“Re-approaching Africa’s economic integration agenda”
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Episode Summary:

Julius Kiiza, professor of Political Economy of Development at Uganda’s Makerere University, discusses Africa’s regional integration efforts as well as the integral role of women and technology in the success of the endeavor.
ORDU: From the promise of new technologies to the innovative and youthful population shaping our continent’s future, Africa is full of dynamism worth celebrating. Hi, I’m Aloysius Uche Ordu, director of the Africa Growth Initiative at the Brookings Institution and host of Foresight Africa podcast. Since 2011, the Africa Growth Initiative has published a high-profile report on the key events and trends likely to shape affairs in Africa in the year ahead. Entitled “Foresight Africa,” the goal of the publication is to bring attention to these burning issues and to support policy actions to address them. With this podcast, we intend to engage the report authors, as well as policymakers, captains of industry, Africa’s youths and other key figures.

Our guest today is Professor Julius Kiiza. Professor Kiiza is at the Department of Political Science and Public Administration, Makerere University, Kampala, Uganda. Professor Kiiza was a panel member when we launched “Foresight Africa 2022” in Kampala in May this year. Professor Kiiza, welcome to the show.

KIIZA: Thank you very much, Aloysius, thank you very much, colleagues at the Brookings Institution. I’m so glad to be here in this conversation tonight.

ORDU: Great. Thank you very much. Let’s start, if you could share with our listeners how you got to where you are today, very briefly please.

KIIZA: Very briefly, I brushed shoulders with economists and other development policy professionals at Makerere University in America, in the UK, in Australia, across the world. So, in my process of brushing shoulders with these best and brightest economists, I have come to learn that there are different strands, different varieties of economics wisdom. There is a brand that appears to be dominant, and that is a brand that seems to speak the language of advanced industrial economies and the digital societies. But there is another brand which speaks the language of developing countries, which are still predominantly in Africa and in Asia, to some degree Latin America.

So, I come to understand that number two, when I read the history of development, many of today’s advanced countries are telling poor countries in Africa and elsewhere in the world to do things that they did not do when they were at comparable levels of development.

So, my conversation today is guided by the understanding that many professionals in economics are literally saying, do as I say, not as I did to become rich and strong.

ORDU: Fascinating, fascinating indeed. In fact, thank you very much for those introductions. To pick up on where you left off, the discourse on Africa’s development, as you know, is rich with catchy phrases like “competitive advantage,” “transformative development,” “inclusive development,” “green growth,” “green transition,” et cetera, et cetera. What institutional and policy reforms are needed to deliver development benefits to the people of our continent?

KIIZA: What we discover is that the dominant discourse on development has started using catchy phrases, as you hinted: “transformative development,” “green transition,” “green growth,” “smart industrial policy,” and several others. Now, the problem is that these catchphrases appear to have been deployed as instruments of the dominant agenda without necessarily having the content that is needed. Nobody hates transformative development. Nobody hates competitive advantages. The problem is that these terms are used loosely
without being impregnated with the content that would actually deliver what these concepts imply.

It appears, therefore, that the starting point is to review received wisdom. The starting point must involve interrogating the ideology, for instance, of free market capitalism, which appears to be underpinning most of these catchy phrases. To talk of reviewing the ideology of free market capitalism is to say, is it possible for us to understand that virtually all of today’s advanced countries use the strong doses of economic nationalism. They use the strong doses of nationalistic institutions, such as MITI in Japan, the Ministry for International Trade and Industry, such as the Council for Economic Planning and Development.

Is it possible for us to understand that when Alexander Hamilton was secretary of the Treasury in the United States of America under the George Washington administration, he pushed for industrial policies driven by the understanding that America is for Americans and American ideas and principles and priorities; that the matters of Europe, the advanced economies of Europe in 18th century are matters for Europeans; that America must build its own institutions, its own infrastructure and its own economy using policies that fundamentally speak to the priorities of America.

So, in other words, in summary, these ideas that we need must be ideas building on country-specific developmental institutions and country-specific development policy. Those kinds of ideas appear to be summarized under the ideology of economic nationalism. It appears, therefore, that the economic liberalism that is driving most of the current conversations has been introduced into the African development discourse prematurely.

ORDU: That’s fascinating, Professor Kiiza. Let’s take an aspect of what you’ve just said. The African Union Agenda 2063, which, as you and I know, seeks to build the Africa we want. Critical scrutiny suggests that the pursuit of a loose federation has taken an upper hand over a firm federalism known as the United States of Africa, which is what our founding fathers clearly had in mind when you think of Nkrumah, et cetera. So in your view, professor, what needs to be done differently to promote the firm model of a truly integrated Africa?

KIIZA: I think the first issue is to be able to understand that there are two broad histories of integration. There is the history of the weak confederation. Confederation means you are bringing together different sovereign states to surrender aspects of their power. But retaining the substantial proportion of their policy spaces. For example, you can decide that we are going to collaborate on matters of foreign policy, but not necessarily on matters of monetary and fiscal policy. So, the idea is that confederation speaks the language of meeting in talk shops. It is a language that is elitist.

And yet what we have seen as successful stories of integration, those stories that push for a firm United States, a firm unification. The typical examples worth quoting are the push from the 13 narrow colonies of America to the United States of America. The super powerful United States of America was built through the westward expansion. And the other example is the unification of Italy under Mussolini. The third example is the unification of Germany under Chancellor von Bismarck. The fourth example is the unification of Japan, beginning with the Meiji Restoration of 1868. What do we see in those successful cases? We are seeing the pursuit of political integration and economic union being pursued simultaneously, that is as joint objectives of state policy.
The aim of these policies was to build a strong state, build a strong economy, which is being transformed from agrarian activities into high tech industrial manufacturing, and eventually digital services. The goal was to build a strong and enriched nation defined as citizens.

So, in other words, Africa has to choose. Do we want to continue meeting to have coffee and tea and wine in a confederation political dispensation? Or do we want to go deep, the line of the firm construction of the United States of Africa? I would go for the second option. The reason being that even under the best-case scenario, African economies that are integrating will have inequitable outcomes of development. The inequality can only be resolved via a central Africa-wide state that is capable of regulating economic activity; that is capable of pushing for progressive taxation; a state that is capable of redistributing the benefits of inequitable growth to other regions that may be lagging behind; a state that is capable of coordinating continent-wide infrastructure—for instance, in the standard gauge rail line, at the moment we don’t have a standard gauge railway line across Africa. We need a state that will be able to coordinate investments in broad highways and in the ICT infrastructure. A nation that would be able to coordinate even the simple thing called language, a language of unification—maybe Kiswahili.

So, in other words, a central United States is extremely important as a precondition to economic liberalization. So, we need this strong state, a strong economy, strong coordinated institutions, and therefore a mode of development that is pursuing structural, social, economic transformation for the people of Africa.

**ORDU:** That’s indeed fascinating. I just, while you were speaking, also thinking of the European experiment, because, as you say, the founding fathers of the European experiment, EU integration, were aiming for a United States of Europe at the very beginning, as you and I recall. Where they were driven by a number of factors, right, the notion of no more wars in Europe after the second war, no more wars. So that was a driving force in the idea of the EU. And another strong precondition was the strength of the leadership of these people, the men of vision, who really wanted to push through the agenda of the United States of Europe. I was just wondering, the points you made earlier, the preconditions in our case in Africa, do you think we have those preconditions to shoot for a United States of Africa?

**KIIZA:** I think the issue is that building the United States of Africa is not going to be easy. The invitation to the unification of Africa is not an invitation to a tea party. It is an invitation to serious work. We need to be able to build a new composition that pushes for the unification of our institutions, the integration of our infrastructure. So, it does not necessarily require that peace comes first. In fact, a centralized state will be part and parcel of that equation that is trying to resolve the issues of conflict.

I wish to submit that the model of integration, the loose confederation which the European Union has eventually settled for, is not the most ideal model to benchmark for Africa. It is not ideal because the European Union model leaves substantial powers to the sovereign states and it leaves room for each sovereign state to do what we may call Brexit, to consider the idea of opting out. What we need is a firm United States. No part of America, however disgruntled, can be permitted to get out of the union. That’s the kind of model we need.

I am not saying that the unification of Africa will result in equitable development by and of itself. And that’s the reason why we need a state with firm institutions to be able to promote growth but also redistribute the fruits of growth across the continent. We need this United
States of Africa to be able to promote inclusive growth and inclusive development. We need a United States of Africa to be able to promote the gender agenda and ensure that male and female are brought on board to contribute their very best on the understanding that we should have equal pay for equal work, that gender discrimination will be a thing of the past.

But we also need to coordinate our efforts, our pursuit for green growth, the transition into a green economy, the transition into the digital economy, robotics engineering. All of this experience shows are best done when we have a strong state to coordinate. The European Union model is not the best benchmark. The best benchmark, I repeat, would be Meiji Japan. It would be the United States of America. It would be the unification of Germany under Chancellor von Bismarck. It would be actually even the United Kingdom is a better model.

So, the point is that we need to rethink our received wisdom and get away from the loose confederation experiment that permits certain sovereign states to opt out of the union.

ORDU: Fascinating indeed. Talking of the centralized state, Professor Kiiza, China has emerged as a top development partner of African countries. Does Chinese capital constitute a new form of imperialism, in your view? And in what ways can African countries leverage Chinese capital without succumbing to foreign domination and control?

KIIZA: Two quick things. The greatest commentators on China as a new form of imperial power in Africa are mainly the traditional lenders to Africa. These traditional lenders—we call them now affectionately “development partners”—have been very good in terms of sponsoring health care, so HIV/AIDS; in terms of sponsoring maternal health; in terms of sponsoring workshops. So, talk shops, we talk about rights, democracy, et cetera.

I’m not saying these are not important, but what Africa identity needs as a matter of priority is infrastructure such as standard gauge railway lines, such as broad highways, such as the ICT bandwidth. And this is where China came in a space that is underpopulated by Western donors. Now the West that is crying foul, that is telling us that China is a bad development partner, has actually been absent in these spaces that are needed to unlock the obstacles to Africa’s development. So, the talk of China as the new imperial power is dominated by the traditional donors who appear to be saying China is editing us out of the development equation in Africa and in Latin America and in Asia.

So, I want to be clear, China is not a charity house. So, Chinese capital like Western capital is driven by political considerations of the aid giver. The only issue that African recipients of Chinese aid, just like Western aid, need to understand is that in the aid dispensation you get what you negotiate, not necessarily what you deserve. So, whether African countries are living with China or Western powers, we need to negotiate and get the best possible outcome.

So, yes, there are components of neo-imperialism in Chinese assistance, but they have to be negotiated. It is our duty as Africans, it is our duty as aid recipients to say, are we getting the aid that unlocks our obstacles to development. For example, by building standard gauge railway lines that will move labor, that will move industrial materials. For example, by attracting technology. It is our duty to take to negotiate technology transfer partnerships to ensure that when Chinese capital comes or Western capital comes to Africa, that there is a component of technology transfer. This is what China has done with the West.
But it is also our duty to invest in the training and skilling of our human resource in STEM disciplines—science, technology, engineering, and math—to ensure that a portion of the labor force that is working on projects funded with Chinese capital is actually local content. That it’s our own citizens who are working with Chinese engineers and scientists to be able to build local content and local capacity. At the moment we are not coordinated, so the Chinese come with top-notch consultants, they come with advisors, they come with even the *jua kali*, “jua kali” is a Swahili word for hot sun. Even people driving forklifts are imported into Africa from China. We need to regulate that. We need to negotiate a better deal for Africa and ensure that a large portion of skilled labor is actually African. That way we are able to embark on technology transfer.

My point is simple: China is not a charity house, China is a sovereign power. A lot of funding coming from China is coming from sovereign sources, and China is still classified as a developing economy. So, the interest rates and the conditions of borrowing from China may actually be problematic. But China is good in that it is investing in infrastructure. And for many of the African economies where the leadership is actually not practicing liberal democracy, China says they have no problem with their form of governance, and will not impose governance conditionalities, nor human rights conditionalities. All we are doing is to invest in Africa in infrastructure, not caring about the way your economy is governed, perhaps in reflection to the mode of governance that’s in China under the Chinese Communist Party, which is reforming to impose a system of Chinese capitalism with Chinese characteristics.

**ORDU:** Thinking of the emphasis on infrastructure, the founding fathers like Nkrumah, et cetera, envisioned east-west highways and railways and north-south railways and highways, and those were in the fifties and sixties. And here we are in 2022 and nowhere near the grand vision of Nkrumah and others. And even now it’s only recently that we have Congo DRC entering the EAC in your region in East Africa. For the first time now we have the possibility of an Indian Ocean link in the Atlantic Ocean, but then we don’t have the requisite infrastructure to go with that. I was just wondering your own thoughts on the enlarged membership of the EAC.

**KIIZA:** While the enlarged membership of the East African community is a welcome idea, the idea that Africans are beginning to talk the language of expanding our economic blocs, the regional economic blocs, that we are beginning to rethink the idea of the colonial borders, I think this is an important achievement. It means that we are no longer lamenting about the colonial borders imposed by a foreign power. We are saying we can actually rethink these colonial borders and promote socio-economic interactions.

So, DRC’s membership into the East African community is a welcome idea. The devil lies in the details. When you bring the Democratic Republic of Congo into the East African community, it is even posing the most serious challenge of integrating the infrastructures of this region. So, we are talking of the need for coordinated standard gauge railway lines. But you know what? Whereas the East African community developed the Northern Corridor plan, which meant that building a standard gauge rail line from Mombasa through Nairobi to Uganda, Kampala, to Kigali, and eventually DRC, what we are seeing is that Kenya has gone ahead with the development of the standard gauge railway line. The funding for the Kenyan leg and the Ugandan leg was supposed to be Exim Bank of China.
Kenya, thanks to its leadership, the political elite from Mwai Kibaki to Uhuru, Kenya has been able to construct their standard gauge railway line. Uganda has had slow progress. The ruling party in Uganda calls it steady progress, defined as small baby steps at a time. Small steps improvement, thanks to COVID. The leadership in Kampala now says that most of the COVID cases that afflicted Uganda were imported by truck drivers from Kenya and from Tanzania.

So, the headship, the political leadership in Uganda now says we need to revive the railway line. But guess what? The political settlement is in favor of reviving the [old colonial] and slow colonial gauge. So it’s not yet Uhuru for Uganda. It’s not yet Uhuru for East Africa. So, unlike Kenya and Tanzania, under Mwai Kibaki that have embarked on impressive investment projects of standard gauge rail line, we in Uganda appear to have settled for a dysfunctional and inefficient colonial gauge, which is what we are reviving.

So, the point is that, among other things, we are going to have interoperability costs where the standard gauge rail line connects with the Ugandan narrow gauge. We are going to have issues of how to integrate DRC. We are going to have issues of this inefficient system being able to move industrial raw materials, and to move labor, to move capital, to be able to create wealth and economic transformation. And that infrastructural issue must be addressed.

But we also have the issue of roads. In Kenya, they are building broad highways. The only broad highway in Uganda is the Kampala Entebbe Express Highway. We need to learn from the Kenyan story. We need to learn from the Magufuli story of Tanzania, and be able to have plans and most importantly, work on the implementation of these plans.

So, we need to coordinate, but we also need to coordinate our learning institutions and develop a language that unites our people. The integration of economies is useless unless people are integrated, and we need a language. Language plays a miracle among societies. Once people can speak the same language, their collaboration becomes much better.

Now, to make the infrastructure investments, to make the connected language, to make the connected ICT bandwidth, we need to build the United States of East Africa. So, if it appears difficult and we cannot pretend that it is easy to build an Africa-wide the United States of Africa, then we should have the regional economic communities building region-specific United States. The hope is that eventually this can actually merger and build the United States of Africa.

Unfortunately, the leaders in the East African community have retreated from the idea of a firm federation to the idea of a loose confederation. So, the African disease is infecting East Africa as well. We have elites advised by orthodox economists who are saying all we need is economic integration. These elites are unwilling to surrender the sovereign powers of the individual nation states to a larger political entity, which I would call the United States of East Africa. That is where we need to invest our energies, our thoughts, and our priorities to build a strong United States of East Africa as we pursue economic integration, as we integrate our societies, as we integrate our knowledge institutions.

**ORDU:** So, it seems to me then, professor, is the African Continental Free Trade Area a friend or foe of durable development in East Africa, in West Africa, SADC, and the other “RECs” from your point of view?
KIIZA: Again, I want to be very clear on two things or three. The first is that the dominant ideology driving the Africa-wide Continental Free Trade Agreement is free market fundamentalism. This is the ideology that is being pushed to Africa by foreign powers—the advanced political economies, the industrial and high-tech economies that have dominated these spaces within the World Trade Organization. The World Trade Organization has adopted the ideology of free market capitalism as its working ideology. The World Trade Organization is pushing for worldwide economic integration along the lines of economic liberalism.

I am not saying that economic liberalism is a wrong ideology. It is just inappropriate for Africa at the current stage of development. Countries at the current stage of development of Africa, countries at comparable stages that are still agrarian, that are still dominated by micro, small to medium enterprises controlling almost 90 plus percent of the economy, contributing up to 65% of gross domestic product, such countries have to pursue an ideology of economic nationalism, not economic liberalism.

In other words, by putting markets ahead of political union and ahead of economic transformation, African economies appear to be institutionalizing an ideology that is inconsistent with our level of development.

What we need to understand is actually that the African Continental Free Trade Area is a distinctive variant of the global free trade areas. Again, the composition of that global is being imported into Africa, mediated through our best and brightest economists and other professionals recruited in the African Union, in African universities, in African ministries of finance and economic affairs. So, what we appear to be headed for is development failure. Ours appears to be an experiment in development failure, because you cannot liberalize markets without a United States of Africa. We cannot say neoliberal markets will work in an agrarian economy. We cannot, because we are now in Africa building a super-market economy. The products sold in Africa’s super-market economies are imported from overseas.

To the extent that these products are made in Africa, they are produced by foreign capital. Foreign direct investment in Africa is being given free with tax holidays, five-year tax holidays. And when the five years are about to end, this FDI, consisting of very knowledgeable actors, negotiates its way out of the registered company or they negotiate for an extension of the tax holidays. So, we are losing revenue. But at the same time, a lot of this FDI is not sufficiently regulated to improve the local content and local participation of Africans in what foreign capital is doing in Africa. In that context, the African continent-wide free trade area is likely to be a foe, not a friend, of African economic transformation. So we need to revise it. And to the extent that the dominant thinkers are pushing for free markets without causing states to surrender their sovereign powers to a larger political entity, we are actually experimenting with development failure, and we need to rethink that.

ORDU: Professor Kiiza, earlier on, you touched upon the issue of gender. Let me switch gears to gender, because in chapter three of “Foresight Africa 2022,” we cover African women and girls leading a continent. What needs to be done, in your view, to ensure that the discourse on gender inclusive development shifts from rhetoric to reality?

KIIZA: Yeah, I first would wish to congratulate the Brookings Institution and other research institutions and development institutions. I really need to congratulate you upon the idea of embracing the gender agenda. So, that’s an important achievement.
But we need to appreciate that the focus has been basically on two things or three. First is political representation in parliament, in cabinet, in local government jurisdictions. The focus of the gender agenda has been on the numbers. So, gender has been reduced to the number of females. Gender is social relationship issue, the relationship between men and women in the process of production and reproduction. That’s what gender is all about. But today, the issue is when people say gender, they mean where are the women? Where are the girls? And that is another way.

So, the development discourse is doing the right thing by bringing the gender agenda on board. We need to go much further, much deeper by ensuring that the issue is not just about the number of women in the commanding heights of politics. We want to appreciate, like Molly Noakes argues—Mary Molly Noakes argued that actually what we need is women’s economic empowerment. Without economic empowerment, you cannot talk of political representation that is meaningful.

So, we need to ensure that women are skilled. They receive the kind of education. So we must address the question of high school dropout rates. High school dropout rates affect both boys and girls, but they disproportionately affect the girl child. In Uganda, for example, 65% of the girls who begin primary one never complete the full primary school cycle. They drop out before completing seven years; 65%. The transition rate, even those who complete, is much lower than those of the boys. Now, let me be clear. We need to address the needs of the boy child alongside the needs of the girl child. That would be a better gender conversation. Because boys and girls from poor households are affected in unique ways and we need to address that question. But fundamentally, we need to ensure that the gender agenda is not just about numbers, counting of numbers of MPs who are women. We need to address the girl child question.

Second, we need to be able to say, where are these skilling programs that ensure that male and female have an equal chance to be able to get skills of the digital economy, skills of a modern industrial economy, rather than the social science skills alone. I’m a social scientist, and I think social science skills like critical thinking, communication skills, are very important, but we need to make sure that we hybridize them with the things that will ensure the proper participation of men and women in the labor market, and in the process of wealth creation.

But number three, we need uniquely to address things that constrain the girl child’s participation in school and in the labor market. Studies in Uganda have concluded that there are things which are doable, such as sanitary towels, sanitary pads for the girl child. A substantial number of girls dropping out of school are not able to afford sanitary towels. We do have elites in power in Uganda, they have failed, they have allocated money for elitist consumption. We have a huge parliament in Uganda and many other African countries, huge cabinets, large ministries, departments, and agencies. But we are not allocating money for the girl child to ensure that the girl child from the poor household is able to access sanitary towels to stay in the school and have a chance at life’s opportunities.

And I hasten to add that addressing the question of numbers of women without transforming the females into a skilled labor force for a 21st digital economy is actually missing the point. It is not just numbers. We need to be able to ensure that women are proactively empowered, alongside the men, to be useful members of the political economy of the 21st century. And that means going beyond the current narrative of elitist women. So, the elitist agenda is not
sufficiently addressing the patriarchal obstacles that constrain women. And the elitist agenda is actually about women who, without any assistance, can compete with any man across the world. We have the women now in spaces, international, regional, and national, who can compete without any assistance. I think what we are missing is an agenda that brings on board females and males who, because of their socioeconomic status, are not able to compete with their peers in the labor market and in the institutions of learning.

ORDU: Fascinating, indeed, the idea of much more practical approaches to the gender question rather than the obsession with number counting. I think that’s what you’re saying. I wanted to turn to an issue also you touched upon, which in chapter five of Foresight 2022, we cover the notion of technological innovation, creating and harnessing tools for improved livelihoods. In your view, what are the preconditions for Africa’s industrial revolution? In particular, what needs to be done to build Africa’s readiness for the so-called fourth industrial revolution?

KIIZA: The fourth industrial revolution is extremely important because it is associated with 21st century technologies, which include robotics engineering, big data, 3D printing, the Internet of Things, and the use of data science as an instrument for evidence-based public policy.

The problem at hand is that many African countries have been persuaded by the intellectual orthodoxy to think that you can leapfrog from an agrarian economy, skipping the stage of industrial manufacturing into a high-tech service economy. That is extremely misleading. I have argued and I wish to repeat that virtually all the digital technologies, all the digital spaces are mediated through manufactured products, including this conversation we are having in a digital space. This conversation is mediated through a laptop. It is mediated through a smartphone. These are manufactured products. The tabs, these are manufactured products. So, the idea that Africans can leapfrog from a backward agrarian economy into a high-tech service economy is very misleading or even harmful. Misleading because there is no country that has ever obtained measurable outcomes from a digital society, a digital service economy, without building but manufacturing capabilities.

There is also destructive in that once you leapfrog from an agrarian economy, Africa-style, into the digital economy, Rwanda-style, Africa-style, what is happening is that you are actually incorporated into the digital economy as a contributor of low-value added services. So, let me be clear: the services sector, thanks to telecommunications and rising internet penetration rates, is accounting for over 53% of GDP in most African countries. To some, that means structural transformation from an agrarian economy into a service economy. I have argued that many of the participants in the digital economy are actually doing peripheral activities like selling airtime, or holding a manufactured phone made in China, made in Korea, made in America—you hold a phone, a manufactured product, which is imported, or you go on your laptop or tab and play with the buttons and transmit money. So, those people are computed as people in the services sector.

But our contribution is not about the high tech. We are the tail’s end, not the actual services that are rewarded. So, the rewards of the digital economy are going to countries that are innovating, countries that are contributing to value, high value addition in that space. So, in other words, for Africa to be able to leverage modern technology, we need to appreciate that meaningful structural transformation of the economy means moving from the primary
commodity economy, being farming, forestry, fishing, mining, into an economy that is doing high-value added industrial manufacturing, not just processing. And then high value-added industrial manufacturing should give us the leverage to penetrate the digital sector from a competitive position rather than as an appendage of the innovative economy controlled by the advanced political economies.

ORDU: I’ve been speaking with Professor Julius Kiiza of the Department of Political Science and Public Administration, Makerere University in Kampala, Uganda. Professor, and my brother, thank you very, very much for your time.

KIIZA: Thank you very much for sharing your questions and thoughts with me. It has been a great pleasure airing out some of my concerns.

ORDU: I’m Aloysius Uche Ordu, and this has been Foresight Africa. To learn more about what you heard today, find this episode online at Brookings dot edu slash Foresight Africa podcast. Each episode will be listed on its own web page and there will be links to the content discussed in the episode.

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Thank you very much.