a question I think that's being debated very much here in town. And as it turns out on 60 minutes last night as well. And it's not clear to me that there’s consensus around that as yet. We'll see.

If the answer is that, yes, the United States does have a vital interest in the status of Taiwan then it will have certain policy implications. If the answer is, no, it will have certain policy implications and one of them would be that we would probably pursue a robust strategy of integrated deterrence to try to prevent China from acting aggressively against the island.

We'll skip ahead to just say, okay. So we're going to choose a strategy to deter either military or integrated. All strategies of deterrence might fail. And so, the next question is what is the after strategy? For military alliances if it fails, if deterrence fails, the after strategy is a war fighting strategy.

The question about integrated deterrence is not so clear cut. What is the after strategy? And I think that's one of the things that we're working through right now. It could be in the cases of failed integrated deterrent posture that there's another war fighting strategy because the United States does choose to engage. Or it could be punishment. Or it could be decoupling. Or it could be sort of punishment and decoupling. There's more than one option.

In any case, I think the important thing I would emphasize is that there needs to be clear objectives of that strategy. If it's a punishment strategy, what are the clear objectives? If it's a decoupling strategy, what are the clear objectives? And I have to confess that today, I'm not sure what strategy we're pursuing. We collectively in terms of Russia.

I don't think anyone believes that we can punish Putin into submission. And that he'll retrench, he'll give up, he'll return territory, he'll do, you know, tuck his tail between his legs.
and go home, right? That’s not what anybody expects. And so, what is our goal with this over time? Is the objective to punish very severely in the near to medium term and then expect that Russia in some way, shape or form returns to an approximately similarly status or role in the global economy that it had before?

Or is it to decouple and fundamentally reshape the role of Russia in the global economy? It’s again not clear to me which we’re pursuing in earnest and that’s in part because I think, you know, the options for how we would pursue either of those strategies are two.

So there’s two ways to decouple. You can decouple faster. You can decouple slow. Similarly, with punishment. There’s two ways you can do it. You can do it for a short time or you can do it for a long time. No matter which quadrant you’re in of that two by two as Samantha rightly points out, it’s painful. It’s painful for everybody as our friends in Europe know all too well.

My concern is that I’m not sure what quadrant we’re actually in right now. And so, I’m going to be watching not just sort of how the conflict itself unfolds and what we can learn from the tactical and operational element there, but also strategically about how the West is positioning its goals for Russia’s role in the global economy moving forward. And what those policy measures can and can’t do in that regard including the price cap on oil. So I hope, Mike, that accessed enough of your interest. But if not, you know where to find me. You can always follow up.

MR. O’HANLON: Thank you very much, Melanie. And let’s go to the audience now. We’ve got a few minutes left. What we’re going to do by the way is going into about 10 or a few minutes after with this panel to have coffee break, a brief coffee break and then we’ll resume it 10:15 with our superstar Europe panel.

So let’s take maybe one round of questions. I’ll ask each panelist to maybe respond to one of the group and then we’ll wrap up. So if I could start over here, please, and then we’ll go to the gentleman in the sixth row.

MR. HUMPHREY: I’m Peter Humphrey. And intelligence analyst and a former
diplomat. When we do well to establish the principle right now that all the damage in Ukraine will eventually be paid for by Russia. And we don’t want sanctions post-war so detrimental that we wind up with a World War I situation.

But we can make it clear that there will be a generational tax on all natural resource exports from Russia to pay for what they are doing right now in Ukraine. And this would have the salutary effect to let Russians know that every single day, they’re growing greater and greater in debt to pay for the Ukraine damage.

MR. O’HANLON: Thank you for that question. And over here please.

MS. SLOVEN: Hi. Mike Sloven. I’m a law student at GW. For Mike, two things that you mentioned to tie together. There’s an element of the war where we’re not sure how long things are going to last. And there’s also a material need for things like tanks for maneuver warfare.

To what extent can we continue to rely on the kind of trickle down of back filing Polish or Czech tanks and APCs to give to Ukraine? And when are we going to have to deal with the logistical problems of training and supply chain for more Western like leopard systems?

MR. O’HANLON: Excellent. And let’s see if we have a follow up question from the audience before we come back to the panel. Okay. Yes, we’ll go here to the gentleman in the second row.

QUESTIONER: Thank you. I’m a research internet AFPC. When it comes to holding Russia accountable in wartime for its war crimes and atrocities. How can the West, Europe and the United States at large be able to contribute to that process especially when it comes to organizations like the Wagner Group that are not the whole bin specifically to the Russian government and their military apparatus?

MR. O’HANLON: Great. And before we respond, and I guess I’ll start since I’ve got the mike and one question was for me, but I’m going to add one more question to the mix for anybody who feels left out so far. Notwithstanding Melanie’s earlier protest against making prognostications, I’d like to ask the panelist, anybody who wants to respond to this, what the
likelihood is that this war will be largely over at this time next year? Or to what extent may it still be continuing onward from that point? So it’s an impossible, unfair question. That’s okay. These folks specialize in answering those kinds of difficult queries.

I guess what I would say about the likelihood of thinking about future supply provisioning by the West is that the greater dilemma here is going to be in munitions not in hardware, not in systems.

For example, the United States has plenty of M1 tanks. If we wanted to use some of our surplus to provide either Ukraine directly or to backfill countries like Poland that have provided a lot of their T72 stock. I think we can do that without any great worry that we’re going to somehow be underprepared and defenseless in a place like Korea or the Baltic states should heaven forbid Russia somehow find a way to threaten NATO territory any time soon.

But I’m more concerned about a lot of the high-tech systems and especially munitions, drones, those kinds of capabilities, where it does appear that we’ve been drawing down our own stock rather quickly to help Ukraine. I think we should sort of still lean in in favor of doing that because Ukraine is doing well. And you hear a lot on trips to Eastern Europe about how it’s everyone’s fight and Ukraine is sort of carrying out this fight for us.

There’s a fair amount of truth to that. Bob Kagan is going to speak later. I remember an op-ed that he wrote right after this war began where he was very worried that NATO was going to have to face a Russia along a multi hundred-mile front as Russia potentially took much or all of Ukraine and then had the Kaliningrad pocket and Belarus and its own territory against Estonia and Latvia. That would have been a foreboding situation even if Putin probably can’t defeat NATO even in the best case in a conventional fight.

He might have been tempted to nibble away at pieces of territory with Russian-majority-speaking populations. I think the chances of that are much less now because Ukraine has exacted such a price on Russia. So we should help them continue to do so partly for our own wellbeing. So that would be my response. But now, if we can go down the panel and, Samantha, any of those questions you would like for yourself?
MS. GROSS: Sure. I will at least make an attempt. Although, I think Doug and I should probably tag team this one. To answer the tax on natural resources in order to fund the reconstruction of Ukraine.

It is a very interesting question. And a question that comes to mind in response for me is those are natural resources that the world is wanting to move away from. And Russian oil is not particularly climate friendly in terms of the way that it is produced.

Russian gas has a lot of flaring and a lot of methane omissions associated with it. So ideally, we would actually like to phase out Russian energy resource production for other reasons as well. And so, I guess my question would be in the future would Russia be seen as a reliable enough supplier? And are we going to continue this theme of preferentially phasing out Russian natural resources to make that policy not quite as effective as it might otherwise be for other reasons? Both energy security reasons and for climate reasons.

And so, I get it. It’s elegant on its face but those are the questions that it raises in my mind.

MR. O’HANLON: Thank you. Doug.

MR. REDIKER: So I’ll do a slightly different tack on the same question. I actually think it’s a smart idea. I just don’t think anyone should talk about it because I think at the end of the day, the framing of what will or will not be on the table in any potential cease-fire peace talks is so prospective that, first of all, at this point -- I mean it’s just premature. Those talks are not any time in the immediate or foreseeable future.

But also, if you start talking to me, you raised in your question the World War I scenario. Of course, the way you described it is different. But I’m not sure it would be perceived as different from those that would know that they are going to be asked to pay for the sins of their leaders in generations to come.

So I think that the way that reparations are actually crafted is an open-ended question. One thing I would argue is a bad idea, even though there are a lot of people in Congress and others that are talking about it, is to seize and repurpose Russian central bank
reserves. It's a very attractive idea. It's also a very bad one from my perspective because central bank reserves play a very unique role in the global landscape.

They are supposed to be sacrosanct. And if you take them even in light of a terrible, terrible set of aggressions like those being undertaken by Russia under Putin right now, what you're basically doing is telling the Chinese and every other central bank in the world that their reserves are being currently held in U.S. dollars at the New York Fed are actually subject to seizure depending on what the political winds are at any given time in the future.

That is a very dangerous precedent to set. So even though that wasn't what you were asking, I wanted to raise that because I think the concept of how you pay for reconstruction is a huge issue but it's probably premature to be talking about specifics.

MR. O'HANLON: Thank you. Melanie, over to you.

MS. SISSON: Yeah. I'll just add onto what Doug has said with less nuance. Which is my question would be to what end would we be making that expectation clear for the population of Russia? I think there is a real risk of overdoing it and in a way that can rebound very poorly into the future.

And so, I would just sort of continue to think about what kind of Russia? And what way in which do we think we can interact with a future Russia? Are we looking to achieve and take care in the policies that we establish so that we don't foreclose any options or push too far in directions where the unintended consequences could be really severe?

MR. O'HANLON: And Caitlin. Still a couple of questions on the table here.

MS. TALMADGE: Sure. I'm aware of that, yes. So before I get to the one that's hanging out there, I just want to briefly foot stomp your munitions point. I think that's spot on that it's less a question of platforms and more the munitions. Which is also a very relevant concern for the sort of Taiwan scenario that Melanie was talking about. And I think it's something that we really should look at with respect to our defense posture in Asia. This war is kind of showing us the importance of munitions and not just platforms.

And sure, I will take a swing at your other question. I mean, you know, I think it
was Yogi Berra who said, prediction is hard especially about the future. And so, I don't want to
overstate predictions. But I think your question does make me step back and say, well, where
do we think the military situation might be in a year?

And I will say I wouldn't be surprised if in a year Russia still controlled parts of
Ukraine including perhaps some swathes of Ukraine that it controls right now, particularly in the
south. When you think about Kherson, Crimea, and Donbas. Like all places, you know,
particular Donbas where Russia is relatively well dug in. And I think my impression, correct me if
I'm wrong, is, you know, better prepared in some ways than perhaps they were in the recent
areas where Ukraine has had successes.

But I think that the critical question. And I think this is actually a good note to
kind of tend towards as we wrap up the militaryish panel where we're looking at the war and
battlefield dynamics. Is that I think whether the war is actually over by this time next year may
not just depend on those military questions of what territory, you know, has or hasn't been
ceased. But that will really be a political question. And it gets back to some of these, you know,
energy questions.

Like what is Europe's will to continue this war after they get through another
winter? What will the Ukrainian population be willing to continue fighting for? Are they, you
know, willing to concede some of that territory in ways that, you know, frankly today I think
they're not? And likewise what does Putin define as success in this war?

I mean he has the ability to define and redefine what his objectives are. And so,
I guess I would just say on a purely military level, I can see the Russians still controlling areas
that they control today. A year from now, the question is, you know, what does that mean
politically for both sides? And does that result in an appetite for political settlement between
those two sides? And also, between, you know, the Western backers of Ukraine and Ukraine?
So I'll just stop there.

MR. O'HANLON: Thank you very much. Thank you all. We're now going to
take a 10-minute coffee break. And then we'll have a panel with three scholars of combined
roughly 50 years’ experience at Brookings, Constanze Stelzenmüller, Jim Goldgeier and Fiona Hill. Moderated by a scholar who has now got about an hour and a half of Brookings experience.

And we’re very happy to be welcoming Elsa to Brookings in our Turkish/American chair studying Europe along with the rest of the Europe center. So thank you all for being here again. Please thank this panel. I have to get a quick cup of coffee and be back at 10:15.

(Recess)

MS. AYDINTAŞBAŞ: Good morning, everyone. Welcome to the second panel of this forum. My name is Aslı Aydintaşbaş. Many of you don’t know me for a good reason. This is actually my first day at Brookings as a visiting fellow at the Center on the United States and Europe. It turns out Brookings has this hazing ritual whereby you make you moderate an all-star cast on your first day. So, I have with me James Goldgeier, who is a visiting fellow at CUSE as well as, of course, a professor at Stanford and leading Russia expert. Fiona Hill is a longtime scholar at Brookings in between various government jobs as a senior national security advisor and the author of a very interesting book on Putin as well as, of course, her recent work. And Constanze Stelzenmüller, who is a leading expert on trans-Atlantic issues and all things European for the purposes of this panel, as well as being the new director of CUSE.

So, I’m going to start with Jim. In the previous panel you heard about the immediate battlefield dynamics as well as some of the critical security and defense issues around the Ukraine War, stretching all the way to the Pacific. I think we want to take a longer-term view in this panel and think through about the longer-term implications for European security and transatlantic issues. Jim, I want to start with you because since the end of the Cold War we have tried to imagine European security as something that dependent on a stable relationship with Russia. That was a core element of our concept of European security. Now what happens now with the Ukraine War that has changed everything? So how do we establish a modus vivendi with Russia at this point?
MR. GOLDGEIER: Well, thanks Aslı, and thanks to Brookings for including me in this Knight Forum and welcome to Brookings. She’s amazing. We’re thrilled to have her here.

So, that kind of relationship that we had hoped for with Russia I just don’t think we can have that as long as Vladimir Putin is in power. I mean, this is a regime that’s trying to carry out a genocide against Ukraine. It’s trying to wipe out Ukraine as a people, as a culture, as a language, as an idea, as a country. So, and I think it’s worth just stepping back just for a minute. We’ve got Strobe Talbott’s name here. Wonderfully his name is on this center. Because what you were describing as to what we hope for in the post-Cold War world in terms of a relationship with Russia, that was, that’s what his job was in the eight years of the Clinton administration. As Suzanne mentioned at the outset, he started as ambassador-at-large for the newly independent states and then a year later became deputy secretary of state and did that job for seven years in the Clinton administration. And his job was to bring the Europe policy and the Russia policy together. It was to establish, to help integrate central and east Europeans into Europe and to try to create a partnership with Russia. You know, there were people who wanted to focus mainly on central and eastern Europe and didn’t really want to worry that much about Russia. There were others who wanted to focus on the partnership with Russia and, you know, didn’t care as much about the central and eastern Europeans, and the Clinton administration’s approach with Strobe in the lead was to do both and there were lots of successes and Russia joined NATO’s Partnership for Peace, Russia participated in the implementation force after the Dayton Peace Accords were signed, the implementation portion, in Bosnia. NATO and Russia signed the Founding Act, as it was called, in 1997 to establish a new relationship between NATO and Russia as NATO was enlarging, and then there was the diplomacy to end the war, the Kosovo war, which Strobe played the critical role working with the Russians and with Finnish President Ahtisaari. So, lots of successes, lots of hope that you could actually have this relationship and there was a belief that, you know, the idea at the time was you couldn’t have a stable European security order without Russia.

Well, and here we are today. You can’t have a stable European security order with
Russia. Russia is out to undermine the European security order. And so, I think the Biden administration policy of punishing Russia we heard in the previous panel sanctions, isolating Russia diplomatically, and weakening Russia militarily through support for Ukraine militarily, is really the only approach that we can have towards Putin Russia and we’re not going to have some kind of modus vivendi unless and until there is a different leader in Russia.

MS. AYDINTAŞBAŞ: I’d love to have Fiona come in for that question, but before that, Doug, isn’t that, we fight, Jim, sorry --

MR. GOLDGEIER: I know it’s your first day.

MS. AYDINTAŞBAŞ: Isn’t that re-fighting the Cold War.

MR. GOLDGEIER: I mean, we’re in -- you know, what can we do? I mean, we have the leader we have in Russia. You know, it’s worth noting, I mean, he did invade Ukraine in 2014, he did annex territory, the U.N. system was founded to try to prevent big counties from just taking territory from their neighbors by sending their forces across the border, and we did still try to pursue a cooperative relationship with Russia. We were still trying to pursue a cooperative relationship with Russia up until this expanded invasion started. But I think again the nature of this expanded invasion, the brutality, the attempted genocide, I think he has created this reaction where the only thing we can do is to try to punish, isolate and weaken.

MS. AYDINTAŞBAŞ: Fiona, can you unpack this European security without Russia?

MS. HILL: Well, obviously this is the huge question that everybody is trying to figure out, and Jim has given us, you know, the frame of, you know, where we started off in the 1990’s after the collapse of the Soviet Union and part of the dilemma is we have to remember that, you know, the Soviet Union didn’t actually just collapse, it was actually picked apart by some of its own elites. There is actually a great book by a Russian historian author based in London, Vladislav Zubok, which is actually called “Collapse,” but the actual premise of the book is that Boris Yeltsin, you know, the first president of an independent Russia was the person who actually pulled the place apart because of a power struggle with Mikhail Gorbachev. So, and
that was, you know, somewhat unexpected for everybody looking at the history of the Soviet Union.

The reason I want to talk about this is, of course, because we are now marking the recent death of Mikhail Gorbachev, a lot of us are looking back over the period of the last forty plus more years, Gorbachev coming into power in 1985, thinking about what he was trying to do. Gorbachev also was setting out to try to stabilize the relationship with Europe and the western United States. He didn't want to pull his country apart. Obviously, that's what happened because of the complexity and just the scale of the problem that confronted him of trying to figure out how to reform the Soviet Union and put the whole union on a different footing. He actually appealed to all of the constituent parts for a new union treaty, but it was the sort of desire to get rid of him because he was in the way of other people's power, that was ultimately what he floundered on.

And we might see something — sorry, I keep realizing as I move here my voice keeps fading in and out, so I'll try to sit a little bit more, stand over the microphone. You know, we have to watch the dynamics inside of Russia very carefully, I think, in terms of answering this question. Because Russia remains a very complex place. We think about Vladimir Putin, we know that it was his decision to launch this war. Part of it is his thinking about Ukraine along the lines that Jim is suggesting here. There are only a handful of people, maybe a bit of the same number of people sitting on this stage, who participated in the decision to invade Ukraine. It hasn't gone anywhere that he thought it would or the so-called “party war” thought it would.

And now there's a big debate inside Russia itself. So it's not just us debating it, it's also people within Russia. We see that hundreds of thousands of Russians clearly want to be in a more stable relationship with the West. They've left, and many of them are in the West. Many of them, in fact, Turkey. Aslı has probably seen an awful lot of quite prominent Russian think-tankers and politicians as she, you know, got on the plane to come here. I mean half of, many of the people who were instrumental in Yeltsin's team back in the 1990's, including Anatoly Chubais, have been residents of Turkey now. There are people here, there are people,
you know, all over in Europe who also are thinking themselves about how does Russia restore this relationship?

Alexei Navalny, one of the key opposition figures, who all of us have been looking at very closely, who is obviously sitting in a penal colony, recently in the most bizarre of all the recent punishments inflicted against him, the prisoners, his fellow prisoners being told not even to look at him, because that underscores, however, just how dangerous somebody like Navalny actually is to Putin’s power. The grip Vladimir Putin has on the system is also faltering. And in the past in the Soviet period, you know, we had a whole succession of geriatric secretary generals who passed on the stage, Putin, as Bill Burns, the director of the CIA said recently at the Aspen Security Forum, he put it, “unfortunately he looks rather healthy at the moment.” But notwithstanding he no longer looks infallible.

And this is all of the issues we will be talking about today on the last panel, talking about the various constraints on a military, energy and otherwise. And once other people around start to question what he’s got out of this war, not just the conduct of brutality but the fact that Ukrainians hate Russians now and there are eleven million Russians who have Ukrainian heritage, Russian citizens, and others. Millions of other who have, you know, some Ukrainian heritage. This kind of feeling of being ostracized elsewhere in Europe where people have been, you know, so used to having this density of relationships, a whole reorientation of the way that Russia itself is operating. I think that this is actually going to be opening up part of that debate too. It’s going to be not just all about us and what we decide. It’s how other Russians and other Russian groups react as well. And I think that that’s going to be part of unpacking this discussion.

MS. AYDINTAŞBAŞ: But are we there?

MS. HILL: No, we’re not there yet and I think that, you know, in talking to many Russian colleagues who are looking at polling, others who are also worried about the future of their country their view is that there’s got to be a lot more of battlefield push-back, disasters, and a lot more pressure, getting through the winter as well is going to be pretty critical for people
around Putin to be able to put some pressure on him and others for changing this situation, so we’re not there yet at all. And I think what Jim said here, we’ve got to start passing things in short, medium, and longer term. The short-term we are where we are and where we’ve all discussed. The medium-term, as Doug said on the last panel, and Samantha and others, you know, were talking about there are going to be knock-on impacts for Russia that’s going to make that pain and the consequences of this felt even more so. And over the longer term, and I suppose this is a segue into Constanze. Look, we’ve had that experience with Germany, you know, twice in the previous century, World War I and World War II. And Germany is much driven by Germans themselves over time, also turned around its relationship, and I think, you know, we’ve got a lot of lessons to learn from that about how we craft a relationship with Russia over the longer term.

MS. AYDINTAŞBAŞ: Constanze, you just came, you’ve just arrived from Germany, in fact. You were there last week. Chancellor Scholz has talked about Zeitenwende, a turning point in German thinking about European security and Germany’s own role in it. What’s the mood like in Germany?

MS. STELZENMÜLLER: Thank you, Aslı. Thank you, everyone, for asking me to be on this panel at this time. I do want to add a footnote to the Russia-Turkey business. To any of you have seen the wonderful 1939 Lubitsch movie, “Ninotchka,” with Greta Garbo and Melvyn Douglas, that ends with a happy end in Istanbul, just so, you know, where the Frenchman and the Soviet woman meet and live happily ever after. Anyway, I thought that was important. On the Zeitenwende, yeah, I came back from Germany on Saturday, having spent a rather exciting week in Germany where Berlin is currently in the middle of a tank battle, or rather a battle about tanks. And which in a larger sense is a battle about indeed what the Zeitenwende means. I do want to say that I occasionally read in my Twitter feed that Germany isn’t doing anything to help Ukraine, and I think that’s not quite fair. There is a very long list of stuff on the German government’s website that you can check, but the Ukrainians themselves would be the first to say that some of the heavy weaponry that Germany has given them more recently,
especially the multi-rocket launchers, have indeed played a great role in Ukraine’s recent spectacular successes in pushing back the Russians on the battlefield and establishing a much longer front, and to Melanie Sisson’s point earlier about ammunition and Caitlin also made and Mike, the Germans have, in fact, delivered huge quantities of ammunition to the Ukrainians. And that’s not to say, obviously, that we couldn’t do more. It’s also true that despite the, I think, very serious determination of not just the chancellor, but his cabinet, to pull through, not just on the promises of the February 27th speech, despite the urgency of concern in Germany about the impact of what is now and has been for two weeks, a complete Russian gas cut-off, mitigated only by the fact that we were able to fill our storage capacities to at this point nearly 90 percent, and the fact that we’ve had good weather so far, everybody knows, as Samantha was saying in the first panel, that this is going to be a grim winter for Europe. And the storage capacities Germany does have the largest storage facilities in Europe. When they’re full, they provide for all of Germany’s consumer and industry needs for about two months. That’s it. Winters are slightly longer than that. Also, it doesn’t account for the fact that we might want or need to provide for our neighbors in the form of reverse flow of gas. So, I think the Zeitenwende is right now in the state of combination of determination and intense worry, but I think we’re going to have to pull through, because Putin’s not stopping. It’s very simple.

MS. AYDINTAŞBAŞ: But let me ask you about how this is shaping internal European politics. Obviously, every country’s experience is different, but we have elections coming up in Italy. We just had elections in Sweden with the rise of the far right. And there is always the worry that this will really have either a destabilizing impact on European politics, domestic politics, or really lead to the rise of the far right in some countries. Is this fear exaggerated?

MS. STELZENMULLER: No, it’s not, of course not. And I can’t go and say that. I do want to, before I address that, just remind us of just how extraordinarily and surprisingly cohesive the European reaction has been. And I want to preface that by saying that it might not have been had not the Biden administration been so extraordinarily decisive and supportive,
which wasn't, as my French colleague might have said, who sadly returned to Paris, ce n'est pas evident. It wasn't evident after the AUKUS debacle and after the withdrawal from Afghanistan that it would go this way, but the truth is that this moment of trans-Atlantic cooperation and coordination is historical in its depth, its breadth and its, yes, its generosity towards Europe. And I don’t know anyone in Berlin, at least not any sane person, who isn’t profoundly grateful for that.

So that was my preface. That said, the European Union also has done some, by its own standards, rather unusual things. Not only has it been very forceful in diplomacy, Ursula von der Leyen I think has surpassed herself, but it has played an essential role in the sanctions. This was to Melanie Sisson’s point, earlier integrated deterrence. Well, European ability, European power assets, and the sanctions played a great role in that, and I think this Biden administration, you know, has, is fully aware of the degree to which European power assets are not just a sort of boutique add-on as they might have been in a military operation, but, in fact, a central leverage for American power in this conflict. And then the EU even has funded military supplies which, again, is a historic first. It’s offered Ukraine and Moldova membership prospective. Again, extraordinary. If you’d asked me to bet on that a couple months ago, I would have said not in your wildest dreams.

We’re seeing a real energy market shake-up. I mean, we’re also seeing the sort of extraordinary insanity of the European energy market, but things are being done about that. And the Germans more specifically are decoupling at breakneck speed. We’re already out of Russian coal, we’re out of Russian oil and, of course, now the Russians have cut us off from gas slightly earlier than we were planning to, which was at the end of 2024. But thank you very much. That also stops the question of are we funding the Russian effort? No, we’re not, because the Russians cut us off.

There is a degree of the circling of wagons. The Finns and the Swedes joining NATO, neutral countries having quiet internal conversations about the degree of their neutrality, which is interesting, and I would expect more movement there. Remember the Danish referendum of the opt-out from the opt-out from European defense and security. That is, I think,
an interesting phenomenon and which I think is useful and might help overcome occasional problems. And you see the European Commission I would say finally cracking down on Hungary.

That’s it. You’re completely right. And the divisive elements didn’t, you know, start with the Swedish election. Remember the extraordinarily narrow win of Macron in the French election, right? And the specter of Marine Le Pen as a serious presidential candidate. Chilling. In Germany, the AfD is inching up in the polls from near 10 to 14 percent. That’s still not a lot but they’re hoping to make hay out of the political divisions of this fall and they’re allying themselves with the Querdenken movement, the conspiracy theorists, the pandemic conspiracy theorists, and so on. All those are unpleasant prospects and I suppose we’re lucky in that Germany is not going to have significant state elections in any of the places where the AfD is particularly strong within the next one and a half years.

And then there is, of course, the question of the U.K.’s relationship with the EU on which I think we can say that the jury is still out. There is the question of the Northern Ireland protocol which could, you know, become insanely divisive if London allows that. And, you know, you’re entirely right. There is still record gas prices, there is still record inflation, and it is entirely possible that that will generate a great deal of political division. That said, at least from my own country -- if you look at the polls, people are saying I am willing to pay the price for supporting Ukraine against Russia. Now, this may involve a certain degree of what we in Germany call whistling in the dark or whistling in the forest.

MS. AYDINTAŞBAŞ: That’s before the winter.

MS. STELZENMULLER: That’s before the winter, exactly. But still, I mean, I’m going to give them brownie points for saying that, and for wanting to think they have the courage to be that strong in the winter, so we’ll see, but I do think we should also talk about the, you know, the current conflicts between Turkey and Greece, and Azerbaijan and Armenia. Things are heating up on our periphery and that’s also something we should be concerned about.

MS. AYDINTAŞBAŞ: Fiona, I want to come to you about the rest, because here
we’re very focused on Europe and the transatlantic relationship, but last week, Thursday and Friday, you had the meeting of Shanghai Cooperation Organization, that was in Samarkand, Uzbekistan, which Xi Jinping, his first travel since Covid, Putin, Erdogan, and Modi. It was a number of other leaders but, you know, we tend to roll our eyes at this SCO which didn’t become the anti-NATO quite, but I think together these countries represent 44 percent of the world population and among them there are four nuclear powers. I guess my question would be, is there any threat, if any, from this organization and is this something you take into consideration when you think of European security?

MS. HILL: I do, but perhaps not in the way that the question is framed, to be clear. And actually I hope everyone will stick around for the next panel because we’ll have actually quite a few of our experts here who can talk, you know, very much about these issues as well, and it will be very interesting, of course, to ask Tanvi Madan when she’s here about how she interprets Modi’s comments to Putin which I think were quite significant, although obviously we probably don’t need to get too carried away about this, about this is not a time for war, but a time for peace.

MS. AYDINTAŞBAŞ: And public comments.

MS. HILL: And public comments, yeah, which I found significant. I mean, I don’t know quite what he said in private, but the fact that he actually said that in public, you know, having India quite rightly from its perspective taking a very cautious approach to this whole conflict because there is so much riding on it from India which feels, you know, a sense of existential threat from China. Remember, India and China had military exchanges in the Himalayas over disputed territory that resulted in several deaths not all that long ago. You know, India having even a mild rebuke of Russia, that it’s often relied on to balance off its relations with China, have obviously been very militarily dependent on us, that’s fairly significant.

But the reason why I wanted to change the framing a bit gets to the whole way that we always talk about things. We always look at it from our perspective. And, you know, we tend to look at it from U.S.-Russia relations, you know, the history of our bilateral engagement.
We then look at it from the trans-Atlantic perspective, we look at it from the elite level, but as Constanze was just mentioning, there’s a lot of public level support. And a lot of people are framing this conflict quite differently from us.

In Europe, at the popular level, and you know in the U.K. and other places, you know, we panic about, oh my God, we could be in World War III, people are already actually looking at it in the frame of World War I and World War II because that’s what Vladimir Putin used. He actually said he’s trying to basically roll back history to the end of World War I when the Russian Empire fell apart and Ukraine suddenly became a socialist republic with a kind of independent perspective within the Soviet Union. He’s saying, of course, that he’s invaded Ukraine to de-Nazify and this is a continuation of World War II. And the very fact that he said all of this in Europe where all of those wars were fought, people are actually, you know, taking him kind of at his word and looking at that frame themselves, where the home front support and the home front role in this was very important.

And then when you look at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in this context, the reason that was set up was not in opposition to the United States or to NATO, it was set up to manage the rise of China within a regional context. In fact, you know, people had said behind the scenes that the Shanghai Cooperation Organization was all about China. It was how to manage suddenly this rising superpower on very sensitive borders with central Asian countries and Russia all trying to figure out how they were going to navigate a completely new reality. And what we’ve seen over time at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, for example, is that China has actually enabled central Asian states not to recognize things that Russia was doing in the neighborhood. So, back after the annexation of, you know, Crimea, there was also the pressure put on the central Asian states because they are part of not just this Shanghai Cooperation Organization but the CSTO, the Cooperative Security Arrangement that the Russians did try to create in opposition to NATO, put pressure on them to recognize annexation of Crimea. Before that after the invasion of Georgia in 2008, pressure put on them to recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia’s independence and each time they were able not to because
behind the scenes it was clear the Chinese didn’t like that. So here again we see at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization that Putin had to also acknowledge that China might have a somewhat different perspective on how things were going.

Now, if Russia had succeeded and Putin had succeeded in forcing the capitulation of Ukraine that first week or so of the invasion, we might be in a different place, but he hasn’t and so, as Jim said, we are where we are now. And it’s clear that other countries that don’t like this at all. And in fact, now the image of Putin as infallible, as rather not infallible anymore, but fallible, and the Russian military not being as powerful as everybody assumed, is having knock-on consequences in the region. Because Russia has pulled troops out of all the other border regions including the territories of central Asia to go and fight in Ukraine.

They’ve pulled them back from the Kola peninsula, you know, up with Norway, the Finnish border. That’s actually one of the reasons the Finns decided to join NATO. What if they come back? Are they going to invade? Because, you know, they seem to be invading with no pretext here.

And in Tajikistan you’re now seeing a fight, a war going on over disputed territory with their neighbor Kyrgyzstan, which you can’t imagine happening in the past if Russia had been much more the arbiter. Another outbreak of war between Armenia and Azerbaijan which of course is right on Turkey’s borders and Turkey has, you know, an ambiguous and complex relationship to all of this as well. The assumption here is that this is some kind of conspiracy theory, you know, among and between, you know, Russia, Azerbaijan, and Turkey, but you see it’s actually more likely that it’s because Russia is no longer able to, you know, force the various parties into basically negotiating or behaving the way that it would like to.

Just as an aside there, I once had the occasion to talk to Dmitry Peskov who is the spokesperson for Putin, immediately after the recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and I said to him, well what if Armenia recognizes Abkhazia and South Ossetia and then also recognizes Nagorno-Karabakh in this context? He said “they won’t because we’ve told them not to.” And that was a public comment. So that just kind of underscores, you know, the way that
Russia used to operate in the region and now not operating in the same way.

And I think that that’s why when we look at the SCO it’s going to very interesting to kind of watch the different dynamics there, because I think there are lots of knock-on effects in this conflict, and what’s happening in other places are just as relevant to get back to the original question that Jim said about, you know, how Russia is going to look in the longer term and what pressures and constraints that might be on to a post-Russia or even a Putin Russia to re-think some of its relationships.

MS. AYDINTAŞBAŞ: So, Jim, let’s come back to the U.S., which has clearly shown leadership in organizing a very united and robust response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. But given what we spoke about in the first panel and given the story that Fiona is laying out in all these other theaters and what’s happening in Asia with Taiwan in the Pacific, is this level of attention to European security sustainable long-term?

MR. GOLDGEIER: Well, that’s a great question and, you know, this is not what the Biden administration came into office thinking they were going --

MS. AYDINTAŞBAŞ: Publicly, not, they told us --

MR. GOLDGEIER: I mean, they were focused really focused on, we’re going to do the Indo-Pacific and we’re going to focus on the competition with China and, you know, President Biden’s first meeting with President Putin in June of 2021, first meeting after becoming president, was the meeting in Geneva. President Biden had been taking about hoping for a stable and predictable relationship with Russia, which was never really realistic. I think, you know, Putin is predictably unpredictable, and I don’t think he was looking for stable relationship with the United States. And I was critical of the framing at the time but actually think it helped a lot because I think the fact that President Biden had made an effort helped in bringing the allies together and gave the United States more credibility, you know, because the United States had made an effort with Putin and, of course, you know, Putin blew everything up with the expanded invasion.

But, you know, again this is not, you know, the fact that the bandwidth of the
leading policy makers in the United States, president and advisors and others within the bureaucracy, the resources, you know, none of this was desired at the beginning of this presidency because really the way they looked at Russia and Europe was not, it wasn’t about Russia and Europe, it was about how they fit into the broader competition with China, right? The focus on Europe was about, okay, what Europeans, what are you going to be able to do for us, with us, in our competition with China? It was about hoping Russia could just stay quiet so that the United States could focus on China. Of course, that didn’t happen.

I think, you know, as Constanze said, there were troubling signs last year with respect to the relationship with the Europeans. You know, the complaints about lack of consultation with the, in Afghanistan withdrawal, the chaos of the Afghanistan withdrawal, the complaints by the French in the way the AUKUS deal was handled. But, you know, this administration clearly stepped up with the response to the expanded invasion of Ukraine and I, in terms of is this sustainable, I mean, the United States has done this with Europe before, so, and I don’t see what the alternative is. And I think the Europeans have stepped up as well. I think the fact that Finland and Sweden are joining NATO is a huge opportunity for NATO, and clearly Finland and Sweden believe that it’s essential for their defense, but it also transforms the map of northern Europe, so, I think that despite the fact that the Biden administration didn’t want to be spending their time on this, they’ve shown themselves quite adept and don’t really have much of a choice but continue to work with the Europeans. Again, you know, it’s about Putin’s, Russia’s, and the really Putin’s efforts to undermine the West, to undermine the United States, to undermine Europe. The United States and its allies have to respond.

MS. AYDINTAŞBAŞ: Before we turn to questions from the audience, let me also ask you have, with the recent battlefield success of Ukraine, and the sort of excitement in Europe and the United States about that, do you think we’ve reached the threshold here in this country where it’s no longer possible to scale back on support for Ukraine?

MR. GOLDFEIER: Well, I don’t --

MS. AYDINTAŞBAŞ: That’s a question about domestic politics, basically, U.S.
politics.

MR. GOLDGEIER: Yeah, I think, you know, our Brookings colleague Shibley Telhami has been running a series of public opinion surveys since the spring asking the question sort of about what, you know, what are you willing to tolerate if, you know, if the support for Ukraine and this war causing problems here a home, you know, Samantha mentioned the biggest impact on all of us, the energy prices, you know, how much are you willing to tolerate? And, you know, it was interesting. I mean, his polls, the public opinion survey showed, you know, strong support, then a little dip and then back up to strong support by May or so, and I think, you know, we see in Europe, Constanze mentioned this, people are willing, I think they see what’s at stake. And I think, you know, at least so far, people are willing to accept some amount of personal pain in light of what’s happening. I think part of that is also the, you know, when you see, I mean, everybody is seeing the photos of what’s coming out of Ukraine, and what the Russians have done to the Ukrainians. I mean, okay, so we have increased gas prices and, you know, certainly there are segments of the population where the increased prices are really hitting quite hard and we shouldn’t understate that, but people here aren’t being subjected to genocide efforts and attempted genocide and these, you know, mass murders and crimes against humanity.

MS. AYDINTAŞBAŞ: Well, thank you, and let’s get a few questions from the audience. The gentleman here in the fifth row. Actually, over there.

QUESTIONER: Thank you very much. I’m Benjamin Tua, retired diplomat. Russia attacked Ukraine and there have been a lot of questions about how it is conducting the war. That said, please comment on the quality of U.S. media coverage of the conflict in terms of objectivity, balance, and completeness, including what led Russia to launch the war, and could it have been avoided? Thank you.

MS. AYDINTAŞBAŞ: Thank you. A very good question. Let’s take two more questions. I see behind you, I think, yes, the gentleman over there has raised his hand first.

QUESTIONER: Hi. Thank you very much. Adam Dawkins. I wanted, the panel
before focused on really lack of – part of it focused on lack of strategy, the fact there’s no clear strategy, what’s happening, and it seems to be one could see the reaction of the U.S. in generally, and what you’ve been describing, is both reactive and transactional. There was a clear, clear doctrine for how NATO came to be after the Second World War. Kind of post-collapse of the Soviet Union. There was a kind of clear doctrine about what was happening with the kind of expectation perhaps Russia was on board with it. What seems lacking if this is going to be cohesive both between the U.S. and its allies in this, but also keeping countries together in terms of popular -- is what is the underlying doctrine? Is it necessary to have an underlying doctrine and have you any sense what that might be? That’s my question.

MS. AYDINTAŞBAŞ: Thank you. And the gentleman here I think had his hand first.

QUESTIONER: Thank you. Guillermo Kisteumacher from the Brazilian Embassy. I would just like to ask the panel what scenarios do you consider most likely, most possible, in the coming months in Ukraine and if any of that scenarios there is room for a negotiated solution?

MS. AYDINTAŞBAŞ: Negotiated settlement or a cease fire or peace. Let’s get these questions. Let’s get the answers for now. Perhaps, let’s see if we can do another round afterwards. Shall we go in this order? Doug?

SPEAKERS: Jim.

MR. GOLDGEIER: We’re going to get to know each other. If you’re coming to the lunch, maybe we’ll sit next to each other. (laughter)

Take the --

MS. AYDINTAŞBAŞ: Because there’s also a Doug --

MR. GOLDGEIER: Yes, Doug’s a great guy. Doug’s a wonderful guy.

QUESTIONER: Both really nice.

MR. GOLDGEIER: And he looks much younger than I am so I’m sure he’s not going to be so happy about that. (laughter)
This question sort of overarching strategy doctrine. I think this is a broader challenge for us, for the United States. Because we had a frame and a -- we had a strategy for about 25 years. George H.W. Bush went to the then-West Germany in May of 1989 and talked about a Europe whole and free. And, you know, that really was the guiding idea behind U.S. policy and U.S. policy with our European allies from 1989 to 2014. They were going to try have a Europe whole, free and at peace. And led to all sorts of policies as a result. I think, you know, NATO enlargement, U.S. support for EU enlargement, the effort, at the same time, to create a partnership with Russia, the effort with Turkey, the efforts to end what was the brutality by the government of Slobodan Milosevic in the Balkans, I mean, all these things went together as part of a broader strategy. And while we've -- I mean, even President Biden last year was using that Europe whole, free and at peace language and I thought, you know, I mean it's just not, it really hasn't been relevant since 2014, and so I think we do need to have a new strategy and as I said at the outset, I mean, the issue right now in the near term is this -- how do we have a strategy to build a stable and secure Europe that at least right now tries to keep Russia out, whatever the prospects are later for trying to bring Russia back in? Just one word on this -- the challenge of a negotiated solution. I mean, how could you imagine this happening right now, right? I mean the Ukrainian government if it decided it wanted to seek a negotiated solution, would have to pursue a diplomatic solution with President Putin who has been leading an effort to eliminate Ukraine as a country and as a people, and it'd have to have -- they would have to believe that whatever solution they agreed to with Putin that he would honor it. And that he wouldn't still continue to try to undermine Ukraine and still try to, you know, find ways to regroup and destroy it later. So, I just don't see how you have a negotiated solution where Putin is the other party.

MS. AYDINTAŞBAŞ: Fiona?

MS. HILL: Yeah, I'll add a few things to this because I completely agree with everything that Jim has said there and, you know, I think that really is a great question about the strategy because it's just as we're talking about Germany and the Zeitenwende, we're all at a turning point. In fact, we've been at it for a long time. And you know we probably shouldn't have
been just looking at 2014 as the point, but thinking about the invasion of Georgia in 2008. And that also showed up, you know, the kind of fallacy of our approaches at the time. I've spoken before about the push by Georgia and Ukraine to get a membership action plan for NATO and the fact that at the Bucharest Summit in 2008 that didn't transpire, but in fact they got then an open door which was the worst of all worlds because there was no thinking about would they end up in NATO, in fact, there's been all kinds of recent comments suggesting of course that they would not have done. But there was no kind of strategy or broader thinking around that.

Mike O'Hanlon who is now sort of sitting at the back, you know, wrote a book not so long ago about Beyond NATO, trying to kind of unpack, you know, the ways that you might think about all of that security, and in fact now we've got even more NATO with Finland and Sweden joining the alliance, but not joining because they want to go back to a kind of a strategy that we had for the last, you know, thirty odd years, but because they're just recognizing it's the only mechanism, the only institution, that's still functioning to be able to at least have some semblance of trying to, we can no longer say keep the peace, but address the situation at hand. And again, you know, Sweden and Finland joining as a package, the Finns have made it very clear why they've done this. We all know that they could have joined NATO at any other point before. It's because of the nature of the crisis, the brutality, the butchery that we're seeing, the fact that this was an unprovoked attack. They knew it didn't actually have anything to do with NATO per se but was all sort of part of the whole affront that Russia and Putin felt about Ukraine and other countries going in any other different direction away from Russia's political security and economic orbit.

Also, the responsibility of flirting with nuclear weapons, which we discussed on the last panel and Caitlin laid out, you know, Finland and Sweden are not nuclear powers. In fact, Sweden was leading the charge for nuclear zero and all of the movements at the United Nations to get rid of nuclear weapons. But, you know, now they're joining what is a nuclear alliance because of the way that Putin is irresponsibly playing with this.

So, the messaging from this is that yes, we need a different security framework,
and the Finns and the Swedes and others want to be part of this. And I think that, you know, going on that is going to be the big question. But it’s not clear, you know, what the direction will take because of this central issue about what to do with Russia over the short- to medium- and long-term. Countries like Finland and Sweden and Norway and Turkey and many others can’t ignore Russia. They’re a near neighbor. Kind of like Israel can’t. They now call Russia the neighbor to the north, even though of course to the north is Syria, because that’s where, you know, Russia is operating there as well. So, we’re also going to have a much larger thinking about European security.

I was mentioning that before. I don’t think you can say that we’re pivoting to China anymore because China in many respects pivoted towards NATO and the United States and Europe as well. And from February 4th when President Xi told the world that there was no limits to the partnership with Russia on the eve of the invasion and criticized NATO very heavily – now, of course, that’s also in response to NATO formulating its own strategies in thinking about China – but I think we now see that we have to have a 360-degree perspective on our security.

And I think the fact that we have our colleague from Brazil asking questions showed that you’re very concerned about Ukraine. There were knock-on effects in your region, the Western Hemisphere. We forget there are very deep relationships with Russia and the Soviet Union going back more than a century with Latin America, also with Asia and Africa. China and Russia, you know, often acting in tandem in different theaters as well. We have to have a much broader perspective than we have already.

That gets, you know, into that question really about media coverage, to be honest. Because, yeah, I’ll admit -- well, first of all, we have a fragmented media space, so it depends on what you mean about media coverage. You can get one thing on, you know, Fox News, another online using the BBC, we’ve got all kinds of you know newspapers from other countries here that we can all access. We have, I mean most people, including the younger generation, get their news from I would say non-standard media, Facebook, TikTok, Instagram,
Trevor Noah, exactly, John Oliver, all kinds of people. I asked my daughter the other day where she got her news from and I was thinking, gosh, maybe I should start looking at some of these sources as well because everyone’s getting a different perspective. And that’s you know part of the thrust of your question here, is about yes, you can actually get really good coverage of what’s happening if you’re omnivorous and you kind of read all over the place, but that puts the responsibility on you. You know, we’ve long passed the day when we’d been you know provided with one source of information, you know, sitting around the radio, listening to the BBC or ABC and CBS and NBC, for example. So, you know, media coverage is, you know, it’s like shopping in the supermarket and that’s one of the things that we’re actually going to have to address and think about is about sources of information and how we process all of this.

And then that does relate to the question about, could the war have been avoided? And I think it’s partly, you know, the fact that we tend to think of it in silos and stove pipes that has led us here. Including for Putin. Putin could have avoided this. He could have decided not to do it. In fact, I mean, he made a decision to invade Ukraine, this is his decision, on February 24th because he thought he could get away with it. He thought we were all distracted, and he thought that the Ukrainians were feckless, and he thought that Zelensky would flee and that then the whole edifice, as he thinks about in Ukraine, would completely crumble.

And the problem there was he relied on reporting from the FSB which is domestic intelligence. We all saw the pictures of the kind of run up to the war where his head of foreign intelligence, Mr. Naryshkin looked completely shocked. I mean, he was like what? We’re doing this? I mean, he probably knew that this was going to be a disaster. Lots of people in the Russian system knew that this was going to be a disaster. Putin might have listened to them, and he might have heard them, but he decided to do something else.

So, if Putin had a much more diverse you know set of information or his own thinking and more and all kinds of different perspectives around him, maybe we wouldn’t be here. And that’s, you know, kind of what I’m making a plea for here. I mean, you know, we try
to do our part at Brookings by airing all kinds of you know different perspectives and different informations, but the only way that we get to resolving these issues is to take a really broad look and to have a strategy. And Putin clearly had a strategy. It's just that it was the wrong one, given you know the particular context for what he wanted to do as well.

MS. AYDINTAŞBAŞ: So, in your article with Angela Stent in the current issue, I think, of Foreign Affairs, you talk about this transformation Putin has had from non-ideological, slightly opportunistic leader to someone who's really revisionist in the sense that he's all about making Russia great again.

MS. HILL: Well, he's not the only person in the world who thinks like that, so and he's been at this for 22 years. So, the fact is we shouldn't also be shocked by Putin, you know, taking this decision either, because if we'd been watching very closely, we would have seen this evolution in his thinking.

I mean it goes back, you know, in part to 2007 and the speech that he made at Munich where he put everyone on notice that no more Mr. Nice Guy. We're in the full revisionist mode and we don't accept you know that post-Cold War strategic perspective on Europe that's driven, you know, from the United States’ viewpoint. And over time, you know, he's obviously gradually built himself up into something of a frenzy about Ukraine. And you know I said, I think he's completely rational. I think he's doing it from his own perspective. But we could see this building from 2011 to 2012 onwards.

Part of the problem is we're not always postured to keep an eye on all of this. You know, in our intelligence services and elsewhere I think they did an excellent job of seeing this coming, but we don't always put all of the dots together, like what happened with 9/11, and we needed to be working very closely with our partners as well. If we look back to prior to February 24th, the French didn't believe it for a second. And there were many others didn't. The Germans kind of, you know, reluctantly accepted that something was going to happen but were hoping it could be staved off. But, of course, the Poles, the Balts, and many others saw this coming as well because they'd never you know dropped the ball on this. And you know we
have to start thinking when we’re trying to find out ways of resolving this. I’m thinking eventually
towards negotiation, how do we all kind of pull together?

MS. AYDINTAŞBAŞ: There was a lot of skepticism prior to February 24th about
U.S. assessment that Putin is about to invade Ukraine but one of the unintended consequences
of this whole conflict has been the impact on the global South in the sense that they have not
accepted western version of this conflict. They have seen it as, to this day, many countries and
their leaders and their public opinions, describe it as a NATO provocation and that battle for the
narrative, I think, is still very much alive.

MS. STELZENMULLER: Isn’t that changing though? I mean it seems to me
that the SCO meeting looked very much as though that particular group of countries was in the
process of changing their minds and not because there’s a genocide happening in Ukraine, but
because Putin is seen as not being -- as failing, and at least no longer being infallible.

MS. AYDINTAŞBAŞ: It’s changing because of that reason, not because of the
morality --

MS. HILL: Yeah, it’s not a moral, yeah, exactly.

MS. AYDINTAŞBAŞ: Changing because there’s now the possibility that Putin
might not win.

MS. STELZENMULLER: Exactly. May I say something about the strategy
point?

MS. AYDINTAŞBAŞ: Please.

MS. STELZENMULLER: And on the borders perhaps. Three weeks ago I was
on the in Finnmark, the Norwegian province that borders Russia, not, I didn’t swim there myself,
this is a study due to courtesy of the Norwegian defense ministry, who showed us the border,
and the border guards told us that on the other side there had been Russian elite regiments who
were among the first to be sent to Ukraine, were decimated there, and not replenished. So, the
land border is relatively calm. What’s still really worrying the Norwegians is the fact that on the
Kola Peninsula is the largest concentration of strategic nuclear weapons on the planet. And that
if Putin decided to engage in a little bit of submarine diplomacy, as, you know, parade of Russian submarines up and down the Norwegian border, that would be the Norwegian coastline. So, in other words, the tensions at the borders, they’re not going away. They’re shifting.

On the strategy question, I think it is fair to say not so much that the West, America, or NATO, as it were, caused this war. Of course, it didn’t. Putin decided to go to war and if he was afraid of anything, then it was of the democratic transformation of eastern Europe. And particularly the democratic transformation of an enormous Slavic country, Ukraine. That was the danger to him.

But it is also fair to say, I think, that the West squandered some of the 1989 moment. If we look back at the history of our engagements with the world, there are some distinct successes. You named ending the genocide in the Balkans. But there are also a lot of failures. There are a lot of double-standards and a lot of hypocrisy, if we’re completely honest with ourselves. And I think I can see how somebody of the mindset of Vladimir Putin who I saw in Munich in 2007 and I believe you did as well, and who seemed a rather small and frustrated man to me at the time. I completely misjudged that. But you can see how Putin would have come to the idea that you know maybe this was the time to give us all a gentle push and we would collapse. And I think frankly we have all surprised ourselves with the intensity of our reaction and the cohesion of our reaction and frankly long may it last.

But on the strategy point, this is not the Cold War. We are not looking at new and this is, and I say this because this is something I heard from China lobbyists in Berlin last week. We are not entering a new Cold War. We are not entering a new era of blocs. That’s the wrong way to look at this. What we are looking at is a phase where autocrats are trying to probe the built-in vulnerabilities of democracies and democratic alliances, are trying to see how far they can push us, and trying to see where they can apply leverage, to destroy our cohesion. And they have still many different opportunities and means of doing that. And that is the challenge before, that we stand before right now.

We have been successful, to our surprise, so far, but it is by no means over as
everybody has said. I will say it -- one point seems important to me, and I think in some ways that also leads into the next panel. I said earlier that the U.S., at least this administration, seems to have discovered that Europe is a useful asset, and that the stability of Europe, peace in Europe, is meaningful to it. And let’s keep in mind here that what Putin is doing is not just about Ukraine, but also about rolling back the European security order, not just post-1989 but post-1945, which also involves throwing the U.S. out. That is what is at stake. And the strategy has to be to resist that. And my final point, we’re looking potentially at a larger conflict with China in which I think this administration understands Europe is also a crucial asset to have. So, it’s not just resisting Russia. It is also fortifying alliance that remains necessary in future tensions and conflict.

MS. AYDINATAŞBAŞ: Constanze, let me ask you a version of the question I asked Jim earlier. Jim, earlier (laughter).

MR. GOLDGEIER: We’re going to be great friends, Aslı.

MS. STELZENMULLER: Call me Camilla.

MS. AYDINATAŞBAŞ: Did you sense any nervousness in Europe about long-term U.S. commitment to European security as such?

MS. STELZENMULLER: Of course they are, because they watch American polls and they watch American politics. And they see what our colleague, Jonathan Rauch in his book, “The Constitution of Knowledge,” has called epistemological warfare, or civil war, in this country. Of course, they see that different media organizations describe completely different truths. That’s got to be terrifying to anybody who is a friend of the United States, whether we live here or not. And so at the same time if this war has made anything clear, it is that we would have been toast without American support. Political, economic, and military. So, the Europeans are profoundly aware of the many ways in which they need America. They are also profoundly aware that they’re going to have to do more for themselves. And that’s the big conundrum of the German Zeitenwende. The German turn. And of course, the Zeitenwende is made more complicated by the fact that, you know, the major powers in Europe, of which Germany is
one, inherently, because of their size and economic power and their political weight, also have responsibility for the safety and security of their neighbors.

MS. HILL: Can I just make one quick comment? Because one thing that we didn’t mention, and you raised the global South was food security. And I’m presuming that will come up on the next panel.

But I think, you know, basically picking up on what Constanze just as a last point, we’re also going to have to rethink the way that we engage with partners outside of Europe and the transatlantic spaces. I mean, Japan and South Korea have been very engaged in this for all kinds of concerns. They’re looking at it from the frame of the Asia-Pacific region, but, you know, with our colleague from Brazil asking a question, and, you know, others in the Middle East, and around the world, are also wondering what the knock-on impacts are going to be and food security is clearly one of them. And I think although we’re obviously worrying about energy supplies in Europe over the winter, people are also worried about food and inflation. And, you know, we’re never really factoring in here all of these, you know, very fundamental basic issues, and of course knowing now, everybody knows this right, that Ukraine and Russia together provide one quarter of global grain exports, and if you take off a country like Ukraine, you know, offline so to speak, you’re going to have some pretty tremendous consequences. I think this is also going to have to shape the way that we think about this conflict and about how we engage moving forward.

MS. AYDINTAŞBAŞ: And this is becoming an important talking point for Putin --

MS. HILL: Exactly.

MS. AYDINTAŞBAŞ: -- as he said last week at several times that much of the grain exports are now going to rich countries --

MS. HILL: Which is just not true.

MS. AYDINTAŞBAŞ: This is actually not true, but he keeps repeating that.

Well, thank you all. I’d like to thank our panelists for this great conversation, and I think we’re wrapping up now, but we’re going to be having the third panel immediately after this.
Thank you for listening.

MR. GALSTON: Okay. Let me welcome you all to the third and final panel of the 2022 Knight Forum on Geopolitics. I should begin, I guess, by introducing myself. I'm Bill Galston, a senior fellow in Governance Studies. Yes, Governance Studies, not Foreign Policy. So, I'm having an Admiral Stockdale moment, for those of you of a certain age. It is, I think, a ritual for the moderator of a panel to describe the panel as timely, unless it's at a philosophy conference.

But in this case, I think that much overworked adjective is literally true. Let's consider what has happened in just the past week. As I think you are aware, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi delivered a public review to Putin. He said, "today's era is not an era of war, and I have spoken to you on the phone about this."

For his part, Vladimir Putin publicly acknowledged China's, quote, "concerns and questions about the war in Ukraine." The Chinese leader Xi Jinping delivered a rebuke in his unique Chinese way when he talked about the need for Russia and China to work together to, quote, "inject stability into the turbulent world," while at the same time challenging Russia's primacy in Central Asia in a very direct way.

And then just last night, in response to the question, quote, so, "unlike Ukraine, U.S. forces, U.S. men and women would defend Taiwan in the event of a Chinese invasion?" "Yes," President Biden replied. As always, the White House insisted that this didn't represent a change in policy. But at the very least, it was a step toward what I can call strategic disambiguation.

To help us understand what all this means, you know, the organizers of this conference have assembled a Brookings all-star team. Robert Kagan, to my immediate left, I guess stage right, the Stephen & Barbara Friedman senior fellow in foreign policies. At the far end, Tanvi Madan, director of Brookings India Project, and Patricia Kim, the David Rubenstein fellow in foreign policy.

Here's how we'll spend this hour, just a little road map. The first segment of our
conversation by prearrangement will address the question of how the war in Ukraine has changed the global and regional architectures of security. In segment two, we’ll talk about what all of this means for U.S. policy. Segment three, time permits, there will be follow-up questions, individual panelists, either from other panelists or from me as your faithful moderator. And finally, we’ll turn to questions from you.

So, Bob, get us started please.

MR. KAGAN: Thank you, Bill. And hello to all of you. I think I’m going to talk about topic two in your first session. But I’m going to talk about a little bit about what the American reaction to Ukraine says about America’s -- Americans’ perception of their interests. And what I want to say is that what we’ve seen in terms of that response follows a recurrent pattern in American history, in the sense that, if you had -- well, as you probably all were, in part of the foreign policy discussion prior to the Russian invasion. I think the general tenor of that discussion was that Ukraine was not within the ambit of U.S. vital national security interests and was not something that we would engage in conflict with Russia over, which we have not yet begun to do, but that in general it was in Russia’s sphere of influence, both Presidents Obama and Biden had taken a position that that wasn’t really an area for U.S. meddling.

And of course, since the invasion, the United States has immediately became deeply involved in supporting Ukraine against the Russian invasion, and I think that raises the interesting question, which is how do Americans, in fact, regard their interests? And it shows yet again -- and I do think this is not only recurrent but almost constant in American foreign policy -- that despite our discourse of what our national interests are, which are usually framed in classical terms, having to do with the security of the nation, what Americans really think of when they think of their interests when confronted by these kinds of aggression, is world order, and particularly liberal world order.

And if you think about both World War 1 and World War 2 -- and I can get into this in Q and A if you want to -- in both those cases, long before the United States was directly -- was in any way directly threatened in terms of its own national security, Americans became
deeply involved in both conflicts in order to prevent some dictatory -- some dictators’ aggression against neighboring states. In Europe in particular, but not just in Europe, but also in Asia in that case. And at a certain point in the 1930’s, again, before American interests were directly threatened, Americans began to perceive, both in Europe and in Asia, a generalized threat to the liberal world order, which led to them to take various policy actions in both places that they would not have taken if the question were simply one of America’s direct national security interests.

And this is what has happened in the case of Ukraine as well. You know, when Mitch McConnell says that Ukraine is a vital core interest of the United States, what is he really saying? Is he really saying that, if Ukraine falls to Russia, America’s immediate security is directly threatened? Obviously not. What he’s saying is the world order that the United States has supported is threatened by that kind of action by Russia, as I think many people would believe the same would be true if China were to invade Taiwan. And I must say, there has been -- I would say, this disjunction between what Americans think, or are told, or is part of the discourse of interests, and what they actually act upon as their interests, is one of the great sources of confusion in American foreign policy.

And it would be good if we began to understand that our interests are actually involved in support of a liberal world order and are not about narrowly focused on our immediate national security. Whether we will learn this lesson or not as a result of Ukraine, I would say as a historian, again, the answer is no. We will continually oscillate between the sort of very narrow, classic, realist definition of our interests, but when actions are taken out by aggressive dictatorships, we will act, in fact, on the basis of a world order concept of our national interests. Which in my view is the correct understanding of our interests.

MR. GALSTON: Thanks, Bob. Tanvi, India and anything -- any other area you want to poach on.

MS. MADAN: Thanks, Bill. I’ll stick to India, given that there’s a lot there, and maybe come back in Q and A to others.
MR. GALSTON: Yeah.

MS. MADAN: And I’ll maybe talk a little bit about the global South in the, kind of, second round. I do, before I start, want to, kind of, acknowledge Strobe Talbott as well, as others have. Partly because, while others have talked about, during the course of this day, his contribution in terms of the Russia side, I will also say, both personally but institutionally, our work on India would not have been possible without Strobe Talbott, who invested in the study of the region, and South Asia more broadly, a long time before it was cool to do it. So -- so, I just wanted to put that out there.

I will talk a little bit about, kind of, how India sees, and the impact this Russian invasion of Ukraine has had on the Indian interests. And kind of broadly, and not just in terms of India-Russia relations.

To put in -- kind of, the bottom line is, several Indian interests have been adversely affected by the Russian invasion and its aftermath. In the immediate sense, the invasion endangered the lives of 20,000 plus Indian students, and others who resided there, one of whom was killed in a Russian shelling, and India had to get those students out. That is -- that was not just a humanitarian concern for India, but also a political one for Prime Minister Modi.

Second, and crucially, Delhi has been facing a more constrained economic environment thanks to the invasion, and its aftermath as well. This took place just as India was trying to come out of the pandemic, and, like many other countries, economically recover from it. But since then, seen high commodity prices, food, fuel, fertilizer, that are significant, in terms of, kind of, what India imports. This poses multiple problems for the Modi government, not just in terms of, you know, energy security or food security, but also it has fiscal implications, and has political implications for the Modi government as well. Moreover, the impact on the global economy has also been adverse, and it’s adversely affected economies of several of India’s major markets, as well as sources of foreign direct investment. So, that’s something that plays into this as well.

On the defense side, the invasion has affected India’s military readiness, by
jeopardizing the Russian and Ukrainian links in India's supply chain, on which its forces depend. And this is particularly crucial for India at a time that the border standoff between China and India started in 2020 still continues and could even potentially escalate down the line.

Strategically, the complications arising from the Russian invasion and the subsequent war, has put pressure on some of India's crucial partnerships, and particular its ties with Western and Indo-Pacific partners that have become crucial, if not essential, for Indian security and economic objectives. The invasion also complicates what has been a longstanding Indian objective, and by longstanding, I mean since the 1950s, trying to keep Russia and China as far away from each other as possible.

For India in an ideal scenario, they want to see a Russia that helps them balance Chinese power, and not one that is aligned with China. From Delhi's perspective, they see questions about what they think the invasion will lead to a Russia more dependent on China, and this raises questions about what a Russia more beholden to China will do if Beijing asks Moscow now to take actions that are against Indian interests, such as in international organizations at the UN Security Council, for instance. Or perhaps at the India-China boundary at the event of another crisis. Or will Beijing expect or demand that Russia take its side more actively in the Indo-Pacific, seeing that it's something that it has not done in recent years.

The Indian response in the short term has to be -- been not what we would think, which is to say okay, we need to move on, or to actually try to keep Russia from moving away from neutrality in the case of the China-India crisis to move towards China's side. And this is particularly crucial because of the level of Indian military dependence on Russia, most of its frontline, it could have been 70 to 80 percent by some calculations, is dependent on Russian or Russian-origin equipment.

India has also been using the Russian relationship to take some pressure off the Indian economy through the purchase of lower-price commodities, or relatively lower-priced commodities. And this instinct to, kind of, keep its ties with Russia, despite all these concerns that I've laid out, is also bolstered by legacy ties, including Indian memories of a Russia that was
far more reliable as a partner for India in the 1970's than anybody else was. But it's also bolstered by the fact that, while there are several divergences irrespective of this Russian invasion, even before that, there are several divergences in India-Russia relations, and the trajectory is the opposite of that of India's relationship to the West.

Despite those divergences and that kind of declining partnership, Russia still remains relevant for several Indian interests, particularly in the defense case, but also in the multi-lateral arena, where it can either help Indian interests, or be very harmful. And as Fiona Hill alluded to earlier, it could even be punitive to India's interests down the line.

So, I'll end with just saying that what this situation has done for India, is it thinks about, kind of, the various imperatives that the Indian government has to balance, is the Russian invasion and its aftermath has highlighted some of the contradictions in competing imperatives in India's foreign policy. And you see this on the kind of balancing internal and external imperatives, where short-term economic and political objectives are leading the Modi government to take advantage of the lower commodity prices that Russia is offering, but it's complicating India's ties with countries that are economically, and technologically, and strategically more consequential for, India.

You're also seeing these, kind of, competing imperatives on the strategic side, where you see an India that wants to align, is aligning, with likeminded partners to balance or even counter China. It's also been aligning in terms of the Quad, which Russia has opposed. But it doesn't want to align with those very countries to isolate Russia, and it's trying to do this even as Russia and China are aligning with each other. So, I think a lot of what you're going to - - what you've seen India with balancing various imperatives is trying to balance -- you know, walk this tightrope which frankly has got trickier and trickier as time has gone since the original invasion itself.

This -- and reconciling these trends has been quite high maintenance for India. But I think this kind of -- these -- I'll just say -- just briefly on this here, we can maybe come back to it in the Q and A, is you saw the result of these, kind of, different imperatives, in terms of the
Indian response. And particularly, why does Modi now come out and say what he did, which is “this is not a time of war”? This echoes a remark he made in September 2014, both alluding to Russia and China. He was in Japan and in a speech said, “this is not an era of development, this is an era” -- sorry, “this is not an era of expansionism, it should be an era of development, people with development mindsets.” And he criticized countries with 18th century mindsets that were encroaching on other countries’ lands and seas.

So, he's echoing something he said before, but the fact that he's gone public is significant. I think India's support for Russia has been exaggerated in the past, and I think now we're in danger of maybe over-reading the rebuke, because do not expect India to give up that Russia relationship, but it is nonetheless significant that India has, or Modi has, spoken out publicly and expressed those concerns, concerns that they have expressed privately in the past. Because I think they recognize the longer this continues, the more the damage those interests that I outlined in the beginning, as well as the fact that they recognize it as not a cost-free strategy to be seen amongst other partners as seeming to only support or, kind of, not speak out against Russia. So, I'll stop there and can say more about the SCO in the Q and A if there's interest.

MR. GALSTON: Patricia?

MS. KIM: Great. Well, thanks very much, Bill. It's a real honor to be here, up with my colleagues, and to be part of the inaugural Knight Forum. So, I'm going to start with China's response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and trying to stand since the beginning has been to say that it's a neutral third party to the conflict, that it supports peaceful negotiations, and that it respect territorial integrity, while at the same time amplifying Russian narratives, that NATO enlargement and disregard for Russia's security interests, are basically the reasons that gave it -- that gave it cause to have no choice but to respond.

Now China's insistence of neutrality has been met with skepticism, because just 20 days before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, President Xi Jinping hosted President Putin at the opening of the Beijing Olympics, where the two sides released an unpresented China-Russia
joint statement. And in this statement, the two countries reaffirmed, or affirmed their so-called no-limits partnership, and they aired their grievances, vis a vis the West, making the case that Western democracy should not have a monopoly over what a democracy is, that they shouldn't impose their standards on others, and they basically accused the United States and its partners of violating what they call indivisible security, that is pursuing their own security at the expense of Russian and Chinese security interests.

Now, there have been various discussions about whether -- how much Xi knew about Putin’s plans to invade Ukraine, whether he greenlighted these plans. And while we may never know exactly to what extent the Chinese knew, I suspect that Beijing was probably taken aback by what has happened in Ukraine. I think they’ve been taken aback by the global backlash against China, and the reputational cost that it has paid for supporting the Russian narrative on Ukraine. But Beijing has decided, essentially, to double down, at least rhetorically, on its alignment with Moscow, and it has shown that it’s unwilling to directly condemn Russia’s war of aggression, although it has raised concerns or questions at the SCO, as Bill mentioned at the outset. And this -- you know, these actions have raised concerns here in Washington, as well as in Europe and Asia, about China's strategic intentions, its long-term outlooks. And it's brought global scrutiny, also, on the situation in Taiwan, which is not in Beijing's interests.

So, this raises the question, you know, why has Beijing stood by Russia, why hasn't it distanced itself more despite these costs? And I think there are several reasons for this.

So, first, I think it's clear that Chinese leaders see direct parallels between their situation and Russia's predicament. They see NATO enlargement as similar to the strengthening of U.S. alliances in Asia, with the growth of new security paths like AUKUS and the Quad, and they say this is Western encirclement and, sort of, Western plans to try to contain Beijing and Moscow. Beijing certainly does not want to make an enemy of its nuclear power neighbor, and to be bogged down by a rivalry with Russia that it was preoccupied with during the second half of the Cold War, especially at a time when China really needs as many strategic partners as possible, as it looks at long-term competition with the United States.
So, it's -- China basically sees Russia as a great power partner, and pushing back, or pushing for what it calls multi-polarity, that is countering what they see as a Western-dominated global order, Western-dominated global financial system, what they call Western long-arm jurisdiction, with sanctions and the imposition of values. So, it sees Russia as a good partner in pushing back on all of this.

And finally, I think that the fact that Xi Jinping has invested personally in his relationship with Putin also makes it very difficult for the Chinese political system to declare that Xi was wrong. The two leaders have actually met a total of 39 times since Xi came into power in 2012, which is remarkable. Now, despite the close ties between the two top leaders, Beijing's behavior since February has also shown us that there are some limits to this so-called no-limits partnership. Beijing this time around was noticeably less enthusiastic at the summit between Xi and Putin at the SCO summit in Uzbekistan last week. Also, China hasn't given direct military aid to Russia. And so, this suggests that there are indeed some limits.

And although Beijing has stated publicly that it opposes all sanctions against Russia and that it will continue normal trade relations with Russia, again China hasn't supplied weapons and hasn't extended direct military aid. Chinese banks and businesses have been, on the whole, largely complying quietly with international sanctions. And even though we've seen a boost in energy trade, and in some sectors, such as semiconductors, for instance, Chinese companies have really filled the gap that American companies and European companies used to play in the Russian market for exports of semiconductors, for instance. But otherwise, you know, I think, we haven't seen as much aid flow from China to Russia, as you would expect between two powers with a so-called no-limits partnership.

And so, these -- these choices suggest to me that, while Beijing wants to maintain its ties with Russia for the reasons that I laid out earlier, it also doesn't intend to significantly undercut its own interests to help Putin wage his war against Ukraine. And so, I think that's kind of where the Chinese stand right now.

MR. GALSTON: We're off to a terrific start. And now I'm going to turn the
conversation, you know, to something that was, I would say, questioned, ever so delicately in the previous panel, you know, as, sort of, American-centric thinking. But I think to some extent we have to engage in it.

So, here is the question for the second segment of our hour. What impact does your analysis of the -- of the meaning of Ukraine, for the United States, for India, and for China, have on the way the United States should be thinking about its foreign policy, and conducting its foreign policy? And I think I'm going to reverse the order, and so I'll go straight to Patricia to follow up for a first round of comments.

MS. KIM: Sure. So, I think the Russian invasion of Ukraine has raised urgent questions about Taiwan's fate. And of course, many parallels have been drawn between Ukraine and Taiwan's predicaments. I think for those who work on Asia, there have long been concerns about the shifting military balance in the Taiwan Strait. There's been a recognition that this balance has shifted largely to China's -- in China's favor in recent years. And of course, this has raised questions about, what more can the United States do to ensure that Taiwan can defend itself, to ensure that Taiwan can stand up to growing Chinese aggression. Which has really escalated across all domains. Military, economic, and diplomatic, vis a vis Taiwan.

I think, you know, for the United States and its allies, this has -- the -- watching Ukraine, I think, especially for European countries, they realize, wow, this -- we don't want something similar to happen in Asia. And there's been an explosion of interest and desire to support Taiwan. There have been a number of high-level visits by Asian and European officials to Taiwan, of course U.S. officials as well. And I think there are also -- there's also greater willingness by certain Asian allies of the United States, like Japan, to talk about contingencies in the Taiwan Strait, and make sure that we're prepared if there were to be some sort of kinetic action there.

But I think it's also important to know that -- note that there are different assessments of, sort of, the situation there, different assessments on what Asian allies or European allies even thinks, or the right -- the right balance of U.S. policy should be towards the
Taiwan Strait. I think everyone at the end of the day wants to avoid war at all costs. And of course, turning to Taiwan, I think the people of Taiwan watching the situation in Ukraine, this has been very sobering, and it's, sort of, kicked up this desire to be better prepared. There's a lot of enthusiasm for civilians learning about first aid, for instance. There's growing support for expanding military training for -- for men over the age of 18, which, right now, is 4 months, but they want to increase it out to a year.

And so, I think it's really, sort of, added energy to this desire for Taiwan to beef up its defenses. And then finally, for China, I think, you know, it's been really interesting to see how China has been reacting to these comparisons.

So, Beijing has been the staunchest voice for making the case that Ukraine and Taiwan are not the same. And they've said that this is because Taiwan is not a sovereign state, whereas Ukraine is. And Beijing has actually accused the United States of exploiting -- exploiting the situation in Ukraine to try to increase support for Taiwan, and they've blamed -- blamed Washington for allegedly emboldening independent forces -- or independence forces in Taiwan. And so, that's kind of where China is coming from. And it says, you know, that -- that the United States is, sort of, asking on China to have a double standard.

It's calling on China to support Ukraine's territorial sovereignty and integrity, whereas it's undermining China's own sovereignty over Taiwan. That's sort of the argumentation we've seen out of Beijing. And I think this is exactly why China has worked so hard over the last several decades to -- to push its one China principle, so that if and when there is a fight over Taiwan, they could say actually this is our territory and everyone recognizes that. So, that's sort of been their diplomatic strategy. And finally, for China, I think watching Russia's invasion of Ukraine and its isolation has confirmed for Beijing that it really needs to continue its push towards self-sufficiency, to reduce its reliance on foreign components to de-risk its own supply chains and its own vulnerability to Western sanctions. So, I think it's, kind of, enforced this idea that we need to have more decoupling on both sides, in China, as well as outside of China.

MR. GALSTON: I can't resist breaking ranks just a little bit and asking you a
follow-up question. In the course of what you just said, you remark that, while everybody agrees that we must avoid war with China, quote, at all costs. That didn't sound like the policy that President Biden articulated last night. So, what is U.S. policy, and what should it be?

MS. KIM: Yeah. So, it's not that -- it's -- so, I don't know if it's at all costs. But basically, nobody wants war in Asia, because that would be devastating for everyone involved, whether it's China, the United States, Taiwan, everyone. And so, you know, everyone wants to avoid it. The question is, how do you do that? And there's debates about whether U.S. -- longstanding U.S. policy towards Taiwan must be tweaked, and this is where you get the debate about strategic clarity or maintaining strategic ambiguity. Of course, President Biden has come out and said multiple times that he would send in U.S. troops to Taiwan if China were to invade. And China gets very upset about this, because they see this as undercutting, sort of, the U.S. recognition of -- or the United States longstanding "One China" policy.

I mean, where I stand on this is that we need to be doing everything we can substantively to strengthen Taiwan, so that it can defend itself. I think there's a lot of good work underway to do this, but Taiwan is certainly, you know, not there yet. I don't think you can necessarily compare Taiwan and Ukraine in their readiness. And so, it still has a ways to go, but it's certainly going in that direction, and I think the United States and its allies should be supporting that, while making it clear to the people of China that we are not trying to necessarily prejudice the outcome of the resolution of cross-strait differences. That's a question that the people of China and the people of Taiwan must come to, you know, an agreement on peacefully. And that's kind of what we stand for, right. Making sure that no decisions are made under coercion, and that both sides can negotiate peacefully.

MR. GALSTON: Tanvi, let me just tee up the question about U.S. policy toward India with an observation based on what you've said in the first round. And you said that India has always been interested in maintaining a -- if I understood you correctly -- a wide separation between Russia and China, rather than an alignment between them. I suspect that most American foreign policy experts would agree with that overall strategic concept. We don't want a
close alignment either, as far as I can tell. So, what can American foreign policy, in addition to all of the other aspects of our relationship with India, do to try to further that longstanding Indian objective of increasing the distance between Russia and China?

MS. MADAN: So, I'll come back to that, partly because I think it's become much, much tougher today than it would have been a year ago, that question. The answer -- the Indian's answer's always been and would have been a year ago that -- to do what President Biden did not this summer but the summer before, which is try to not have a -- necessarily have a rapprochement, but have some sort of engagement with Russia that would keep it -- give it some options that are not China. But I'll come back to that maybe. I will say kind of more broadly on U.S.-India ties, and I think this is all caught up, you know, India's -- U.S. relations with India, as well as how Russia-China relations actually operate.

Which is I think what the -- what we've seen and done to the impact on U.S. policy is it has complicated U.S. ties with a country that now, since about '99-'2000, several -- all American administrations have invested a considerable amount of time, and effort, and resources. Partly on the -- on the, kind of, assumption that India, per se, but also India in alignment with the U.S. and its allies and partners, would serve as a balance and contrast to China.

And so, several American administrations have deepened these ties. This has complicated, it's thrown some kind of friction into the relationship. Now, this friction is not new. One thing, at least, about U.S.-India ties versus, perhaps, India's ties with its European partners is that the differences over Russia have been known, and they've been -- they've actually created problems even as recently over potential CAAPSA sanctions for India purchasing the S-400 missile defense system. So, that's not new. But I do think India's response has raised questions in the administration, but in the establishment more broadly, about what India's response means for its view towards the international order more broadly. And, kind of, you know, you've seen potentially whether India would be similarly reticent in the event of a contingency in the Indo-Pacific, that is not a China-India boundary crisis. Whether it's a crisis
over Taiwan, or in the South China Sea, will India be, kind of, reticent.

I think for the very -- at the very least, what people in Delhi should be concerned about a little bit is the impact of its stance on, not necessarily the trajectory of the relationship, U.S.-India relationship, will continue to deepen, but does it -- in certain domains -- but does it lower the, kind of, level of enthusiasm, which I think it has, amongst certain quarters in the U.S. about the India relationship and the India investment? And in a time when there are internal debates about whether to do something with India or not, or for India or not, within the administration, how is its stance impacting the battle between the internal bureaucratic battles between the transatlanticists and the Indo-Pacificists? Or, for instance, you know, is it going to, as you're thinking about, you know, is it going to, as you're thinking about limited bandwidth, and administrations are thinking, should we be investing so much time and effort into an India relationship in the Quad, versus other relationships and mechanisms? So, how is this feeding it, and I think that could potentially have an impact.

Nonetheless, I mentioned, kind of, some of the contradictions in India's relationship. One thing from the U.S. perspective that this highlights, this whole situation the last six months it highlights, is also contradiction in terms of U.S. interests. Because what the U.S. wants to do is see, kind of, India move away from Russia. But it also, India's ability to serve as that counterbalance to China as a net security provider in the Indo-Pacific, holding the line at the India-China border, depends on the military equipment that it gets. Its ability to do so depends on the ability to continue to get its supplies. So, its military readiness, its ability even for its Navy, depends on that Russian military equipment. So, it's a bit of a contradiction.

I do think the administration and the Indian government has managed this difference as well as could be expected. Partly by coming -- kind of, working from the bottom line that they're not going to let Russia essentially veto the deepening of U.S.-India ties. Which could have been possible by saying, you are not, you know, with us, so you're against us, so we're not going to do anything more. That would have been feeding into Russia's hands, and frankly it would have been feeding into China's hands. And so, I think that the administration
has done a good job.

I do think, though, that there's a thing that the administration and the Modi government could do, which is, because this raises questions about what about a contingency in the Indo-Pacific, is to have a frank conversation behind closed doors if necessary, to keep it there, about Indo-Pacific contingencies, what the expectations of each other are, and sharing assessments as well. Because I think if that doesn't happen, you're going to see a situation where the again different expectations about what saying India will do, versus what it will actually do.

And you could also say that -- just very quickly, I will say, I do want to say something about, kind of, the Global South, as people talk about it. And the reason I put it in quotation marks earlier is, I think it is a term that, you know, hides a lot of diversity. And I will say this when people say the Global South has not taken a similar stance.

One -- some of the most, kind of, incisive comments on what the Russians had done, and what that meant for territorial integrity, and sovereignty, and the international order, came from countries like Kenya and Bhutan. And when you keep the focus on that, you do see countries outside the West, see what the problem with the Russian invasion are. But you will not see countries outside, kind of, the transatlantic domain of, perhaps, Japan and Australia included.

Common borders see the situation exactly in the same way. And so, for the U.S. from a kind of approach system, whether it's about the China challenge or the Russia challenge, needing to think about how you actually come up with strategic communications in a narrative that is going to be something that they listen to. And things that are not going to be attractive to them, even though they might be good from a transatlantic or domestic U.S. perspective, are a with us or against us approach, or an approach that talks about authoritarianism versus democracy. or, frankly, taking the moral high ground, because I think we have to recognize the rest of the world does not necessarily see our moral high ground as being deserving of it, given whether it was the war in Iraq, or frankly, the imperial or colonial
legacies of several European countries, and the lack of recognition about what that's done.

So, I do think, you know, thinking about that, we need to have an approach that is thinking about, not the Global South, but countries within, and who can actually -- who can you actually get to align on certain positions versus not. Because I don't think it's one large, big hole, and there can be strategies to try to get them on board, or at least keep them from going over to the other side.

MR. GALTSON: Okay. I'd like to invite you, Bob, to speculate. Okay, but let me tee up sort of a science fiction experiment. You've agreed -- you've agreed to accept a demotion from your role as a globally recognized foreign policy guru and become the national security advisor to the president. And --

MR. KAGAN: That would be a demotion in terms of lifestyle.

MR. GALTSON: Well, in many other ways as well. The -- and here's my question. If you thought that you had 4 years or 8 years in that role, given your analysis that you laid out of the way Americans actually think about the way we should conduct our foreign policy, as the way that the standard realist template, as opposed to the standard realist template of, you know, a hard account of interest, what would you do differently from what's now happening? What would you do more of, what would you do less of? Would you talk about it differently, what difference would your analysis make for the conduct of American foreign and defense policy?

MR. KAGAN: I mean, right now, not -- not -- I mean, other than more of the same, not very much. Because the United States, it seems to me, has already -- you know, if you think about the history of American foreign policy since the United States became a great power, it's -- it's a sine wave, it's an oscillation between periods of significant overseas involvement, usually inspired by some moral-slash-security connection, followed by disillusionment, and a desire for retraction. I mean, it is the case that the United States is really unique in its relative invulnerability to foreign attack. Obviously, people can fire missiles at the United States, they can conduct terrorist attacks at the United States, but unlike every other country in the world, the United States is not really subject to the prospect of invasion.
And therefore, for Americans, all foreign policy is a choice. I think that, you know, if you think, in terms of world order, America does have, I think, has, in its own interest, acquired a responsibility to maintain that, but Americans don't always necessarily feel that way, especially when things go bad as they inevitably do.

So, we are on -- we were after the Iraq war in a long trough in this oscillation, and now, as a result of a conjunction of events, both Ukraine and the rise of China, Americans have, once again, warped themselves into the mode of thinking globally about their interests, thinking that they actually have a responsibility, both to themselves and to the world that they want to live in, to act more, to be willing to take greater risks, which we are taking in Ukraine, which we are taking on the subject of -- on the issue of Taiwan, and therefore, you know, that we are more in that mode that we were in, you know, in the late 1930's, heading into - - not that we're heading into World War II, but of that -- of that mentality, and also that we were during certain periods of the Cold War. So, what I would want to try to do is avoid the -- the inevitable downturn or put it off as much as possible.

And already, we see the seeds of that oscillation in the way certain segments of the Republican Party are already deciding to position themselves against American policy in Ukraine. 11 senators voted against the latest aid bill. And should something go wrong, which, by the way, something always goes wrong, there will be a significant recurrence of Americans saying, wait a minute, wait a minute. How did we get into this? And this is where our confusion about our interests comes in. Because at that point, a lot of people, as Rand Paul and a lot of Republicans, some significant portion of Republicans say now, what is our interest in Ukraine? We have an interest along the southern border against, you know, immigrants, but what is our interest in Ukraine? And that view can take hold more rapidly than you might imagine in the United States.

So, the real task, it seems to me, of American leadership now, is to try to conduct this policy in a way that you can establish some consistency in American foreign policy. And that does, as you were suggesting in your question, require an educational element. And I
think part of that educational element is for the president. As Franklin Roosevelt did, beginning in the mid -- you know, beginning with, I would say, his quarantine speech in 1937, to begin saying, look, we do have an interest in this liberal world order -- you can’t use the word liberal apparently, but in this world order, and it is time for us to take that interest seriously again.

And so, I would like to see more of that, rather than treating this as, kind of, a one-off, and we hope this will end night well, and then we can move on and get back to normal. There is this constant feeling in the United States that we’re going to get through this crisis and then get back to normal. And normal means we don’t have to pay full attention to what’s going on everywhere around the world. And while you don’t want to tell the Americans the truth, I suppose, that we’re in this, like, for eternity, you do want to make it clear to them that this liberal world order that we support is of great value to us and does require consistent efforts on our parts to sustain.

We did that more easily when communism was the threat. I think we were overblown about the threat of communism, but it worked as a domestic strategy. Whether we can do the same thing now, I think, remains to be seen. But of course, and I’ll end on this, we’re only at the beginning of the series of crises that are going to be erupting. I mean, this is -- this is an early phase in what’s happening in the world, unless we do such a good job of staunching all of these efforts to reshape the international system that Russia and China in particular engaged in. If we are not really quite up to that now, we’re going to see more crises, and then, you know, we were in this for the long -- for the long term, whether we wanted to be or not.

MR. GALTSON: Perfect. You know, we’re right on time, and now it’s your turn. There’s a sea of hands. I think we’re going to start with the young woman in the back. Yes, you. And I should say, we have limited time, so, no speeches please, ask questions.

QUESTIONER: Thank you so much for the -- to the panelists. My name is Reva (phonetic), I’m a post-doctoral fellow --

MR. GALTSON: Stand up so we can hear you better. Thank you.

QUESTIONER: My name is Reva, I’m a post-doctoral fellow in the FP program.
I had a question for Tanvi. If you could elaborate on what you were saying on the global south, and it connects to the liberal world order comment. So, you talked about an information campaign in the global south, but when you see currency crises rising, commodity prices, very real implications of, you know, the fertilizer and grain disruptions, how much of it is an information campaign versus actual investments and aid towards our -- our allies or partners in the Global South, and how much do you see this as a priority in U.S. foreign policy circles, versus something that's marginalized in the conversation?

MR. GALTSON: Okay. I think our best strategy to take a tranche of three questions, and then answers, and then there will be another round of questions if time permits. So, yes, the young man over -- yes, you.

QUESTIONER: Hi, thank you. I'm Joe Cariz, just a guy with an interest in geopolitics. I had a question for Patricia. I was wondering if you could elaborate a bit on the impact of China's domestic economic pressure, especially with COVID lockdowns and the real estate problems, and how those have affected its calculus on how far to support Russia, and perhaps on how far it might be willing to go with Taiwan as well. Thank you.

MR. GALTSON: Now for the third question. Yes, young man right in the center there.

QUESTIONER: Hi, my name is Amiz Lushi (phonetic), I'm a graduate student at Johns Hopkins SAIS right across the street. So, my question is for Dr. Kaplan. You mentioned U.S. leadership right across the world, and kind of strengthening the liberal international order. So, in the Indo-Pacific, we see that the U.S. leadership is kind of reticent, especially when it comes to the IPEF, the Indo-Pacific economic framework, especially not appointing an ambassador to India for the past two years.

So, how do you foresee the U.S. kind of becoming more active, and more broader, in its approach to the Indo-Pacific, and kind of showing that leadership encountering China, and also, kind of, becoming an active partner to India and all its other partners and allies there?
MR. GALTSION: Thanks. Okay, panelists, over to you.

MS. MADAN: So, very quickly, Reva, on -- and we can talk about this more, but I don't think it can just be an information campaign. But I think even on the food, fuel, fertilizer concerns that you mentioned, for instance, you have seen several countries, not -- this is where, kind of, the Russian Chinese efforts, in terms of their information campaign, have paid -- paid for the -- I'm mixing my metaphors here -- but have actually paid off. Which is, you've seen them say, it is not the Russian invasion that is at fault, it is Western sanctions. Even though there aren't any sanctions on food, fuel, and fertilizer.

I do think you have seen more effort, maybe not at the beginning, I think there was an underestimation of the second- and third-order effects of the, kind of, invasion, but also, kind of, the response. I think you've seen the administration, as well as other countries, in the global South, but in -- in the kind of trans-Atlantic space as well, pay more attention to this issue of -- partly because it's affected all of us here as well, but I think the recognition that at the end of the day, if you want to get other countries to think about these issues in a similar way, to actually focus on that, kind of, violation of territorial integrity and sovereignty, you have to actually be responsive to their concerns as well. Which is primarily going to be on these concerns.

I also think it's going to get worse before it gets better. We've seen the impact on places in South Asia and places like Sri Lanka and Pakistan. We're going to see it more broadly where these kind of high commodity prices are going to lead to a spiral, which frankly might not have been created by debt sustainability problems that China has enabled or exacerbated, but they are not doing very much to help support it either. So, I think we also have to get on board trying to figure out these longer-term concerns. Because I don't think they're going to go away any time soon.

MS. KIM: On the question about China's domestic economic situation and how that impacts its foreign policy behavior. I mean, the slowdown of economic growth in China, because of its strict zero-COVID policy, as well as problems in the real estate industry and other industries, has definitely made an impact on China. This is definitely something that keeps Xi
Jinping and the communist party up at night. Under the CCP, China has had phenomenal economic growth for the last several decades. And I think the reason why many Chinese citizens have tolerated their, sort of, their monopoly over power, is because they have this implicit contract, right, they've made life better, at least materially, for many Chinese.

And so, this is work for now. But, you know, it's -- there's a slowdown. And so, I think that makes a lot of Chinese leaders nervous, and to deal with this, the CCP and -- and President Xi has really, sort of, doubled down on state intervention and, sort of, the state, sort of, pushing its global, or its common prosperity campaign, and sending in more oversight. And I don't think this sits well necessarily with the people of China.

And so, there's a lot of people who are unhappy with the tightening and the, sort of, the growing ideological turn of their country. And so, this is a lot for Xi to deal with. There have been arguments, I've seen recently, that because China is economically slowing down, perhaps it might strike even faster on Taiwan while it has the chance to do so. This is sort of a debate that's become popular in Washington right now. I don't think we can say definitively if that's -- if that is the case or not.

I think President Xi has held his own strategic ambiguity about his timeline on Taiwan. He said that he doesn't want the problem to be passed down multiple generations, that it needs to be taken care of in order for China to achieve its full national rejuvenation. But I don't think that means there's a D-Day marked somewhere in Zhongnanhai, and that the Chinese are going to move on a certain date. I think they're preserving their ambiguity; they have a lot to deal with at home, they need to preserve their legitimacy at home. And I think that serves as a source of restraint.

MR. KAGAN: I just -- you know, I think it's possible to overstate -- I mean I slightly disagree with Tanvi on this -- it's possible to overstate the significance of how the United States messages itself around the world. I think that, you know, it's pretty clear that most countries around the world want to know what's in it for them in any given situation. And Tanvi has listed, and Patricia's listed, the things that these other countries want, how their interests
have been affected by this war. And I think the real question is, is the United States, and the transatlantic world in general, capable of meeting some of these needs or not?

I think an answer to your question, I -- you know, when the United States is most effective, it is thinking globally, it is thinking about exactly the question of what is it that is motivating other countries, and what is it that they need, and to the degree that it's possible to meet those needs, then the United States can try to do that.

Now, I would say that the United States is, you know, like any other country, tremendously solipsistic, and not necessarily always attuned to what other countries want and need, and much more attuned to what they want and need, but of course, that is like all countries. It's certainly like India. So -- but that is -- that is the goal. The goal is to try to meet the various needs. I don't think it matters very much, quite honestly, whether the United States has every single country on the world on the right side of the Russia question. There really are a limited number of countries whose actions fundamentally matter. Most of those in the current situation are basically on the same side as the United States, for the same reasons. You know, I don't think that -- some of it is ideological. But I think when you look at countries like Japan and other Asian countries, they're worried about China taking aggression and what the effect will be on them, and they look to the United States for security. Either the United States is offering to provide that security or it isn't. If it is, then they're basically on the American side.

So, I think, you know, America has been hated around the world much more in the past than it currently is, you know? If you think about the late 1960's, or the 1950's, American officials were obsessed with the fact that the world hated them. It's a common fixture of international relations with the United States. But -- and we should try to make, insofar as is possible, not have countries hate us. But I think the way to do that is to focus on the very specific, usually material and practical, needs and desires of the countries around the world.

MR. GALTSON: With that, I wish there were time for more questions. But it's my sad duty to bring both this panel and this overall Knight Forum to a conclusion. I want to thank our panelists very much for such clarity in offering their views, and to all of you for taking
the time, and the trouble, and the modest COVID risk, to attend this session. (laughter) Not you who are watching. (applause)
CERTIFICATE OF NOTARY PUBLIC

I, Carleton J. Anderson, III do hereby certify that the forgoing electronic file when originally transmitted was reduced to text at my direction; that said transcript is a true record of the proceedings therein referenced; that I am neither counsel for, related to, nor employed by any of the parties to the action in which these proceedings were taken; and, furthermore, that I am neither a relative or employee of any attorney or counsel employed by the parties hereto, nor financially or otherwise interested in the outcome of this action.

Carleton J. Anderson, III

(Signature and Seal on File)

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