



Economic Impact Payments and Household Spending During the Pandemic

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Recent Lump-Sum Fiscal Payment Programs in the US

Tax Payment	Total Estimated Cost	Payment per filer	Payment per qualifying dependent	Number of payments
2020 Economic Impact Payments,	\$292	\$1,200 single	\$500	162
CARES Act	billion	\$2,400 joint		million
2020 Economic Impact Payments,	\$142	\$600 single	\$600	147
Tax Relief Act of 2020	billion	\$1,200 joint		million
2021 Economic Impact Payments,	\$409	\$1,400 single	\$1,400	175
American Rescue Plan Act	billion	\$2,800 joint		million

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American Rescue Plan Act	billion	\$2,800 joint		million
2001 Economic Recovery Rebates, Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act	\$38 billion	\$300 single \$600 joint	_	92 million
2008 Economic Stimulus	\$96	\$300-\$600 single	\$300	130
Payments, Economic Stimulus Act	billion	\$600-\$1,200 joint		million

Motivating Questions

1. Did the EIPs provide widespread, urgently-needed pandemic insurance?

- 1.1 Did households spend their EIPs rapidly after receipt?
 - ► Estimate average marginal propensity to spend on consumer expenditures (MPC) using new methods suited for the pandemic
- 1.2 Did the different economic situation in 2020-21 lead to different spending responses to EIPs than to tax rebates in 2001 and 2008?
 - Estimate MPC using the same method as the 2001 and 2008 rebates (and the same dataset)

2. Did the EIPs provide pandemic insurance for some households?

- 2.1 Did households who entered the pandemic with little liquid wealth spend more of their EIPs more rapidly?
- 2.2 Did households who worked and could not work from home spend more of their EIPs more rapidly?

Main Findings

- 1. The EIPs did not provide widespread, urgently-needed pandemic insurance
 - ► Relatively low average MPCs during the three-month period of arrival on CE-measured non-durable goods and services (44% of total spending)

Share of payment spent on CE non-durable goods and services

	During 3-mont	th period of receipt	And also next 3 months		
Policy	Full Sample	Recipients Only	Full Sample, long horizon		
2020 EIP 1	0.102	-0.062	0.124		
	(0.028)	(0.072)	(0.068)		
2020 EIP 2	0.083		0.153		
	(0.039)		(0.104)		
2021 EIP 3	0.009		-0.030		
	(0.018)		(0.047)		

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	(0.018)		(0.047)
2001 Stimulus Rebates	0.386	0.247	0.691*
	(0.135)	(0.213)	(0.260)
2008 Stimulus Rebates	0.121	0.308	0.347
	(0.055)	(0.112)	(0.155)

Source: Authors calculations on CE survey data, Johnson, Parker, Souleles (2006), Parker Souleles, Johnson, McClelland (2013).

 $^{^{}st}$ big due to one outlier in spending on food

Main Findings

- 1. The EIPs did not provide widespread, urgently-needed pandemic insurance
 - ► Relatively low average MPCs during the three-month period of arrival on CE-measured non-durable goods and services (44% of total spending)
 - ► EIP1/2/3 10% (2.8) / 8% (3.9) / 1% (1.8) for spending on CE non-durable goods
 - ► EIP3 least reliable estimates
 - ▶ Only slightly larger for longer horizons 12-15% for EIP1 and EIP2
 - Some more spending including durable goods

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
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 - Some more spending including durable goods
- 2. The EIPs appear to have provided pandemic insurance to some households with little ex ante liquidity and who could not work from home
 - ▶ EIP1 MPC roughly twice the average for bottom third of liquidity
 - ▶ EIP1 MPC close to three times as large (stat insignificant) for unable to WFH

Why were MPCs lower than in previous episodes?

▶ The pandemic; the EIP size or variation across people; statistical uncertainty


I. The Economic Impact Payments

Figure: Economic Impact Payment Amounts as a Function of AGI and Family Structure



Economic Impact Payment Disbursement

Figure: Economic Impact Payments Over Time and by Mode of Distribution



Note: all EIP2 disbursed in the same month in 2020

II. Estimation of Spending Responses

Basic analysis, to compare to previous studies:

$$\Delta C_{i,t} = \sum_{s=0}^{S} \beta_s EIP_{i,t-s} + \gamma_1 age_{i,t} + \gamma_2 \Delta FamSize_{i,t} + \tau_t + \epsilon_{i,t}$$

- $ightharpoonup \Delta C_{i,j}$ change in expenditures for household i between t and t-1
- ightharpoonup EIP1, EIP2, or EIP3 received in period t-s
- age_{i,t} controls for life-cycle patterns
- $ightharpoonup \Delta FamSize_{i,t}$ controls for changes in consumption needs due to family size
- lacktriangledown au_t controls for average change in spending by period
- $ightharpoonup arepsilon_{i,t}$ captures movements in consumer expenditures due to individual-level factors
- ► Sample: all households or only recipients

II. Estimation of Spending Responses

New analysis, best and more robust estimate of MPC:

$$\Delta \widetilde{C}_{i,t} = \sum_{s=0}^{S} \beta_s \widetilde{EIP}_{i,t-s} + \gamma_1 \widetilde{age}_{i,t} + \gamma_2 \Delta F \widetilde{amSize}_{i,t} + \tau_t + \alpha_{R(i)} + \epsilon_{i,t}$$

- 1. Pandemic-appropriate: Scale by average C for household $i\left(\tilde{X}_{i,t}=X_{i,t}/\bar{C}_i\right)$
 - $\Rightarrow \tau_t$ captures percent change in expenditures by period instead of dollar change Also include other EIPs as controls when studying each EIP
- 2. **Econometric advancement**: Drop assumption that β_s does not depend on t by estimating τ_t in first stage using only households who have not received EIPs Note: $\alpha_{R(i)}$ absorbs average difference between recipients and never-recipients
- 3. Focus on variation in amount and receipt status: use sample of recipients and "similar" never-recipients by dropping high-income households but keep high-ish income households in ranges where some get EIPs

Results similar for traditional vs. pandemic-adjusted methods, focus on new method

III. Data

- Consumer Expenditure Interview Survey
 - Observations at the consumer unit (CU) level
 - Interviewed up to four times at three month intervals
 - Reference period is the previous three months
- EIP questions
 - Included starting with June 2020 interviews, except January 2021
 - ightharpoonup Receipt, # of payments, amount received, mode of receipt, and how mostly used
 - Similar phrasing CE 2001 and 2008 tax rebate questions
- Sample:
 - ▶ Drop households on May 2020 interview schedule due to missing EIP information
 - ▶ As noted: Drop high income households (based on low fraction reporting EIP)

IV. Results: The Average MPC to EIP Receipt

	Panel A: EIP1				Panel B: EIP2			Panel C: EIP3		
	Strictly non- durables	Nondurables	All CE goods and services	Strictly non- durables	Nondurables	All CE goods and services	Strictly non- durables	Nondurables	All CE goods and services	
\widetilde{EIPn}_t	0.075	0.102	0.234	0.103	0.083	0.247	0.030	0.009	0.015	
	(0.020)	(0.028)	(0.059)	(0.031)	(0.039)	(0.090)	(0.016)	(0.018)	(0.043)	
\widetilde{EIPn}_{t-1}	-0.011	-0.080	-0.017	0.030	-0.013	0.107	0.000	-0.049	-0.150	
	(0.020)	(0.028)	(0.070)	(0.038)	(0.045)	(0.124)	(0.010)	(0.019)	(0.049)	
		I	mplied cumula	ative fraction	n of EIP spent o	over two three	-month peri	ods		
	0.139	0.124	0.452	0.235	0.153	0.601	0.059	-0.030	-0.119	
	(0.051)	(0.068)	(0.158)	(0.086)	(0.104)	(0.257)	(0.036)	(0.047)	(0.112)	

 $[\]Rightarrow$ Small MPC for contemporaneous and lagged spending on non-durable goods

 $[\]Rightarrow$ Higher MPC estimates and higher standard errors for total spending

MPCs for EIPs Lower than Previous Stimulus Rebates/Payments

	During 3-mont	th period of receipt	And also next 3 months
Policy	Full Sample	Recipients Only	Full Sample, long horizon
2020 EIP 1	0.102	-0.062	0.124
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Households with Low Ex-Ante Liquid Wealth Had Higher MPCs

			Depend	dent variable.	scaled dollar o	change in sper	nding on		
		Panel A: EIP1	!		Panel B: EIP2	?		Panel C: EIP3	3
	Food and alcohol	Nondurables	All CE goods and services	Food and alcohol	Nondurables	All CE goods and services	Food and alcohol	Nondurables	All CE goods and services
		_	,		_	,		_	,
\widetilde{EIPn}_t	0.039 (0.033)	0.087 (0.064)	0.178 (0.155)	-0.032 (0.071)	0.112 (0.111)	0.220 (0.326)	0.078 (0.035)	0.132 (0.062)	0.081 (0.197)
$\widetilde{\textit{EIPn}}_t \times \textit{Bottom third}$	0.016 (0.051)	0.130 (0.095)	0.301 (0.210)	0.050 (0.084)	0.009 (0.157)	0.191 (0.403)	-0.018 (0.048)	-0.099 (0.087)	-0.065 (0.219)
$\widetilde{\textit{EIPn}}_{\textit{t}} imes \textit{Top third}$	0.013 (0.046)	-0.188 (0.102)	-0.275 (0.243)	-0.090 (0.085)	-0.255 (0.139)	-0.272 (0.449)	0.048 (0.101)	-0.129 (0.099)	-0.057 (0.267)
p-value for test of equality of responses	0.942	0.011	0.044	0.107	0.077	0.492	0.784	0.355	0.957
				Implied pr	opensity to spe	nd by group			
Least liquid third	0.055 (0.039)	0.217 (0.070)	0.479 (0.142)	0.018 (0.046)	0.121 (0.112)	0.411 (0.237)	0.060 (0.034)	0.033 (0.062)	0.016 (0.095)
	$\widetilde{EIPn_t} \times Bottom \ third$ $\widetilde{EIPn_t} \times Top \ third$ $p\text{-}value \ for \ test \ of \ equality \ of \ responses$ Least liquid								

Weak, but EIP1 MPC Higher If Could Not Work Remotely


	Depend	change in spending on	
	Food and alcohol	Nondurables	All CE goods and services
	Fraction of E	EIP1 spent over contempor	aneous three-month period
$\widetilde{\mathit{EIP}}1_t$	0.021	0.052	-0.049
	(0.022)	(0.055)	(0.119)
$\widetilde{\textit{EIP1}}_t imes \textit{Middle third}$	0.030	0.176	0.258
	(0.043)	(0.089)	(0.232)
$\widetilde{EIP1}_t \times Least$ able third	0.036	0.064	0.367
•	(0.038)	(0.083)	(0.188)
p-value for test of equality of responses	0.731	0.225	0.210
	Cumulative fraction of	EIP1 spent over contempo	praneous and next three-month period
Most able third	-0.007	-0.135	-0.435
	(0.057)	(0.159)	(0.349)
Middle third	0.126	0.365	0.181
	(0.100)	(0.190)	(0.622)
Least able third	0.117	0.285	0.842
	(0.080)	(0.156)	(0.448)


V. Related Research

- 1. We build on lots of research on spending response to previous tax rebates
- **2. Previous analyses of MPCs out of EIPs** mostly find high MPC in account-level data on low-income households or people using app to try to save
 - ightharpoonup Baker et al. (2020) MPC pprox 25-35%; also JPMorganChase Institute in progress
 - ▶ Karger and Rajan (2021) and Cooper and Olivei (2021): low inc MPC \approx 46% and \approx 66% ;
 - ► Credit card spending: Meyer and Zhou (2020) year-over-year spending increased by 50% for households with income < \$50,000, by 3% for income > \$125,000.
 - ➤ Zip codes card data: Misra et al. (2021) MPC of 50% in days after EIP arrived, Chetty et al. (2021) spending rose by 25% in zips in bottom 1/4 by avg income
- **3. Reported use of EIPs**: Sahm et al. (2020): 18% will "mostly increase spending;" 1% lower than 2008; Coibion et al. (2021): 15% of households report mostly spend/spent; Armantier et al. (2020): avg spending rate of 29%; Garner et al. (2020), Boutros (2020): 59% in Household Pulse Survey report they "will mostly pay for expenses" with EIPs

VI. Conclusion

Figure: Change in Real Personal Consumption Expenditures Directly due to EIPs





VI. Conclusion

- ➤ Spending out of pandemic EIPs appears lower than spending out of stimulus payments in 2001 and 2008 recessions
- ▶ But some households spent substantial amounts rapidly: those with little accumulated liquid wealth and those whose jobs were at risk
- ▶ Were the EIPs effective?
 - Goal of the 2001 and 2008 rebates were to increase demand
 - Goal of the 2020 EIPs was insurance
 - The average person did not need urgent pandemic support, but some did and appear to have used EIPs rapidly
 - ▶ Slow average spending response consistent with current high demand