THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION

SOUTH KOREA AND THE NEW GEOECONOMICS OF ASIA

Washington, D.C.

Wednesday, May 25, 2022

Welcome:

MIREYA SOLIS
Senior Fellow and Director, Center for East Asia Policy Studies
The Brookings Institution

Keynote Address:

TARUN CHHABRA
Senior Director for Technology and National Security, U.S. National Security Council

Panel 1: South Korea’s role in Asia’s new trade architecture

MODERATOR: MIREYA SOLIS
Senior Fellow and Director, Center for East Asia Policy Studies, The Brookings Institution

HYE MIN LEE
Visiting Professor, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies

WENDY CUTLER
Vice President and Managing Director, Asia Society Policy Institute

JUNE PARK
Fung Global Fellow, Institute for International & Regional Studies, Princeton University

Panel 2: South Korea as a provider of regional public goods

MODERATOR: ANDREW YEO
Senior Fellow, Center for East Asia Policy Studies, The Brookings Institution

MIYEON OH
Director and Senior Fellow, Asia Security Initiative, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, Atlantic Council

SCOTT SNYDER
Senior Fellow for Korea Studies, Director of the Program on U.S.-Korea Policy, Council on Foreign Relations

TROY STANGARONE
Senior Director and Fellow, Korea Economic Institute

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PROCEEDINGS

MS. SOLIS: Good morning, everyone. Wonderful to see you. If I can ask you to kindly take your seats, I think we are about ready to start.

So, good morning again. My name is Mireya Solis. I’m the director of the Center for East Asia Policy Studies at Brookings. And it is a pleasure to welcome an in-person audience, and a virtual audience, to today’s program on South Korea, and the new geoeconomics of Asia. Our event today could not be more timely, as President Biden and President Yoon had their first bilateral meeting just a few days ago, where they underscored the growing potential of the U.S.-South Korea partnership to address regional and global challenges. They produced a very lengthy and substantive joint statement. And from that statement, I think there were 2 things in particular that really speak to the core of today’s program.

They talked about forging a strategic, economic and technology partnership. And they also talked about expanding the reach of cooperation, towards a global alliance beyond the peninsula. I think this encapsulates, very well, the theme of the panels later today. But we’re going to start very strong, with a keynote that will go to the core of many of these issues, and it is my pleasure to introduce a very distinguished keynote speaker.

Tarun Chhabra is a senior director for technology and national security with the National Security Council, for the Biden administration. Prior to joining the NSC, Tarun was a fellow here at Brookings, in the Foreign Policy Program’s Center for Security, Strategy and Technology. One of his many accomplishments during his time at Brookings was collating the Brookings Foreign Policy-wide initiative, Global China, which focused on the implications of China’s growing global influence.

Tarun was also senior fellow at the Center for Security and Emerging Technology at Georgetown University, and previously served as director in Obama’s National Security Council, from 2015 to 2017, and as speechwriter to the secretary of defense, from 2013 to 15.
Following Tarun’s remarks, my colleague Andrew Yeo, the SK-Korea Foundation chair on Korea studies, will engage in a conversation with him, and he will also be taking questions from the audience.

Tarun, it’s such a pleasure to welcome you back to Brookings. Thank you.

MR. CHHABRA: Good morning, everyone. Thanks for being here. Thanks to those who are tuning in online. It’s really a privilege to be back here at Brookings, and I look forward to our discussion today.

I just want to say, at the outset of our discussions, and I know that all of our hearts ache for the tragedy yesterday, in Texas, and our thoughts and prayers are obviously with all of the families, and the community there.

Overnight, I guess, all of you saw, as well, we saw additional ballistic missile launches from North Korea. I’ll let the readouts from National Security Advisor Sullivan’s discussion with his counterpart, National Security Advisor Kim. And, of course, Secretary of State Blinken with Foreign Minister Park as well. Those readouts speak for themselves.

As Mireya said, you know, this event today is obviously very, very well timed, coming the day after the President returned from this trip to Asia visiting, of course, Korea and Japan, and participating not only in bilateral summit meetings with President Yoon and Prime Minister Kishida, but also, of course, the third summit meeting, and the second in-person one for the Quad. Along with important bilateral meetings with Prime Minister Modi, freshly elected Prime Minister Albanese as well. And, of course, the President participated, as we’ll discuss I’m sure, in the launch of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, along with the leaders of 12 other nations, including Australia, Brunei, India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, of course, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam. Countries that, as I’m sure you’ve all heard us say many times now, together account for 40 percent of the world’s GDP.

And I’m glad today, to talk a little bit about the extraordinary strength, and still further potential, as we see it, of the United States’ relationship with the Republic of Korea, at a moment of really profound geopolitical and technological change. And also
about the ways in which the influence and impact of our alliance, as Mireya has just alluded to, has matured far beyond a focus on the Korean peninsula, but to redound to the benefit of workers and consumers. Not just in the United States, not just in Korea, but in countries across the Indo-Pacific, and well beyond. And we really see tremendous opportunities at the nexus of technology and security. Both national security and economic security, which will be the heart of the National Security Council to National Security Council, coordinated dialogue on economic security that was launched by the leaders at their summit, just a few days ago.

So, you know, underlying this initiative is a foundational commitment by the Biden administration to building deep and enduring ties of technological cooperation, not just between the United States and our allies and like-minded countries, but also between, and among those allies and like-minded countries as well.

The United States, or any of our allies for that matter, cannot meet the technology-inflected challenges that are facing us, alone. Whether we’re talking about vulnerabilities in our supply chains, whether we’re talking about challenges involving investment security, or cyber security, or data security. The modern American industrial strategy that we’re embarking on as National Economic Council Director Brian Deese recently described it, whether we’re talking about semiconductors, or critical minerals, is really about shoring up America’s economic and national security resilience and capacity, not autarchy; is about ensuring that America has a strong foundation at home, that will enable strong technological and industrial partnerships with allies and like-minded partners abroad. And that’s why we saw such a productive meeting, just about 10 days ago, between the United States and the European Union at our Trade and Technology Council. Why the Quad leaders announced new progress on standards, 5G and technology investments at the summit in Tokyo, just a couple of days ago.

And it’s why deep cooperation with the Republic of Korea is such a priority as well. So let me just say a few words about some about the specific areas, both in specific
technology sectors, and in functional areas where we see really tremendous opportunity for
deeper work between the United States and the Republic of Korea.

So first, semiconductors. Obviously, our leaders have been seized with the
vulnerabilities in the semiconductor supply chain, because of the shortage that we’ve all
been coping with, that have such profound impacts on our economies. We’re also aware of
the vulnerabilities in the supply chain. If there were geopolitical shocks, or other events as
well. And so, I think it’s clear to everyone here, semiconductors are foundational for
anything that has an on-off switch. They’re the lifeblood of the digital economy. And they’re
also critical, from where I sit, for pushing the frontiers of innovation, whether that’s for
economic progress or National Security. Because advanced computing and artificial
intelligence, are really the foundation for discovery across technology sectors. As you all
know, the President’s first stop in Korea was at Samsung’s Fabtech, where he welcomed
Samsung’s investments in Texas to expand semiconductor manufacturing there. As you all
know, the administration is in the midst of a big push to get the chips bill in Congress to the
President’s desk as well. That, obviously, has incentives for manufacturing in the United
States, but it also has a major component on research and development for next generation
semiconductors, and we see partnerships with allies, including Korea, to be critical to that
effort as well.

Next, biotechnology, biomanufacturing, this is something you’re going to
hear more about from this administration soon. And that’s because, by 2030, some
estimates would say that biotechnology will be used so extensively in manufacturing
industries, accounting for up to a third of global output, around $30 trillion, potentially, in
value. These technologies are maturing very rapidly, they’re capturing associated
innovations that will enable us to diversify critical supply chains, and create sustainable and
climate friendly domestic manufacturing, with real opportunities for growing our workforce,
both here and in allied countries.

Clean technologies. Obviously, a lot of discussion on the President’s visit
about EVs and batteries, as you all know, an event with the Chairman of Hyundai, the
President welcomed more than $10 billion in new investment in American manufacturing. This commitment of $5 billion for advanced automotive technology, and about $5.5 billion to open a new factory near Savannah, Georgia. This comes on the heels, of course, of announcements last Fall, that SK and Ford would invest more than $11 billion in battery and EV production in the United States.

Nuclear Energy. The importance of nuclear energy, I think, was affirmed in the joint statement, as a critical and reliable source of carbon free electricity. An important element to grow our clean energy economy. I think the urgency of this has only become more clear in the aftermath of Russia’s further invasion of Ukraine. And we see this as an integral part of enhancing Global Energy Security. And the 2 leaders, of course, committed to a greater nuclear energy collaboration, and particularly in accelerating the development and deployment of advanced reactors and small modular reactors, by using joint export promotion, and capacity building tools, and building a more resilient nuclear supply chain.

Digital infrastructure development. Another area. Here you saw the pleaders agree to cooperate on infrastructure financing, including with respect to digital infrastructure. And third countries, you saw something similar coming out of the U.S. and EU Trade and Tech Council meeting as well, a task force with a very, very similar focus. We see this as not just about telecom, we see it as digital infrastructure writ large, including cloud services and data centers, which will power the next generation of virtualized telecommunications. And our cooperation here will -- we see as complementary to what we’re doing with Europe, what we’re doing with the Quad and other partners as well.

Quantum technologies. Just earlier this month, the United States, you saw from the White House, 2 directives on advancing quantum technologies, with a particular emphasis on post quantum cryptography. That’s an area where we see additional areas for cooperation on the cyber security front, but also on the r and d front as well.

Just very briefly on some additional functional areas. You know, supply chain resilience, again, just as we’ve discussed with, with our colleagues in Europe, early warning mechanisms from supply chain disruptions, you saw this highlighted as well, in the
summit meeting. Also an area of focus, potentially, is on critical minerals sourcing and processing. On investment security, we see really growing challenges to ensure that we’re able to protect technologies through our investment security regimes. This is another area where better alignment and information sharing, we think, is critical. This administration has also been public about our exploration of outbound investment regimes. That’s an area where Korea, as you all know, has some experience, and another area for productive dialogue.

And on expert controls, we see our cooperation with respect to export controls on Russia, really as a watershed moment in being able to overcome some of the challenges that we anticipate with the existing export control regime, that do include Russia as a member. Secretary Raimondo, as you know, talked about the effort to work with a broad range of allies in building a new export control regime to address this challenge. And Korea is going to be, really, a crucial partner in that effort.

There are many other areas that we could talk about, whether it’s research security, or data security, where we have very active work. But I’ll leave it there. And, just to say, you know, this is building on, already, a deep well of cooperation. And we look forward not just to the bilateral work ahead of us in all these areas, but also ways that we can integrate Korea into broader dialogues with allies in Europe, and the Indo-Pacific and elsewhere, on this broad range of challenges and opportunities as well. So thanks very much, and I look forward to the discussion.

MR. YEO: Well, thank you again for those remarks, Tarun. It’s very comprehensive. And let me, also, welcome you back to Brookings, also. I know it’s been a while, especially with the pandemic. But let me just get right to it. You know, we mentioned Biden just returned from Asia, very recently, and he released the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework. Can you let us know what you think, or what you anticipate being the next step forward, moving with IPEF and its implementation, particularly on the issue of supply chains?
MR. CHHABRA: Yeah. Thank you very much, Andrew. Again, very great to be back here. I think, as the President laid out, and as you heard from the National Security Advisor, and others, as well, we’ve now kind of laid out a framework with, kind of, areas of focus, right? And I think now the task is really beginning. Negotiations over what standards look like in each of those areas. An additional part of this is figuring out, among the countries that have expressed interest in joining the framework, which of these pillars they are going to be focused on, and engaged in, as well.

So there’s a lot of diplomatic work that’s now going to be happening in the next few weeks. In particular, I think, to, kind of, bring what is kind of a great framework now, into sharper focus, in terms of developing standards in each of the areas. Whether we’re talking about trade, or digital trade issues, or supply chains, or clean energy, or anti-corruption and tax issues as well.

And I’ll just say, you know, one other thing. I know that there are obviously a lot of questions about market access as well. And, you know, I guess, you know, in the lead up to this announcement, and the development of this framework, it was obviously informed by really extensive diplomatic discussions between many -- with many -- involving many of our colleagues across many departments and agencies, with their counterparts in the region.

And, obviously, we have heard the questions about market access as well. But it’s not the only thing that is on the minds of our partners, right? I mean, they are -- they want to know, how can they ensure that their own digital economies can flourish, right? They want to know how they can access affordable, and secure and trustworthy digital infrastructure, to enable that to happen. They want to know how they can not be left behind, as they see the market for electrical vehicles and advanced energy storage take off. And they want to ensure that they’re part of the networks that we’re building, to ensure supply chain resilience. Because they worry about economic coercion the same way we do as well.
So, I think it’s just important to have the, kind of, full conversation. Because that really reflects the nature of the discussion that we’ve been having with all of our allies in the region, and partners in the region.

MR. YEO: Okay. Great. And, you know, if I can move more specifically to South Korea. We know that, under the previous Moon government, there was an initial wave of South Korean investment in the United States, in the high tech, including the semiconductor plant in Texas, or an EV battery plant in Tennessee with SK. But given -- and so given these ongoing supply chain problems in the U.S. and -- we really need these critical components where, as you said, any gadget that has an on or, on or off switch. It seems like a, an easy win-win agreement. But if we think ahead, moving forward, you know, there is the potential for future competition between the U.S. and South Korean companies. Or even backlash against foreign companies investing in the United States. And we also see competition among allies as well, too. If I can give an example, I know we have Taiwan’s TSMC, and then Samsung as well.

So, how can the Biden administration ensure that it facilitates coordination and cooperation, rather than competition, among allies, when it comes to emerging and critical technology?

MR. CHHABRA: Yeah. It’s -- it’s a great question. I think you’re already seeing cooperation in tie ups, right? Between U.S. and South Korean firms, right? Which is a very good sign, and a signal of the complementarity that we think is possible. And you mentioned Intel, or TSMC and Samsung.

You know, I think the challenge, right now, is just bringing more capacity online, globally, right? That’s what we need to do. And it’s not -- I think it’s not just a near-term issue, right? With the current shortage that we’re facing. If you look at, kind of, demand projections overtime, as we move to an internet of things, and all the demands that this transition into an even more digital economy is going to require -- the real question is, can we bring enough capacity online, fast enough? That will include plenty of space for all of the key players, I think, in the industry? And that’s a question not just for the companies
that have produced chips. But, as Mireya and I were discussing earlier, it’s a challenge to make the tools to produce the chips as well. Which is also something that we’re focused on. So, I think we’re now in a zone of cooperation, where it’s really a race to bring enough capacity online, and there’s more than enough space for all of the key players.

MR. YEO: Yeah. So it seems like it’s not just a short-term issue. But something that’s going to be an issue that’s ongoing. So -- yeah. I guess my concern is down the road though. If there is any kind of, of -- I think, for the U.S., they understand that. But among our allies as well, too, I think it will be important to remind them about the importance of why we need to secure these supply chains. It’s for their benefit as well too. Not just the United States. And——

MR. CHHABRA: And to that point, Andrew, I think it’s really important to underscore what our investments here, and our, and our, you know, policies on resilience are about, and what they are not about.

I think -- To your point I think -- I find it surprising that there is still, sometimes, a lingering misperception that what the United States is trying to do is to make everything here. And, again, kind of going toward autarchy. That’s not possible, right? As you all know, that’s not possible. You know, you can look at private sector estimates, for example, in the semiconductor industry. What it would cost to do that in the United States It’s something on the order of $1 trillion right? And you can—— you know exactly what’s on the table if you look at the chips act. It’s $52 billion. That, of course, is intended to catalyze a lot more private investment, right? But I think the numbers speak for themselves. So what we really are trying to do is build more resilience, but interdependence among allies and like-minded partners.

MR. YEO: All right. Thank you for that. Those thoughts. I do want to bring in an actor that maybe not so excited about the Indo-Pacific economic framework, and what we’re seeing in terms of coordination of supply chains, and that’s China. China, of course, has criticized the Indo-Pacific economic framework as being exclusive, and antithetical to regional trade. In effect, squeezing out China from supply chains. And they’ve even made
veiled threats at South Korea already, for supporting IPEF. And claiming that IPEF will destabilize economic relations between Beijing and Seoul.

Is the Biden administration concerned about the bifurcation of regional, if not global, economic order? And is there any room left for cooperation with China at this point? Particularly when it comes to technology and trade?

MR. CHHABRA: So, look -- I think the kinds of threats that you mentioned, Andrew, are precisely what drives the appetite and enthusiasm for this kind of project, right? It’s precisely why countries in the region worry about economic coercion, and why they want to be part of a broader agreement, that helps ensure they have supply chain security, and that they’re not subject to those kinds of threats. So I think -- look -- I think, in many respects, China’s, kind of, economic policies are quite clear. They’re all -- they’re all publicly stated, right? I mean, some analysts have called it, you know, China’s approach is asymmetric to decoupling, right? It’s too -- or, dual circulation is to ensure that the world is more dependent on China, and China is less dependent on the rest of the world, right?

So, so I think it’s in that context that there really is enthusiasm in the region for ensuring that there is some degree of economic security. And that they’re not left behind, or left vulnerable to, to China’s policies in the region.

Overall, you know, obviously, the United States still maintains a very large trade relationship with China, as you know, and we have people to people exchanges. And there is ongoing, obviously, research collaboration as well. What we’re trying to do, I think, is to be, you know, careful and targeted, and -- in the way that we look at particular kinds of investments. So, you know, when it comes to the committee on foreign investment in the United States, you know, there are ongoing discussions about ways that we can ensure that the committee is really focused on particular ways that China is trying to transfer technologies that we deem to be of particular national security concern. On -- in the discussion about outbound investment, again, the question is really about focusing on particular sectors that we deem to be of national security priority, where we don’t want to see
American capital enabling technological developments that ultimately will be a national security challenge for us.

And those are discussions that we want to and need to have with allies.

But, again, you know, while it’s a novel discussion here, on the outbound investment side, it’s not novel to countries in the region that have had this concern for quite a while. Whether that’s Korea or -- and obviously Taiwan as well.

So I think it’s important just to, kind of, (inaudible) the way our concerns are targeted here. And, and, and, and, have been fairly clear, and publicly stated.

MR. YEO: Okay. Thanks. Well, Tarun, I could go on with another handful of questions, but I know your time is limited, and we do have an actual live audience here, in addition to our virtual audience. So let me just take, maybe a couple of questions? And if you could just, quickly, respond to those. I think that will probably be all the time that we have. But are there any questions? From the audience?

So we have one here, and—

QUESTIONER: Thank you. Hi. I’m Tammy Overbee (phonetic). I have a question. How can the American business community engage with you in this new journey? Thank you.

MR. YEO: And then one more question here.

QUESTIONER: My question is about nuclear energy. I understand the South Korean (inaudible) financing. So what would be some comparative advantages for the South Korea— for the U.S. and South Korea?

MR. YEO: Okay. So a question about what American businesses can do to support the U.S. government, and a question about nuclear energy and competition in that area, in that space, with China.

MR. CHABBRA: Yes. Great questions. Thank you. So this is, you know -- I think there -- in the context of our new economic security dialogue that was announced, with Seoul, we will definitely have opportunities for engagement with stakeholders. I think we’ve built a good model for this, with some of the broader plurilateral engagements that
we’ve done. So if you look at just the Trade and Tech council meeting that we did last week, we had a stakeholder event, with industry and labor. A lot of trade associations as well, on both sides of the Atlantic. And I think that’s something that I think we’ll want to do, and need to do in this context, too. If you look at the Quad, we’ve had a track 1.5 dialogue in advanced telecommunications, with a focus on open round technology.

So I think we have good precedent for it here. I didn’t mention it earlier today, but one of the outcomes of the President’s meeting with Prime Minister Modi was to announce technology dialogue as well, that would be NSC coordinated on both sides. And, similarly, I think, we’re looking at ways that we can ensure that there’s stakeholder dialogue. So, very much appreciate that, and welcome, and want all good ideas.

On the question about cooperation on SMRs, and nuclear energy, I think the, you know -- you’ve set up the answer well, which is that -- this question about financing. But also regulation, I think, is really critical. I think what -- I think we -- I think there, there’s confidence, I think, in nuclear safety, nuclear security, is really critical, I think, alongside the financing element of it. We see those as, kind of, coming together. That’s part of the dialogue we want to have. I think this is also something where Japan plays a critical role. And we’ve been in discussions with Japan as well about it.

So I think the way we see this is trying to get ahead of the curve, right? The technology is maturing, but it’s not ready for deployment quite yet. And so we can use this runway to build a framework, whereas I think we didn’t do that in some areas, like in telecom, right? Over the last decade.

MR. YEO: Right. Well, Tarun, thank you so much for giving us your time this morning. I apologize if there’s any other questions out there, but we’re already at the end of our time, so thank you once again.

MR. CHHABRA: Thanks for having me.

MR. YEO: We’re looking forward to seeing what else happens with the economic framework, especially on the technology front.

MR. CHHABRA: Thank you so much, I appreciate it.
MR. YEO: Thank you.

MR. CHABBRA: Thank you.

MS. SOLIS: So, I think we are ready to start. I think we did this very quickly, so we have an extra 3 minutes that I'm going to claim for a discussion on trade and economic issues.

So it is really my pleasure to moderate our first panel of the conference, on South Korea's role in the new economic architecture in Asia. We have much to cover, and we also have a wonderful set of panelists, who have kindly agreed to join us today. And we need their insights, because it's a complex and fast paced agenda that we're going to be discussing today. We now have, in the region, mega trade agreements, like the comprehensive and progressive TPP, like the regional comprehensive economic partnership and, just brand new, launched 2 days ago, the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework.

So we're going to spend some time talking about what this evolving architecture means for South Korea, for the United States, and for the other countries in the region. And we also have new issues that are becoming more and more relevant. We already touched on some of them in the keynote session. But I think we need to go back and discuss them further. Questions of supply chain resilience, and also the digital economy. And we'll spend some time there.

So let me introduce our panelists, and we'll just start with a conversation. So -- and let me start with Ambassador Hye Min Lee, who is a visiting professor at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies in South Korea. Prior to this, Ambassador Lee served as the G20 sherpa for South Korea, as ambassador for international economic affairs, and as South Korea’s ambassador to France and the Philippines.

Throughout his career, Ambassador Lee has continuously worked on international trade and investment related issues, participating in almost all major bilateral and multilateral trade negotiations for South Korea. He was a chief negotiator for the Korea-EU Free Trade Agreement, and deputy chief negotiator for the Korea-U.S. FTA negotiations.
Next to Ambassador Lee is Wendy Cutler, who is vice president at the Asia Society Policy Institute, and a managing director of the Washington, D.C. Office. Wendy joined ASPI following an illustrious career of nearly 3 decades as a diplomat and negotiator in the office of the U.S. trade representative, where she also served as acting deputy U.S. trade representative.

During her USTR career, she worked on a range of bilateral, regional, and multilateral trade negotiations, including the U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement, the Trans-Pacific Partnership, and U.S.-China negotiations.

Wendy, it’s a pleasure to have you with us.

Next to Wendy is June Park, who is a Fung global fellow, Princeton Institute for International & Regional Studies. She is a political economist, and works on trade, energy, and technology conflicts, covering the United States, Asia, and Europe. Her current work looks at post-pandemic geoeconomic conflicts in data governance and technology. So I’m sure you’re pretty busy these days, June.

And, prior to joining Princeton, June was an East Asia Voices Initiative fellow at the GW’s Elliott School of International Affairs.

So we have a lot of expertise here with us, this morning. And therefore let me take advantage of that and start our conversation. And, as we all know, President Biden just wrapped a very important trip to Asia, with stops in Seoul, in Tokyo, a meeting of the leaders of the Quad, and then the launch of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework.

As I mentioned at the outset of this conference, the leaders of the United States and South Korea produced a very substantive joint statement, where they lay out a very robust agenda for economic operation, that’s important for the region as a whole, and also globally. And therefore, I would like to start, you know, this conversation with a big picture set of topics. Looking at what has been accomplished in the past, and what lies ahead. Where can we make the most progress? And this is an important year as well because it marks the 10th anniversary of the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement. And, of
course, we have some people here who had a very important role in accomplishing -- making sure that ultimately negotiations succeeded.

So I would like to start by asking about, how do you think the core of the FTA changed, shaped the U.S.-Korea relationship? Looking back, what do you see as the main strengths, the enduring strengths of that trade agreement? But also, what needs to be modernized? What should be changed? What are potential shortcomings?

So let me start with Ambassador Lee, and then we’ll make our way to the rest of the panel.

MR. LEE: Thank you for your kind introduction. I am very happy to be here in Washington, D.C., after more than 2 years of pandemic lockdown, virtually. You see, I think I would like to start that I’m very happy that our 2 leaders confirmed that Korus FTA foundation of Korea-U.S. economy relations in their joint statement. You see, the -- since the Korus FTA in 2012, Korus FTA has significantly contributed the increase, or boost, trade and investment. I think there are very good numbers, according to the study by KITA. And in addition to the significant increase of trade and investment, I would like to point it out that the Korus FTA has contributed to the increasing transparency and predictability of Korea’s regulatory regime, thereby contributing to the amelioration of (inaudible) both domestic and foreign. I think that is very important point.

And second point, I’d like to say that Korus FTA has legitimized ways of trade and -- trade concerns of United States. In the past, it is described as political pressure. Not anymore. With the enforcement Korus FTA, because U.S. is legitimate, to raise their concerns in the context of Korus FTA, thereby contributing to the friendly and good development of bilateral relations. It is normal political pressure, this legitimate raise of concerns. I think that is the most significant part of the Korus FTA. But what we need to be -- what we can do more. Because this Korus FTA was negotiated about 15 years ago, 2006 and 2007. Since then, there has been a significant development, especially of technology.

And, secondly, (inaudible) changing international economic trade environment. We need to update the Korus FTA, reflecting those technology co -- changes
and environment international economic change as well. So Wendy and I wrote short booklet, to stress the importance of going beyond the Korus FTA in the future. I think those issues -- we need to reflect those changes in technology and economic environment of the world. Thank you.

MS. SOLIS: Thank you very much. That was a very insightful, sort of, comments. Wendy, if I can ask you to comment as well?

MS. CUTLER: Well, sure. And thank you very much for inviting me. Great to see you Mireya, and great to be on the panel with June, and with my longtime colleague Hye Min.

Yeah. Those were, kind of, my talking points, so I’m not really sure what more I can add. But I will add a few things. For me, when I think about Korus, it was a real - - it was a new chapter in the U.S.-Korea relationship. And particularly in the economic and trade area, it went from one of friction to one of cooperation. And that was a real shift. And, for me, when I think about our economic relationships now, or, I think we’re at the juncture where we need to turn the page and enter a new chapter. Because, as Hye Min said, and Tarun said, the issues that -- and the challenges that are facing the global and regional economy have evolved. And they’re not pure trade issues. Economic security issues have come to the forefront, technology issues have come to the forefront. And other, you know, matters that were discussed by the previous speaker.

So, for me, when I think of Korus, again, great foundation. The 2 leaders recognized that this week. But we need to move beyond Korus now. One could say, “Well, why don’t we just update Korus?” And I could tell you that after 2 renegotiations, I don’t think either side has the appetite, or interest in trying to update the agreement. Because to update that agreement, we need to bring it to our respective legislatures. And not just, once that happens, all bets are off. In both legislatures, I would argue.

So, I think we need to find creative ways to use the committee structure and the existing mechanisms in Korus, and then build on our relationship through other arrangements, and other cooperative activities. Not just bilaterally, but move to, kind of, that
regional and multilateral cooperation, which is so essential if we’re going to be addressing the challenges that we’re facing in the global economy.

MS. SOLIS: Thank you Wendy. That was wonderful. June?

MS. PARK: First of all, thank you everyone at Brookings, Mireya and Drew. It’s really great to see everybody here, in person, and I’m grateful that I’m on this panel. It’s an honorable thing. And it’s just really miraculous after -- 2 years after -- well, it’s still ongoing, but—

So, on the Korus FTA, I think, for me, there are 2 things. Personally, growing up in the 1990s in Los Angeles, I didn't see the amount of economic collaboration, should I say? After FTA, when I was growing up, it was a very big contrast. Since, when I was a child and now, it’s a very different environment that we are living in. So, personally, it was more of a, an affection toward these 2 countries. But at the scholarly level, if I may, I think what really, really changed the dynamics is that company activity in the United States or South Korea is not something foreign anymore. If you just go to Best Buy, you would have Samsung and LGL Electronics listed. There have been years of turbulent trade conflicts between the 2 countries, and there have been volatile relationships between the 2 countries during the previous administration too. But overall, the fact that the FTA has endured these turbulent periods, it just tells us that this agreement really sure -- it ensures that we are a partnership -- in a partnership together.

MS. SOLIS: Thank you very much. So one of the main messages I take from your remarks is that, you know, through that hard and painful negotiation process, the 2 countries were able to build an economic partnership, where trade ceased to be, mostly, not an item of friction, but now there’s greater convergence of interest. Then this then allows them -- for them to be looking beyond Korus, and to be creative about how you move forward that economic partnership, through other mechanisms, or other fora.

And I’m using this precisely to transition what I think is the agenda going forward. And just 2 days ago we had the launch of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework. And of course, I’m very curious about your assessment. These are very early days. We’ve
all eagerly awaited. I would say I was very surprised, pleasantly surprised, when I saw the list of countries participating. Together with the United States, 12 other countries, and very robust participation from Southeast Asia, that was not always considered a given.

And, of course, the fact that India joined as well.

So I think that’s a promising beginning. I think that many of the issues that IPEF highlights are exceedingly important. It’s about how we green new infrastructure, how we make sure that there is predictability to the supply chains and how we make sure that there is resilient trade, given that there is so much disruption because of the pandemic, and geopolitical tension.

But -- but I would be remiss if I don’t note that, while not much is yet clear, we don’t know which of the pillars will be attractive to the participants. We don’t know if this is really going to be about binding commitments, or pledges of cooperation. And, therefore, I think the slate is clean, and it needs to be drawn upon.

But I would like to then, if I may, ask for your assessment of the potential of Indo-Pacific Economic Framework. Especially thinking about the potential to use this as an avenue for the United States and South Korea to move forward, shared interest.

So, Wendy, why don’t I start with you this time?

MS. CUTLER: Okay. Well first, I’d agree with your assessment, in that I was also, not just pleasantly surprised, but, like, strikingly surprised by how many countries signed on to the IPEF. And I think that’s a real testament to the Administration’s diplomatic efforts. Because I can tell you, a few weeks earlier, just based on some of my conversations with current and former officials who are pretty plugged in, there was a lot of skepticism about this initiative. That’s the good news. Now, as a trade negotiator, I closely read their launch document, and there’s some language in there which just, kind of, stood out to me. Including the fact that they were launching the process for negotiations. And they were launching collective consultations towards future negotiations. And I think that language was instrumental in getting other countries to sign on.
And so, in many ways, the hard work on IPEF is really going to be taking place in the coming weeks and coming months. In the coming weeks, as Tarun earlier explained, the, the 2 -- the countries involved will need to, kind of, scope out the kind of, outline, right? What are the parameters in each pillar? And, you know, it's unclear to me if there is, you know, collective thinking on what, exactly, should be achieved under each pillar. And which issues should fall under each pillar. And so, again, I think it's doable. But given the diversity of countries and, I think that maybe some of these countries joined more for the desire for the United States to be engaged economically in the region. But, you know, feel that the -- all they committed to was to join in a conversation about a negotiation.

And so I, you know, I bring that to the forefront. But let me just end on an optimistic note. The other thing I do hear from the region, just a strong desire for U.S. leadership, economic engagement in the region. Of course, many of these countries would prefer the United States to rejoin CPTPP. They recognize it's not happening in, at least, for now. And so they want to work with the United States to make IPEF successful. And that message, I think, gives me hope that with some creativity and flexibility that this initiative can remain robust, and really make a difference in the region.

MS. SOLIS: Thank you, Wendy. I read it the same way. I -- the consultations were -- really jumped at me. Ambassador Lee?

MR. LEE: Okay. I see that I have participate in all major bilateral and multilateral trade negotiations, Korea, since 1983. So it is my first time to observe the major trade negotiation Korea is engaged in. So I'd like to speak, as an observer, not government officials anymore. The first one I would like to welcome and support Korean government decision to join IPEF, and I'm sure that our 2 countries will strongly collaborate for a success in the years to come.

Having that said, I have to say that I share the view, already expressed by my -- many experts the IPEF is with too many U.S. (inaudible) with very few U.S. offers. Negotiations are, in essence, give and take. To make, to balance the interest of the parties. There must be more clearly examined, what kind of benefit can be realized for more
participating of the countries in the region. Participating of sufficient number of countries are essential, not only to IPEF representativeness, but also to its legitimacy. In this regard, as Wendy mentioned, and Dr. Solis mentioned, I’m mostly encouraged to see that certain numbers of countries are declaring that they have interest in joining the initiative. Particularly 7 out 10 Asian countries to join the initiative. But we have to note that, except Singapore and Vietnam, 5 other Asian countries, and India has never participated in the high level of trade liberalization agreement. So it will be a huge task.

I would like to say that there 2 key points of IPEF. One is establishing new rules on the digital economy, climate change, high level environment standard, and possibly infrastructure. That is one thing. Create new rules.

Second is establishing resilient supply chain with friends. As in those 2 are most important features of IPEF. The -- establishing new rules, it will be very difficult and sensitive task, because we are now entering into unknown chapter of the new economy. And, secondly, friends showing -- many people say, what is the definition of friend? It’s not so clear.

And, secondly, I think more importantly, since there is no market access component of this initiative, how you can provide a benefit to the products coming from friends (inaudible).

You see, traditionally, those benefits are provided by privileged market access, features as reduced or eliminated tariff. Since there is no market access, how you can provide the benefit? I think that is the big challenge in the years to come.

And, finally, TPA. It’s clear that there is no TPA covered for these negotiations. And then, how can the U.S. ensure legally binding commitment of the agreement? Of the -- IF (phonetic) is not covered by the TPA. That is a real serious challenge. It may signal to the world that U.S. want to conclude the negotiation without changing any existing rules and regulations. It may be true, eventually. May be true eventually. However, it’s not so encouraging to guess it, even before we start the negotiations. In addition, if agreement is not fully enforceable with the dispute settlement
mechanism of the independent arbitration. There are always -- there are always the possibility that other countries may not change their rules and regulations, not consistent with the provisions of IPEF, or take much longer time for the implementation.

And, finally, let me finish. The final point is a practical matter. For the negotiators to come up with a compromise, we need a deadline. And, in this exercise there is no statutory deadlines. It seems to me that U.S. want to impose the symbolic deadline for the end of next year. At the time of U.S. hosting the APEC Summit Meeting. But if U.S. impose artificial deadlines, it will play negative for the U.S. It’s not the other countries, but U.S., to make concessions in order to do something for the coming event, like APEC summit. Thank you.

MS. CUTLER: You can tell what a tough negotiator he was on Korus.

MS. SOLIS: Yes, indeed. Thank you. And, I also want to give June a chance to jump into this conversation. And Ambassador Lee already mentioned the important issue of supply chain resilience. How you build trust. So if there’s anything that the panelists also would like to -- to comment on, regarding the desire to build these (inaudible) supply networks. I think Ambassador Lee made a very important point. Without providing that preferential type of treatment, it’s going to be hard, therefore, to make significant progress.

But, June, if you want to add to this?

MR. PARK: All right. Although the details of the IPEF -- in terms of pillars, we know. But how we’re going to go about this we’re not so sure yet. Because we’re in the early days. I would just like to bring the example of semiconductors here. And my -- although I am optimistic about the U.S. move to tilt more towards Asia, there is this concern inside of me, as someone observing the semiconductor industry, that number one, Taiwan is not included. If you consider the, the importance of the supply chain risk, or resilience that is mentioned in one of the pillars, it’s not really clear to me how, given Taiwan’s presence in the semiconductor global market, this would be, actually, a drive to really ensure the resilience. And, secondly, given what the U.S. has demonstrated, not just under the Biden
Administration, but also the Trump Administration, and decades of adherence to its technological leadership in semiconductors. I’m not quite sure how the cooperative mechanisms would play out, aside from competition the Tarun talked about. I’m not quite sure how the blend of 2 countries, plus other countries that are in the chip supply network, how this IPEF would contribute to ensuring that resilience and cooperation.

So that’s my main concern at the moment.

MS. CUTLER: Can I just, maybe, add something on this whole debate about market access being off the table? I mean, I’ve heard the Administration’s points very clearly. They’re for Yoon, the number one is we’re not saying market access is off the table, because, indeed, if you look at the trade pillar, and trade facilitation as part of the trade pillar, by definition trade facilitation does provide some kind of market access.

So then they say, “We’re talking about tariffs.” And then their talking point is, “But tariffs are really low for the average U.S. Tariff Is about, less than 2.5 percent. I think 2.3 percent. And so their view maybe this -- maybe in past negotiations and past initiatives this has been tariff, you know, the tariff focus has been really key. But we’re in a new world, a new economy now, where regulatory barriers and other types of initiatives are more important.

And so I think we all should, kind of, keep an open mind. The one point that I would say, though, as someone who worked on TPP: For a country like Vietnam, okay, they wanted access to the U.S. apparel and footwear market. And in those markets, we have what are called tariff peaks. Where tariffs are a lot higher than the average, okay? Five percent, 10 percent, even higher for certain products.

In return for that, they then were willing to make tradeoffs and agree to, for example, to high labor standards. And so that is a real dynamic. But I’m trying to keep an open mind with respect to IPEF, and I was listening carefully what Tarun said when he opened up. And that was, for example, on supply chains, you know, a lot of countries and the companies within the countries are feeling the vulnerabilities. Or are experiencing the disruptions. And maybe by joining in some collective effort to develop resilient supply
chains, even if it just starts with an early warning system, you’re in a better position with that than without it. So, I just want to put that on the table.

MS. SOLIS: Thank you Wendy. That’s very insightful. You know, when the market access and tariff liberalization discussion, I understand that, you know, aggregate or average U.S. tariffs are not that high anymore. But I also think it’s important to think what’s in it for U.S. producers. And that has been, also, a premise of the TPP, right? That we would be opening foreign markets, and providing access, especially in agriculture, manufacturing, and services, to our producers here. So it’s not just about whether the U.S. tariffs are already lower level – and the peaks tariff points is very valid – but also about opening other markets. And therefore generating, also, political support in this country for the initiative and meaningful economic outcomes.

But I wanted to, you know, move on to another topic. You can touch -- related to the IPEF. But we can have this part of a broader conversation. And I want to start with June first on this topic because I really think it speaks to her expertise. And this has to do with the digital economy, and the technology questions. Because, obviously, certainly, now with technological change, and with the pandemic, our economies are shifting at a very rapid pace to the digital sphere. I think that a lot of the growth is being generated there. But it seems to me that international rules, data governance, are behind the pace of actual digitalization of economies and societies.

So, you know, June, if you could talk about, in your view, are the United States and South Korea well positioned to work together in codifying rules for the digital economy? Are they well-positioned to deal with China, who is an important player here? You know China, for example, has its own digital Silk Road initiative. China is very active in international bodies to set standards in emerging technologies. China is negotiating trade agreements, like the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, where it can make commitments to data flows, but actually get a lot of exceptions, so that it doesn’t really have to change its digital protectionist policies.
So looking at the landscape of, you know, how significant a digital economy is, the challenges of codifying rules in this area, how are the U.S. and South Korea responding to these challenges? How can they work together, what will be the best ways to move this forward?

MS. PARK: Thank you for the question, Mireya. I think this a very tough question, given the variance of digital technology and digital capacity of each country. There is no one set or governance system that governs every single country’s digital way of life, or regulatory measures. Although there are some regional -- so DEPA one of them, and there are some motivations at the OECD toward AI. But at the same time, what I -- when it comes to this topic, my reservation is mainly that data governance regulatory measures are within the national law, by jurisdiction. It’s not something that can be dictated by a foreign entity unless there is a willingness to change from within. And one thing that could be a sign -- a sigh of relief here would be that, you know, South Korea is transforming a little bit in terms of its data regulations. In 2020, South Korea went through the revised -- revising process of 3 major data regulatory measures, within the South Korean legal system.

Now, there are proponents to this. There are some, you know, devil’s advocates to this. But the main key was that pseudonymized the processing of data would be allowed for within the South Korean system, adhering to the European Union’s GDPR, the General Data Protection Regulation. So, you see this variance among South Korea, EU. U.S. does not have a blanket law. California has its own, but it’s not really clear where the U.S. stands on this issue, other than the fact that free flow of data, as in the U.S. and CA is adhered to, in terms of trade practices.

But China -- looking at China, so data security law, or the PIPL that China laid out during the pandemic, it really shows that China is driven toward national security motivations regarding data. And it’s not the same case for other countries. So having a single undertaking, as we’ve seen in the WTO, would not be the way forward. Countries may align together bilaterally, or regionally. But still there would be gaps in each of the jurisdictions, in terms of the collaboration. And I think that what South Korea would like to do
with the United States, is to see how the United States responds to the revised data laws that the South Korea has, and see how the U.S. views that structure, and gives feedback.

MS. SOLIS: Thank you. Other comments from the other panelists, on the digital economy?

MS. CUTLER: Well, in my view, the U.S., we should have just been doing -- we should have led, launched, or joined a regional digital negotiation a few years ago, after we left TPP. I think that was, kind of, the logical place where we could have started. Unfortunately, that didn’t happen. And now we’re in a situation where the digital work is going to be subsumed under the trade pillar. My understanding is it will be a combination of binding provisions, cooperation provisions, including provisions that would gear toward helping small and medium sized enterprises participate more fully in the international marketplace and delivering more digital tools for them. But also bringing this, kind of, worker centered element into the digital talks, addressing some of the concerns that the administration heard from workers and GOs and other groups as they consulted with them in the IPEF process. I’m not exactly sure what those will be, but I hear phrases like, “provisions to promote consumer trust,” to deal with algorithms, the use of algorithms in the workplace, and the greening of call centers. That’s also, I think, been -- been mentioned by the administration.

So I think it’s going to be, kind of, a creative type of digital agreement. It will have a lot of these same features as the U.S.-Japan digital deal, as well as the digital chapter in the USMCA. The question will be, and I think there’s kind of a debate you’ll hear. Some people will say that, “Oh, the digital work is going to be a real incentive for countries to join.” I’m not sure that that’s the case, because a number of countries, particularly in Southeast Asia, have some strict regulations about the use of data, about the storage of data, about the application of data and about the taxation of data. And so it’s unclear to me how this pillar will evolve, who will want to join the digital work. But you can’t just join the digital work, you have to join the whole trade pillar, which will also include a section on labor,
and a section on the environment, 2 areas that, traditionally, have been tough for our trading partners to sign up to.

So we’ll have to see how, you know, how this plays out. But I do think that the digital work has the potential to be, kind of, the front and center of the IPEF initiative, along with supply chains. If, indeed, there’s momentum for countries to join the work.

MS. SOLIS: Thank you. Ambassador Lee?

MR. LEE: Yes. Digital economy will be one of the 2 most important subjects facing us today. The other one is the climate change. You see, when it comes to the drafting international laws, it is either U.S., European Union. Not anymore. It is always the U.S. or European Union. European Union has led—embarked upon legislation like the GDPL, digital market -- Digital Services Act. Not exist in the United States. I think it’s important -- it’s important that the U.S. and Korea, and other countries in the region, take the initiative to make international rules, not just, kind of meditation from the European Union. If nothing happens in this region, it will be dictated by the United States, as we can see in case of the GDPL.

But there is a wide divergence on the key issues of digital economy. One is the free flow of data. Second is the data localization requirement. And third is cyber security tax issues as well. But tax issues, and tariff issues already have dealt with. You see, when I participate in the international conference organized the by the French Institute of Foreign relations, one French expert said that, in the U.S., data belongs to the company. In China, it belongs to the state. In Europe, it belongs to us. That is the definition of the data.

For Korea, we are rather inclined to Europe for the protection of privacy and data. When it comes to data localization, we have a requirement, like China. It must be stored in Korea. So we need a clear direction with the legal stores provisions. For Korea, it’s most important to have clear rules. Then Korean companies can adapt to the new environment. So I think it’s very important for Korea to have clear message on this important subject. Thank you.
MS. SOLIS: Thank you. Very insightful comments from all of you.

I want to shift gears a little bit and place the IPEF in the broader context of what’s happening in the region. And that is, as I mentioned before, that we have 2 important megatrade agreements, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, and the CPTPP.

And my question is going to go first to Ambassador Lee. And that is, what are the prospects, timelines and so forth, for the Yoon Administration to finally make an official bid, in seeking entry into CPTPP. Andrew has heard me make this comment 1,000 times, so I know I sound like a broken record, but I want to say that the first paper I wrote when I arrived at Brookings was about why South Korea should join TPP. And it’s been a while since I came here, let me put it that way.

So is the political will there?

Wendy, to you, what is likely to be -- And to June as well, the reception from CPTPP countries, and what are the opportunities of South Korea for doing this? What are the domestic sensitivities that would need to be handled? And I would also note that, obviously, we all know, for trade negotiations, domestic politics matter a lot. And President Yoon does not really have control of the legislature, right? It’s the other party.

So, what is the landscape here, for potential CPTPP membership?

MR. LEE: See, I have to confess that my position has changed. You see, I think the current government may continue its process of previous administration with regard to CPTPP. In fact, I have expressed the support for joining CPTPP in various fora in Korea last year. The reason why I supported was that I thought the U.S. may come back to TPP. But now that possibility gone.

I do not find any merit of Korea to join the CPTPP, as we are about to begin the negotiations of IPEF with identical members, and on almost same issues. In addition, in order to get the unanimous support of 11 original members, we have to settle, among others, bilateral pending issues with Japan which I think impossible, and not advisable at all. I may say, not advisable at all.
We have to make additional concession on access to Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, which may create negative reaction domestically, you see? The TPP, or CPTPP has 3 objectives. First is a check on China. Second is the (inaudible) market of Japan. Third one, international trade rule making.

Check on China, it must be set aside as China has already expressed its intention to join. And second, (inaudible) market of Japan. I don’t think, even with a conclusion of the CPTPP, and Korea’s joining the CPTPP, our own market access conditions to Japan will not be improved significantly. As you see the Japanese tariff on auto is already 0, but Korean cars are not sold there. Third element, international trade rule making, without U.S., CPTPP cannot make any rules in international trade rule making.

So I do not see -- I do not see any merit of joining the CPTPP at this moment. And CPTPP countries will try to establish very high standard for the new accession. First, finish the negotiations with the U.K., and then they will set the example of the U.K. as model for new entrants.

If that is the case, it will be very difficult for China to get the accession to the CPTPP, as their laws and regulations are not so many are very incompatible with core elements of the CPTPP agreement. As China’s bid to join the CPTPP, will not be realized, it would be very difficult for CPTPP countries to allow accession of Taiwan, as we cannot -- Taiwan was not invited to join the IPEF. Okay? Thank you.

MS. SOLIS: Well, that was a very candid response, and generated a lot of thought, and I have lots of questions for you. But I want to ask Wendy to also address something you mentioned. You said that the U.S. potential to the CPTPP is almost impossible. And I want to see Wendy’s take on this, and our take on whether there’s merit for South Korea to join the CPTPP.

MS. CUTLER: Okay. So, for now we’re not returning to the CPTPP. I never say never, but I don’t see that happening. And if we ever were to return, we would need to return to a revised TPP. The agreement would need to be updated, it would need to
be modernized to reflect changes in technology, changes in politics, some of the changes that we secured from Canada and Mexico and the USMCA. So I’d just put that on the table.

I’m—— you know, it’s easy — so given that, I’m going to now say, from my perspective, I think that Korea should join the CPTPP. But it’s easy for me to say, because my country’s not joining, so who am I to offer that advice?

But just a couple of things that I would just put on the table. I do think that, from a geopolitical, and geoeconomic point of view, that there are gains to be accrued by Korea. One of the arguments I always hear from Korea through the years, why they didn’t join, is because they already have FTAs with most of the CPTPP partners. But the CPTPP market access commitments are much deeper than many of the commitments in current Korea FTAs with these countries. And, also, the rules are much more expansive. Also, it’s a regional agreement, so there’s a regional rule of origin. And this gets into, kind of, my view that, in many respects, these trade agreements are supply chain agreements. Because they get rid of the barriers, both tariff and non-tariff measures among the group of countries. And therefore, like, are promoting trade between them. It becomes easier to trade between them. And if you have a common rule of origin, you have common documentation, by definition it’s easier to trade with those partners.

So, again, I think there is much for Korea to gain. And I don’t think there’s a lot more Korea would need to do, compared to other applicants, to accede to the CPTPP. I recognize the agriculture sector is still very sensitive in Korea. But as someone who watched Korea, firsthand, make incredible concessions in agriculture, facing enormous political constraints in 2007, then I think Korea can find a way around this.

So, again, I think, you know, those are the gains. The other thing I think when I think about China’s accession to the CPTPP, I think about a U.K. accession and a Korea accession, which would do a lot in terms of keeping those standards high, and not allowing for a lot of exceptions, or watering down of the obligations. So I think Korea’s participation could also help the other countries in CPTPP to keep the standards high.
I’m very concerned about, you know, China’s accession to the CPTPP and, you know, there’s a lot of debate about whether their standards would ever -- could ever, meet the TPP’s standards. I’m not sure that that’s the right question, because I look at China’s relationship with a lot of the CPTPP countries, and just the Singapore Prime Minister Lee, just last week, was very vocal in saying, “We support China’s accession to the CPTPP.” At the same time he said that Singapore would support the IPEF. And I think, from the view of Singapore and other countries, it’s, like, better to get China under the tent and, you know, get them to talk about reform and opening, and agree to new rules. Even if, at the end of the day, they don’t end up at the same point everyone else does.

So I think it’s those initial, the front end of China’s accession process is something to watch carefully, and I think once a working group is set up for China to join, then it’s going to be harder and harder to turn off China’s eventual accession to the TPP.

MS. SOLIS: Thank you, Wendy. June, do you have comments on this topic?

MS. PARK: So, on this, maybe I should offer a little bit from the domestic side of things. We, we clearly know that the Yoon Administration, although newly inaugurated, does not have full control of the legislature -- the National Assembly. And although from the trade bureaucracy, of course, there is enormous motivation toward CPTPP accession. However, within the country itself, I am not sure if IPEF is the main choice. I’m not sure if the constituencies would be on board with another one, which would be the CPTPP. Because, given the protest that I witnessed, through the open hearings that were held by Modi, I am not sure whether the agriculture sector, this time around, would be okay with something other than IPEF.

MS. SOLIS: Very interesting point. I have more questions for you, but I also -- I cannot be greedy, I have to bring in the audience, both virtually but in person. So if there’s a question, the microphones are around. Just raise your hand, and I’m happy to take your question. Mark.

MR. MANYIN: Hi, Mark Manyin from the Congressional Research Service.
Thanks for a great panel discussion. Question and then a comment.

The question is, it looks like export controls weren’t included in the IPEF, and some people like Emily Kilcrease at the CNAS pointed out and criticized this. I’m wondering what your thoughts are on that. Is that a significant omission, what does it say about the process that we went through to get countries on board.

And then secondly, you know, I was struck in the lead up to the IPEF launch at how this was being presented as a U.S. initiative. Like there didn’t seem to be much ownership from other countries of the launch. So I’m wondering if perhaps the concession that the U.S. gave and that these are just the discussions leading to a negotiation is actually a smart like backtrack to sort of give countries like South Korea a chance to have more ownership over the process by deciding what topics and what emphasis should be included in the framework.

MS. CUTLER: Thank you, Mark. My comments on expert controls and the framing of IPEF as a U.S. led initiative. So, thanks, Mark, maybe I’ll start and, you know, with your second question I think there is some merit to that. I think the tradeoff was if, you know, if the U.S. wanted to dictate what was going to be in each pillar, then other countries would feel well wait a second, you know, we don’t have time to input, we’re not sure we want to do this. And so the U.S. did make a calculation to be more open to their input and that will happen during the scoping exercise.

I think from my perspective if they were going, you know, given the launch and given that the President first announced the initiative in November, I don’t know why it took seven months then to launch what they did. I think they could have done it months earlier and this thing could have, you know, actually been in the negotiations stage.

But again, they learned a lot through the process, and I think there was a realization that we can’t have it both ways, we can’t dictate what countries need to do and then except them all to sign on with us. So they made a decision and, you know, we’ll see if that, you know, if it’s a correct decision in terms of still being able to agree to impactful work under each pillar.
I have to say with respect to export controls, I’m not clear if they’re in or they’re out. Have you heard they’re out?

MR. MANYIN: I’ve seen them on the list, so.

MS. CUTLER: Yeah, I’m not sure. But from my perspective even if they’re not in IPEF, there’s a lot of other work going on. And one of the things that just strikes me is that this Administration has launched so many dialogues and so many work going on in a lot of these areas with different groupings of countries, whether it’s the EU, whether it’s bilateral, whether it’s, you know, working on export controls right now, you know, with respect to Russia/Ukraine.

And so I’m not worried if export controls doesn’t find its way to IPEF because it is such an important issue, you know, and the administration is working bilaterally and with groupings of countries on, you know, on export controls.

But again I’m not sure that it’s off the table. I just don’t know.

MR. OH: Whether export controls issue is included in the IPEF or not, it’s very important to regulate export control. Up to now the trade officials have concentrated how to regulate input distribution to safeguard measures. I’m sorry, but now which is more important how to regulate export control. Many countries abuse export control and listen to the literature published report on export control used by members, especially in regard to the pandemic.

So I think it’s the time for us to regulate export control so that we can enhance credibility and transparency of export control.

With regard to IPEF framework I think in view of the current geopolitical situation created by the Russia’s invasion and the west sanctions on Russia, as well as COVID lockdown and disruption of global supply chain. Politics has become more important than enhancing efficiency or cost reductions. In this regard it’s very important to join the initial supply chain with the United States, it’s very important. Yes, it is initiated by the United States, however, if it is well crafted and well documented it needs the product of this region which will benefit all countries, all companies in the region.
So what’s important is we need to collaborate with the U.S. to produce the good, legal framework.

MS. SOLIS: Thank you, Mr. Lee. And this has been an opportunity to bring in a question from the virtual audience as well because you refer to the growing risk of international economic system.

And this question comes from Darcie Draudt at the George Washington University. And she makes reference to the decouple from China question. And she asks, you know, are pressures for decoupling felt the same way in Washington and in South Korea. What has changed, how can they address the heightened risk environment when it comes to the balance of the economic relationship with China.

Maybe, June, can I ask you to go first on this one?

MS. PARK: Thanks for the question, Darcie. She’s a friend of mine.

MS. SOLIS: Oh, really?

MS. PARK: Kind of weird to receive a question from someone I know. So I think the perception on sort of trying to look at this from the industry perspective, there is a lot of pressure of course. And in the month of January it was mainly having to do with SK hynix trying to import EV machine into its Chinese plant. And later they were reserving their intents, but the whole month of January was just about this. And given they’re both in terms of production and increasing capacity, I think what Korean industries, especially semiconductor industries is facing is, okay, let’s take it one thing at a time but we do have operation in China, there will be additional R&D plus new plants in Tyler, Texas, how are you going to grapple this together.

Because the entity list as well as the export curves, you know, Japan, all of these things, as Ambassador Lee mentioned, it’s a heightened political risk that these companies have to grapple with, and every day there are media reports about this. So I think it’s a little bit more heightened than here when Korean companies see this issue.

MS. SOLIS: Interesting. Other comments on decoupling? If not, I’ll go back to the in-person audience. Other questions? Oh, we have a lot.
All right. I’ll take them in twos. This lady and then Dr. Jay.

MS. LEE: Thank you so much for this panel. My name is Jessica Lee, I’m from the Quincy Institute. I had a question, you know, going back to Ambassador Lee’s comment about how, you know, we don’t have a trade promotion authority, and I think the discussion, you know, around kind of on the U.S. side what sort of congressional engagement and blessing we would essentially need for IPEF to, you know, evolve and advance.

And so maybe this is a question for Wendy, but I wondered if you could talk a little bit about, you know, from your experience, what ideally would be the level of congressional involvement and consultation that would ensue to avoid any sort of last minute, you know, backlash or attacks against IPEF as it advances.

MS. SOLIS: Thank you, very interesting. And then Dr. Jay.

DR. JAY: Thank you. I’m with South Korea International Trade Association. And about the CTCPP, I more than 100 percent agree with Ambassador Lee’s comments on the CTCPP because there is no limit the merit to Korea joining the CTCPP right now. But I think some people believe that maybe KITA joined the CTCPP can be a great momentum for Korea and Japan to normalize their relationship. And then I think that may business communities on both sides they really wanted to enhance the relationship with these two countries.

So do you believe that maybe if Korea does not join the CPTPP at the moment and that IPEF could be a great moment for the two countries? Thank you.

MS. SOLIS: Thank you. Can I start with you, Wendy, on the congressional question?

MS. CUTLER: Yes, Jessica, that’s a really good question. And from my point of view I think close congressional consultation throughout the IPEF process is critical. And in all fairness, I think because of the depth of consultations to date, that led to a delay in the launch of the negotiation. You know I mentioned earlier, it took seven months to, you know, between the initial announcement and then the announcement we saw just earlier this
week. So, you know, I think that’s critical.

You know, from my point of view I think the days of trade promotion authority are over. Frankly, you know, for a lot of our trading partners they say they want trade promotion authority because that’s the guarantee that our Congress won’t ask for more. Tell me one trade negotiation where our Congress did not ask for more, even with the trade promotion authority. And I think Hye Min Lee knows this better than anyone, having dragged Korea through two really painful renegotiations of KORUS.

And so, you know, this notion that we need TPA to do this, I don’t think, you know, that’s critical. That said, Congress does want to play a role here and if it looks, you know, like during these IPEF talks that we may need to change a law or regulation or need some kind of legislation, I don’t think we should be saying from day one we’re not doing that. I think we, you know, we should see where the IPEF takes us because as you’ve heard from Hye Min, for other countries that’s not a great signal. Like you’re going to ask us to change everything but we’re telling you from day one we’re not going to be, you know, we’re not going to be lifting a finger to change any of our laws or regulations.

I recognize that’s really hard for us to do, going to Congress now for anything is very difficult, particularly in the trade economics sphere. But again, I think close consultation with Congress will go a long way. And I also think if the Administration can get strong bipartisan support for the IPEF initiative, and I’m optimistic here because I think to date the, you know, I’ve seen, you know, statements coming out of both the Rs and the Ds on IPEF.

I think that could go a long way in addressing IPEF countries concerns about the durability of this initiative and whether it would be torn up, you know, in a new administration, you know. A lot of concern there. Why should we make concessions if two years from now we don’t know who will be in the White House and what the fate of IPEF will be?

And here I think Congress can play a very important role in signaling that this work is important, there’s bipartisan support for it, and it should continue regardless of
who’s in the White House.

MS. SOLIS: We are at time, but I wondered if there’s a 30 second thought.

MR. LEE: I think you see if we negotiate with Japan in the context of the CPTPP, Korea’s position is a disadvantage. Korea becomes a demander so it’s not smart policy to be in that position. We must begin in a neutral ground. I think it’s better to have a bilateral exchange rather than joining the CPTPP. And as I mentioned in my intervention, now the IPEF is with identical members with almost all same issues. So I think we can go on with Japan during the negotiations of IPEF, definitely.

MS. SOLIS: Thank you so much. It has been such a robust and insightful conversation. Please join me in thanking the panelists for their expertise today.

MR. YEO: Okay. I think we’re going to get started now on our second panel. I’m again delighted to invite our speakers here for the second portion, the second panel on our conference on South Korean and the new geo-economics of Asia. And we’ll be talking about South Korea as a provider of regional and public goods.

And I want to just introduce our speakers. I’ll just be brief on the introductions to give us enough time to have a conversation about some of these recent public goods issues.

So to my immediate left is Dr. Miyeon Oh. She is the director and senior fellow of the Asia Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council where she’s part of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. To her immediate left is Mr. Scott Snyder. He’s a senior fellow for Korea Studies, and the director of the program on the U.S./Korea policy at the Council on Foreign Relations. And last but not least, we have Troy Stangarone, who’s a long-time friend of mine. We’ve been around D.C. for a while now. But he’s a senior director and fellow at the Korea Economic Institute. So welcome to Brookings.

Let me just kick off with a few framing remarks before I open the floor to our panelists. There’s a tendency to compartmentalize security and economic issues as well as traditional and non-traditional security issues when examining regional policy. But in the new geo-economics of Asia, economics and security can no longer be separated.
We’ve already covered a lot of ground in our first panel addressing regional trade, the digital economy, and South Korea’s place within the evolving regional trade architecture. In this second panel I hope to broaden our aperture to a range of transnational issues, including but not limited to development of finance, climate change, energy, and supply chains, among others.

Each of these issues carries strategic implications not only for South Korea but due to their transnational nature also the broader Indo-Pacific Region. The U.S. and South Korea will therefore need to coordinate with other allies and partners to address these transnational issues.

So with that I just want to open the floor to our panelists and begin with a broad question. So which issue areas do you think South Korea has the ability to make the greatest regional impact or exercise the greatest leadership when it comes to providing regional public goods?

And why don’t I just begin with Miyeon and go down the road here. Miyeon.

MS. OH: Thank you so much, Andrew. And I just wanted to start by saying that it’s so great to be back. A while ago, several, several years ago, I was Pre-Doctorate Fellow at the time to really always a conversation with Mireya, so it’s really great to be back.

And I mean we hear so much about economic security, and I mean what I see, I mean the region, on the shore, we already discussed these issues a lot at the first session. But the regions on economic architecture is really enormously changing and even making further drastic changes since the COVID-19 pandemic era.

And what I’d like to say first is that the United States and South Korea share common key advantages as leading economies with its advanced and emerging technologies as well as leading democracies. So I think two countries can play a proactive role in sort of establishing or setting up a global network of technology democracies.

The reason why I’d like to just say this is I’d like to talk about global supply chain but in the context of a value driven ecosystem and technological alliance that we hear so much, and even since the Trump Administration and the importance of technology in the...
national security realm is even more important than ever.

So when Ambassador Cutler mentioned that there are so many ongoing, you know, existing efforts and dialogue in the current Administration, but then she put that in a very positive way, which I really agree. So I think this emerging network on some people try to figure out what is really the destination that we talk about in terms of technodemocracies. And what I think, if we can start to setting up a platform of the coordination to set global standards and facilitate the development of mutual framework for these critical technologies, I think it would be a good start.

And for example on Summit for Democracy I know some expert mentioned that could be the platform to bring in democracies with technologies against the authoritarian, you know, regime, etcetera. I think there are multiple ways to do so but I just wanted to put that even to countries common advantages on their very well positioned to take a proactive role in terms of techno and sustain something in terms of the technodemocracies.

And on this particular matter President Yoon said during the inaugural IPEF meeting that South Korea will work with other countries to establish regional and secure supply chains of critical technologies on such as semi-conductors, rare earth, and batteries, and autonomous vehicle. And even during the summit between President Biden and Yoon, two leaders agreed to establish a regular ministerial level supply chain and commercial dialogue to discuss the promotion of regionally unsupplied chains of key product.

I think the two countries should and could expand this bilateral supply chain cooperation into multilateral effort to flexible and informal framework. And the reason why I say this, you know, during the first session we talk about expanding the trilateral framework and other existing mechanisms and body, and I think just involving private sector companies and even trade associations, involving them and in terms of this multilateral framework. It’s very important, and that framework should be really adaptable and open to some adjustment given that the major global market of technology related industry sectors are very complicated and even with the current geopolitical landscape, not to mention the Russia’s
Ukraine invasion.

So for instance I think the United States and ROK can take the lead in setting up the multilateral framework. For example as Dr. Chhabra mentioned, for semiconductors. And we already heard about Like U.S./Japan, South Korean, Taiwan, and we can even bring in Netherlands and United Kingdom.

And I just wanted to mention quickly that Atlantic Council within to doing this ongoing project for two to three years in terms of the supply chain cooperation, U.S./ROK, U.S./Japan and also like U.S./Taiwan. So try to really better understand how we can put that into a multiple framework and how that would fit into in terms of not just in terms of domestic politics, but then any effort to even by the U.S. government working with other countries.

So if we can set up some sort of multiple framework, I think what they can do, again, just taking the lead of the United States and ROK and working with other countries. Number one, I think they can monitor and share supply chain intelligence on both existing and emerging non-market risk that threaten to disrupt critical supply chains.

For instance, Ukraine produces 70 percent of the neon gases that is critical to making supply chain semi-conductors. So we can even monitor and then basically discuss about those kind of things.

And number two, I think this multilateral framework and countries can formulate emerging sharing agreements for strategic stockpiles like rare earth minerals, for instance, from one of the examples between for the territorial dispute between Japan and China. China enforces the trade measures onto basically banning exporting various minerals from China to Japan. So that kind of things.

And the next thing is mapping global supply chain networks of critical pathologies to provide more detailed understanding of specific point of vulnerabilities and opportunities for diversification.

And lastly, not the least, I think this multilateral framework can also monitor and engage on government policies, including tariff as Ambassador Lee mentioned, export
control and government procurement or any other measures that actually could impede a
afford to strengthen supply chains.

And I like to stop here but then just wanted to say quickly that again, there
has been a lot of discussion how should we define this trusted, value-driven technology for
ecosystems. But then I think this could be a good starting point again, just having U.S./ROK
in taking the lead, working with other countries.

MR. YEO: All right. Thank you, Miyeon. And I know you’ve done a lot of
work on supply chains. And it’s important to think about South Korea not only as a partner
for the U.S. in addressing supply chain resilience, but South Korea itself has agency as well
too and can play more of a role for the region.

And I like what you mention about, you know, monitoring, sharing supply
chain intelligence. That sounds similar to what our keynote speaker, Tarun Chhabra, had
mentioned with this early warning system that the U.S. wants to help implement.

But, Scott, let me turn it over to you with the same question about, you
know, where you think South Korea can play, have the greatest regional impact, or exercise
leadership within the region. Because this is something that the new Yoon government is
keen and promoting. He’s talked about having a more active foreign policy but within the
region.

And what’s an issue area that you think South Korea can focus on to
exercise that leadership?

MR. SNYDER: Okay. Well thank you, Andrew, for the opportunity to be
here and be a part of this panel. I want to start simply by congratulating Mireya and Andrew
on their presence with regards to focusing on the geo-economic component of the
relationship and also for their timing.

Because I think that one thing is very clear following the U.S./Korea Joint
Statement that we just saw released over the weekend is that economics has been elevated
to a pillar that is almost as important, maybe more so, than the military security component
of the alliance relationship.
And so I want to take my response to that question in that context because as we have seen the alliance grapple with an expanding aperture to deal with regional and global issues over the course of the past decade, it was the regional components that was really the donut hole. If we go back to the 2009 Joint Vision Statement. And so that’s the area of opportunity to try to fill it in.

Miyeon has already talked about a lot of the supply chain resiliency issues and so I just want to put on the table that South Korea is a very important partner, especially for Southeast Asia and the area of capacity building. And I see two components that I’m going highlight.

One is actually over the course of the past five years we’ve seen South Korea engaging with Southeast Asia as a provider of military equipment. And that is something that doesn’t necessarily get a lot of focus in the relationship. But, you know, South Korea has become a major exporter of military equipment, including to Southeast Asia. And that is important in the current geopolitical context.

And then also non-military capacity building. This is also an area that I think has kind of been under the surface. But I see South Korea appreciated, especially in Southeast Asia, as a leader in application of technology. And in particular for a long time now South Korea, it’s kind of under the surface, has been a partner for many Southeast Asian countries in applying technology and digitization in the area of local governance and transparency. And so I would just highlight that role as a dimension of what South Korea provides in that regional space that usually kind of gets overlooked. And so I can tell that.

There are a number of areas in the Joint Statement that we see highlighted across the board, you know, continued focus on vaccine partnership, etcetera. Those are well enumerated, so I think I should stop there and turn it over to Troy.

MR. YEO: All right. Thanks, Scott. I should mention on the presence and the wisdom of thinking about geo-economics I really have to give credit to Mireya because this predates even my presence at Brookings. So I’ll give that credit to Mireya.

You had brought up the Joint Statement briefly there at the end. And so
then I may pass the baton over to Troy and also ask where you see South Korea has room to play a regional role or exercise leadership based on perhaps what you may have read or seen in the latest Joint Statement.

MR. STANGARONE: Well, Andrew, thank you for having me. It’s always great to be here with you, with Miyeon and with Scott.

I’ll start off, I want to touch on very briefly supply chains, which, you know, Miyeon went through. I completely agree with Miyeon, we need to look at this more of a multilateral issue, not bilateral because you can’t do this on a bilateral basis. And, you know, if we look at things like semi-conductors it’s also, you know, Miyeon went through the countries who are involved in semi-conductors, you know, who are the key partners we need involved in this issue. So we need to be thinking about this in terms of what the actual structures are rather than sort of pre-set boxes when we look at these. And so I think that’s a very important point that Miyeon has highlighted, and I want to just second that.

You know, when we look going forward though, where can South Korea provide public goods? So I want to talk about two areas specifically. One is the pandemic, and then the other sort on in terms of green financing.

So we’re in year three of the pandemic now. Things are much better, we’re now able to do these types of meetings, they’re partially in person, but, you know, if you were here today, you’d see a lot of people in the audience have a mask on. You know, we’re still having, you know, spikes in cases both in the United States now but other places. So this is something that’s still with us. And I think this is an area where Korea, whether it be in the region or more globally, can play a prominent role.

The Biden Administration, you all may remember, about two or three weeks ago hosted a summit to try to bring everyone together to build more financing. COVAX going into that summit was $15 billion short of what it needed. It’s still now with the 3 billion that was committed about 12 to $13 billion short. So financing security.

Now I point out that at that summit President Yoon pledge $300 million over the three-year period from 2023 to 2025 but didn’t pledge any additional money for this year.
And the one thing that I think we’ve often not focused on as much is that we are now at a point to where there is sufficient vaccine capacity. We can produce the vaccines we need. It’s about developing the plants in low-income countries, it’s about getting the supplies you need to take and get them there, so things like insurance, syringes, safety boxes, these kinds of things. And this is the area where COVAX lacks money. And so I think Korea can play an important role here.

One, through additional financing but also syringes that you use for vaccines are very specific gauges. Korea produces one of those gauges. So be it either through increased production and donation of syringes to COVAX or other areas, you know, whether you do this through even cooperation of the Quad, or I think more specifically through COVAX who has accounted for 83 percent of all the vaccinations or vaccines provided to low-income countries. There’s real potential here for Korea to do more, and I think Korea should do more on this.

So very briefly green financing. If we look at, going back to the Yoon administration and reaffirmed by the Yoon administration the goal of the United States and South Korea is to take and have financing that is focused on zero carbon emissions by 2050. So we have already committed to this, but if we look more deeply at South Korea’s ODA, you know, this is an area that’s still sort of new for them.

And if you look more specifically at ODA, Lee Myung-bak had pledged to get ODA to one-quarter percent of GDP by 2015, Korea has not reached that goal, so I think there’s scope for additional ODA specifically financed on green financing.

So with that I’d like to turn things back to you, Andrew.

MR. YEO: Okay. Great. Thanks. So important areas on pandemic resilience and, you know, it’s still ongoing, as you mentioned, the masks are still a reminder. But that’s certainly a space that Korea can push forward on. And then green growth, and I like how you linked that to ODA. And I didn’t realize that there was an actual benchmark from the Lee Myung-bak administration, but we haven’t reached it. But I believe President Yoon has also talked about ODA. It seems like he’s going to put much more money into
that.

And, you know, one of the regions where I think we'll see more investments is Southeast Asia. And I know Scott had briefly mentioned it in terms of capacity building on the military end, but the previous Yoon government was keen in strengthening ties in Southeast Asia under the New Southern Policy as a means of reducing economic dependence with China. And, you know, just in conversations with other policy experts, policy makers in D.C. it sounds like other countries think that South Korea can be doing more, there's room for cooperation with South Korea in Southeast Asia. I'm thinking of Australia in particular. But they want to work together with Korea on issues like development finance.

But, you know, the New Southern Policy is now in the past. How might President Yoon build on what has already been done to facilitate cooperation in Southeast Asia in conjunction with other partners, with perhaps Australia or Japan.

And maybe I'll start with Scott and then I'll bring Miyeon into conversation. Scott, because you already brought up Southeast Asia.

You know, when I was in Manila, I knew that the Koreans had sold Philippines, they had given them a naval ship, a naval corvette, and they'd also sold them a ship, and they were also supplying some weapons. But no one ever mentions this and, I mean it's in the media if you read like in a Jane's Defence, you know, Weekly or if you read, you know, military defense type news. But it wasn't something that was common public knowledge. And I'm wondering if you think that the Yoon government will make more of this than as you mentioned. And as I've been saying quite frequently, you know, we recognize South Korea's economic weight, it's the 10th large economy, but very few people recognize that it's also the 10th largest defense spender in the world.

And I know that they're keen in building their arms industry. So do you think that at least in terms of these deals in Southeast Asia, is there going to be more, are we going to hear more about this? I assume that one of the reasons why we didn't in the past was because of perhaps concerns about China or the optics of, you know, looking like
they’re trying to strengthen ties with Southeast Asia because they’re concerned about China. So, Scott.

MR. SNYDER: Well because of the way you ask that question I feel obligated to torch the Yoon campaign platform for Southeast Asia that presumably would replace the New Southern Policy. And in my reading of it I’m going to dub it the ABCD policy because essentially what the campaign listed was four priorities, with an acronym.

A, advance human capital; B, build health security; C, connect cultures; and D, digitize Asian infrastructure. So that’s what the Yoon campaign has put forward and is likely to be the core of what is going to shape a Yoon Administration approach to Southeast Asia.

Now I was on a call earlier this week where I started talking about the importance of Southeast Asia as part of South Korean foreign policy and the significant of the New Southern Policy. And I was corrected by my Korean colleague who worked in the Park Administration who said well actually the New Southern Policy was originated in ideas that were generated in the Lee and Park Administrations.

So, you know, I think that what’s really interesting is the evolution of ASEAN as a partner, South Korea’s second largest trading partner. And the question of whether or not South Korea can live up to expectations that ASEAN may have for South Korea as a strategic partner or as playing a unique strategic role rather than simply being driven by the economic opportunities in the relationship.

And so in some respects I think that what, you know, remains to be developed, and the military cooperation is probably a part of that. Maybe we will see a little bit more mention of it as the Yoon Administration sheds sensitivity as related to concerns about offending China.

But, you know, this is all to say that Korea is already a very important partner and has a lot of stakes in Southeast Asia. And I think that there are going to be good opportunities.

The other thing that I would say is that the area that we made most progress
on in the U.S. in the context of the Yoon Administration was actually coordinating New Southern Policy with Free and Open Indo-Pacific Policy. And so, you know, that is an area where at least at the bureaucratic level there are already structures in place for that dialogue probably to continue. And then this whole supply chain resiliency discussion adds another dimension to those possibilities.

MR. YEO: Yeah. I’m really interested to see how ASEAN responds to the Yoon government’s policy in Southeast Asia. As you mentioned, we might not see the New Southern Policy in name, and the Yoon government is coming up with Indo-Pacific strategy of its own and, you know, ASEAN is always concerned about ASEAN centrality.

So suddenly if the Yoon government comes to ASEAN and says well, we want to take what was NSP and make that part of our Indo-Pacific framework or strategy, I don’t know what sort of pushback you might hear from ASEAN. But that’s certainly a development to follow.

Miyeon, I know that you had also thought about Southeast Asia as well too on especially the role of perhaps private companies also. Where do you see South Korea heading in terms of engagement with Southeast Asia?

MS. OH: Yes. So as we already have seen from the Joint Statement, both U.S. and ROK and the leaders have basically affirmed the commitment to the ASEAN centrality and seen the level of commitment. So, and even under NSP, there were ongoing existing mechanisms such as senior economic dialog and ROK/U.S. energy security dialogue and commercial dialogue, etcetera. So we just have to take that into account that even under the new name, I mean as we show new name and, I mean it’s now almost impossible to create all the new efforts and mechanisms.

So I think there will be continuous efforts. And I just wanted to quickly mention, so President Yoon, when he was a candidate, he wrote an article at Foreign Affairs magazine, and he mentioned like South Korea’s global positioning. And I think the environment that we’re living right now, it’s not easy to really pertain on such ambiguity because just, you know, withdrawal from Afghanistan, I mean U.S. forces, and also Russia’s
Ukraine invasion.

So it will be as easy as it used to be to just keep the strategic balance between United States and China, although we’re not still, we don’t have enough clarity in terms of South Korea’s China policy, per se, I think.

But just going back to Southeast Asia, I also, Scott mentioned about the digital and other ABCD. I just wanted to add briefly about energy security. And the reason I say so, and also quickly following up your comment. Since not just United States but all the major economies. They have limited resources, so rather than just putting the resources to even spread, I think it might be also strategic and wise to probably focus on a couple of countries that are strategically more important, such as Vietnam and the Philippines and Indonesia. And by expanding using the current U.S./ROK/Japan trilateral framework I think in terms of energy security. And we know that Asia EDGE, it’s one of U.S. effort in the region, Asia Enhancing Development and Growth for Energy, Asia EDGE. And so basically using these existing mechanisms I think the two countries, U.S./ROK, they can leverageimmerging opportunities.

For instance and which is in line with climate change as well. Climate change mitigation, just building a lot of LNG power plant, Vietnam, and also renewable energy in parts of Indonesia, that can really amplify national joint efforts and demonstrate the added value of the U.S./ROK cooperation in other countries in the region.

And I think successful launch of this kind of joint pilot product will enable two countries to replicate that practice in other areas and countries.

And I like to mention the expending early-stage U.S.-ROK cooperation (inaudible) in Vietnam as such so seen between coal, gas, and energy capital Vietnam and also their basic launching of signature renewable energy project in Indonesia, like I mentioned briefly.

And also, I’d like to, in addition to the ongoing U.S.-ROK-Japan trilateral framework I also like to mention the importance of public/private partnership, which I think really important. And not just enhance the bilateral energy cooperation in the region but that
the mechanism could include government and private sector some sort of steering committee, but involvement in LNG and other energy related sector which could empower the private sector to coordinate and work with the local government and GOs which has been one of the harder for Korean and other U.S. companies to be better settled.

MR. YEO: All right, ma’am, well you’ve already brought us into my next topic, and that’s with energy. And, you know, as we see oil/gas prices going up, as we see the conflict in Ukraine, you know, a lot of people are thinking about energy security, energy supply. And we know that South Korea, of course, is also vulnerable to, you know, shortages of energy. And they’re also thinking about climate change and reducing carbon emissions. And that brings us to nuclear energy in addition to other forms of clean energy.

And maybe I can direct this at Troy to take a first stab at it. But we know that President Yoon’s link, the restarting and building of nuclear power plants as a climate change issue and a means of reducing carbon emissions.

Do you see South Korea becoming a stronger advocate for climate change? I know there was some questions and concerns that when you have a conservative government in power that they may be less in tune with climate change. But we know that this is important, and Ambassador Lee said in the first panel, you know, that climate change was going to be important.

But where do you see Korea in this space. So if you could comment either about nuclear energy or about climate change more generally, I’d welcome your thoughts there.

MR. STANGARONE: Yeah. I’m cautiously optimistic. During the campaign and even shortly after there were some signals that the business community was hoping that the Yoon Administration would actually reduce South Korea’s nationally declared contribution to reduce emissions. And the Yoon Administration reaffirmed that in the Joint Statement with the United States, and we reaffirmed our commitments there.

Now obviously those could slip in time, we’ve seen this happen in a lot of cases. And I would point out that, you know, the Yoon Administration faces a real challenge
in cutting South Korea’s own emissions. If we look at the preliminary data, emissions rose in 2021 in South Korea. So the Yoon Administration, to meet their 2030 targets, now has a more difficult task to meet because we have rising emissions again.

Their contribution is 40 percent reduction from 2018’s levels, so it was going to be challenging for South Korea to begin with. But that being said, we have a commitment from the Administration. President Yoon is backing the hydrogen commitments that were put in place by the party in the top 10 of the world’s green economies. And at the same time MIT ranks Korea as actually the most innovative country in terms of green technology. So I think that there is potential here. It’s something that we’ll need to see how the Yoon Administration moves forward.

But one of the other bilateral goals is to take and try to really work on a green transition within Southeast Asia. And so I think if we can take some of the technology that South Korea is working to develop, we’re going to have to probably find other partners, you know. When I look at things like hydrogen, I see a need actually to probably knit together South Korea’s technology, Japan’s working on this as well, so Japanese technology. Then clean, green hydrogen in Australia, and actually most likely Chile so to really have more of a Pacific Rim type of focus. But to bring that together and to try and move forward with that.

And I mean this is going to be important. You’ve highlighted the challenges that we see from the war in Ukraine, so climate change is obviously a reason to take and move forward with renewables. At the end of the day South Korea is a country that is dependent on imports for essentially all its energy, be it, you know, fuel for its nuclear power plants, be it fuel for vehicles that run on petroleum and other things. And so the more South Korea can do to take and move towards green tech that allows it to take and produce at least some of that energy at home domestically, will enhance its own economy security. And I think that’s going to be a key thing.

And so I think the scenario we create can play an important role. I understand the reasons for skepticism given Korea’s past, but there is potential there for
actual real progress going forward.

MR. YEO: I’m glad you brought up hydrogen as another form of renewable energy which may be more politically viable, especially if you want to expand that within the region rather than nuclear energy.

We know that Japan, for instance, is still quite reluctant or cautious about restarting any power plants. So that might be a no-go, but --

MR. STANGARONE: I think, you know, nuclear has to be part of this. We’re not going to achieve our climate change goals without nuclear. But at the end of the day we need to be looking at all of our options and then which ones develop best may be the ones we focus on.

And also, I just keep in mind, you know, we’ve talked about small modular reactors but, you know, reactors generally take, you know, there’s plan to be built in like three to four years but they end up often taking 10 years to build. So these are things that are going to be long-term projects.

And even when we look at the issue of nuclear, one of the things that South Korea’s involved in with other countries is the ITAR Project, where actually fusion rather than fission. And some companies now are actually starting to show promising prospects in this area too. So, you know, Korea isn’t necessarily the forefront of this but if we can try and pool our resources in this part of the nuclear sphere as well, I think, you know, I think that’s going to be important for the future.

MR. YEO: Okay. Scott or Miyeon, did you want to add anything to this conversation?

MR. SNYDER: I’d like to say something on nuclear because it was, I think, significantly underscored in the Joint Statements to a degree that I was not necessarily expecting.

And the reason why this is important is because I think that for the first time as South Korea has looked at the civilian nuclear energy exporter, we see the U.S. and South Korean goals more aligned than ever before, especially as we discussed in the earlier
panel in the context of the broader global market. And actually transmission of the global security and safety imperatives as we think about that market.

And so, you know, specifically I’m very interested in the context of the Russian invasion of Ukraine and European energy dependency on Russia as a source and what is going to happen in the nuclear sphere, especially as related to Eastern Europe.

And I think that bears watching even more so because Russia is the foremost provider of nuclear power plants globally. And their ability to carry forward some of those projects is also likely to take a hit. Troy is absolutely right; this is long term. And it should not necessarily be the central focus, but I think that it is notable that we’ve never seen a greater alignment between the U.S. and South Korean governments on this issue than we see at this time.

And maybe U.S. and Japan as well as we think about financing.

MR. YEO: Yeah, I noticed that as well about the Joint Statement, the discussion on nuclear there and that actually may be an opportunity for U.S. and South Korea to pursue, especially if we recognize the South Korea’s vulnerability to energy, energy shortages.

Miyeon, did you have anything or --

MS. OH: It’s really, really briefly so I’d like to echo what Scott said on SMR, Small Modular Reactors. I wasn’t really expecting to say specific, just commenting on the Joint Statement. And it’s going to be very controversial because it’s a big shift in terms of South Korea main policy on nuclear and the issue in terms of national assembly that June Park mentioned of how we’re going to tackle this issue. It’s not going to be an easy road.

But I just wanted to mention quickly that right after the U.S./ROK summit, like Korean tech companies, they also released their plan and strategy how they’re going to tackle the inflation, boost South Korean economy, and really listing the future industries. So I think on this FMR I think it could be very aligned with the direction that South Korean economy has to move forward.

MR. YEO: Great. You know we’ve been talking a lot about what role or
what responsibility South Korea will take on within the region, but we’re referring to the
government, the South Korean State. But we also have to recognize that the private sector
also has to be on board as well too.

You know the topics that we’ve addressed so far are, you know, green
growth, renewable energy, development finance, supply chains. And these are all areas
that, you know, private companies are following and, you know, have to be on top of.

So I wanted to ask, you know, how or to what extent will South Korean
private companies become more engaged in conversations about geo-economics, especially
when it comes to things like coordinating supply chains, setting standards, or thinking about,
you know, investing in regions like Southeast Asia. And, you know, I think I’ve raised this
question before, an event that you hosted me on Atlantic Council. And maybe direct it to
Troy about being able to coordinate between I guess national interests and corporate
interests, because they don’t always align. And so these are some issues that have to be
sorted out within South Korea’s own domestic policy.

So if you could say, if each of you could say something about the role that
the private sector will play in advancing South Korea’s regional role.

MS. OH: Me first?

MR. YEO: Sure, go ahead.

MS. OH: So one of the chairmen, the CEO of the Korean Company and
one of the (inaudible), he made a really impressive comment recently. He said that
nowadays Washington, D.C. is even more important that Seoul for him to make any
business ventures. I think that really resonated and really the importance of geopolitics and
how to keep balance between the national security concerns and geopolitics and economic
competitiveness.

I think, again, we’re living in a very different environment and really dealing
with different calculus, I think. But it is really important for both the United States and South
Korea to more engage with the private sector and industry expert. And the reason I say this,
this all we hear a lot of effort led by the government but the role of government, and it is true
that the role of government is very important, people talk to both during supply chain resiliency that we just talked so much. But it is not easy for them to make really dramatic impact on the complex environment global supply chain that exists today.

So I say this, like I mentioned, and this is also part of our report and when we host event, I say this a lot, that really suggesting to establishing the working groups that are really sector specific.

And by doing so I think it could be really structure mechanism that can help facilitate coordination, not just between the governments, but then really between the government, the public sector, and private sector.

And, yeah, so I just wanted to say that establishing the working group. And just before turning to other quickly also to say I think one of the comments from President Yoon during the press conference right after the joint summit and which I think is related to one of our policy recommendations from our semi-conductor supply chain report that is coming up soon.

So I just wanted to say that it is important that United States ensure the principle of non-discrimination when they are providing incentive. And it will ensure that United States will remain a competitive investment destination for award of those events and innovative technologies. And in addition to bring in most of their technologies and also send jobs to the United States. This non-discriminatory approach will also reinforce the Biden Administration’s priority of rebooting relations with the allies and partners and then they will also benefit from the same arrangement by doing so.

So, yeah, I just wanted to just provide one perspective thinking from the private sector viewpoint.

MR. YEO: Okay. Yes. So it seems like it’s not just what South Korea can do, but what may whet the appetite of private companies also, what the U.S. can do issues like non-discrimination.

Troy.

MR. STANGARONE: Yeah. I think this is going to be a challenge because
corporate interest, as you mentioned, and national interest do not always align. Sometimes they will and that’s good, but not always.

And so when we think of things like an early warning system for supply chains, you know, some of the data we go into that in theory would be political risk information. It would be, you know, U.S. or South Korean diplomats talking with their colleagues in other countries and realizing that things politically are getting more dicey in one country than another and so maybe something cut off there. So some of this will come from the government side.

But then the question is, how much of that information are the United States and other governments going to be willing to share with companies? On the flip side, some of this information will come from the supply chain networks. Suppliers who realize that there are shortages of things that they didn’t realize there would be shortages of for some reason and not filtering in. And the companies that know these shortages then actually have a comparative advantage against their competitors because they know to take and try and stock up on those things because there’s now this problem within the supply chain system.

So you have this tension between how much is each side going to be willing to share and how much can be achieved within that. So I think, you know, that’s one thing we need to work through. And that doesn’t mean that we don’t try because I think we do need to try and find ways to do this better. But I think those are the tensions that built into the system.

MR. YEO: Exactly. I mean I just want to interject that, you know, at the end of the day private companies, their bottom lines still matter, profits still matter. And if you have a comparative or competitive advantage over another company, then, yes, you’re going to try to exploit that. But then at the same time you know that if you’re talking about regional cooperation in the long run, that you do need to coordinate to some extent. An excellent point there.

MR. STANGARONE: The one thing I’ll add on this is that, you know, when we think about supply chain resiliency and cooperation, you know, some of this obviously we
want to take and either move production to a place that we consider more politically secure or safer. Part of that you can do through incentives of financing, you know, tax incentives and other things to try to incentivize companies to move if they don’t see because, you know, maybe certain things are cheaper to produce in one country than they are in the country you would like them to go to. And so you’re going to have to financial incentivize things. So there’s going to be this government role there.

But it’s going to also be important looking forward because, you know, to go back to climate change but this even I think fits on Tarun’s comment about semi-conductor growth in the future. You know, we don’t have the capacity to do what we want to achieve going forward. If our goal is to take and by 2030 significantly, you know, and I think if I remember correctly IAA said like half of the vehicles sold in the world need to be electric vehicles. There’s not enough lithium mining, let alone refining, in the world to do that right now. So we’re going to have to invest in new production, new refining, and basically enhance the supply chains.

And until we do that, we also have to realize that most of these minerals that go into either semi-conductors or electric vehicles, other things, are mined by Chinese companies and are refined by Chinese companies, and China dominates this market.

So, you know, at the same time we also have to balance our relationship with China because we can’t deteriorate that relationship so much to where perhaps China starts restricting the access to things we need.

So it’s going to be a balance that’s going to have conflicts both on the political level, the geopolitical level, and the corporate level that we’re going to have to work through.

MR. YEO: All right. Thanks, Troy. I’m mindful that, you know, we might have a room full of questions. There’s some questions from our virtual audience. But, Scott, I did want to ask, either on this point, but I did want to shift gears and talk a little bit about Korea globally, not just regionally.

And I wanted to ask you this because I know you’ve written a book about
South Korean foreign policy and have looked at how that foreign policy has evolved over different administrations.

And, you know, the questions that probably many of us have been receiving after Yoon’s inauguration was how President Yoon’s foreign policy is going to differ from that of President Moon. And I think that’s been, a lot of people have already talked about that, but I wanted to ask you how this administration’s foreign policy is going to differ from that of maybe his predecessors. And I think specifically the Lee Myung-bak government because it was Lee Myung-bak who talked about global Korea and we’re again seeing the Yoon government turning to a more global, you know, he wants to have a more globally engaged South Korea.

Now it’s fittingly, you know, many of his staff or the people on his foreign policy team are from the Lee Myung-bak Administration. But what’s going to be different this time? Do you see any differences from, you know, what this administration, what the Yoon Administration will try to do and what division of the Lee Myung-bak government was when they talked about global Korea?

MR. SNYDER: Well, Andrew, you’ve already partially answered your own question. And that’s fine. I mean we’re just really at a more evolved state in terms of South Korea’s overall clout and what that might mean in terms of the implications of a U.S./Korea relationship.

But I want to go back to another piece of what we were just talking about before. You know, Miyeon and Troy are actually my go-to experts on economic security. But the other, the political dimension of what is happening on supply chain resiliency is very interesting, I think important to watch because it represents a potentially new tool for South Korean foreign policy that did not exist 10 years ago.

And that is for the first time there are individuals in the Korean private sector who have direct access to the U.S. President in a way that did not happen before. Some participating in supply chain resiliency discussions. Biden being hosted by Seok-Youl Yoon and meeting privately with Chung Eui-Sun as related to inward South Korean investment to
the United States.

And there’s another dimension to that that caught my ear that was very important. Biden flagging to one of those CEOs the importance of labor and environment as they think about their investments, you know, inward investments to the United States. And almost a kind of appeal to don’t be opposed to unionization despite the tendency of South Korean investments to be directed toward right to work states.

And so this is a new dimension I think of our broader interaction that is important as part of the influence game that I think we’ll want to watch in the U.S./South Korea relationship.

MR. YEO: All right. Terrific. And thanks for connecting the previous question about private actors with how the Yoon government’s foreign policy may shift. Certainly there does seem to be a greater role for private companies to weigh in on that conversation.

So I know that there is, I do have a couple questions from our virtual audience that were sent in advance. But before I turn to those, I’d like to open the floor to our audience in person. So we’ll start with Sarah and June. Now again I’ll take two at a time. And if you can just identify yourself and your affiliation before speaking.

So one of the things about live events we have difficulties that -- okay. We’re good now.

MS. KIM: Hi, I’m Sarah Kim, I’m a Ph.D. student at the University and my question relates more to the discussions you had on Southeast Asia. And I know Mr. Snyder mentioned the ABC strategy that was included in Yoon’s pledges. But I think it wasn’t as publicized as much, and partially it was intentional because we’re now talking about its incorporation into the Indo-Pacific framework as Professor Yeo also mentioned.

And there are concerns, but I feel like the one upside of this could be, you know, the stepping up of security cooperation among the U.S./ASEAN partners as well as at the U.S. in areas such as maritime security. Especially since the original NSP, people criticized that it wasn’t as emphasizing the peace pillars.
So I was wondering if you had any thoughts on how South Korea could take more part within the regional security apparatus with regards to this. So that’s my question.

MR. YEO: Okay. So there’s a question about South Korea’s role on more of the security side when it comes to Southeast Asia. And June.

MS. PARK: June Park, Political Economist, Princeton University. I have a question about the Small Modular Reactors that we discussed during this panel. My own research query going back to the UAE days when, you know, Bak, and then later subsequent Jae-in, and now.

In sum there are three questions that I’d like to ask. Number one, is there any appetite to void the 123 Agreement for Saudi Arabia, because KAERI, the Korea Atomic Research Institute has been doing these sort of like going back into Saudi Arabia and Seoul, they’ve been having negotiations for several years on this. I mean studies, but not negotiations.

So in order for gaining that market in the Gulf it seems like that’s the main take. The Trump Administration didn’t allow it but is there any appetite for that. But given the UAE experience I don’t think that’s possible because they adhere to the 123 Agreement as the gold standard.

Number two, with regard to, you know, South Korea’s domestic apparatus, you know, what happened during the Lee and Moon administrations in terms of that sale of APR 1400s to the UAE, it would open a whole can of worms just in terms of doing prosecutorial investigations and whatnot. What is the take on, you know, making this actually happen? Because it seems like Saudi Arabia would be the best bet.

And third, what about the reliance on China and Russia in terms of sourcing South Korea’s nuclear power generation. Because it seems like uranium, a lot of it comes from China and Russia. Thanks.

MR. YEO: Okay. I’m not sure if that’s cheating to have three questions but because they all relate to the nuclear question, I think that’s fair enough.

So everyone can respond to either of those questions, either on the nuclear
front or about security in Southeast Asia.

Scott, maybe you can take the Southeast Asia one since I know you’ve been thinking about that.

MR. SNYDER: I’ll make an observation. I think that it’s to be determined. And I think that the issues are related to how South Korea positions its cooperation initiatives overall in Southeast Asia, whether it really wants to align with the alliance and do a lot through that bilateral framework. And whether or not Southeast Asia wants it that way.

You know, the really interesting question I think on this issue is how does Southeast Asia actually perceive South Korea? I don’t think that Southeast Asia necessarily perceives South Korea as one of the great powers to be balanced. Instead I think they see South Korea as a partner that can help leverage balance among the great powers.

And so that makes the alliance framing of what South Korea does in Southeast Asia complex. The Moon Administration was sensitive about it because of concerns about China’s response. And it’ll be interesting to see how the Yoon Administration processes that.

MR. YEO: All right. Troy.

MR. STANGARONE: I’ll try to partially answer your nuclear questions. I’m not sure on the Saudi Arabia question, on the 123 Agreement.

I think in terms of sourcing though for South Korea’s own domestic nuclear power plants, you know, there’s two issues here. One is which, you know, Russia may become problematic but at the moment there’s no reason why China shouldn’t be able to remain a partner. And we should point out that South Korea, somewhat to my surprise, I actually thought this would happen at the summit with Biden, that there would be some type of, you know, energy announcement to wean South Korea off Russian energy.

But I think, you know, the other thing is, you know, South Korea probably will need to start looking for alternative sources, maybe Australia or somewhere else. And I think that’s probably where it will head. But China, my guess would be if there’s an issue with Russia, would be a bridge country.
MR. YEO: All right. So we can talk more about the nuclear piece maybe after the panel. But I did want to get to these questions that were sent in virtually.

So the first one is, is actually from maybe someone you know, Troy, Sarah Marshall at the Korea Economic Institute, a Research Intern there. And she asks, and I think this is a great question because it really highlights how security and economics are really intertwined. But she’s asking will the ability to share innovative green technologies be hindered by security concerns?

Well now I’m wondering, Troy, if maybe you planted that question. But it’s a fantastic question because, you know, we’re talking about cooperation, Korea being a regional leader but then if, you know, once again, if you have this technology, should it be shared, will private companies be willing to share that, will governments, you know, kind of tell companies to be sharing that sort of technology.

So do you want to take that question? I don’t know if Miyeon if maybe you have a response at all about innovative green technologies but being hindered by security concerns.

MS. OH: So I think I can probably provide for more broader, you know, contents rather than just specifically talking about the green technology, so overall advanced and emerging technologies.

I think this is what I mentioned in one of my interviews. So with engaging with private sector and executive, I actually, I had a very interesting comment that when the U.S. government, the Congress, had request for information to semiconductor companies and the private company, not necessarily Korean, also other countries and semiconductor companies, they said that what if they have similar request from China and then how they should be dealing with those kinds of requests in terms of information.

And the reason why I think this is in line with what I just mentioned at the beginning in terms of setting up the techno democracy very informal framework in terms of multilateral cooperation. So I think, number one, I think maybe people in private sector folks are assuming that not just one time, there will be continuous RFI from the U.S. government.
and if there is more clarity it'll be good to what extent they should be or they would willing or they would be able to share any information, that kind of thing.

So just again, existing a lot of existing or new efforts, there should be more platform for the stakeholders to discuss this kind of set of issues rather than just the media. That would be my point.

MR. YEO: Okay. Right. Troy, do you have a quick response?

MR. STANGARONE: Just briefly. So as to her question, as I mentioned, we didn't talk about this in advance. To me it's sort of should we allow the export of those technologies to, you know, countries who maybe have security concerns.

I think in the area of green technology that's probably not going to be an issue. One, you know, we share common goals with China on climate change. Now there are going to be maybe economic reasons to not want to sort of share certain technologies in the sense that we're competing with China to develop and commercialize these technologies. And so there may be concerns on that level. But to channel one more key individual, our former president, Donald Manzullo who one of his concerns always when he was in Congress was that when we place restrictions on the export of our technology, we often ending up losing ground in those industries. And so I think you have to balance sort of that economic competitiveness with other goals as well.

MR. YEO: All right. Thanks. And let me just ask this one final question. So this from Ala Masheena (phonetic), a student at People's Friendship University of Russia. And I'll somewhat modify this question for the purpose of the panel.

But in terms of relations with other countries, are there any countries that come to mind that will be prioritized for Korea's government under President Yoon Seok-Youl? And of course the United States and China are always given priorities. Are there any countries within the region that you think South Korea will be looking into more closely to work with?

MR. SNYDER: Well I think, you know, Miyeon mentioned earlier Vietnam. I think definitely Vietnam. I think Indonesia will be one as well. But I think, you know, those
are sort of traditional Southeast Asian partners for South Korea. So I’d actually sort of encourage the Yoon Administration to try and maybe broaden out, you know, maybe more focus on Malaysia or a couple other countries in the region as well so as to try to really sort of flush out their relations of the region.

MR. YEO: Interesting because those were the two countries that I was, well Vietnam, Malaysia and Indonesia were the three that were in my mind.

But, you know, we’re out of time here so I do want to thank each of our panelists for sharing their insights with us about the prospects of South Korea playing a more active and engaged role when it comes to the provision of regional public goods.

And, you know, with that I just want to close our conference here. This has been a very productive morning. The U.S. and its Asian partners, including South Korea, have their work I think cut out for them in the upcoming months as they negotiate different pillars of the Indo-Pacific economic framework, as they navigate the geo-economics of Asia.

But there are also several suggestions I think that were offered this morning for a path forward.

So let me just close by thanking a few important people who made this conference possible. Our Senior Research Assistants Laura McGee, who’s in the back, did the lion’s share of the work in handling the invites and logistics, I really want to thank her. Also I want to thank another Senior Research Assistant, Adrian Chorn, who’s probably somewhere out there getting things set up for his help. And of course Jennifer Mason, our Associate Director who makes the trains run at the Center for East Asia Policy Studies.

I do want to mention that the Brookings Center on East Asia Policy Studies is very grateful for the support that we receive from a range of individuals, foundations, and corporate supporters.

And this event was a capstone event to a year-long research project on South Korea and the new geo-economics, which has made possible in part through a generous support from the Korea Foundation. And I want to thank the Korea Foundation
people who are in this room today.

And I’d like to thank the Foundation for their support, but also reiterate a Brookings commitment to independence in all of our work. And I should underscore that the views expressed today are solely those of the individual speakers.

And finally I’d like to thank our audience. I’d like to thank you both in the virtual world and in person here at Brookings for spending your morning or your evening, if you’re in the virtual space, with us.

So with that have a good day or a good night. Thank you.

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I, Carleton J. Anderson, III do hereby certify that the forgoing electronic file when originally transmitted was reduced to text at my direction; that said transcript is a true record of the proceedings therein referenced; that I am neither counsel for, related to, nor employed by any of the parties to the action in which these proceedings were taken; and, furthermore, that I am neither a relative or employee of any attorney or counsel employed by the parties hereto, nor financially or otherwise interested in the outcome of this action.

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